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HONOR, REPUTATION, AND CONFLICT: 
GEORGE OF TREBIZOND AND 
HUMANIST ACTS OF SELF-PRESENTATION 
 
The present study investigates the verbal strategies of self-presentation that 
humanist scholars employed in contests of honor during the early fifteenth century. The 
focus of this study is George of Trebizond (1395-1472/3), a Cretan scholar who 
emigrated to Italy in 1416, taught in Venice, Vicenza, and elsewhere, served as an 
apostolic secretary in Rome, and composed the first major humanist treatise on rhetoric, 
his Rhetoricorum libri quinque, in 1433/34. Trebizond feuded with many prominent 
humanists during his career, including Guarino of Verona (1374-1460) and Poggio 
Bracciolini (1380-1459). His quarrels with both men illustrate how humanist conflicts 
were the sites upon which Quattrocento scholars won or lost honor via literary activities 
designed to appeal to a public audience of peers and patrons. Humanists wrote to 
denigrate publicly their competitors, casting them as ignorant and morally corrupt, and to 
praise themselves as eloquent and virtuous. Although Renaissance scholarship has long 
acknowledged the humanist pursuit of glory, the linguistic means by which humanists 
contested honor remains understudied. The present study contends that Quattrocento 
contests of honor were conducted using standard sets of oppositional categories, themes, 
and literary models. Additionally, I argue that an analysis of the linguistic strategies of 
self-presentation provides a more complex and complete picture of Quattrocento 
humanism and of individual humanists as historical figures.  
 
Following an introductory discussion of George of Trebizond and Quattrocento 
humanism in Chapter One, the next three chapters of this dissertation address individual 
themes evident in Trebizond’s correspondence. Chapter Two examines the anti-Greek 
language that dominated Trebizond’s dispute with Guarino in 1437. Chapter Three 
explores the language of restraint and rational self-control in Trebizond’s feud with 
Poggio between 1452 and 1453. Chapter Four evaluates humanist concepts of 
masculinity in Trebizond’s feuds with both men. Chapter Five steps back from a deep 
thematic reading of Trebizond’s correspondence to consider invective as a literary genre 
that was a preferred vehicle for humanist self-presentation. This final chapter studies two 
additional feuds, between Guarino and Niccolò Niccoli, and Poggio and Lorenzo Valla, 
to understand better Trebizond’s experiences as a reflection of the broader culture of 
which he was a part.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
HUMANISM IN THE EARLY QUATTROCENTO 
 
Introduction 
 
Renaissance humanists worried a great deal about their reputations. Scholars have 
long recognized humanists’ efforts to seek approbation from their peers and patrons, and 
recent scholarship has turned its attention to a discussion of humanist anxiety—the 
constant lamentations about the difficulties of being a professional scholar.1 The present 
study advances existing scholarship on humanist honor by examining conflicts between 
scholars—the sites where honor was contested—and the written correspondence –
personal letters and invective—that feuding scholars exchanged. This study proposes to 
move beyond the idea that humanists were concerned about honor to a consideration of 
how and why they fought with one another as they did. What were the strategies 
humanists employed to contest honor? As erudite, eloquent individuals, how did they 
mobilize language to meet the demands of scholarly life? What concepts, themes, or 
categories did they use to promote themselves and challenge the reputations of their 
opponents? How did they address the problem of audience, namely that one secured 
honor through one’s peers—some friendly, some not? What were the socio-economic 
consequences of humanist contests and how did they influence the language that scholars 
used? What meaning are we to take from the often aggressive and denigrating language 
humanists used?   
1 For the former, see Hanna H. Gray, “Renaissance Humanism: The Pursuit of Eloquence,” Journal of the 
History of Ideas 24, no.4 (Oct.-Dec. 1963): 494-514. For the latter, see especially the works of Christopher 
S. Celenza, including Renaissance Humanism and the Papal Curia: Lapo da Castiglionchio the Younger’s 
De curiae commodis (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999) and The Lost Italian Renaissance: 
Humanists, Historians, and Latin’s Legacy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004).  
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In response to these questions, the present study makes the following contentions. 
First, humanists employed identifiable strategies that involved standard sets of categories, 
themes, and literary models to contest honor. In essence there was a language of honor 
that humanists used, and that language is the focus of the present study. The language 
consisted of contrasts between, for example, prudence and imprudence, honesty and 
dishonesty, reason and emotion, as well as the contrast between manly behavior on the 
one hand and womanish, childish or beast-like behavior on the other. Second, humanists 
modeled their language on examples from the classical Latin tradition, including but not 
limited to those drawn from rhetorical treatises. Fifteenth-century scholars adapted these 
classical examples to the contemporary needs of their professional lives. Third, formal 
scholarly disputes consisted of competing acts of self-presentation generally composed in 
writing and circulated among an audience of an author’s peers. In these compositions, 
humanists defined themselves in ways that would establish or defend their reputation and 
defined their opponents in ways that would challenge their reputations. Humanists, then, 
viewed themselves as exercising influence over public perception and thus as agents in 
the construction of their own identities. Fourth, humanist self-presentation was a concrete 
response to the anxiety scholars experienced about the highly competitive nature of 
professional life in the early Quattrocento. To find meaning in humanist invective and to 
make sense of the frequently insulting and aggressive language in these pieces, we ought 
to view humanist self-presentation as a function of the times. Humanists were erudite 
men with an eye towards their predecessors as well as men who prided themselves on 
their learning and eloquence. They were well aware of the challenges that faced them in 
building and maintaining a reputation as a professional scholar, and were more than 
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capable of drawing on a host of models and concepts to influence how others perceived 
them and their opponents.  
My analysis of humanist self-presentation and honor focuses on the career of 
George of Trebizond (1395-1472/3), a Cretan émigré to Italy who engaged in disputes 
with some of the most prominent humanists of the day. To inform my arguments and to 
establish a sense of time, place, and those involved in Trebizond’s disputes, I begin with 
a series of brief discussions about Trebizond, his adversaries, and the socio-economic and 
cultural circumstances of fifteenth-century humanism. 
George of Trebizond and Humanist Contests of Honor 
 
Trebizond—an accomplished scholar, respected educator, and a prolific translator 
of Greek texts—is a useful lens through which to view humanist experiences during the 
early Quattrocento. Trebizond arrived in Italy in 1416 at the behest of the Venetian 
patrician Francesco Barbaro, and learned Latin from and did translation work for one of 
the most renowned fifteenth-century humanist schoolmen, Vittorino da Feltre. He 
composed the first major Renaissance treatise on rhetoric—the Rhetoricorum libri 
quinque (hereafter RLV)—in 1433/34 and served in Rome as apostolic secretary to a 
number of popes.2 He worked in many key sites of patronage including Venice, Rome, 
and Naples, and alongside some of the most brilliant lights of the Quattrocento—Guarino 
of Verona, Poggio Bracciolini, Lorenzo Valla, Cardinal Bessarion, and Theodore Gaza 
among others. He was a respected educator. He enjoyed the patronage of rulers such as 
2 For Trebizond’s contributions, including the RLV, to Renaissance rhetoric see John Monfasani’s major 
biography George of Trebizond: A Biography and a Study of his Rhetoric and Logic (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 
1976), 318-327 and Peter Mack, A History of Renaissance Rhetoric, 1380-1620 (New York: Oxford 
University Press), 39-47. For the RLV in the early modern classroom see Paul Grendler, Schooling in 
Renaissance Italy: Literacy and Learning, 1300-1600 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 
208-209 and 212. 
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Alfonso of Aragon, King of Naples. He was friends with influential political figures 
including Barbaro and fellow scholars such as Francesco Filelfo. Others, including Flavio 
Biondo and Lorenzo Valla, with whom Trebizond engaged in public debates while in 
Rome, held him in esteem.3 Trebizond himself never attained the reputation of a 
Leonardo Bruni or even of some of the men with whom he feuded, including Guarino and 
Poggio. He was by most accounts, however, a success as he attained both patronage and 
financial prosperity.4 Like many of his contemporaries, he engaged in a number of 
literary duels. The present study analyzes two of Trebizond’s major quarrels: the first 
with Guarino of Verona (1374-1460) while Trebizond was in Venice in 1437, and the 
second with Poggio Bracciolini (1380-1459) in Rome and Naples between 1452 and 
1454.  
The Trebizond-Guarino dispute began when Andreas Agaso, who claimed to be a 
student of Guarino’s, took issue with passages in Trebizond’s RLV  that criticized 
Guarino’s rhetorical style. Agaso wrote about Trebizond to Paulus Regius, supposedly 
another of Guarino’s students. He took up the defense of his instructor and attacked 
Trebizond’s eloquence, knowledge of Latin, alleged abuse of Guarino, and the precepts 
3 On Trebizond’s friendship with Barbaro and Filelfo as well as Valla’s comments, see Monfasani, 3, 104, 
and 124-125. 
 
4 Trebizond’s position in the curia was particularly lucrative. Peter Partner writes that “the fees due to the 
secretaries were also substantial: the income enjoyed from his post by a secretary in the mid fifteenth 
century was in the region of 250-300 florins annually…and George of Trebizond, at the end of a twelve-
year tenure of the office, had over 4,000 florins placed in Roman banks, besides investments in real 
property.” The Pope’s Men: The Papal Civil Service in the Renaissance (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 
54. Monfasani also addresses Trebizond’s substantial assets. Monfasani, 114-115 and 141-145.  
Trebizond’s rivals were successful as well. Poggio Bracciolini, like Trebizond, turned his curial 
post into financial success. Stephen Greenblatt writes “By the 1450s, along with a family palazzo and a 
country estate, he had managed to acquire several farms, nineteen separate pieces of land, and two houses 
in Florence, and he had made very large deposits in banking and business houses.” Greenblatt, The Swerve: 
How the World Became Modern (New York: W.W. Norton, 2011), 22. For additional details about 
Poggio’s holdings see Lauro Martines, The Social World of Florentine Humanists, 1390-1460 (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963), 123-127. Guarino of Verona earned a salary of 300 ducats when he 
became a public lecturer in Ferrara in 1435 under the patronage of the Este family. Grendler, 126-128. 
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of the RLV. Trebizond believed Guarino had written the Agaso letter and penned a 
response three days later to Guarino himself.5 He attacked Guarino for hiding behind the 
Agaso pseudonym, reiterated his criticisms of Guarino’s style, and claimed to be the 
superior orator and instructor. His response included a cover letter to the Ferraran prince 
Leonello d’Este, Guarino’s student and patron. Trebizond urged Leonello to arrange a 
public debate between Trebizond and Guarino to prove once and for all who the greater 
scholar was.6 
The Trebizond-Poggio dispute, by contrast, was the result of a public, physical 
altercation between the two in the papal chancery in May 1452. Both men were apostolic 
secretaries at the time. Their altercation began as a fist fight but eventually Trebizond 
drew a sword against Poggio, causing his opponent to flee. Afterwards, the cardinal in 
charge of the chancery and then Nicholas V himself judged Trebizond to have acted 
imprudently and without restraint. Trebizond was imprisoned for his actions and upon his 
release not welcomed back to the chancery. He left Rome soon thereafter for the 
patronage of Alfonso of Aragon in Naples. Over the next two years, Trebizond continued 
to write about the chancery fight and Poggio. In January 1453, he presented his account 
of the chancery fight—a story of self-defense—to Poggio. That same month, he wrote to 
Nicholas V that Poggio had sent assassins to Naples to kill him. Responding in February 
5 The authorship of the Agaso letter is not clear. Monfasani questions whether Agaso and Regius actually 
existed. See Monfasani, 29-30. 
 
6 For Leonello, the court of Ferrara, and Guarino’s role there, see Werner L. Gundersheimer, Ferrara: The 
Style of a Renaissance Despotism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973); Marianne Pade, 
“Guarino and Caesar at the Court of the Este,” in The Court of Ferrara and its Patronage, ed. Marianne 
Pade (Modena: Edizioni Panini, 2001), 71-92 and The Reception of Plutarch’s Lives in Fifteenth-Century 
Italy, vol. 1 (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2007), 231-239; Michael Baxandall, “A Dialogue 
on Art from the Court of Leonello d’Este: Angelo Decembrio’s De Politia Litteraria Pars LXVIII,” Journal 
of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 26, no.3/4 (1963): 183-204 and “Guarino, Pisanello and Manuel 
Chrysoloras,” Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 28 (1965): 304-326. 
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1453, Poggio rejected Trebizond’s account of the chancery fight and the assassination 
plot accusation. In June 1454, Trebizond added another charge, that Poggio and Giovanni 
Aurispa had circulated forged letters to frame him for writing insultingly about the pope.  
Each of Trebizond’s rivals was a well-known and widely respected fifteenth-
century humanist.7 Guarino was one of the most significant humanist educators of the 
century. His school in Ferrara under the patronage of the Este family was, alongside 
Vittorino da Feltre’s school in Mantua, one of the best of its kind.8 Guarino was also a 
leading grammarian. His Regulae grammaticales, written while he was in Venice around 
1418, remained in use until the seventeenth century and survives in almost forty 
manuscripts.9 His contributions to the revival of Greek studies in Italy were equally 
important. Guarino was one of the eager Italian students—alongside Bruni, Ambrogio 
Traversari, and others—of the Greek instructor Manuel Chrysoloras who reintroduced 
Greek studies to Italy at the end of the fourteenth century. Guarino was in his early 
twenties when Chrysoloras arrived in Italy in 1397, and he followed him back to 
Constantinople in 1403. During his studies there, he translated Lucian’s Slander and The 
Fly. After returning to Italy in 1417, he published an abridged version of Chrysoloras’s 
manual on Greek inflections, the Erotemata, which became one of the standard Greek 
7 I reserve more detailed discussions of pertinent biographical information of Guarino and Poggio for the 
following chapters.   
 
8 For Guarino, see first the works of Remigio Sabbadini including Vita di Guarino Veronese (Genoa: 
Instituto Sordo-Mutti, 1891); Epistolario di Guarino Veronese, 3 vols. (Venice: A spese della Società, 
1915-1919); La Scuola e gli studi di Guarino Guarini Veronese (Catania: F. Galati, 1896). Guarino’s 
reputation as an educator is well documented. Grendler, 126-129; John Ward, “The Lectures of Guarino da 
Verona on the Rhetorica ad Herennium: A Preliminary Discussion,” in Rhetoric and Pedagogy: Its 
History, Philosophy, and Practice, ed. Winifred Brian Homer and Michael Leff, 97-127 (Mahwah, NJ: 
Erlbaum, 1995); Anthony Grafton and Lisa Jardine, “Humanism and the School of Guarino: A Problem of 
Evaluation,” Past & Present 96 (Aug. 1982): 51-80 and From Humanism to the Humanities (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986).  
 
9 Grendler, 166-169, 191 and 194.   
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grammars of the fifteenth century, and translated Lucian’s The Parasite.10 Guarino 
settled in Ferrara in 1429 and taught there until his death in 1460.  
Poggio rose from relatively obscure origins to the heights of humanist success by 
his death in 1459.11 Under the guidance of then-chancellor Coluccio Salutati, Poggio 
worked alongside the likes of Leonardo Bruni and Niccolò Niccoli in Florence. In 1403, 
at the age of twenty-three and with Salutati’s recommendation, Poggio entered the 
service of Pope Boniface IX as a scribe. Poggio was perhaps best known for his 
reputation as a book-hunter. In the summer of 1415, he discovered a codex in Cluny 
containing seven Ciceronian orations, two of them hitherto unknown—the Pro Roscio 
Amerino and Pro Murena. In the summer of 1416, he found in St. Gall Asconius’s 
Commentary on five Ciceronian speeches, and, perhaps his best known discovery, the 
complete text of Quintilian’s Institutio oratoria.12 In the 1430s, Poggio attained the 
highest position in the papal service, apostolic secretary, which he maintained for the 
next two decades under Eugenius IV and Nicholas V. Like his contemporaries, Poggio 
composed a number of treatises and dialogues: De avaritia (1429), De nobilitate (1440), 
De infelicitate principum (1440), De varietate fortunae (1448), and Contra hypocritas 
10 Grendler, 265; Paul Botley, Learning Greek in Western Europe, 1396-1529 (Philadelphia: American 
Philosophical Society, 2012), 2, 7-12; Federica Ciccolella, Donati Graeci: Learning Greek in the 
Renaissance (Leiden: Brill, 2008),101, 130-131; David Marsh, Lucian and the Latins: Humor and 
Humanism in the Early Renaissance (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press: 1998), xi. 
 
11 Poggio’s major biographers are William Shepherd, whose nineteenth-century work is still the most 
complete biography of Poggio in English, and Ernst Walser. William Shepherd, The Life of Poggio 
Bracciolini (London: Harris Brothers, 1837); Ernst Walser, Poggius Florentinus. Leben und Werke 
(Leipzig-Berlin, 1914). For Poggio’s correspondence and writings, there is Poggio Bracciolini, Opera 
Omnia, ed. T. Tonelli (Basel, 1538; rpt. Turin, 1964). For a recent account of Poggio’s life and career see 
Greenblatt, The Swerve. 
 
12 Grendler, 121-122. Poggio and Niccoli discussed the discoveries of these new texts excitedly in their 
letters to each other. Two Renaissance Book Hunters: The Letters of Poggius Bracciolini to Nicolaus de 
Niccolis, trans. Phyllis Walter Goodhart Gordan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974). In January 
1417, Poggio discovered Lucretius’s De rerum natura in another monastic library, perhaps in Fulda. That 
discovery is the focus of Greenblatt’s recent work. Greenblatt, 176-180. 
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(1447-8). Poggio’s Facetiae, a collection of jokes and anecdotes purportedly told by his 
fellow curial servants and compiled between the 1430s and 1450s, was immensely 
popular. Poggio was also an active polemicist. He engaged in a literary duel with 
Guarino, the so-called Scipio-Caesar controversy of 1435, and a protracted debate with 
Francesco Filelfo in the 1430s. His major feud, and the one that garnered the most 
attention in Rome and throughout Italy, was his extremely vitriolic dispute with Lorenzo 
Valla (1407-1457), another apostolic secretary, between 1452 and 1453.13 Poggio’s 
animosity towards Valla continued even after Poggio left Rome in 1453 to become 
chancellor of Florence, a position he retained until he retired in 1458. He passed away the 
following year. 
Scholarly life at the turn of the Quattrocento was extremely competitive and rife 
with conflicts among erudite men—including Trebizond, Guarino, and Poggio—seeking 
to build reputations and careers. Humanism was a movement still largely in its infancy. 
Job prospects were limited and students of the studia humanitatis in cities throughout 
Italy were dependent on patronage. Aspiring humanists taught the youths of wealthy, 
powerful patricians in cities like Vicenza or Venice.14 In Florence, figures including 
Niccolò Niccoli and Poggio built lucrative relationships with the ruling Medici family.15 
The Roman curia became a center for humanist activity in the middle of the Quattrocento 
13 Ennio Rao describes the Poggio-Valla feud as the high-water mark for humanist invective in 
Curmudgeons in High Dudgeon: 101 Years of Invectives (1352-1452) (Messina: EDAS, 2007), 96-97.  
 
14 For humanist patronage in Venice, see Margaret L. King, Venetian Humanism in an Age of Patrician 
Dominance (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986).  
 
15 For humanism in Florence see Martines, The Social World of Florentine Humanists; George Holmes, The 
Florentine Enlightenment, 1400-1450 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969); Ronald Witt, Hercules at the 
Crossroads: The Life, Works, and Thought of Coluccio Salutati (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
1983).    
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under the papal patronage of Eugenius IV and Nicholas V.16 Success as a humanist 
required appealing to these patrons, presenting oneself as a skilled intellectual, and 
distinguishing oneself from the competition. The relatively limited opportunities 
available to humanists meant that reputation was crucial to their prospects as 
professionals and to their financial stability. Bound by the demands of patronage, 
scholars exhibited no small amount of anxiety about how others perceived them. 
Humanists expressed their anxiety and carried out conflicts with one another 
through their personal letters and by composing invective. Letters and invective were 
each immensely popular during the fifteenth century and are of vital importance to 
understanding how humanists viewed and responded to their socio-economic realities. 
The Quattrocento saw a veritable boom in the composition of personal letters aided by 
the recovery of Cicero’s letters to Atticus and Quintus in 1345 and his Epistolae ad 
familiares in 1392.17 The composition and circulation of one’s letters quickly became the 
primary means by which humanists disseminated their ideas and cultivated reputation. 
Letter collections became the sign of serious scholarship.18 Furthermore, humanists 
16 For humanism and the curia see John W. O’Malley, Praise and Blame in Renaissance Rome: Rhetoric, 
Doctrine, and Reform in the Sacred Orators of the Papal Court, c. 1450-1521 (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 1979); John D’Amico, Renaissance Humanism in Papal Rome: Humanists and 
Churchmen on the Eve of the Reformation (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1983); Charles L. 
Stinger, The Renaissance in Rome (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985); Peter Partner, 
Renaissance Rome, 1500-1599 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976) and Partner, The Pope’s 
Men. Most of the existing literature examines the late fifteenth century. Elizabeth May McCahill’s recent 
study of the papal reigns of Martin V and Eugenius IV remedies this. McCahill, Reviving the Eternal City: 
Rome and the Papal Court, 1420-1447 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013). 
 
17 On the discovery of Cicero’s letters, their use as humanist models, and the role of letter-writing in the 
cultivation of humanist reputation see Cecil H. Clough, “The Cult of Antiquity: Letters and Letter 
Collections,” in Cultural Aspects of the Italian Renaissance (New York: A.F. Zambelli, 1976), 33-67; L.D. 
Reynolds and N.G. Wilson, Scribes and Scholars: A Guide to the Transmission of Greek and Latin 
Literature (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 128-136; John Najemy, Between Friends: Discourses of 
Power and Desire in the Machiavelli-Vettori Letters of 1513-1515, 25-33.  
 
18 Clough, 33-35. Humanists including Leonardo Bruni, Poggio Bracciolini, Francesco Filelfo, and others 
collected and edited their letters, arranging them into collections. For letter-writing as a sign of serious 
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frequently used their personal letters as a vehicle for invective attacking their 
competitors. In letter form, they addressed their invectives to a friend, patron, or 
adversary. Fundamental to the act of composing invective was the author’s understanding 
that his correspondence was anything but private. Ostensibly addressed to individuals, 
writer and recipient alike expected that once they left the author’s hands his letters would 
be read by a much wider audience. Letters were routinely collected, copied, and 
disseminated within and between cities. Friends alerted each other to the goings-on of 
notable scholars, advocated on behalf of each other, and criticized their own adversaries 
as well as the adversaries of their allies. Humanist quarrels were public contests waged 
before an audience of contemporaries to whom authors sometimes explicitly but always 
implicitly appealed.  
Historiography 
 
My study of humanist self-presentation during the feuds of George of Trebizond 
emerges from two specific historiographical conversations relative to the contextual 
information just discussed. The first involves the competitive nature of Quattrocento 
scholarly life, the anxiety this created among humanists, and the social practices they 
adopted in response to their anxiety. Humanist anxiety has been the focus of a series of 
recent works examining complaints or lamentations about the socio-economic situations 
in which scholars found themselves. A representative and valuable example of this trend 
is Christopher Celenza’s work on Lapo da Castiglionchio the Younger.19 In Renaissance 
Humanism and the Papal Curia (1999), Celenza examined the career of Lapo (1406-
scholarship, see Elizabeth May McCahill, “Finding a Job as a Humanist: The Epistolary Collection of Lapo 
da Castiglionchio the Younger,” Renaissance Quarterly 57, no.4 (Winter 2004): 1309-1310. 
 
19 See note 1. 
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1438), a Florentine scholar who was always on the verge of success. Lapo’s major work, 
On the Benefits of the Curia [De curiae commodis], includes a portrait of life in the papal 
court that reflects the difficulties of achieving and maintaining success as a scholar there. 
Others, including Elizabeth May McCahill and Stephen Greenblatt, have followed 
Celenza in identifying Lapo as a sort of cultural barometer for scholarly distress and 
frustration in cultivating reputation and gaining entry into patronage networks.20 Celenza 
returned to Lapo in The Lost Italian Renaissance (2004) where he situated the 
conversation about honor and reputation in an exploration of the intersection between the 
social and intellectual worlds of humanists. He suggests examining humanist social 
practices, specifically the composition and dissemination of their Latin writings, to 
understand how they conceptualized and measured the honor they sought. He also 
provides a model for doing so, noting how humanists used “gendered categories in an 
oppositional way, so that a thinker, in order to emphasize the right kind of behavior or 
action, will deploy the opposite in vilifying an opponent.” For Lapo, this meant charging 
some in the curia of effeminate behavior—either in accusations of luxury or sexual 
immorality—and employing a “feminizing antitype” that Celenza explains many 
fifteenth-century polemicists used.  
The present study uses Celenza’s discussion of oppositional categories as a 
starting point and advances the study of humanist anxiety and social practices by 
examining the verbal strategies evident during Trebizond’s feuds with Guarino and 
Poggio. The correspondence of these feuds reflects a shared set of standard categories 
20 McCahill, “Finding a Job,” 1308-1345; Greenblatt, 138-141. See also Lauro Martines, Strong Words: 
Writing and Social Strain in the Italian Renaissance (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001). 
Martines examines the use of language to negotiate patronage networks, including expressions of anxiety 
and distress, but does not address humanists. 
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used, as Celenza explains, in an oppositional manner to praise the author and vilify his 
opponent. I add to Celenza’s account of gendered language a consideration of additional 
categories, the examination of which can provide a richer sense of the social world of 
humanist scholars. In Trebizond’s feuds, the categories each author employed depended 
on the context of the particular dispute. Trebizond’s feud with Guarino was largely 
defined by the fact that Andreas Agaso used anti-Greek language to denigrate Trebizond 
as an ignorant, immoral Greek. Agaso attacked Trebizond’s learnedness by casting him 
as a loquacious Greekling rather than an eloquent Latin, and he accused Trebizond of 
immoral conduct by contrasting Roman gravitas with Greek levitas. The Trebizond-
Poggio feud was defined by the chancery fight and Trebizond’s imprisonment for 
drawing a sword against his opponent. The ensuing dispute was conducted through a 
language of restraint that contrasted prudence and imprudence, honesty and dishonesty, 
and reason and emotion. The figures in both feuds also employed gendered categories 
that included but were not limited to the feminizing antitype that Celenza has identified. 
They contrasted masculinity with femininity, childishness, and animal or beast-like 
behavior. These categories offer insight into what scholarly circles deemed appropriate 
behavior as well as what they considered effective and suited to winning and maintaining 
honor. My examination thus strives toward the richer, more detailed account of humanist 
social practices and verbal strategies called for and begun by Celenza.  
The present study is also situated in a second historiographical debate, a growing 
field of works investigating Renaissance invective. Despite its popularity in the fifteenth-
century as a vehicle for self-presentation, invective has not received a great deal of 
12 
 
attention by later scholars.21 Studies of Quattrocento invective lag far behind more 
extensive analyses of classical invective.22 Scholars have, however, begun to take notice 
of the historical value of Renaissance invective. There remain few analyses of humanist 
invective but the number of editions and translations of these texts has increased since the 
1970s. Important recent examples include David Rutherford’s edition and translation of 
Antonio da Rho’s invectives and David Marsh’s edition and translation of Petrarch’s 
invectives. Both authors include introductions containing brief assessments or overviews 
of Renaissance invective. Their works are undoubtedly valuable but still offer 
comparatively little in the way of analysis of the texts themselves. The most significant 
analytical work done on Renaissance invective is that of Ennio Rao. His Curmudgeons in 
High Dudgeon (2007) contains brief summations of notable humanist conflicts between 
1352 and 1453.23 Rao’s work, though, is limited as an analytical study. His survey offers 
breadth but does not analyze any one conflict in great detail.  
To the extent that existing studies have discussed or analyzed invective, they have 
tended to cast it in a negative light and condemn its authors for their aggressive, harsh 
21 Davies noted the relative lack of scholarship on Renaissance invective in his very important study of the 
invectives against Niccolò Niccoli. M.C. Davies, “An Emperor without Clothes? Niccolò Niccoli under 
Attack,” in Maistor: Classical, Byzantine, and Renaissance Studies for Robert Browning (Canberra: 
Australian Association for Byzantine Studies, 1984). Ennio Rao writes that “before the 1950’s the 
invectives [of humanists] were little known and rarely read, as with a few exceptions they were available 
only in manuscript form or in rare sixteenth-century editions.” Rao, 7-10. 
 
22 On classical invective, see especially the studies of C.P. Craig on the standard categories orators used to 
denigrate their opponents: “Audience Expectations, Invective, and Proof,” in Cicero the Advocate, ed. 
J.G.F. Powell and Jeremy Paterson (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 187-213 and Craig, “Self-
Restraint, Invective, and Credibility in Cicero’s ‘First Catilinarian Oration,’” The American Journal of 
Philology 128, no.3 (Autumn, 2007): 335-339. I offer additional examples in Chapter Five. 
 
23 For an overview of the field of invective studies, see Rao, 7-10. Rao is an important figure. His edition of 
Bartolomeo Facio’s invective against Lorenzo Valla was one of the early editions of humanist invectives. 
Bartolomeo Facio, Invective in Laurentium Vallam, ed. Ennio I. Rao (Naples: Società Editrice Napoletana, 
1978). David Rutherford, Early Renaissance Invective and The Controversies of Antonio da Rho (Tempe: 
Arizona Center for Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 2005) and Francesco Petrarca, Invectives, 
ed. and trans. David Marsh (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003).  
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language. This was true of nineteenth-century writers who found it difficult to reconcile 
the sometimes savage invectives of humanists with their stated goals, the high-minded 
pursuit of honor, wisdom, and eloquence, and so criticized polemicists. In his biography 
of Poggio, William Shepherd lamented that Poggio “unfortunately indulged, to the latest 
period of his life, that bitterness of resentment, and that intemperance of language” that 
characterized his professional feuds.24 Even recent studies tend to draw moralizing 
conclusions from invective, which they treat as a reflection of the author’s character. 
Ennio Rao described humanist purveyors of invective as “curmudgeons” in the title of his 
survey. In his assessment of the Poggio-Valla feud, one of the most explosive and public 
feuds of the fifteenth-century, he characterized Poggio as “impatient and quick to anger” 
and as someone who would “at the slightest provocation… unleash his attacks with 
unprecedented fury.”25  
The offensive tone of invective has thus left us with somewhat distorted portraits 
of individual figures. The tendency toward moralizing views of humanist polemics, then, 
is an analytical problem in Renaissance studies. Trebizond was engaged in a number of 
feuds during his career and so modern scholarship has cast him as bitter, morose, and 
angry. Harold S. Wilson describes him as having “suffered from some very human 
defects of character,” including being “moved by a vehement impatience for self-
advancement,” having a “high sense of his own merits and a somewhat vindictive 
24 Shepherd described the invectives between Poggio and Francesco Filelfo in the 1430s as “exhausting 
every topic of obloquy,” an “odious mass of…allegations,” “virulent and foul abuse,” and as acrimony that 
“defeated its own purpose.” Shepherd, 252. See also John Addington Symonds, Renaissance in Italy: The 
Revival of Learning (London: Smith, Elder, & Co, 1897), 175. Symonds described the Poggio-Valla 
conflict as a “disgraceful fray” and Poggio’s orations as “disgusting compositions,” adding that “there is no 
sort of vituperation which the antagonists do not vomit forth against each other, no obscenity and roguery 
of which they are not mutually accused.”  
 
25 Rao, Curmudgeons, 32, 54-55. 
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temper” and an “impatient turbulence [which] made him influential enemies.” C. Joachim 
Classen similarly characterizes Trebizond’s works, including the RLV, as suffering “from 
the author’s arrogance and aggressiveness” and “presumptuousness,” and accuses 
Trebizond of “hostility toward Italian teachers of rhetoric” and of a “polemical spirit” in 
his works. Elsewhere, Trebizond has been characterized as “choleric,” “volatile,” as well 
as arrogant, irritable, and paranoid. John Monfasani, Trebizond’s main biographer, 
tempers these characterizations somewhat by noting that Trebizond was only rarely the 
instigator in his conflicts.26 
By applying conclusions from recent investigations of humanist anxiety and 
social practices, such as Celenza’s, we can shift the focus of studies of invective from 
moralizing conclusions about humanist character to a greater consideration of humanist 
context. I contend that a more fruitful approach to reading invective is not to ask what it 
tells us about the conduct or character of the authors but to ask what it tells us about the 
experiences of the authors. I do not mean to argue that negative portrayals of Trebizond 
or of invectives such as those exchanged between Poggio-Valla are necessarily incorrect. 
To reduce our understanding of invective to a question of character assessments alone, 
though, unnecessarily narrows the value of invectives as historical evidence. Such a focus 
obscures the social realities that bound and compelled the composition of invective and 
leads to depictions of scholars as somehow naturally temperamental or irritable. It also 
obscures the fact that humanists were erudite men well-aware of classical models of 
invective and capable of applying those models to the needs of contemporary, 
26 Harold S. Wilson, “George of Trebizond and Early Humanist Rhetoric,” Studies in Philology 40, no.3 
(July 1934): 368; C. Joachim Classen, “The Rhetorical Works of George of Trebizond and Their Debt to 
Cicero,” Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 56 (1993): 80-81 and 84; Thomas M. Conley, 
Rhetoric in the European Tradition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 115; Grendler, 129; 
James Hankins, Plato in the Italian Renaissance (New York: E.J. Brill, 1990), 167; Monfasani, 104. 
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professional life. I turn back here to Celenza’s call to examine humanist social practices. 
As he writes, “we cannot properly understand these seemingly exaggerated, immensely 
vitriolic Renaissance polemics…unless we situate the debates…in the social, political 
context of the acquisition, protection, and maintenance of masculine honor.”27 The shift I 
describe not only allows us to explore additional levels of meaning in invective texts but 
also to reconsider how we view humanist authors, including Trebizond.    
George of Trebizond is a particularly interesting case study to use to bring 
together studies of anxiety and invective given his place in the existing scholarship. The 
main source for his career is still John Monfasani’s impressive biography, published in 
1976. Beyond this, scholars of Renaissance education and rhetoric have recognized the 
significance of his RLV.28 Although his major contributions have been acknowledged, 
nobody has thoroughly analyzed his correspondence since Monfasani’s biography. This 
is surprising considering that Trebizond spent most of his career in the orbit of significant 
figures and attained renown and financial success. It is also surprising given the amount 
of material Monfasani has made available regarding Trebizond’s career. Monfasani’s 
Collectanea Trapezuntiana not only identifies the extant manuscripts and printed editions 
of Trebizond’s letters and speeches but also provides edited texts for many of them.29 
Only a handful of works since Monfasani have studied Trebizond and most of them have 
been interested in his place in the history of rhetoric.30 The present study of Trebizond’s 
27 Celenza, Lost, 130. 
 
28 See note 2. 
 
29 Collectanea Trapezuntiana: Texts, Documents, and Bibliographies of George of Trebizond, ed. John 
Monfasani (Binghamton, NY: Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 1984). 
 
30 Luc Deitz’s recent biographical sketch of Trebizond relies on Monfasani. Luc Deitz, introduction to 
Rhetoricorum libri quinque, by George of Trebizond (New York: Georg Olms, 2006). See also Luca 
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career not only provides entry into a discussion of humanist honor and the verbal 
strategies of self-presentation but also takes up the investigation of a figure whom 
scholars—since Monfasani—have examined in a limited manner and whose character has 
been frequently derided. 
 Trebizond also offers the opportunity to expand the conversation about humanist 
anxiety, honor, and social practices in new ways and thus is a useful complement to 
existing studies of figures such as Lapo. Lapo, as Celenza and others have noted, is an 
interesting example of an individual perpetually on the outside of lucrative patronage 
networks looking in.31 Trebizond’s career can in some ways take us farther than Lapo’s. 
First, Trebizond’s feuds take us beyond the confines of the Roman curia of which Lapo 
struggled so mightily to become a part. The dispute with Poggio began in the curia of 
course, as both men were serving as apostolic secretaries, but continued despite 
Trebizond’s departure to Naples and Poggio’s return to Florence in the spring of 1453. 
Trebizond’s earlier feud with Guarino moreover occurred while Trebizond was in 
Venice. Second, Trebizond’s disputes allow us to explore social practices and verbal 
strategies at two distinctly different points in a humanist’s career and under very different 
circumstances. While Lapo failed to achieve success in the curia and ultimately died 
young, Trebizond both achieved financial success and renown and lived a much longer 
life. His experiences were more varied and thus so were his verbal strategies. The contest 
with Guarino in 1437 occurred relatively early in Trebizond’s career. To build a 
reputation for himself, Trebizond had in his RLV criticized respected rhetorical 
D’Ascia, “La Retorica di Giorgio da Trebisonda e L’umaneismo Ciceroniano,” Rinascimento 29 (1989): 
193-216; Classen, 75-84; Lucia Calboli Montefusco, “Ciceronian and Hermogenean Influences on George 
of Trebizond’s Rhetoricorum Libri V,” Rhetorica 26, no.2 (2008): 139-164. 
 
31 See pages 10-11.  
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authorities, Guarino included.32 The feud with Poggio was not about gaining honor but 
about mitigating damage done to his reputation. At that point, Trebizond was no longer 
an aspiring humanist but a successful one and his changing circumstances are certainly 
reflected in the correspondence of the dispute. With Trebizond, then, we can examine not 
just the strategies of an aspiring scholar but also of one who had won, lost, and was trying 
to regain honor.  
Sources  
 
The source material for the present investigation is, first of all, the correspondence 
and invectives written during the Trebizond-Guarino and Trebizond-Poggio feuds. The 
sources for Trebizond’s feud with Guarino consist of three main pieces composed in 
March 1437. These compositions include the letter from Andreas Agaso to Paulus 
Regius, Trebizond’s response to the Agaso letter addressed to Guarino, and the cover 
letter Trebizond attached to his response and addressed to Leonello d’Este.33 My analysis 
of the Trebizond-Guarino feud relies on critical editions of the letters of Agaso and 
Trebizond in Monfasani’s Collectanea Trapezuntiana. The Collectanea also includes a 
list and discussion of the extant manuscripts that provides a sense of how they were 
transmitted. Monfasani reports that Agaso’s letter appears alongside Trebizond’s 
response in all but two of the manuscripts. It is notable that the correspondence of the 
dispute was preserved together given the importance that Renaissance figures ascribed to 
32 The RLV was the culmination of Trebizond’s early works in Italy. In the early 1420s he composed for 
Vittorino da Feltre a synopsis of the ideas of Hermogenes of Tarsus, a Greek rhetorician of the second 
century. In 1426, he composed a second piece on Hermogenes titled De suavitate dicendi and dedicated to 
Girolamo Bragadin. Trebizond also delivered public speeches in 1421 in Vicenza and in the early 1430s in 
Venice to demonstrate his eloquence. Monfasani rightly views each of these early works as Trebizond’s 
attempts to elevate his status. He notes that Trebizond ended his speech in Venice by promising to teach 
rhetoric publicly on feast days. Monfasani, 17-21 and 26 
 
33 See the outlines of Trebizond’s feuds with Guarino and Poggio, pages 4-6.   
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collecting and circulating personal letters.34 Indeed, the Trebizond-Guarino affair was a 
public one. In the fall of 1437, approximately five months after Trebizond wrote his 
response to Guarino, Poggio Bracciolini wrote a letter to Christopher Cauchus thanking 
his friend for sending to him the Agaso letter and Trebizond’s response.35 Poggio’s letter 
attests to the public nature of the Trebizond-Guarino dispute, the manner in which the 
texts of the feud circulated—hand to hand from friend to friend—and the speed by which 
the texts were transmitted.        
The correspondence of the Trebizond-Poggio dispute consists of five main pieces 
written between 1453 and 1454. These include Trebizond’s letters to Poggio and 
Nicholas V in January 1453, Poggio’s response to Trebizond in February, Trebizond’s 
reply to Poggio in March, and a letter from Trebizond to his son Andreas in June 1454. 
Each of these pieces fundamentally dealt with the chancery fight of May 1452. Ernst 
Walser’s Poggius Florentinus contains Trebizond’s January letters to Poggio and to 
Nicholas as well as Trebizond’s March reply to Poggio, though the letters have not been 
edited. Poggio’s February response to Trebizond, also unedited, is in Thomas Tonelli’s 
collection of Poggio’s correspondence. Monfasani provides Trebizond’s 1454 letter to 
Andreas, based on the sole Renaissance copy, in his Collectanea.36 
34 Collectanea, 360-411. Monfasani lists eight manuscripts for the Agaso letter and five for Trebizond’s 
response, including the cover letter to Leonello. The Collectanea includes an edited version, based on the 
oldest dated manuscript, of Trebizond’s initial criticism of Guarino in the RLV.  
 
35 The unedited letter is in Poggii Epistolae, ed. T. Tonelli, 3 vols. (Florence, 1832-1861), 2:125-128. 
Tonelli’s edition is reprinted in Poggio, Opera Omnia, vol. 3, Epistolae (Turin: 1964). Poggio’s letter is 
dated September 1437.  
 
36 For Trebizond’s letters to Poggio and Nicholas V in January and March 1453, see Ernst Walser, Poggius 
Florentinus: Leben und Werke (Leipzig: Teubner, 1914), 501-514. Poggio’s letter from February 1453 is in 
Poggii Epistolae, ed. Tonelli, 3:49-52. Trebizond’s June 1454 letter to Andreas is in Collectanea, 117-124. 
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 In addition to these sources, I also explore two additional invectives, the first 
written by Guarino against Niccolò Niccoli in 1413, and the second written by Poggio 
against Lorenzo Valla in 1452. These sources not only demonstrate how Trebizond’s 
opponents expressed the same kind of anxiety regarding audience and reputation as he 
did, but also show how they relied on the same verbal strategies to contest honor. 
Guarino composed his invective against Niccoli, originally written as a letter to 
Guarino’s friend Biagio Guasconi, in response to the alleged abuse he had suffered from 
Niccoli while working with the man in Florence. He later revised his letter for a wider 
circulation and titled it Against the Fake Poet [In auripellem poetam]. Guarino’s 
invective is in Remigio Sabbadini’s collection of Guarino’s letters.37 Poggio wrote four 
invectives against Valla during their dispute between 1452 and 1453 in response to what 
he claimed to be Valla’s attacks on his writing style. I analyze the first of these, available 
in Poggio’s Opera and edited by Tonelli.38   
Chapter Outline  
 
The present study is divided into four main chapters, each of which explores from 
a different perspective how scholars used language to present themselves to humanist 
readers, aggrandizing themselves while denigrating others, all in the pursuit of honor and 
esteem in the humanist community. The first three chapters are devoted to analyses of the 
specific concepts, language, and themes that framed Trebizond’s feuds with Guarino and 
Poggio. Chapter Two addresses anti-Greek slander and cultural stereotypes during the 
37 Remigio Sabbadini discusses the feud in Vita di Guarino Veronese (Genoa: Instituto Sordo-Mutti, 1891), 
19-21. Martin Davies examines Guarino’s invective in his article on Niccoli’s feuds, note 21. For Guarino’s 
invective, see Epistolario di Guarino Veronese, ed. Remigio Sabbadini, vol. 1, Testo (Venezia: A spese 
della società, 1915), 33-46 
 
38 Poggio Bracciolini, Opera Omnia, ed. T. Tonelli, 4 vols. (Basel, 1538; rpt. Turin, 1964-1969), 1:188-
205. 
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Trebizond-Guarino dispute and the challenges facing Greek émigrés in the West during 
the early fifteenth century. Agaso composed a letter in 1437 notable for its frequent use 
of anti-Greek language which he used to criticize Trebizond’s knowledge of the Latin 
language and moral conduct. The chapter contends that Agaso’s anti-Greek slander was a 
conscious verbal strategy based on classical and early modern Greek stereotypes and 
intended to cast Trebizond as an incompetent, immoral Greekling. Trebizond believed 
Guarino himself to have penned the Agaso letter and responded to him directly in a letter 
of his own. He refuted “Agaso’s” anti-Greek language but engaged with Guarino using 
the same oppositional categories—including eloquence and loquaciousness as well as 
gravitas and levitas—contained in the Agaso letter. Trebizond used these categories as 
Agaso had, to praise himself and vilify his opponent, Guarino.  
 Chapter Three is an analysis of the interrelated humanist concepts of reason and 
restraint in the aftermath of Trebizond’s fist fight with Poggio in the papal chancery in 
May 1452. Chapter Three argues that Trebizond’s correspondence from Naples reflects a 
consistent effort to reframe the events in the chancery and present himself as having acted 
reasonably and with restraint. A language of restraint was therefore the foundation of 
Trebizond’s dispute with Poggio and of his attempts to mitigate the damage done to his 
reputation. As with his earlier feud with Guarino, both Trebizond and Poggio employed 
similar verbal strategies and categories to defend themselves and defame their opponent. 
Trebizond and Poggio conducted their dispute by means of oppositional categories 
including reason and emotion, prudence and imprudence, and honesty and dishonesty. 
Both men demonstrated a concern for their reputations and how others viewed their 
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actions, and both men strove to influence how their peers would view the chancery fight 
and their relationship after that event. 
 Chapter Four considers both the Trebizond-Guarino and Trebizond-Poggio 
feuds as evidence for the humanist use of concepts of masculinity in acts of self-
presentation. The chapter argues that the humanist understanding of manhood, derived 
from classical and medieval antecedents, considered reason as the identifying quality of 
manhood and that humanists used gendered language to verbally emasculate their 
opponents in the public eye. Gendered language was prominent in the insults exchanged 
during both feuds and was used to advance characterizations of oneself as learned, 
knowledgeable, prudent, honest, and restrained, as well as to denigrate one’s opponent as 
unlearned, lacking eloquence, imprudent, dishonest, and emotional. The analysis of 
Chapter Four, like that of Chapter Two, is organized around the two main avenues of 
attack employed by the figures involved: insults involving either an opponent’s 
knowledge or his moral conduct. Whether attacking an opponent’s learning or conduct, 
humanists used categories related to gender to give shape and substance to their invective 
and contrasted concepts of manhood with concepts of the child, woman, and beast.  
 The fifth and final chapter steps back from a deep thematic analysis of 
Trebizond’s feuds to consider the vehicle for humanist self-presentation: invective. The 
focus shifts to two additional feuds, Guarino’s dispute with Niccolò Niccoli in 1413 and 
Poggio’s conflict with Valla between 1452 and 1453, adding analytical breadth to the 
depth of the preceding chapters. In expanding beyond Trebizond’s feuds, the final chapter 
contextualizes Trebizond’s experiences—his anxiety about public perception and
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reputation, his pursuit of honor, the strategies he used to achieve his goals and challenge 
his adversaries—in the broader community of humanist scholars. Chapter Five argues 
that invective was one of the primary modes of expression available to humanists for the 
rhetorical presentation of self. Humanists understood invective to have discernible 
guidelines and limitations, a sense of which they derived from the classical Latin 
oratorical tradition and adapted to contemporary contests of honor. The chapter examines 
some of the staples of invective—the concept of provocation, the standard sets of tropes 
and issues humanists drew upon, and the use of wit and humor—that characterized the 
genre. The chapter demonstrates that our understanding of invective and its authors is 
best situated in a consideration of the socio-economic and professional stressors and 
anxiety about reputation that defined humanist life in the Quattrocento.     
Copyright  Karl R. Alexander 2013 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
ANTI-GREEK LANGUAGE  
AND THE DISPUTE BETWEEN  
GEORGE OF TREBIZOND AND GUARINO OF VERONA 
 
Introduction 
 
The dispute between George of Trebizond and Guarino of Verona was a product 
of the publication of Trebizond’s Rhetoricorum libri quinque (RLV), the first Renaissance 
treatise on rhetoric, in 1434. In the preface, he lamented what he described as a severe 
decline in the study of rhetoric and took aim at a host of medieval rhetorical authorities as 
well as those who continued to teach them. His argument was not new. He had argued 
much the same in a speech in Venice shortly before the publication of the RLV. In the 
fifth book of his treatise, he offered explicit criticism of one current instructor when he 
analyzed an encomium in praise of the condotierre Carmagnola. Guarino of Verona, one 
of the foremost humanist schoolmen of the fifteenth century and one of Trebizond’s own 
former Latin instructors, composed the encomium. Trebizond’s challenges to medieval 
and Renaissance authorities, including Guarino, were very public attempts to better his 
reputation as a rhetorical authority. In fact, he sent a copy of the RLV to Guarino himself. 
In 1437, he came into possession of a letter circulating under the name Andreas Agaso 
and addressed to Paulus Regius. Both men were supposedly students of Guarino. The 
Agaso letter contained a stalwart defense of Guarino and a scathing criticism of the RLV, 
especially Trebizond’s rhetorical knowledge and style. Trebizond responded within days 
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with a letter addressed to Leonello d’Este, son of the Ferraran ruler and Guarino’s 
student, which blamed Guarino for adopting the Agaso pseudonym and attacking him.1  
 One of the most prominent features of the Agaso letter is the extent to which the 
author expresses his arguments through anti-Greek language. Agaso criticizes 
Trebizond’s knowledge of the Latin language and casts aspersions on his moral character 
by employing an array of negative cultural stereotypes with roots in classical Roman as 
well as contemporary thought. This chapter contends that Agaso’s anti-Greek language 
was a deliberate verbal strategy crafted to contest honor and reputation. His attacks on 
Trebizond as a Greek were attempts to undermine his authority as a rhetorician and 
defend Guarino’s honor in a public manner by writing a letter he intended to be seen by 
others.2 These anti-Greek attacks were intended to define Trebizond as an incompetent 
and immoral Greekling rather than as a skilled Latinist and reliable rhetorical authority. 
Cultural stereotypes were so central to Agaso’s arguments that Trebizond was forced to 
respond to them in his own letter to Guarino. Trebizond countered with his own acts of 
self-presentation, defending both his Latinity—his skill and eloquence as a Latinist—and 
his moral rectitude. He was as intent as Agaso in making his acts of self-presentation a 
public matter, an intention perhaps nowhere more evident than in his cover letter to 
Leonello d’Este, where Trebizond called upon the Ferraran patron to arrange a public 
1 For the sources for the dispute see Collectanea Trapezuntiana: Texts, Documents, and Bibliographies of 
George of Trebizond, ed. John Monfasani (Binghamton, NY: Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 
1984), 360-411. For Trebizond’s initial criticisms of Guarino in the RLV, see ibid., 360-364. For the letter 
of Andreas Agaso to Paulus Regius, see ibid., 364-376. For Trebizond’s cover letter to Leonello d’Este and 
the Responsio to Guarino, see ibid., 377-411. 
 
2 The correspondence of the Trebizond-Guarino dispute was intended for and read by a public audience 
beyond the recipients of the original letters. Monfasani notes that in all but two of the manuscripts of 
Agaso’s letter, it accompanies Trebizond’s Responsio. The texts, after leaving their authors’s hands, were 
copied, circulated, and read together. Trebizond’s interest in public opinion is evident in the revisions he 
made both to Agaso’s letter and to his own Responsio. He was clearly interested in how the feud was 
viewed by others. For a discussion of the existing manuscripts, see ibid., 364 and 377.  
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oratorical exhibition between Guarino and himself to prove once and for all who was the 
more eloquent man.3 The Agaso letter and Trebizond’s Responsio to Guarino represented 
competing attempts to sway public perception and persuade an audience composed of 
fellow scholars and potential patrons.  
An analysis of the anti-Greek language in this correspondence advances our 
understanding of fifteenth-century humanism and the experience of Greek émigrés in 
Italy. Such an analysis illustrates for instance the need for a reconsideration of the 
traditional narrative of the experience of Greek scholars during the Renaissance. This 
narrative focuses on how the west embraced Greeks and Greek learning in the first half of 
the fifteenth century. It explains how the arrival of Manuel Chrysoloras (1355-1415) in 
Florence in 1397 inspired Italians to an interest in Greek studies and sparked a wave of 
philhellenism. John Monfasani describes how it was Chrysoloras’s pupils who “almost 
immediately inaugurated the Renaissance absorption of the Byzantine rhetorical 
tradition.”4 Some of these men, most notably Francesco Filelfo and Guarino himself, 
travelled to Constantinople for additional training.5 This interest in Greek studies 
expanded to include powerful Italian patrons, including the papacy. Fifteenth-century 
Rome became a hub for Greek cultural activity, where émigrés such as Cardinal 
3 Ibid., 379 (9). …si multis etatibus omissum pravitate morum et ignorantia declamandi usum, ut debes, 
revocare cupis, me tibi dedo. Paratus adero quandocumque iusseris. Hortare Guarinum ad hoc tam 
preclarum munus subeundum, quod apud maiores tanti fuit ut etiam seniores iam et defuncti non nunquam 
honoribus oratores domi ad excitandum ingenium declamarent. 
 
4 John Monfasani, “The Byzantine Rhetorical Tradition and the Renaissance,” in Byzantine Scholars in 
Renaissance Italy: Cardinal Bessarion and Other Émigrés (Brookfield, Vt: Variorum, 1995), 177-178. 
Chysoloras’s students included Guarino, Leonardo Bruni, Pier Paolo Vergerio, Palla Strozzi, and Roberto 
Rossi. 
 
5 This narrative can be traced back to Kenneth Setton’s important article, “The Byzantine Background to 
the Italian Renaissance,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 100 (1956): 1-76. For a 
succinct example of the narrative, see L.D. Reynolds and N.G. Wilson, Scribes and Scholars: A Guide to 
the Transmission of Greek and Latin Literature (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 146-154.   
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Bessarion facilitated the copying, translation, and transmission of Greek texts in Italy. A 
substantial strain of existing scholarship focuses on identifying Greek scholars in Italy 
and tracking their contributions to Italian humanism in an era actively cultivating 
antiquarian interests. Deno Geanakoplos’s work on Byzantine scholars is representative 
of this approach, as is John Monfasani’s, including his major biography of Trebizond.6  
Studies of Byzantine contributions have been invaluable in their own right, but 
scholars have recently begun to look at some of the problems Greeks faced in Italy as 
well. The result has been a growing realization that Byzantine experiences were more 
complex than the traditional narrative suggests. Monfasani’s recent works are an 
excellent example of this scholarly turn. He warns that merely listing the achievements of 
émigré Greeks misleads us into believing that Byzantines “started” the Renaissance. He 
does not deny the formative influence of Byzantines but notes that “despite all the 
glamour that attaches to them today and despite the clear success some of them enjoyed,” 
many struggled in Italy.7 Others have noted these struggles as well and offered 
qualifications or changes to the traditional narrative. James Hankins, in his work on 
Renaissance crusading literature, suggests that Italian philhellenism was largely restricted 
to intellectuals and elites and that the west received Greeks less favorably than humanist 
6 John Monfasani, George of Trebizond: A Biography and a Study of his Rhetoric and Logic (Leiden: E.J. 
Brill, 1976) and Byzantine Scholars in Renaissance Italy. For Deno Geanakoplos, see his Greek Scholars in 
Venice: Studies in the Dissemination of Greek Learning from Byzantium to Western Europe (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1962); Byzantine East and Latin West: Two Worlds of Christendom in the 
Middle Ages and Renaissance (New York: Harper & Row, 1966); Interaction of the “Sibling” Byzantine 
and Western Cultures in the Middle Ages and Italian Renaissance (330-1600) (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1976).  
 
7 John Monfasani, “Greek Renaissance Migrations,” Italian History and Culture 8 (2002): 5-7 and “The 
Pro-Latin Apologetics of the Greek Émigrés to Quattrocento Italy,” in Byzantine Theology and its 
Philosophical Background, ed. Antonio Rigo (Turnhout: Brepolis, 2011), 160.  
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accounts indicate.8 Jonathan Harris has also spoken about biases against Greeks in the 
west but does not address how these biases functioned among intellectuals.9 Some 
scholars have discussed the increasing troubles that Greeks faced particularly in the 
second half of the fifteenth century, as the number of Greek teachers increased and as 
Latins became increasingly capable of teaching the language independent of Greeks.10 
Monfasani’s description of the “Latin chauvinism” of Angelo Poliziano is an example of 
this, though he does not explore the implications of anti-Greek bias in detail.11 
Though scholars have begun to address the problems with the traditional 
narrative, neither anti-Greek language nor the impact of Greek biases on fifteenth-century 
humanism have received sufficient attention. The Trebizond-Guarino correspondence 
demonstrates how anti-Greek attacks functioned prominently in contests of honor and 
illustrates how Greek biases were evident even among Renaissance intellectuals at the 
height of the philhellenic movement in the early fifteenth century. Even as scholars were 
genuinely excited about a resurgence in Greek learning, Greeks faced barriers to 
cultivating their reputation that their Italian counterparts did not. An Italy becoming open 
to the study of Greek letters and an Italy with a pro-Latin bias were not mutually 
8 James Hankins, “Renaissance Crusaders: Humanist Crusade Literature in the Age of Mehmed II,” 
Dumbarton Oaks Papers 49 (1995): 111-207; George Arabatzis, “Sailing Away from Byzantium: 
Renaissance Crusade Literature and Peace Plans,” in War and Peace: Critical Issues in European Societies 
and Literature 800-1800, ed. Albrecht Classen and Nadia Margolis (Boston, MA: De Gruyter, 2011), 463-
490.  
 
9 Jonathan Harris, Greek Émigrés in the West: 1400-1520 (Camberley: Porphyrogenitus, 1995), 39-41, 62-
68. 
 
10 Paul Botley, Learning Greek in Western Europe, 1396-1529: Grammars, Lexica, and Classroom Texts 
(Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 2010), 115-116; Federica Ciccolella, Donati Graeci: 
Learning Greek in the Renaissance (Boston: Brill, 2008), 121; Monfasani, “Migrations,” 11. 
 
11 John Monfasani, “Angelo Poliziano, Aldo Manuzio, Theodore Gaza, George of Trebizond, and Chapter 
90 of the Miscellaneorum Centuria Prima (with an Edition and Translation),” in Interpretations of 
Renaissance Humanism, ed. Angelo Mazzoco (Boston: Brill, 2006), 243-265.  
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exclusive. The Agaso letter speaks to a pro-Latin bias in the culture of fifteenth-century 
humanism. In challenging Trebizond’s Latinity, Agaso articulated a standard of 
intellectual excellence rooted in the Latin language, not Greek. Agaso also employed 
negative cultural stereotypes depicting Greeks as dishonest, treacherous, arrogant, 
heretical, and devoid of honor. These stereotypes had roots in classical Roman thought as 
well as in the history of crusading, attempts to unify the Greek and Roman churches, and 
the tension between Latins and Greeks that developed over time because of these issues. 
They also forced Trebizond to craft a presentation of himself that could counter Agaso’s 
claims. His response illustrates the pressure he felt as a member of a minority to prove his 
Latinity, defend his Greek heritage, and defend the value of Greek learning more broadly.  
An analysis of anti-Greek language also allows us to understand better 
Trebizond’s career. In his biography, Monfasani rightly argues that even as he struggled 
to assimilate to life in Italy, Trebizond remained a Greek patriot.12 Monfasani 
emphasized Trebizond’s complex attitudes toward his homeland, and with good reason. 
Trebizond frequently appears torn between his Latin and Greek identities in his response 
to Guarino. Their correspondence allows us to advance Monfasani’s analysis by 
understanding why a balance between Latin assimilation and Greek patriotism had to be 
struck. Agaso’s vehement criticism of Trebizond’s Latinity makes clear how essential 
proficiency in Latin was to a humanist’s reputation and identity. At the same time, 
Trebizond’s Greek background afforded him opportunities among Italians interested in 
the resurgence of Greek. It is notable that in defending the value of Greek to Guarino, he 
makes the same arguments that fifteenth-century Italian philhellenes employed. To the 
typical stresses associated with contesting honor and building a reputation, he had the 
12 Monfasani, George of Trebizond, 128-130 and 139.  
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added pressure of demonstrating the appropriate balance between his Greek background 
and his Latinity. He could not afford to be cast as an incompetent Greekling but neither 
could he simply accept wholesale the premise that Greeks were unlearned. The result is 
that Trebizond is at times inconsistent, wavering between depictions of himself as a 
Latinist so skilled he could be mistaken for a contemporary of Cicero, and as an ardent 
defender of the Greek language struggling to help it attain a place of prominence on par 
with Latin. 
 The Trebizond-Guarino correspondence also raises questions about Guarino 
himself, although any conclusions here must be tentative. The authorship of the Agaso 
letter is by no means clear.13 Trebizond argued that nobody had ever heard of an 
“Andreas Agaso,” and maintained even decades later that Guarino had written the letter. 
Monfasani adds that nobody since then has managed to find Agaso, and that he, like 
Trebizond, believes Guarino was the author.14 At least one other Greek émigré, 
Andronicus Contoblacas, suggested, in the middle of his own feud with the man years 
later, that Guarino had written as Agaso.15 The evidence to the contrary rests on the 
13 The question of Agaso’s existence complicates a discussion of the texts of the Trebizond-Guarino 
dispute. When discussing the Agaso letter, I refer to the author as “Andreas Agaso” rather than Guarino 
because the authorship of that letter and Agaso’s very existence are in question. When discussing 
Trebizond’s response to the Agaso letter, I typically follow Trebizond and refer to “Agaso” as Guarino. 
Trebizond does occasionally discuss Agaso and Guarino separately, usually when trying to prove the two 
were the same person, and in those cases I make the distinction as well. When I say that Trebizond replies 
to Guarino, this indicates his response to something in the Agaso letter that he believes Guarino to have 
written while posing as Agaso. Monfasani adds that there is no evidence Paulus Regius was a real person 
either. Monfasani, George of Trebizond, 30-32. 
 
14 Collectanea, 381. (2) Nam ut latere possis, ne tibi respondeam, vel inter asinos ita te intrusisti ut Agaso 
factus sis et posteris hoc te nomine tuis scriptis commendes. Quid enim celare nomen tuum, et Agasonem 
nescio quem, non te in Georgium invehi credituros homines putasti? At primum, nullum in Italia qui 
litteraturam profiteatur hoc nomine appellari constat; nec sane invenies aliquem preter te qui se ita velit 
vocitari.  
 
15 John Monfasani, “In Praise of Ognibene and Blame of Guarino: Andronicus Controblacas’ Invective 
against Niccolò Botano and the Citizens of Brescia,” Bibliothèque d’Humanisme et Renaissance 52 (1990): 
309-321.  
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testimony of Poggio Bracciolini. Poggio argued in September 1437 that the letter was not 
written in Guarino’s style and that Guarino would have defended himself openly rather 
than hiding behind a pseudonym or one of his students.16 Poggio’s testimony was a point 
of contention in his later feud with Trebizond but there was no evident animosity between 
the two at this earlier date. There is no reason to doubt Poggio’s sincerity regarding the 
Agaso letter.   
Although there is ultimately no incontrovertible evidence identifying Agaso as 
Guarino, the Agaso letter complicates the image of Guarino as a devoted philhellene. 
Guarino’s philhellenic reputation is truly difficult to overstate, as is his role in the spread 
of Greek learning. Chrysoloras, his Greek instructor, gave a major impetus to this 
movement but wrote little. By 1417, Guarino had produced an abridged version of 
Chrysoloras’s most notable piece, a manual on Greek inflections, which became one of 
the standard Greek grammars of the fifteenth century.17 If Guarino wrote the Agaso 
letter, it serves as evidence that even one of the most renowned and ardent philhellenes of 
the early fifteenth century employed anti-Greek language to undermine the credibility of 
a Byzantine rival. Whether Guarino truly believed the stereotypes is a separate question. 
He and Trebizond were both engaging in a process of self-fashioning that required them 
to use a variety of rhetorical strategies to define themselves and each other. The Agaso 
attacks may simply have been attempts to use stereotypes to appeal to existing pro-Latin, 
anti-Greek biases. Even so, this interpretation is difficult to square with an image of 
Guarino as the devoted student of Chrysoloras, as a man who ventured to Constantinople, 
16 Poggii Epistolae, ed. T. Tonelli, vol. 2 (Florence, 1832-1861): 125-128. Tonelli’s edition is reprinted in 
Poggio Bracciolini, Opera Omnia, vol. 3, Epistolae (Turin: 1964).   
 
17 Paul Grendler, Schooling in Renaissance Italy: Literacy and Learning, 1300-1600 (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1989), 265; Botley, 2 and 7-12; Ciccolella, 101 and 130-131. 
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and one who wrote extensively about the importance of Greek literature. If Guarino wrote 
the letter, his anti-Greek attacks indicate limits to the acceptance of Byzantines in Italy, 
even among those who supported the spread of Greek studies. If there really was an 
Andreas Agaso, the question becomes why Guarino remained silent when Trebizond 
wrote against him. He could simply have rejected his student’s attacks against 
Trebizond’s Greekness. That he did not may indicate complicity. It could however 
equally well indicate Guarino’s unwillingness to engage in a dispute with someone he 
considered beneath him. For my part, I follow Monfasani in believing that Guarino wrote 
the letter, and find compelling the question he raises: Why did Andreas Agaso not step 
forward and prove Trebizond wrong about Guarino?18 Moreover, I tend also to agree 
with Trebizond’s assessment—and disagree with Poggio’s—that the Agaso letter bears 
Guarino’s hallmarks, a point to which I will return throughout this chapter. Regardless of 
the question of authorship, at the very least, the extensive use of anti-Greek language in 
the Agaso letter indicates that Greek émigrés faced challenges even among intellectuals.  
 The structure of this chapter is derived from the two main types of attacks in the 
Agaso letter, one against Trebizond’s knowledge of Latin and the other against his moral 
character. In both cases, Agaso explains Trebizond’s flaws as a function of his 
Greekness. The first argument relies on ancient Roman stereotypes of the Greek as 
ineptus and loquax to characterize Trebizond as ignorant of the Latin language and 
incapable of understanding the art of speaking, much less of teaching it to others. These 
characterizations are primarily framed as challenges to Trebizond’s Latinity and are the 
subject of the first part of the present analysis. The second argument and the second part 
of the present analysis consist of Agaso’s challenges to Trebizond’s moral conduct. 
18 Monfasani, George of Trebizond, 30-31.  
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Agaso relies on the classical Roman distinction between Roman gravitas and Greek 
levitas to cast Trebizond as audacious, arrogant, ungrateful, and shameless. The two 
arguments—against knowledge and moral conduct—are not mutually exclusive, as when 
Agaso argues that Trebizond’s faulty teachings and attacks on learned authorities are 
signs of both his ignorance and arrogance. I divide my treatment of these two kinds of 
arguments for the sake of clarity, but point to areas where they overlap as well. At its 
heart, I offer an analysis of concepts of Greekness and how they serve as the foundation 
for anti-Greek attacks in this contest of honor. Given the debt Agaso and Trebizond owe 
to the classical Roman discussion of Greeks, I begin with a discussion of the models from 
which they drew.  
The Classical Roman Precedent 
 
In casting Trebizond as an ignorant and immoral Greekling, Agaso was taking 
part in a very old conversation about the differences between Latins and Greeks, one in 
which a number of Roman authors of the late Republic and empire engaged.19 Many of 
Agaso’s more explicit anti-Greek attacks rely on Cicero.20 His works are a useful lens 
through which to understand the classical Roman conception of Greekness, which could 
at times be decidedly negative. The De oratore, for instance, describes Greeks as ineptus 
and loquax. The former suggests a lack of tact or impertinence while the latter indicates a 
19 A number of studies examine classical Roman views of Greeks. For a recent account see Benjamin Isaac, 
The Invention of Racism in Classical Antiquity (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 381-405. 
See also Nicholas Petrochilos, Roman Attitudes to the Greeks (Athens: National and Capodistrian 
University of Athens, 1974), 35-53; Arnaldo Momigliano, Alien Wisdom: The Limits of Hellenization (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1975); J.P.V.D. Balsdon, Romans and Aliens (Chapel Hill: University 
of Carolina Press, 1979); Erich S. Gruen, Culture and National Identity in Republican Rome (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1992); Antony Spawforth, Greece and the Augustan Cultural Revolution (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2012).  
 
20 Cicero’s opinion of Greeks is by no means easy to identify and how he speaks of them depends largely 
on his purpose in writing. See Isaac, 390-393.  
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concern with argumentation rather than truth, with loquaciousness, not eloquence.21 
Cicero has Crassus describe the Greeks thus in discussing Plato’s Gorgias, noting, “in 
fact controversy about a word has long tormented those Greeklings, fonder as they are of 
argument than of truth.”22 He maintains this position when Sulpicius asks him whether 
there is an art of oratory: “Do you think I am some idle talkative [loquax] Greekling that 
you propound to me a petty question on which to talk as I will?” Mucius replies by 
contrasting loquaciousness with eloquence: “It is for you, Crassus, to comply with the 
wishes of young men, who do not want the everyday chatter [loquacitas] of some 
unpracticed Greek…but something from the wisest and most eloquent man in the 
world.”23 In the second book of the dialogue, Catulus describes the ineptus man as 
someone who “fails to realize the demands of the occasion, or talks too much, or 
advertises himself, or ignores the prestige or convenience of those with whom he has to 
deal, or, in short, is in any way awkward or tedious.” He then relates this to the entire 
“Greek nation,” which  
with all its learning, abounds in this fault…but, of all the countless forms assumed 
by want of tact, I rather think that the grossest is the Greeks’ habit, in any place 
21 Petrochilos, 37-39. 
 
22 This and subsequent translations are Sutton’s. Cicero, De oratore, trans. E.W. Sutton (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1959), 1.47-48. quo in libro in hoc maxime admirabar Platonem, quod mihi in 
oratoribus irridendis ipse esse orator summus videbatur. Verbi enim controversia iamdiu torquet Graeculos 
homines, contentionis cupidiores quam veritatis.  
L. Licinius Crassus (b. 140 B.C.) was a prominent Roman orator and the spokesperson for 
Cicero’s views throughout the dialogue. See H. Rackham, introduction to Cicero, De oratore, trans. E.W. 
Sutton, xiii. 
 
23 Cic., De or. 1.102. Quid? mihi nunc vos, inquit Crassus, tanquam alicui Graeculo otioso et loquaci, et 
fortasse docto atque erudito, quaestiunculam, de qua meo arbitratu loquar, ponitis?; Cic., De or. 1.105. 
Gerendus est tibi mos adolescentibus, Crasse: qui non Graeci alicuius quotidianam loquacitatem sine usu, 
neque ex scholis cantilenam requirunt, sed ex homine omnium sapientissimo atque eloquentissimo, atque 
ex eo, qui non in libellis, sed in maximis causis, et in hoc domicilio imperii et gloriae, sit consilio linguaque 
princeps; cuius vestigia persequi cupiunt, eius sententiam sciscitantur. 
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and any company they like, of plunging into the most subtle dialectic concerning 
subjects that present extreme difficulty, or at any rate do not call for discussion.24  
 
Whatever Cicero’s own opinion on the matter, his dialogue suggests that for at least some 
Romans, Greek learning was characterized by a combination of loquaciousness—
certainly not eloquence—and ineptia.  
Loquacitas and ineptia also served as signs of Greek arrogance in Cicero’s 
works. Some argued that by claiming to know more than they do and by speaking 
endlessly about all issues, Greeks overreached themselves. In De oratore, Catulus 
articulates the connection between loquaciousness and arrogance when he asks: “What 
can be more arrogant [arrogans], more loquacious [loquax]…than for a Greek, who has 
never seen a foeman or a camp…to lecture on military matters to Hannibal?”25 In his 
defense of Flaccus, Cicero takes aim at the alleged levitas of the Greek witnesses and 
accusers.26 He refers to them as impudent, unlettered, and leves, and speaks about the 
levitas and crudelitas of the Greeks as a people.27 Cicero makes clear their lack of 
24 Cic., De or. 2.17-18. Quem enim nos ‘ineptum’ vocamus, is mihi videtur ab hoc nomen habere ductum, 
quod non sit aptus; idque in sermonis nostri consuetudine perlate patet; nam qui aut, tempus quid postulet, 
non videt, aut plura loquitur, aut se ostentat, aut eorum, quibuscum est, vel dignitatis, vel commodi 
rationem non habet, aut denique in aliquo genere aut inconcinnus, aut multus est, is ineptus dicitur. Hoc 
vitio cumulata est eruditissima illa Graecorum natio…Omnium autem ineptiarum, quae sunt innumerabiles, 
haud scio, an nulla sit maior, quam, ut illi solent, quocumque in loco, quoscumque inter homines visum est, 
de rebus aut difficillimis, aut non necessariis, argutissime disputare. 
 
25 Sutton translates this sentence as “what better example of prating insolence could there be than for a 
Greek... .” My alternative translation draws attention to the descriptive terms used. Cic., De or. 2.76. quid 
enim aut arrogantius, aut loquacius fieri potuit, quam Hannibali, qui tot annis de imperio cum populo 
Romano, omnium gentium victore, certasset, Graecum hominem, qui nunquam hostem, nunquam castra 
vidisset, nunquam denique minimam partem ullius publici muneris attigisset, praecepta de re militari dare? 
 
26 For a discussion of Greek levitas see Isaac, 393 and Petrochilos, 40-42.  
 
27 This and subsequent translations are Lord’s. Cicero, Pro Flacco, in The Speeches of Cicero, trans. Louis 
E. Lord (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1937). Cic., Flac. 9-11. Sed sunt in illo numero multi 
boni, docti, pudentes, qui ad hoc iudicium deducti non sunt, multi impudentes, illiterati, leves, quos variis 
de causis video concitatos; Cic., Flac. 24. Si quem infimo loco natum, nullo splendore vitae, nulla 
commendatione famae defenderem, tamen civem a civibus communis humanitatis iure ac misericordia 
deprecarer, ne ignotis testibus, ne incitatis, ne accusatoris consessoribus, convivis, contubernalibus, ne 
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gravitas, thus establishing a contrast between levitas and gravitas and linking both to 
honor.28 In this context, levitas indicates actions or individuals lacking dignity. It readily 
encompasses concepts such as arrogance, selfishness, shamelessness, or 
presumptuousness.29 Cicero offers Heraclides, whom he describes as utterly without 
honor, as a specific example of Greek levitas. He borrowed money on the endorsement of 
a good and honest man, Hermippus, secretly left Rome “after cheating many persons out 
of small loans,” later lied and claimed he had repaid the money, and then lied again about 
the loan at trial, where he “heaped all sorts of insults and curses on Hermippus.”30 Not 
only does Cicero portray Heraclides as a selfish liar and characterize him as audax and 
loquax, he contrasts him with Hermippus, a pudens and optimus vir. Cicero’s application 
of the concept of levitas suggests that the levis Graecus homo was as much a classical 
stereotype as the ineptus or loquax Graecus homo.  
 Despite the negative depiction of Greeks in the passages above, Cicero’s 
treatment of Greeks was by no means wholly negative. This is even the case in the Pro 
Flacco. The severity of Cicero’s treatment of Greek morality in that speech is largely a 
function of the Greek witnesses and accusers at the trial. This becomes clear when Cicero 
describes himself as “not unsympathetic to that race” and notes that there are among the 
Greeks “many honorable [bonus], learned [doctus], [and] modest [pudens] men.” Cicero 
hominibus levitate Graecis, crudelitate barbaris civem ac supplicem vestrum dederetis, ne periculosam 
imitationem exempli reliquis in posterum proderetis; Cic., Flac. 61. liceat mihi potius de levitate 
Graecorum queri quam de crudelitate… . 
 
28 Cic., Flac. 36. Das enim mihi quod haec causa maxime postulat, nullam gravitatem, nullam constantiam, 
nullum firmum in Graecis hominibus consilium, nullam denique esse testimonii fidem.   
 
29 I follow Isaac: “in Cicero’s time and in his work, [levitas was] used for viles or people considered nullo 
honore dignos.” Isaac, 393, n. 63.  
 
30 Cic., Flac. 47-48. 
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does not count the Greek witnesses and accusers at Flaccus’s trial among them, however. 
He praises Greek learning by stating, “I grant them literature, I grant them a knowledge 
of many arts, I do not deny the charm of their speech, the keenness of their intellects, the 
richness of their diction.” He adds, however, that Greeks lack “truth and honour in giving 
testimony,” an understandable position given his role defending Flaccus against Greek 
witnesses and accusers.31 Cicero is generally positive about Greek learning even if he is 
less glowing in his estimation of Greek conduct. The same is true when he pauses to 
consider Athens, “where men think humanity, learning, religion, grain, rights, and laws 
were born, and whence they were spread through all the earth.” The chronological 
distinction allows Cicero to praise Greek learning and past contributions to the arts while 
setting aside present-day Greek arrogance, loquaciousness, and the like. The narrative 
that emerges—a model of the degradation of Greek culture over time—is of an older 
Greece with something to offer contemporary Rome.32 It suggests that over time Greek 
learning had declined and Greek men had become prone to vice. Even so, the memory of 
Athens retained “such renown that the now shattered and weakened name of Greece is 
supported by the reputation of this city.”33 Cicero was not alone in struggling to 
31 Cic., Flac. 9. Sed sunt in illo numero multi boni, docti, pudentes, qui ad hoc iudicium deducti non sunt, 
multi impudentes, illiterati, leves, quos variis de causis video concitatos. Verum tamen hoc dico de toto 
genere Graecorum: tribuo illis litteras, do multarum artium disciplinam, non adimo sermonis leporem, 
ingeniorum acumen, dicendi copiam, denique etiam, si qua sibi alia sumunt non repugno… 
 Sutton translates pudens as “wise” but “modest” is more appropriate given the impudens that 
follows and the discussion about the Greek lack of honor in giving testimony.  
 
32 The term “degradation model” is my own means of conveying Cicero’s complex views regarding Greece. 
I refer to the fifteenth-century use of the degradation model below, pages 63-66 specifically as a strategy of 
Trebizond’s to defend Greece and Greek scholars.  
 
33 Cic., Flac. 62-64.  
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appropriate Greek culture, nor was he alone in articulating anti-Greek stereotypes even as 
he acknowledged the contributions of Greeks to the arts.34  
Cicero’s description of Greeks illustrates the complexities of the Roman concept 
of Greekness. That concept established a precedent for the linguistic strategies fifteenth-
century scholars employed to characterize the Byzantine émigrés of their own day. Agaso 
drew extensively from these ideas in his 1437 letter to Paulus Regius to construct his 
presentation of Trebizond, his Latinity, and the RLV.  
Latinity Challenged: Ineptia, Loquentia, et Arrogantia  
 
The Trebizond depicted in the Agaso letter is the prototypical ineptus, loquax, 
arrogans Graeculus of Cicero. Agaso condemns the Cretan’s understanding of Latin, 
knowledge of rhetorical authorities, and the precepts and style in the RLV. In the process, 
he characterizes Trebizond as arrogant in believing himself an expert in subjects he does 
not understand and shameless in his criticisms of truly learned authorities past and 
present. Agaso’s purpose is to undermine Trebizond’s credibility, a goal he makes clear 
from the beginning of his letter to Regius by explaining how he is sending his friend a 
work, Trebizond’s RLV, “suitable only for either your derision or vexation, more stinking 
of chattering loquaciousness than eloquence.” The opening passages of Agaso’s letter 
introduce the main aspects of his portrayal of Trebizond and offer a concise overview of 
the arguments he unfolds throughout.35 He adds how “absurd and most shameful to Latin 
34 On the Hellenization of Rome and anti-Greek stereotypes see Momigliano, 16-21; Spawforth, 3-18; 
Elizabeth Rawson, Intellectual Life in the Late Roman Republic (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1985), 7-13; and Erich S. Gruen, Rethinking the Other in Antiquity (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2011), 1-4, 344-345, 357.  
 
35 Whether Agaso and Regius truly existed, the Agaso letter accurately depicts how humanists spread 
texts—here, Trebizond’s RLV—and discussed them by means of their correspondence. Texts were 
exchanged hand to hand and circulated among friends, who made copies of their own. For an additional 
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studies it is to receive instruction in speaking Latin from a Greek,” who scarcely knows 
how to speak Greek and knows Latin even less well.36 Trebizond’s ignorance, Agaso 
continues, is no obstacle to either his arrogance or shamelessness. “This man,” he 
explains, “stupid, impertinent, and without honor” wrote “an altogether vulgar 
introduction” lamenting the collapse of oratory, criticizing medieval commentators, and 
promising to revive and sustain eloquence himself.37 Agaso contends that eloquence is 
more than sufficiently sustained by a host of erudite men among whom Trebizond, an 
indecorous man, does not “blush to thrust his nose.”38 Agaso leans heavily on the 
classical Roman concept of Greeks in these passages. He characterizes Trebizond as 
loquacious rather than eloquent and as a man lacking in honor, and implies his arrogance 
example, see note 89 and Leonardo Bruni’s request of Guarino during the controversy surrounding Lorenzo 
da Monachi in 1416.  
 
36 Collectanea, 364-365. (1) Tuorum nequaquam mandatorum oblitus…Nihil adhuc quod nostra magnopere 
studia postulent comperi cum aut vulgaria sint aut illis abundes. Ne tamen vacuam et inanem sumpsisse 
legationem videar, aliquid quo iocari aut subirasci liceat audias interim faxo. (2) Unum enim tuo vel 
cachinno vel stomacho dignum opus in manus incidit, cazambanicam redolens loquacitatem verius quam 
eloquentiam, quo cum auctor Greculus Latinis dicendi rationem aperire profiteatur (est enim De rhetorica 
liber inscriptus). Ita egregie, vel e grege potius, disserit ut tam facile ei Latine sciendi consuetudinem 
ademeris quam eloquentie peritiam denegaris. Non dicam quam absurdum sit et Latinis studiis turpissimum 
ab Greco Latine dicendi rationem accipere, qui vix Grece, male autem Latine sciat.  
Monfasani speculates that “Cazambanica is an adjective, perhaps related to gazza (in Italian, a 
“female chatterbox”), or to cazabàn, a river in Crete.” Ibid., 372.  
 
37 Ibid., 365. (3) Ceterum prohemium tractandis de artis preceptis insulsus homo atque ineptus nulla cum 
dignitate, vulgare ferme, premittit, in quo, cum eloquentiam et eius facultatis libros hisce temporibus 
fugisse ac cecidisse deploret, eam restituere ac fulcire promittit, presertim cum Alanos Bertolinosque 
nimium vigere in pretioque esse queratur et accuset. Evas columbas, Prosperos, Chartulas annumerare 
videtur, oblitus quibus adducere poterat et Bononie natos, Ethiopum terras, Fabasque Guidones. Sed enim 
incautus homo id non accusat quod est accusandum. 
 Monfasani explains how “Agaso is listing the standard texts of the medieval Italian curriculum 
in Latin and the greatest authorities in medieval rhetoric.” He identifies “Evas columbas” as the incipit of 
the Dittochaeon of Prudentius, attributes ‘Prosperos’ to Prosper of Aquitaine, and notes “Chartulas” as the 
opening of the Carmen de contemptu mundi, “Ethiopum terras” as the beginning of Theodulus’s Ecloga, 
“Bononie natos” as the opening words of the ars dictaminis of Giovanni di Bonandrea, and Guido Faba, 
“the most famous of the Bolognese dictatores.” Ibid., 373. See also Grendler, 116 and 123. 
 
38 Collectanea, 366. (7) Tamen inter tantos artis scriptores doctissimosque viventes nasum ingerere 
importunus homo non erubuit, Aristotelem imitatus, qui cum motus esset Isocratis rhetoris gloria, dicere 
etiam cepit adolescentes docere et prudentiam cum eloquentia iungere.  
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by casting him as indecorous in his attacks on learned men. Each of these 
characterizations is furthermore intended to demonstrate the “absurdity” of accepting 
instruction from a Greek man lacking knowledge of the Latin language.  
Agaso’s continued reliance on classical stereotypes is evident as he outlines what 
he proclaims to be the foolish principles in the RLV, which he explains as functions of the 
author’s background as an ineptus and arrogans Greekling more interested in fame than 
truth. He criticizes, for example, Trebizond’s definition of demonstrative oratory as a 
“genre assigned to the praise or blame of a particular person.” “That much,” he explains, 
is “the complete and pure definition of Cicero. But this is not enough for this particular 
magister. He added, so foolishly and stupidly, ‘cum amplificatione.’” The addition, 
Agaso argues, was solely so Trebizond might appear to have contributed something of his 
own.39 Agaso likewise criticizes Trebizond’s classification of four parts of an oration as 
opposed to six, “contrary to every authority ancient and subsequent.” He labels Trebizond 
a sciolus of the Latin language, one whose knowledge is pretentious and superficial, and 
cites Cicero to brand him as one of “those Greeklings, fonder of argument than truth.”40 
This is a common refrain. Elsewhere, he accuses Trebizond of foolishly blurting out, no 
39 Ibid., 366. (9) Mox desumpto in manus codice, artis precepta percurrenti quot occurrunt ineptie! Verbi 
gratia: “demonstrativum genus est,” inquit, “quod tribuitur in alicuius certe persone laudem vel 
vituperationem.” Hactenus Ciceronis absoluta et integra diffinitio est. Verum ea huic ipsi magistro non satis 
est. Adiecit quam insipienter et insipide: “cum amplificatione”…(10) Hic itidem, ne Ciceronis credatur 
assertio et aliquid sui videatur afferre, etiam recta premutans, “cum amplificatione” supplevit. Cf. Rhet. 
Her. 1.2. 
 
40 Collectanea, 366-367. (11) Inde non longe post Neptunius hic magister inventionem divisurus contra 
veterum omnium et posterorum auctoritatem atque sententiam, quattuor tantum partes enumerat, cum sex 
esse nemo sanus eat inficias. Sic enim partitur in exordium, narrationem, contentionem, et perorationem. 
Primum quidem non mediocri vitio conflictatur is qui genus aliquid divisurus in species, in genus potius 
speciemque partitur, ut si quis dicat: animalia quedam aquatilia sunt, nonnulla terrestria, alia corpus esse 
constat, cum et hic divisionem, confirmationem et confutationem contentionis esse velit tres unius loci 
partes. (12) Deinde Latine lingue sciolus parum advertit contentionem, etsi aliud alias, controversiam vel 
causam vel concertationem appellari, quomodo in Oratore usus est Tullius: “omnem esse contentionem 
inter homines doctos in verbi controversia positam et Greculos magis contentionis cupidos quam veritatis.” 
Cf. Cic., De or. 1.47.  
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less shamelessly than unwisely, hundreds of things contrary to the custom of the most 
learned men. He characterizes Trebizond as ignorant of these authorities, brilliant authors 
of whom he is a mere copyist.41 He explains that Trebizond’s arrogance leads him to 
attack these men in pursuit of his own glory. Trebizond is a “public censor” who, 
refusing to spare anything “to claim for himself from the unlearned a bit of glory,” 
censures Quintilian, “a most learned rhetor and orator.”42 The end result is a portrayal of 
Trebizond as a tyrant, an “unskilled and ineptus [man] who thinks nothing correct except 
what he himself made.”43  
Agaso counts Guarino as one of the learned authorities whom Trebizond unjustly 
attacks.44 His discussion of the two men presents further evidence of Trebizond’s lack of 
Latinity—as well as his lack of honor—by contrasting Trebizond’s loquacity with 
Guarino’s eloquence. The distinction follows the classical model and throws into relief 
some of Agaso’s implicit anti-Greek attacks. Despite Guarino’s ornate words and sweet 
style, he explains, Trebizond wrongly attacks the smallest things.45 He was wrong, for 
41 Collectanea, 366. (6) Sin in tanta dicendi copia, doctrina ordine, subtilitate, dulcedine tam preclara 
negliguntur auctores, a quibus librarius ipse, si que eruditius ab eo dicta sunt, cuncta transcripsit verius 
quam excogitavit, quis sua legere volet? I take the description of Trebizond as a copyist as evidence of anti-
Greek language. See pages 52-55 below. 
 
42 Collectanea, 367. (16) Dein, ne ullis parcat huius publici lingua censoris et ab imperitis gloriolam 
aucupetur, Quintiliano, doctissimo et rhetori et oratori, turpes ignorationis notas conatur iniicere ut sibi 
decus intercipiat. Quintilianus ab ironia Ciceronem pro Q. Ligarii defensione exordium sumpsisse ait, quod 
hic noster negat, maleque sensisse Quintilianum Diogenes ipse iactat, quamquam et Martianum et alios 
peritissimos viros Quintiliano adstipulari certum sit. Cf. Quint., Inst. 4.1.38-39.   
 
43 Collectanea, 371. (33) Homine enim imperito et inepto nunquam quicquam iniustius est, qui nisi quod 
ipse fecit nil rectum putat.   
 
44 Ibid., 368. (19) Cernere est sexcenta que sibi fingit in somnia queque contra doctissimorum veterum 
usum et auctoritatem impudenter non minus quam imprudenter effutit. Hec tibi eam ob causam dixerim ut 
equo patiaris animo quia Guarino, preceptori nostro, eodem in libro non parcit, harum omnium rerum 
ignaro et, quod indignius est, hunc talem collaudanti.   
 
45 Ibid., 369. (25) “Nam que illius carpende orationis ratio extitit in Franciscum Carmegnolam edite 
amplissima cum senatus Veneti gloria, que satis pro dignitate laudari non potest? Ornatissima verba, idonea 
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instance, to argue Guarino ought to have used scribentium in his encomium rather than 
scriptorum.46 Agaso cites Livy as evidence of the correctness of Guarino’s usage and 
adds a further example “lest our Lycurgus or Minos of the Latin language suppose this 
was said here by chance rather than deliberate choice.” Indeed, Agaso offers a variety of 
examples—from Cicero’s Ad Herennium and Pro Archia, Servius’ Georgics, Virgil, and 
Nonius Marcellus—to prove Trebizond wrong.47 His appeal to these authorities is 
intended to demonstrate Trebizond’s ignorance, but it also reinforces the difference 
between a man who chatters on about things he does not understand and Guarino, whose 
style is sweet and well informed.   
Agaso’s anti-Greek language is explicit when he names Trebizond as the author 
of the criticisms against Guarino. The passage appears roughly half way through his 
letter, before which point he had referred to Trebizond only as a “Greekling author,” a 
rhetorical slight suggesting Trebizond’s name was not worth mentioning. When Agaso 
finally names Trebizond, he does so via his Greek origins. Noting that Trebizond hailed 
from Crete, he adds that he will forego personally commenting on the “men of this island 
sententiarum frequentia, stilus perquam suavis, enucleatus ad rem atque personam virtutum numerus et 
ordo, quamquam inexpertus homo Trapezuntius minima carpat, araneas imitatus que muscis aucupandis 
inhiant.  
 
46For Trebizond’s initial comment in the RLV, see ibid., 363. (8) Cur etiam “scribentium,” non 
“scriptorum” dixerit non intelligo, nisi quod timidum in dicendo hominem, ne a “scripto” “scriptorum” 
dicere videretur, inscitia deterruit. Sed hec infinita sunt atque idcirco pretermittenda.  
 
47 Ibid., 370. (27) Et, ne noster hic lingue Latine Lycurgus aut Minos dictum hoc fortuito potius quam 
iudicio censeat, legat et Livium primo de secundo bello Punico: ‘neque ulla, que in tali re memorabilis 
scribentibus videri solet, pretermissa clades est,’ scribentibus, non scriptoribus dixit…(28) Et quoniam 
pervicaces non facile cedere solent nisi multis obruantur exemplis, legisse debet apud Ciceronem ad 
Herennium: ‘inimicorum persequentissimum,’ non persecutorem; et in oratione Pro Archia: ‘populus enim 
Romanus aperuit Lucullo imperante Pontum,’ potius quam Lucullo imperatore. (29) Accedit et Servius, 
non minus rhetor facundus quam grammaticus eruditus, qui in tertio Georgicorum commento: ‘scimus,’ 
inquit, ‘esse concessum scribentibus ut iteratione prohemii legentium reficiant interdum laborem,’ magis 
quam scriptoribus et lectorum, ut magister imperat Trapezuntius Num Iuvenalis quoque: ‘culpa docentis 
scilicet arguitur,’ magis quam doctoris; Ovidius: ‘primi vidistis amantes,’ non amatores; Virgilius: ‘et 
amans et femina Dido;’ utque Trapezuntio familiarius inducatur exemplum: ‘quinque greges illi balantum,’ 
non balantricum. Non. Marcellus, ‘venantium telum,’ non venatorum esse declaravit?  
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and their character, lest I appear to revile the learning of the man.” Instead, he cites Paul: 
“A Cretan is a liar, an evil beast, slothful, and a glutton.”48 Agaso casts Trebizond’s 
attacks here as typical of his culture, an argument to which he returns shortly while 
discussing again his ineptia and loquentia. Accusing Trebizond of rendering Cicero 
“rough and unrefined,” all the while “knowing less of Latin,” Agaso comments that the 
man is surely aware of Cicero’s warning to Quintus regarding “shameless Greeklings like 
him”: 
And even among the Greeks themselves you must be on your guard against 
admitting close intimacies, except in the case of the very few, if such are to be 
found, who are worthy of ancient Greece. As things now stand, indeed, too many 
of them are untrustworthy, false, and schooled by long servitude in the arts of 
extravagant adulation. My advice is that these men should all be entertained with 
courtesy, but that close ties of hospitality or friendship should only be formed 
with the best of them: excessive intimacies with them are not very trustworthy—
for they do not venture to oppose our wishes—and they are not only jealous of 
our countrymen, but of their own as well.49 
 
Agaso makes explicit here what he implies elsewhere, and by citing Cicero he makes 
clear his debt to the classical Roman model for anti-Greek sentiment. Trebizond, like the 
Greeks Cicero describes, is untrustworthy, boastful, shameless, and interested more in 
argument than in truth.   
48 Ibid., 368. (19) Scire vis quisnam is est qui sic mortuos ac viventes exossat homines? E Creta dudum 
advectus, quo pruna et cotana, vento. (20) De cuius insule hominibus et eorum ingenio tacebo ipse, ne 
homini litterato conviciari videar, sed beatum Paulum audies, qui acceptum ab vetusto poeta versum 
hexametrum de illis breviter explicat: “Cretensis mendax, mala bestia, segnis, et alvus.” Cf. Titus 1:12. 
 
49 Collectanea, 370. (27) “Infortunatum Ciceronem qui non hec in tempora reservatus es ut Trapezuntius te 
rudem et impolitum expoliret ac doceret minus Latine scientem, qui tuis in Tusculanis nescio quo pacto 
effunderis, ‘itaque industrios homines illi studiosos vel potius amantes doloris appellant, qui amatores 
dicere formidasti, quamquam haud sciam te ne docturus esset! Non enim ignorat quam improbis suique 
similibus Greculis gravis homo semper obstiteris. (28) Meminit nanque ad Q. fratrem te ita scripsisse: 
‘atque etiam e Grecis ipsis diligenter cavende sunt familiaritates preter hominum perpaucorum, si qui sunt 
vetere Grecia digni. Sic vero fallaces sunt permulti et leves et diuturna servitute ad nimiam assentationem 
eruditi. Nimie familiaritates eorum neque tam fideles sunt (non enim audent adversari nostris voluntatibus) 
et vero invident non nostris solum verum etiam suis.’” Cf. Cic., Q. Fr. 1.16. For the preceding text, see note 
47. 
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 The characterizations Agaso outlines lead him to argue that Trebizond is unfit to 
instruct anyone in the study of rhetoric. It is an assertion with significant implications. 
There is too often a tendency in reading humanist invective to consider such attacks petty 
or meaningless. Humanist strategies to cultivate honor could have significant 
consequences and Agaso indicates the implications of his criticisms when he argues that 
Trebizond is likely to leave his students less knowledgeable—“dumber by half”—for 
having had him as their instructor. He suggests instead that Trebizond should be removed 
from teaching and that his salary should be “vomited back up again.” The precedent had 
already been set, he explains, years earlier when Trebizond had taught in Vicenza. During 
that time, he furnished his pupils “with stories and foolishness” and was cast out of the 
city.50 Whether this is true is unknown. Trebizond did leave his position in Vicenza in 
1428 and later blamed Guarino for driving him out.51 Whether the assertion was true or 
not, Agaso’s letter suggests the very real implications of these contests. Agaso not only 
defends Guarino but questions Trebizond’s aptitude for instructing patrician youths, a 
main source of income for humanists.  
  Agaso’s comment on Trebizond’s aptitude as an instructor is also an allusion to 
a figure who, in the Pro Flacco, epitomizes the ineptus and loquax Greek: Heraclides.52 
Monfasani does not cite the reference, but the parallels are clear and amplify Agaso’s 
preceding characterizations of Trebizond. Heraclides was “the chief man instigating all 
50 Collectanea, 367. (15) Eat igitur Greculus ipse, et discipulus esse discat qui magister esse nescit. 
Alioquin dimidio stultiores redditurus est discipulos quam accepit. Et intercepta salaria revomenda; Ibid., 
368. (20) Hic est qui aliquot ante annis Vicentiam, oppidum vetus ac nobile, publico salario conductus, 
dum fabulis iuventutem implet et ineptiis, explosus et exibilatus est. 
 
51 Ibid., 405. (102) Explosum me quondam e Vincentia exibilatumque dicis. Tua opera qui me vicinum 
nolebas.   
 
52 Cic., Flac. 42-49. Rawson cites Heraclides as an example of how easy it was “to stir up distrust of a 
Greek rhetor in the courts.” Rawson, 77. 
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the Greeks” against Flaccus. Cicero describes him as ineptus et loquax, eager for 
recognition [ambitiosus], and later, both audax and again loquax. He was a rhetor and 
teacher who was overly confident of his learning and who “claimed he could teach others 
the art of speaking.”53 Cicero also describes Heraclides as one accused and convicted of 
numerous charges, including his slander of Hermippus.54 Heraclides was for Agaso the 
perfect figure to signify Greek loquacity, arrogance, and abuse. Like Cicero’s description 
of Heraclides, Agaso portrays Trebizond as ineptus and loquax. Like Heraclides, 
Trebizond arrogantly believes himself capable of teaching the art of speaking. Both men 
are eager for recognition and Agaso cites Trebizond’s pursuit of glory as the reason he 
attacks authorities such as Quintilian.55 That Agaso intended his comment regarding 
Trebizond’s instruction as an allusion to Heraclides is evident in that he quotes Cicero’s 
descriptions almost verbatim. Despite his criticisms of Heraclides’s abilities, Cicero 
acknowledges that “this professor of oratory did have some rich young pupils, whom he 
made dumber by half than when he had taken them.”56 Trebizond too has some wealthy 
pupils, as Agaso makes clear. When he calls for Trebizond to be removed from his 
53 Cic., Flac. 42. Caput est omnium Graecorum concitandorum, qui cum accusatoribus sedet, Heraclides 
ille Temnites, homo ineptus et loquax, sed ut sibi videtur, ita doctus ut etiam magistrum illorum se esse 
dicat. At, qui ita sit ambitiosus ut omnis vos nosque cotidie persalutet, Temni usque ad illam aetatem in 
senatum venire non potuit et qui se artem dicendi traditurum etiam ceteris profiteatur, ipse omnibus 
turpissimis iudiciis victus est; Cic., Flac. 48. Sed cum se homo volubilis quadam praecipiti celeritate 
dicendi in illa oratione iactaret, repente testimoniis Fufiorum nominibusque recitatis homo audacissimus 
pertimuit, loquacissimus obmutuit. 
 
54 For the abuse of Hermippus, see page 36 above.  
 
55 For Agaso’s discussion of Trebizond as ineptus and loquax, his criticisms of Trebizond’s claims that he 
can teach the art of speaking, and his characterization of Trebizond’s pursuit of glory see pages 38-41.  
 
56 I retain Sutton’s translation in the first part of the sentence but offer my own translation of the latter part 
to make clear how Agaso’s criticism of Trebizond parallels Cicero’s characterization of Heraclides. Cic., 
Flac. 47. Habebat enim rhetor iste adulescentis quosdam locupletis, quos dimidio redderet stultiores quam 
acceperat… 
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teaching position to avoid rendering his students “dumber by half,” it is to Heraclides, the 
quintessential ineptus, loquax, and arrogans Greek that Agaso alludes. 
Agaso uses the Heraclides allusion as a cautionary tale that fifteenth-century 
pedagogues would have understood well. His suggestion that Trebizond should have his 
salary revoked and his discussion of the expulsion from Vicenza reflect the seriousness 
with which humanist educators viewed poor instructors who greatly complicated the 
learning process. Guarino himself accepted this premise. Battista Guarino (1434-1513), 
Guarino’s son, penned an educational treatise he describes as “the program of teaching 
and the precepts of study which my father, who was as learned as he was excellent…used 
to teach his pupils.”57 His arguments can be understood as indicative of his father’s 
program of study. Quoting the Pro Flacco, Battista Guarino argues “it is of capital 
importance not to hand over beginning pupils to coarse and uneducated teachers. For the 
pupils of such men as Cicero says, return ‘dumber by half’ than when they left.” The 
danger lay not only in leading students astray but also in the effort required to undo the 
damage done by an unlearned teacher.58 Similarly, Pier Paolo Vergerio (1370-1444) also 
argued for the importance of youths becoming “accustomed to the best” teachers from the 
57 This and all subsequent translations are Kallendorf’s. For all of the treatises in Kallendorf’s edited 
collection, I cite the section numbers provided by Kallendorf. Battista Guarino, De ordine docendi et 
studendi, trans. and ed. Craig W. Kallendorf, in Humanist Educational Treatises (Cambridge, MA: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), 39.  
 
58 Ibid., 4. In primis autem id cavendum erit ne rudibus et indoctis ab initio praeceptoribus tradantur 
erudiendi, a quibus illud Ciceronis consequantur, ut ‘dimidio stultiores,’ redeant quam accesserint. Ut enim 
tempus taceam quid amittunt: efficitur profecto illud Timoethei musici, ut postea duplex suscipiendus sit 
labor: alter quo ea quae didicerunt oblivioni tradant—quid sane difficillimum…alter, ut ad meliores 
praeceptiones evehantur, quod etiam eo tardius fit, quo in prioribus illis obliterandis necesse est operam 
tempusque consumere. Kallendorf notes the references to Cic., Flac. 47 and to Quint., Inst. 2.3.2-3. 
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beginning. He explained that if “they imbibe any errors, twice as much time will be 
needed: to shake out errors, and then to inculcate true precepts.”59    
The Agaso letter defined the terms of the conflict between the two men. 
Trebizond’s task in his response to Guarino was to answer the challenges laid at his feet. 
This meant addressing the accusations regarding his learning and Latinity as well as the 
resultant claims regarding his aptitude as an instructor and authority of rhetoric. It also 
meant grappling with the anti-Greek language Agaso used and the stereotypes that 
informed that language.  
Latinity Defended 
 
Trebizond’s 1437 Responsio to Guarino was his chance to construct an alternative 
definition of himself to counter Agaso’s characterization of him as an ineptus, loquax, 
arrogans Graeculus. To do so he had to demonstrate a mastery of Latin and prove his 
Latinity. That the majority of his effort was spent defending his Latinity indicates how 
important he considered that strategy to his self-presentation. He struggled with Agaso’s 
labels and his response illustrates the pressure he felt as a Greek to establish his Latin 
bona fides. To that end, he directly engaged Agaso on the technical arguments Agaso had 
raised against him, much as Agaso had considered Trebizond’s specific criticisms of 
Guarino. A few examples suffice to demonstrate this. To the accusation that in lamenting 
the collapse of rhetorical study he had disparaged a host of venerated authors, Trebizond 
makes a distinction between speaking with the art and speaking about the art. True, he 
acknowledges, the authors Agaso cites are examples of good rhetorical practice, but they 
59 Pier Paolo Vergerio, De ingenuis moribus et liberalibus adulescentiae studiis liber, in Humanist 
Educational Treatises, ed. Kallendorf, 49. Ergo si melioribus initio assueverint, illos habebunt praecipuos 
et veluti ducibus semper utentur. Sin vero errores ullos imbiberint, his duplici tempore opus erit, primum ut 
errores excutiant, ac deinde ut vera praecepta condiscant.  
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contributed nothing to a discussion of the art itself.60 In response to Agaso’s criticisms of 
his grammatical usage, he recalls Guarino’s previous feud with Poggio regarding Caesar 
and Scipio. Here, Trebizond mocks Guarino’s misinterpretation of Livy and likens his 
comprehension of the text and his ability to discuss it to that of a student.61 To Agaso’s 
complaint that he identifies four rather than six parts of an oration, Trebizond explains 
that Cicero himself eventually rejected the six-part scheme laid out in De oratore in favor 
of four parts.62 In each case, Trebizond’s efforts serve dual purposes, to undermine 
Guarino’s claims of knowledge while making clear his own skill as a Latinist.   
60 Collectanea, 383. (9) Cum autem nobis in illis libris, ut orationes declamationesque maiorum intelligere 
ac imitari valeamus, non ex arte, sed de arte dicere propositum sit, que duo inter se adeo differre asserit 
Cicero ut multi de arte bene, nihil ex arte dicere potuerint, cur tu Isocratem ac Demosthenem, quos nihil de 
arte scripsisse constat, nobis obiicis? Aut cur declamationes nescio cuius orationesque Ciceronis, que nobis 
multa huius artifcii ornamenta perperunt, in medium profers?...(10) Tu ipse fateris Ciceronem sua 
retractasse quoniam adolescenti vel “inchoata vel rudia exciderunt.” Itaque fit ut nisi ad Grecos refugias, 
nihil habeas. Non dico hec quod mihi plurima Cicero artis principia non tradiderit, sed tuis verbis ostendo 
partim que retractata ab auctore suo predicas, ea tibi sic magna videri non debere ut, nisi mente captus sis, 
alia non querites, partim nihil tibi fere ex tam multis reliqui fieri, quod probes, ut videas deplorandum 
profecto nobis fuisse quod tantos optimorum librorum cumulos amiserimus et meos codices ut animo, sic 
sermone amplectaris. Cf. Agaso’s argument, pages 39-40 above and Collectanea, 365. (4) Nam Aristotelis, 
Isocratis, Hermogenis, Demosthenis, Victorini, Boetii, Augustini, Quintiliani, Ciceronis, aliorumque 
complurimum omissa recordatio <est>, quorum volumina, Rhetorica, Orator, De oratore, Partitiones, 
Institutiones oratorie, Declamationes, orationes, commentaria satis superque ad fulciendam eloquentiam 
forent nisi tempora vel mores sic adversarentur ut nos potius libris quam libri nobis defuisse videantur.   
 
61 Collectanea, 386. (22) Et cum testem T. Livium citares, quod pusillanimis civis fuisset Scipio, in te 
ipsum adduxisti. Quid enim rudius quam cum scribat Livius prestantem fuisse virum P. Scipionem, belli 
tamen artibus quam pacis prestantiorem, his verbis, ‘pacis artibus,’ pusillanimem illum putare neque videre 
prestantiam in omnibus attestatum homini Livium? Que cum in pacis et belli artibus ei partita sit, si utraque 
in re qualis fuerit Scipio scire cupis, prestans, inquit; si in utra prestantior, in belli artibus, inquit. Tu 
prestans illud, quod Livius quasi genus posuerat, pro pusillanimo interpretaris. Ita litteraturam tenes. Sic 
textus discipulis exponis. For the Scipio-Caesar controversy between Guarino and Poggio see Chapter 
Three, pages 108-109. 
 
62 Collectanea, 388. (30) “At veteres et posteriores sexpartito partiuntur.” Audite, audite, omnes, atque 
attendite quanta sit Guarini peritia. Cicero in his voluminibus que ipso teste retractavit sex, in Partitionibus 
statim in principio nobis his verbis astipulatur: “quatuor orationis sunt partes,” inquit, “exordium, narratio, 
concertatio, peroratio.” Audis, Guarine? Vidisti unquam hunc locum? Centies oculis scio, sed mente 
nunquam. Si Ciceronis ergo auctoritate, Aristotelis, Grecorumque omnium movemur, quatuor, sin aliorum 
quorumcunque vis, sex existimabimus.Verum qui sex dicunt, percipiendi commoditatem, non rei veritatem 
secuti sunt. Ergo nos et cur quatuor et quomodo sex aperuimus ut et Ciceronem in Partitionibus intelligas et 
ceteros non asperneris. For Agaso’s complaint, see page 40 above. Cf. Cic., De or. 1.47 and Cic., Part. or. 
4, 27. 
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In articulating these technical arguments, Trebizond sometimes explicitly 
recognizes Agaso’s accusations as anti-Greek. In fact, he pauses at one point to justify his 
criticisms of Guarino and his defense of the RLV, and in doing so he outlines the dilemma 
facing him by referring directly to the concept of Greek levitas:  
What should I say? What should I do? To whom should I turn? If I say I 
discovered many things [in Guarino’s writing], changed them for the better and 
made them clearer, although this is true, I will nevertheless be blamed for 
arrogance, and Guarino will exclaim about the “levitas” of the Greek man!63  
 
Trebizond acknowledges here the conundrum posed by his Greekness. If he defends 
himself, he risks living up to Agaso’s characterization of him as a stereotypical arrogant 
Greek interested only in seeking glory for himself at the expense of others. It is worth 
noting, however, that Agaso never explicitly accuses the Greeks or Trebizond of 
levitas.64 Trebizond’s use of the term suggests that he recognizes the totality of Agaso’s 
case against him—in essence a series of accusations that his behavior lacks honor and 
dignity—as Agaso acting out an overarching stereotype of levitas. It also indicates that 
Trebizond is clearly aware of how much that stereotype complicates his defense. 
 To combat accusations of arrogance and levitas, Trebizond repeatedly claims 
that what he has written about the art of speaking, including his criticisms of Guarino’s 
style, has value for general use [communis utilitas]. The emphasis he places on his 
contributions to Latin studies is also an important part of his defense of his Latinity. He 
begins the letter to Guarino by noting that when he received the Agaso letter, he did not 
respond by retracting what he had said, “those things we wrote for general use [communis 
63 Collectanea, 393. (48) Quid dicam? Quid faciam? Quo me vertam? Si me multa invenisse, multa in 
melius mutasse, multa illustrasse dixero, etsi id verum sit, culpabitur tamen arrogantia, et ‘Greci hominis 
levitatem!’ Guarinus exclamabit. 
 
64 The exception is when Agaso quotes Cicero. See page 43 above. 
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utilitas].”65 In the middle of the letter, he explains that if he allows Agaso’s criticisms of 
his books—“which many eminent men judge pertain to general use [communis 
utilitas]”—to stand, he fears that “the false accusations of my enemies [will] detract more 
from the general good [commune commodum] than from me.” He maintains that his work 
is useful for his contemporaries and for posterity.66 The work, he continues, demonstrates 
how much he has to offer to orators and to the art of speaking.67   
Trebizond’s technical arguments represent one set of strategies he employs to 
demonstrate his Latinity, but he also appeals to his spoken eloquence. This too is 
evidence of his direct engagement with Agaso, who had had a number of unflattering 
things to say about Trebizond’s speaking style. For example, Agaso recalls a story an 
unnamed patrician told to him wherein a crowd of Guarino’s former students and 
supporters confronted Trebizond.68 Many in the crowd, the patrician reported, spoke at 
length about Guarino’s prudence and the elegance, sweetness, and clarity of his speech. 
In a Homeric reference that seems an implicit slight of Trebizond, the patrician told 
65 Collectanea, 381. (1) Postquam vero ad me tua oratiuncula vix delata est, non his que scripsimus tantum, 
hoc est, communi utilitati, indigne detrahi, sed librorum quoque auctorem contumeliis peti abste iniuria 
perspexi, quodque iniquissimum est et tibi vel tuorum iudicio turpissimum, non tuo in me aperte sed, ne 
commodius me defendam, occulte ac timide sub Agasonis nomine invectus es. 
 
66 Ibid., 393. (48) Sin libros, quos non nihil ad utilitatem communem et multi et preclari viri pertinere 
arbitrantur, non tutabor, ambigam oportet ne invidorum calumnia plus communi commodo quam mihi 
detraxerit. Quin ego me balantum familiarem, ut Guarinus dicit, esse fatebor, si, cum inimicum videam in 
Agasonem versum ut ut et mihi licentius ac tutius convicietur, et sibi tum multa alia falso arroget, tum vel 
maxime illud de Nestore Homericum ad se transferat, cuius e lingua melle dulcior fluebat oratio, nequid 
ipse, qui ad communem usum et equalibus et posteris non nulla contuli, de me ipso dicam? See note 63 for 
the preceding text.   
 
67 Collectanea, 394. (52) Me vero multa quoque peperisse ac usu oratorum animadvertisse utilia robustaque 
dicendi precepta ipse codex demonstrat. 
 
68 For more on the patrician’s testimony see pages 52-53 and 74-75 below. The patrician’s testimony is an 
interesting component of the Agaso letter that reflects the importance of audience in acts of self-
presentation. By drawing upon supposed third-party accounts, Agaso suggests that Trebizond’s reputation, 
in this case his lack of eloquence, is well known. Agaso’s letter was meant to be circulated and read and the 
patrician’s testimony amplifies his criticisms by making them seem consistent with the judgments of others.  
50 
 
                                                 
 
Agaso how Guarino’s supporters described how “from his [Guarino’s] tongue, as Homer 
said about Nestor, speech flowed sweeter than honey.” Trebizond did not fare as well 
when the patrician compared his speech to Guarino’s. According to him, whenever 
Trebizond speaks, he chews his words, speaks with a snort, and mumbles like “a thick 
swarm of bees in a hollow oak.”69  
The passage is interesting because of the bold response it elicits from Trebizond, 
which illustrates how crucial Latinity was to his self-presentation. He argues that if 
Guarino had ever heard him speak or had asked anybody who had, he “would praise my 
voice as much as my spirit and my Latinity, and would proclaim I had been born not in 
Greece but in Rome, not in these times but in the age of Cicero.” Monfasani considers 
this passage representative of the “braggadocio and buffoonery” of the letter, and cites as 
evidence Trebizond’s description of how Guarino would marvel at the sweetness of his 
composition, be overwhelmed by his skills and would finally, with creaking knees and 
blushing face, acknowledge his eloquence.70 At the same time, Trebizond mocks 
69 Ibid., 368-369. (22) Tum frequentes ad eum, ut pharmacopolam, auditores accurrebant, recentem adhuc 
Guarini cum caritate memoriam disciplinamque retinentes. Proinde audire erat varias de Guarino 
predicationes: alius prudentiam, ille comitate conditam gravitatem, nonnulli ingenium et legendi suavitatem 
ac evidentiam, quidam scribendi facundiam nec minus orandi dulcedinem extollebant, cum ex eius lingua, 
ut de Nestore dixit Homerus, melle dulcior flueret oratio. Quas ob laudes animosus in primis homo 
Trapezuntius eum sibi parem ferre non valens absentis honori detractare cepit et invidie stimulis agitatus et 
emulationis facibus incensus ista in eum maledicta scriptis evomuit, quasi vel Guarinum, qui docta per ora 
volitat, sua spoliare commendatione queat vel se alienis conviciis in peioris comparatione adornare, qui 
quotiens lectionem exponendam aggreditur, verba mandit, balba de nare loquitur, vocem suffocat et, 
urentes quasi fabas, infringat, non tam profert quam immurmurat; credas densum crabronum examen intra 
cavam quercum instrepere.  
 Cf. Hom., Il. 2.87. The bee imagery may be an extension of the Homeric reference to Nestor and 
an allusion to Homer describing the Greeks gathering for assembly as a dense swarms of bees. The 
characterization may suggest that Trebizond has all the eloquence of a dense, incoherent mob. It may also 
suggest Trebizond is like the Greek warriors in the mob Homer describes, the intent being to focus on 
Trebizond’s aggression and anger. Agaso’s likening of Guarino to Nestor emphasizes Guarino’s eloquence 
but may also suggest his wise counsel, as Nestor had advised reconciliation between Agamemnon and 
Achilles. The contrast could distinguish Guarino’s wisdom, eloquence, and modesty from Trebizond’s 
aggression, violence, and Achilles-like rage.  
 
70 Monfasani, George of Trebizond, 31. 
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Guarino’s distorted speech and pronunciation.71 Although the passage is deliberately 
boastful, it is more than just buffoonery. It is part of Trebizond’s consistent effort to 
defend his eloquence and reputation to a community that required Latin eloquence. It is 
not without reason that he twice refers to his Latinity here—first when he argues that 
Guarino would praise him for his Latinity and again when he claims Guarino would think 
Trebizond had been born in Cicero’s Rome. This is not the only time he adamantly 
defends his eloquence. Early on, he accuses Guarino of creating the Agaso pseudonym 
because “you cannot endure George’s eloquence,” which had long left him trembling.72 
Here, however, Trebizond defends his speech as a specifically Latin eloquence.  
The importance of Latin eloquence is also clear in Agaso’s attempt to label 
Trebizond as a copyist, one of his implicitly anti-Greek attacks. He makes this charge 
when questioning the value of the RLV. If, Agaso asks, one accepts Trebizond’s premise 
that the works of so many brilliant men and the study of rhetoric have been neglected, 
why would anybody choose to read the RLV, the work of a copyist [librarius], over the 
originals?73 Agaso’s question casts doubt on the value of the copyist, the most common 
71 Collectanea, 386-387. (23) Deinde balbutire audes in exponenda lectione, verba me mandere, balba de 
nare loqui, vocem suffocare, nec tam proferre quam immurmurare. Si audisses tu me, Guarine, aut si saltem 
ab iis qui audiverunt querere voluisses (dicam aperte non ut me laudem, sed ut iniuria circumventum 
defendam), tam vocem, quam spiritum, quam Latinitatem laudares, nec me in Grecia ortum, sed Rome, nec 
his temporibus, sed Ciceronis etate natum predicares. Nam suavitate compositionis premulsus, verborum 
gravitate contusus, scientiarum oppressus pondere, pronuntiatione attonitus, vi denique argumentorum 
perterritus, etiam si tacere cuperes, tremore tamen genuum, trepidatione vocis, et vultus confusione quid 
sentires animo spiritu, Stentore sonantius conclamares. Proinde, irride tu quidem et detorque os, ac verba 
comprime, ut soles, lipposque oculos tuos anteaquam tenacissimis e dentibus syllaba elabatur, huc atque 
illuc, quasi rabie concitus, centies circumferas, ac in singulis pronunciandis verbis non parva temporum 
spatia interpone ut que in scribendo tam tarditas quam incommoditas tibi inest, ea etiam in dicendo inesse 
videatur. 
 
72 Ibid., 382. (5) Vident enim omnes atque intelligunt versute sic te inscripsisse quoniam orationem Georgii 
ferre non posses, cuius vim dicendi iam exhorruisses. 
 
73 Ibid., 366. (6). See note 41.  
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literary position open to and filled by Byzantine émigrés.74 Agaso suggests that the role 
was hardly impressive, a point he makes again when offering the patrician’s testimony. 
The patrician, Agaso reports, had praised Trebizond specifically for his ability to rise 
above the role of copyist: “And no small amount of esteem and praise ought to be given 
to Trebizond as is fitting for one who, once a copyist drawn from Crete to the eminent 
nobility of the patrician order, secured for himself a greater position by means of his 
virtue and the strength of his talent.”75 Though it is clear from Agaso’s earlier comments 
that he is not willing—whereas the patrician is willing—to accept Trebizond as anything 
more than a copyist, the patrician’s testimony does reinforce Agaso’s underlying premise 
that copyists held a lower status than other men of learning.76 The role of copyist offered 
opportunity, but there was an assumption that true talent allowed one to attain positions 
of greater prestige. Agaso uses that assumption as means to undermine Trebizond’s 
Latinity and RLV. 
Trebizond’s response indicates that he understood public perceptions regarding 
copyists and the underlying standard of Latin eloquence to which humanists were held. 
That he felt anxiety about being labeled a copyist is clear from the fact that he replies 
directly to the label when describing his early education in Italy. He admits that when he 
74 Harris, 124; Reynolds and Wilson, 148. 
 
75 Collectanea, 368. (21) Huius bellissimi viri ingratitudinem et de preceptore maledicta cum in aliquorem 
cetu patriciorum nuper increparem, hoc ab eorum uno et quidem excellentissimo eidemque familiarissimo 
responsum accepi: “Hic est, si forte, hospes, ignoras, Georgius Trapezuntius nomine,” inquit, “qui superiori 
[sic] tempore, cum ludum aperiret, modo non eloquentie fontes polliceri coepit. Et sane Trapezuntio non 
parva commendatio laudesque debentur ut qui librarius olim ad insignem patricii ordinis virum e Creta 
conductus pro ipsius virtute ac ingenii ardore maiorem sibi gradum adoptavit.”  
 Monfasani’s edition reads “cum in aliquorem cetu patriciorum.” The aliquorem must be an 
aliquorum and taken with the patriciorum. I do not know if this is a mistake in the manuscripts or in 
Monfasani’s edition. He does not note the spelling in his apparatus.   
 
76 Agaso also includes the patrician’s comment because the patrician went on to describe how he had 
supposedly witnessed Guarino’s students speak in defense of their instructor and Trebizond publicly 
slander Guarino. See pages 74-75.   
53 
 
                                                 
 
had arrived in Italy at the behest of Francesco Barbaro, Barbaro had asked him if he 
would be willing to transcribe Greek codices. Trebizond had replied that he “preferred to 
devote my efforts to my Latin letters.”77 Monfasani rightly reads this commitment to 
Latin studies as evidence of Trebizond’s attempts to assimilate to Latin culture.78 
Trebizond’s descriptions of his early Latin education are clear attempts to present himself 
as a skilled Latinist. He explains how he was unable to speak or understand a word of 
Latin upon his arrival and elsewhere describes how he “scarcely knew the shape of the 
Latin letters.” He boasts that after a few years he was able to “keep two very fast scribes 
busy while speaking on two subjects at the same time.”79 He describes his rapid progress 
as a result of his diligence and a series of important instructors. He credits Barbaro, the 
“most brilliant physician” Nicholas Leonardus, and finally Vittorino da Feltre, whom he 
names as his true Latin instructor.80 The latter figure is of particular importance. By 
77 Collectanea, 397. (67) “Venisti de Grecia missus librarius,” inquit, “ad insignem virum patricii ordinis,” 
quem non nominas, veritus ne tua fallatia sinceritate ipsius evertatur. (68) Ego nomen apponam, quoniam 
post deum preclarissimam genere, virtute, doctrina militem Franciscum Barbarum huius quicquid in me est 
auctorem habeo, apud quem te monstrante, cum vix figuras Latinarum litterarum pernoscerem, prima didici 
rudimenta…(69) Illico enim cum venissem, interrogatus ab eo, te presente, si vellem Grecos codices 
transcribere, Latinis me dare operam letteris velle dixi. Cui actutum ille: et ego tibi, ut discas, optimam 
commoditatem prestabo. Ita librarium me missum usque ad hos dies ignorabam; Guarinus sciebat, qui 
consuluit. 
 
78 Monfasani, George of Trebizond, 11. 
 
79 Collectanea, 394. (53) Nam eius vires quante sint nos tibi exemplo sumus, qui maiusculi quam vigennes 
cum in Italiam venissemus, monstro multis fuimus cum nec dicere nec percipere quicquam a quoquam 
possemus. Paucissimis deinde annis et Latine ita locuti sumus ut in duabus causis duobus velocissimis in 
scribendo librariis eodem tempore dicendo suffecerimus, et <precepta> doctrinarum omnium bonarumque 
artium, addam etiam, ut magis doleas, ipsius theologie, cui relique omnes administrantur (pauca quidem, 
sed tamen que tibi ad celos usque coacervata viderentur) percepimus, et, nisi onere filiorum oppressi et 
valitudine deiecti, litterarum studia pene liquissemus. Singulare iam ingenii specimen invidorum victa 
protervia de nobis edere facile possemus. 
 
80 I use Vittorino’s Italian name. Trebizond uses his Latin name Victorinus Feltrensis. Ibid., 397. (67) 
Preceptorem enim te meum fingis, cum ego Greca a meis, Latina a Victorino Feltrensi acceperim; Ibid., 
398 (72) Vix duorum mensium illa tua fuit doctrina in transcribendo, non in discendo me penitus occupato, 
si tamen doctrina sit appellanda primorum elementorum confusa cognitio. Postquam inde ad clarissimi 
physici Nicolai de Leonardis domum profectus sum, duce illo ad quem missus fueram, ut domum, ita 
doctorem mutavi. 
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naming Vittorino, an Italian, as his Latin instructor, Trebizond was implicitly attempting 
to strengthen his claims of eloquence and prove his Latin bona fides against Agaso’s 
claims that he was no more than a Greekling copyist. In fact, Trebizond implies, he is a 
skilled Latinist precisely because Vittorino—a learned, eloquent Italian—instructed him. 
Trebizond’s description of this period stresses his desire to attain glory through Latin but 
should also be read as a clear repudiation of Agaso’s attempt to limit him to the role of 
copyist. Trebizond is clear here that his interest had always been in honing his Latin 
skills, not in copying Greek texts, and perhaps even more importantly that he had 
developed the skill set required of a master Latinist. He recognized the danger of being 
pigeonholed as a copyist and relegated to the status of a second-class scholar.  
In Defense of Greece 
 
In addition to defending his Latinity, Trebizond often goes to great lengths to 
defend the value of Greeks and their literature in response to Agaso’s anti-Greek 
language. Trebizond’s defense of Greece appears at times to contradict his defense of his 
Latinity. This is the case when he distances himself from the role of the Greek copyist 
and implies a tacit acceptance of a standard of learning that values Latinity over 
Greekness. The two strategies make clear the complicated experiences of Greek émigrés 
as individuals torn between two worlds. Trebizond clearly felt pressured to assimilate to 
life in Italy but could not distance himself completely from his background. Agaso’s 
letter indicates that certain individuals would not allow him to do so. Beyond that, 
Trebizond’s background did create professional opportunities. His defense of Greek 
studies shows that he wanted to take advantage of these opportunities, but struggled with 
how to do so. His struggle explains Monfasani’s correct observation that as much as 
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Trebizond assimilated to Latin culture, he never abandoned his Greek patriotism.81 
Trebizond’s defense of Greek studies is also indicative of how early fifteenth-century 
humanism simultaneously articulated an anti-Greek bias and an argument in favor of 
Greek learning. 
There was a firm foundation in Quattrocento Italy on which Trebizond could draw 
to justify the value of Greek learning in response to the Agaso letter in 1437. A useful 
pair of examples are the letters of Guarino and his student Francesco Barbaro in response 
to Lorenzo da Monachi’s 1416 public condemnation of Greek studies as fruitless.82 
Lorenzo was then secretary to the Venetian Senate, chancellor of Crete, and a friend of 
both Leonardo Bruni and Barbaro. Barbaro’s perspective is of particular interest because, 
if we accept the premise that Agaso was really one of Guarino’s students, Barbaro’s 
steadfast defense of Greek studies is inconsistent with Agaso’s anti-Greek attacks. That 
one of Guarino’s students (Barbaro) so resolutely defended Greek learning makes it 
difficult to understand why Agaso (supposedly another of Guarino’s students) used such 
forceful anti-Greek language against Trebizond. His language is even harder to fathom 
because Agaso did not qualify it, as for instance Cicero did, by distinguishing between 
the general benefits of Greek learning on the one hand and specific “bad” Greeks on the 
other.83 Though hardly conclusive evidence, this inconsistency makes it plausible that 
Agaso was, as Trebizond believed, not really Guarino’s student. The inconsistency 
81 Monfasani, George of Trebizond, 130.  
 
82 Deno Geanakoplos discusses the context of the da Monachi comments in “The Discourse of Demetrius 
Chalcondyles on the Inauguration of Greek Studies at the University of Padua in 1463,” Studies in the 
Renaissance 21 (1974): 130-1. See also Sarah Stever Gravelle, “Lorenzo Valla’s Comparison of Latin and 
Greek and the Humanist Background,” Bibliothèque d’Humanisme et Renaissance 44, no.2 (1982): 269-
273. 
 
83 See my discussion of the “degradation model” above, note 32. Although Agaso makes no such 
distinction, I argue Trebizond does follow Cicero when arguing in defense of Greece. See pages 63-66.   
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remains, of course, if Guarino really did compose the letter. In that case, Agaso’s 
language could be understood as a deliberate attempt of Guarino’s to attack Trebizond as 
a Greek without attaching his own name to anti-Greek slander. As a learned orator, 
Guarino would have been able to argue both sides of the issue, in this case marshaling 
anti-Greek language to attack a Greek opponent while himself believing in the 
importance of Greek literature. Speculation aside, Trebizond, firmly believing Agaso to 
be Guarino, later employed a defense of Greek learning similar to the one Guarino and 
Barbaro had articulated.  
Guarino responds to da Monachi’s comments and defends Greek studies in a 1416 
letter to Nicholas Perondolus with the argument that Greek studies are useful and 
necessary to Latin studies.84 He characterizes Greek letters as both joyful and useful to 
Latins and “bound to Latin letters by such an affinity and necessity that you would not 
unreasonably call them mother and daughter.” He cites their utility for “all the liberal arts 
and sciences,” suggesting that some things can only be conveyed properly in Greek, and 
quotes Horace’s exhortation: “page through the Greek models day and night…the Muse 
gave genius to the Greeks; to the Greeks she gave the ability to speak with smoothness 
and polish.”85 Ancient Romans, Guarino contends, so valued Greek letters that nearly all 
were learned in them. He concludes by appealing to his own famous Greek instructor, 
84 Guarino of Verona to Niccolò Perondolo, Venice, 1416, in Epistolario di Guarino Veronese, ed. Remigio 
Sabbadini, vol. 1, Testo (Venice: A spese della Società, 1915), 98-99.  
 
85 Ibid., 98-99. Gaudeo et magnopere te collaudo, quod summa cum ratione ad graecarum studia litterarum 
te vehementer anhelantem aspicio; quae tam iocundae tam utiles nostris hominibus sunt et latinis litteris 
tanta cognatione ac necessitudine devinctae, ut matrem ac filiam non iniuria dixeris et “qui utramvis norit, 
ambas ferme norit.” Id adeo verum est, ut omnes liberales artes, omnes scientiae, quibus latinitas utitur, 
graeca prae se ferant nomina, immo si latinis appellentur vocabulis, quasi mutata veste ac habitu, vix 
dignosci queant. Quocirca non absurdum illud Horatii praeceptum: “vos exemplaria graeca nocturna 
versate manu versate diurna;” quidni? “Graiis ingenium, Graiis dedit ore rotundo musa loqui.” Cf. Hor., 
Ars. P. 208 and 323. 
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Chrysoloras, who explained that the decline in Latin studies was a result of the decline in 
Greek.86 Further evidence of Guarino’s position can be found in his son’s educational 
treatise. Battista Guarino is even more emphatic than his father on the importance of 
Greek, arguing: 
I shall proclaim it loudly: no one can get completely to the bottom and into the 
marrow, so to speak, of prosody without knowledge of Greek. I know there are 
many people who say it is unnecessary for Latin literature. These are people who 
are themselves ignorant of Greek and want everyone else to be equally ignorant, 
so that if they may not be judged superior to others, at least they can avoid being 
thought inferior. For my part…I shall believe that Greek is not only useful but 
absolutely essential for Latin letters.87 
 
and:  
We follow the example of the learned men of old, none of whom were ignorant of 
Greek; and the authority of Quintilian, who says that our literature flowed from 
the Greek; and of Cicero, who holds that Greek literature should receive the credit 
if Cato speaks with more learning in [Cicero’s] book On Old Age than he had 
been used to do in his own books; and the exhortation of Horace…88 
 
Battista Guarino’s defense is important not only as evidence of his father’s position but as 
evidence of the codification of that position into educational precept. 
Barbaro, unlike Guarino, wrote directly to da Monachi, and his response offers a 
similar though more extensive set of arguments than Guarino’s.89 He argues that today’s 
86 Guarino of Verona to Niccolò Perondolo, Epistolario, ed. Sabbadini, 99. Quod apud maiores nostros ita 
servatum est, ut neminem ferme sine graecarum eruditione litterarum comperias: adeo ut Mario clarissimo 
imperatori vitio et infamiae obiecta sit graecae ignoratio litteraturae. Et profecto verum est quod a 
clarissimo philosopho et huius aetatis lumine Manuele Chrysolora dici saepenumero audiebam, a quo 
manavit quicquid graecorum hodie studiorum ad nostrates derivatum est homines. Is crebro commemorare 
solebat maximarum rerum scientiam et doctissimos illos apud nostros defecisse viros, cum graeca defecere 
studia. 
 
87 Battista Guarino, De ordine docendi et studendi, in Humanist Educational Treatises, ed. Kallendorf, 16.  
 
88 Ibid., 17. Kallendorf notes the comparisons to Quint., Inst., 1.1.12; Cic., Acad. 2.2.5; Sen. 8.26. 
 
89 Francesco Barbaro to Lorenzo da Monachi, Venice, in Epistolario, ed. Claudio Griggio, vol. 2, La 
raccolta canonica delle Epistole (Florence: L.S. Olschiki, 1999), 3-18. The letter is undated. Given the date 
of Guarino’s letter to Perondolo and the time of the controversy it was likely also written in 1416. Gravelle 
notes that Bruni praised Barbaro’s letter and wrote to Guarino for a copy of da Monachi’s comments so he 
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erudite men ought to value Greek studies, “since they always held the greatest influence 
among the wisest of our ancestors.”90 Erudition was contingent upon knowledge of 
Greek.91 Like Guarino, he argues that classical Romans were well-versed in Greek and 
considered it a fundamental part of education.92 These men “watered their gardens with 
the rivers of the Greeks.”93 Barbaro offers as evidence Cicero’s estimation of Greek 
learning in his otherwise decidedly anti-Greek defense of Flaccus: “I do not deny the 
charms of their speech, the keenness of their intellects. Finally, I do not deny to them any 
too could compose a response. Leonardo Bruni to Guarino of Verona, Florence, in Leonardi Bruni Arretini 
Epistolarum libri VIII, ed. Lorenzo Mehus (Florence: 1741), 4:125-126. Bruni’s request is another 
indication of how texts circulated among humanists, passed hand to hand among friends, and how literary 
controversies spread and were sustained. See note 35.  
 
90 Francesco Barbaro to Lorenzo da Monachi, Venice, in Epistolario, ed. Claudio Griggio, 6. Quod tametsi 
adeo perspicuum sit, ut in contrarium neminem verbum esse facturum existimem, nisi qui contentiosus ac 
indoctus quam gravis et eruditus haberi malit, tamen de utroque dicam et de litteris grecis prius, que 
magnum apud eruditos homines pondus habere debent, cum apud sapientissimos viros maiores nostros 
maximum semper habuerint. 
 
91 Ibid., 6. Et ut reliquas nationes in presentia missas faciam, in omnibus enim gentibus greca hec litteratura 
singulari in admiratione fuit, apud Latinos tantum habuit auctoritatis eo tempore quo grecis in philosophia 
litteris Romanos non eguisse a Cicerone scriptum est, ut quisquis eruditionem huius sermonis non calleret 
sine ulla dubitatione indoctus haberetur; Ibid., 10-11. Quid plura? Nisi me fallit animus, facile perspiciemus 
neminem qui de his litterature partibus cum ingenio et industria versatus sit, a nobis nisi per tenebras 
intelligi posse, si grecarum litterarum lumen non accesserit; Ibid., 11. si denique ipsi rei que valet plurimum 
et commoditati atque necessitati studiorum nostrorum credere voluerimus, certo nobis persuadebimus 
grecas litteras cum latinis habere strictissimum et necessarium quoddam vinculum et tanto nobis usui ac 
honori esse posse, ut nemo sine hoc instrumento in ullis illustrioribus artibus satis instructus, satis ornatus 
habendus sit. 
 
92Ibid., 7-8. Quid in singulis moror? Omnes qui in ampla laude nati, in amplissima vixerunt, ita grecis 
litteris ornatos fuisse legimus, ut non modo que in illis continentur cognovisse constet, sed etiam verba et 
versus memoria tenuisse manifestum sit. Sic Cesares consulares triumphales pretorios senatorios patritios 
equites et reliquos qui ullo numero essent, ex tempore aliquid homericum aut sophocleum et aliorum 
exprompsisse et eleganter multa grece scripsisse proditum est. Quid Catones Scipiones Emilios Brutos 
Servilios Scevolas Pomponios Marcellos Hortensios Metellos et reliqua superioris etatis lumina 
commemorem? Mitto Aulum Albinum Asinium Pollionem Cor. Nepotem qui latinas historias grece 
scriptas reliquerunt, cum exiguis finibus, quibus latinitas ipsa continetur, contenti non fuissent. Quid 
posteriores Plinios Suetonios Tacitos Spurinnas Lactantios Cyprianos Florios Servios Favorinos Gellios et 
innumberabiles alios?; Ibid., 8. Quamobrem si diligenter ea que litterarum monumentis tradita sunt 
attendere voluerimus, neminem inveniemus qui doctis illis temporibus eruditus habitus sit qui in his litteris, 
de quibus in presentiarum verba facimus, non iecerit fundamenta doctrine sue. 
 
93 Ibid., 11. Que tametsi minus ingenii minus admirationis minus dignitatis habeat, ut copiosissime a te 
demonstratum est, quam si iisdem de rebus, exemplo maiorum qui ex fluminibus grecorum hortulos suos 
irrigabant… 
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other claims.”94 Barbaro considers it important that even Cicero, the “keenest defender of 
the Latin name,” acknowledges the impressiveness of Greek learning. Quintilian, he 
continues, wanted his ideal orator educated in Greek letters. Like Guarino, he offers 
Horace and Virgil as additional evidence.95 Barbaro adds that Roman authors were 
praised for modeling their work on that of the Greeks. He cites the Antiope of Pacuvius 
and the Medea of Ennius (both modeled on Euripides) and the works of Terence as 
examples.96 Barbaro and Guarino thus articulate similar arguments about the utility and 
classical Roman praise of Greek literature.  
 Trebizond had already voiced many of these same ideas years before responding 
to the Agaso letter in 1437. His Oratio de laudibus Ciceronis, delivered in Venice in 
1421, emphasizes Greek learning in his narrative of Cicero’s life and discusses Cicero’s 
education under Philo, his studies of Plato, and his study of philosophy in Athens.97 
94 Ibid., 6-7. Quamobrem, quia non modo studia hec humanitatis apud Grecos, sed ab ipsis ad ceteros 
homines pervenisse putaverunt, ipse M.T. Cicero, qui ut latini nominis patronus acerrimus, sic greci iudex 
parum equus creditus est, tribuit Grecis litteras, dat multarum artium disciplinam, “non adimit sermonis 
leporem, ingeniorum acumen. Deinde etiam alia quecumque sibi sumunt non repugnat”… Cf. to Cic., 
Flac., 9. See note 31.  
 
95 Francesco Barbaro to Lorenzo da Monachi, Venice, in Epistolario, ed. Claudio Griggio, 9-10. 
Quintilianus etiam, eruditissimus ac diligentissimus scriptor, cum ab incunabulis oratorem instituit, in 
primis sibi grecas litteras proposuit, a quibus nostre fluxerunt, ut facile intelligi posset quantum ornamenti 
et adiumenti afferant oratori, cum ad collocandum et stabiliendum fundamenta laudis oratorie principem 
sibi locum resignaverit.Quid Oratius familiaris tuus velit, iam me intelligis: “vos exemplaria greca/nocturna 
versate manu, versate diurna.” Quidni? “Grais ingenium, Grais dedit ore rotundo/Musa loqui.” Virgilius 
noster preterea, qui etiam post illam etatem fuit qua, ut tu vis, philosophia et omnes bone artes illustrate 
latinis litteris erant ut grecis studiis Romanis opus non esset; quid Maro sentiat clara voce testatur: 
‘Excudent alii spirantia mollius era…’ 
 
96 Ibid., 12. Quis enim vel eo tempore fuit quo in homine romano etiam satis pauce littere multe putabantur, 
qui Ennii Medeam aut Antiopam Pacuvii sperneret atque reiceret? Quis etiam posteaquam greca magis 
familiaria Latinis fuerunt quam ipsa latina nostris hominbus nunc sunt, quis, inquam, easdem fabulas 
latinas ad verbum ex Eurypede expressas non legerit et auctores non laudaverit? Quem mihi dabis, qui ea 
que Terentius ex Menandro et Plautus et Cecilius ex veteribus comicis in latinum verbis electis graviter et 
ornate convertit non admiretur et eos multa cum venustate et omni sale interpretum munere functos esse 
non asseveret? 
 
97 Collectanea, 345. (7) Liberalibus ergo studiis se sub Philone illo Rome exercuit, quem ex genere constat 
<H>ebreorum fuisse et ad tantum philosophie pervenisse ut solus alter Plato appellari meruerit, cuius 
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Trebizond tells his audience that when Cicero returned to Rome he vowed to bring Greek 
eloquence with him. This marked an important transition in the Republic whereby Roman 
glory came to be won by eloquence rather than arms. Trebizond articulates the idea that 
learning flows from Greece, a position both Guarino and Barbaro had argued. He links 
Greek studies with knowledge of the most important topics, a position that Quattrocento 
advocates of Greek studies voiced. 98 He revisits these positions to defend himself from 
Agaso’s anti-Greek attacks in 1437. 
 Like his contemporaries, Trebizond defended the importance of Greece by 
arguing for the value of Greek learning to all studies. Trebizond’s most adamant and 
explicit defense of Greek learning in his Responsio to Guarino occurs at the conclusion. 
Greece, he explains, is the “inventor of all the good arts” and “more than other regions, 
produces men better in all things.”99 He argues here for the utility and primacy of Greek 
in the same way as Guarino and Barbaro linked Greek studies to Latin and in the same 
way as Battista Guarino described how Latin studies flow from Greek.  
quidem egregia opera in omni disciplinarum genere adhuc apud Grecos multis magnisque voluminibus 
explicata feruntur.  Hoc ille doctore et ingenio acutissimo ad philosophie brevi speculationes erectus, statuit 
militarem quoque doctrinam eo magis complecti quo arma litteris, litteras autem armis facilius 
decorasset… Athenas autem profectus, tantum opere philosophie dedit ut eam iam merito profiteri posset. 
In qua persistere cogitabat perpetuo nisi redire et capescere rempublicam crebris amici cogerent litteris. 
 
98 Ibid., 345. (8) Eloquentiam enim, maximam Grecie laudem, in Italiam eum traducere affirmavit, cum iam 
Romani militaris rei gloriam transtulissent. (9) Sed quid omnium singulatim eum dixi laudes superasse cum 
ipsius populi Romani tot annis comparatam armis gloriam antecelluerit? Nam populus Romanus ab urbe 
condita gravissimis bellis perfectis in potentissimis populis illustrissimisque subactis regibus continua 
exercitatione armorum post multos annos tandem rei militaris palmam a Grecis accepisse videbatur; Tullius 
brevi, imo minimo, temporis momento (sic enim, si comparare voluerimus, ferme videbitur) eloquentiam, 
que rerum omnium scientiam comprehendit, et ipsius Academie gloriam et dignitatem ab Grecia in Italiam 
Apollonii, Greci hominis, traduxit iudicio. Cf. Plut., Cic. 4.3-5. 
 
99 Collectanea, 406. (107) Verum huc loci factus, non possum non dolere quod in Greciam homo tu 
omnium, in Greciam, omnium bonarum artium inventricem…. inveheris; Ibid., 407. (109) O patria, patria, 
ostendes profecto, si unquam liberaberis, quanto ceteris tu regionibus meliores omnibus rebus viros 
procrees.   
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These were common arguments for other Byzantines as well. In his 1449 address 
inaugurating Greek studies at Ferrara, Theodore Gaza claimed that Latin studies began to 
decline when people abandoned the study of Greek.100 In an oration inaugurating Greek 
studies at the University of Padua in 1463/4, Demetrius Chalcondyles stated that “no one 
is ignorant that the Latins received every kind of the liberal arts from the Greeks” and 
added that because of this “the study of Greek letters offers much fruit to the Latins in 
every kind of learning.”101 In the 1460s, Andronicus Contoblacas, a prominent member 
of Cardinal Bessarion’s circle of Byzantine scholars, similarly identified Greeks as the 
“inventors of all the good arts.”102 Like his Italian and Byzantine contemporaries, 
Trebizond appeals to classical Roman authorities—including Horace and Vergil—to 
100 Theodore Gaza, Oratio de Litteris Graecis in Aus Bessarions Gelehrtenkreis, by Ludwig Mohler 
(Paderborn: Schöningh, 1942), 254. Non enim Romanis Graecae litterae alienae erant a quibus fere omnia 
latinae litteraturae ac disciplinae non modo carptim accepta, verum et plerumque ordine translata 
videntur… Hunc tamen tam frequentem litterarum graecarum usum fortuna primum, quae mutationibus 
rerum gaudet, prohibere ac paulatim auferre coepit, hominum deinde negligentia accedens penitus 
delevit… Etenim tamdiu graecae litterae in Italia sunt conservatae, quamdiu in ea latina elegantia viguit. 
Cum vero haec deseri coepit, litterae quoque graecae simul neglectae sunt, amboque praeclara haec studia 
multos iam per annos tamquam duo clarissima lumina sunt exstincta.  
The address was “the earliest surviving inaugural discourse on the importance of Greek studies 
given by a Byzantine émigré scholar in Italy.” See Deno Geanakoplos, Constantinople and the West: 
Essays on the Byzantine (Palaeologan) and Italian Renaissances and the Byzantine and Roman Churches 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989), 73-74 and Gravelle, 276-277. 
 
101 Geanakoplos provides the Latin from the sole extant manuscript. Geanakoplos, “Demetrius,” 132 n. 42. 
MS. fs. 3v-4r: Nemini credo vestrum esse ignotum omne genus liberalium artium a grecis latinos accepisse 
et cum auctores omnium istarum arcium grecos et ipsa nomina artibus indicta greca fuisse constat… Cum 
itaque et studia litterarum et omnes artes ab eis accepissent auctoresque ipsos sequuntur, nemo inficias ibit, 
quin studia litterarum grecarum plurimum fructus latinis in omni genere doctrine afferant. 
Chalcondyles also describes how classical Romans venerated Greek literature. Ibid., 133 n. 48. 
MS. f. 4v: Quorum nullum ignarum litterarum grecarum fuisse constat. Quin complures eorum adeo bene 
pleneque eas venerasse, ut dubium esset an litteras grecas vel latinas melius scirent. 
 
102 Peter Bravus criticizes Contoblacas for doing so. Petrus Bravus Veronensis, Invectiva in Andronicum 
Callistum, in Hankins, “Renaissance Crusaders,” 203-204. I cite the text with the author’s name and the 
line numbers provided by Hankins. Bravus, 31-33. Nunc inter rosas ac lilia iocaris; audes preterea Graecos 
religionis excultores ac bonarum artium et omnium inuentores appellare.  
Monfasani has since corrected Hankins, who originally identified Andronicus Callistus as the 
object of Bravus’ invective. Monfasani, “The Pro-Latin Apologetics,” 182. Hankins offers the invective as 
an example of prejudice against Byzantine émigrés and provides the tentative date. 
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assert that it is by “the authority of the [Greek] ancients” that the “spirit of Greece is 
strong.”103      
This latter argument illustrates how Trebizond defends Greeks by citing the 
Latinists’ own authorities against them. This is also how he responds to Agaso’s 
contention that Cicero warned Quintus against association with Greeks, and is a sign that 
Trebizond struggled with characterizations of Greek vice. He circumvents these 
characterizations, as Cicero did, by drawing a distinction between past and present 
Greeks. Trebizond notes that even in warning Quintus that many Greeks “are deceitful 
[fallaces] and unreliable [leves],” Cicero “at the same time excuses them” explaining they 
had been “trained by a long course of servitude to show an excess of sycophancy.”104 
Trebizond’s interpretation of the passage maintains an idyllic ancient Greece “by whose 
strengths the spirit of Greece is strong.” This passage was not the only time Cicero had 
questioned contemporary Greek morality even while distinguishing it from the heritage 
of ancient Greece. His praise of ancient Athens in the Pro Flacco, discussed above, is an 
example. In that speech, Cicero also argues “This later Greece has long been troubled and 
103 Collectanea, 406. (108) Neque advertis quid a Cicerone in testimonium assumis.“Diuturna,” inquit 
“servitute ad nimiam assentationem eruditi.” Aderas cum hec transcriberes? Corpore scio; animo sentio te 
oppressum vi. Sed quid oportet conviciari cum multa tibi huiuscemodi dicta imprudenter comperiantur? 
Accusat Cicero Grecos et excusat simul. Nam diuturna servitus maxima vitia parit; proxima, paupertas; que 
duo fortune incommoda maxime animum deiiciunt, ingenii vires deprimunt, totum hominem simul semper 
oppugnant, sepe expugnant ea diuturna durioraque; modo cum sint, vastarunt Greciam. Quare non a 
presenti fortuna, verum veterum auctoritate quibus animi viribus polleat Grecia querere debuisti. “Grecis,” 
quidam ait, “ingenium Grecis dedit musa rotundo ore loqui.” Et poeta maximus omniumque 
prestantissimus: “excudent alii spirantia, melius era, credo, equidem vivos ducent de marmore vultus, 
orabunt causas melius.” Cf. Hor., Ars. P. 323 and Verg., Aen. 6.847-849. Trebizond’s quotation of the 
Aeneid differs from the original line, which reads “excudent alii spirantia mollius aera (credo equidem)…” 
See the substitution of melius for mollius, which Monfasani notes in his apparatus, and that Trebizond does 
not retain the dipthong in aera.  
 
104 See previous note, “Accusat Cicero...vastarunt Greciam.” Cf. Cic., Q. Fr. 1.16. The translation is 
Williams’, though I have translated leves as “unreliable” as it better represents the context of the passage as 
a warning against close intimacies with people who are naturally untrustworthy. Cicero, Epistulae ad 
Quintum Fratrem, in Cicero: Letters to Quintus, Brutus, and Others, trans. W. Glynn Williams 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972). See note 49. 
63 
 
                                                 
 
vexed by its own devices,” while “that older Greece, which once was so notable for its 
resources, its powers, its glory, fell because of…the undue freedom and irresponsibility 
of its assemblies.”105 In each case, Cicero emphasizes the degradation of Greek culture 
over time. It is a narrative that fixes firmly in the past a Greek culture that can still 
contribute to contemporary concerns.  
 Trebizond’s appeal to the degradation model—perplexing at first since he was 
not himself an ancient Greek—can be read as an attempt to depict himself as a “good” 
rather than a “bad” Greek. Even in lamenting Greek levitas, Cicero did admit the 
existence of learned and honorable “contemporary” Greeks.106 Trebizond’s 
contemporaries also articulated that position. At the end of his scathing letter against 
Contoblacas, Peter Bravus noted that his anti-Greek invective was not directed “against 
all Greeks (for I believe some good men can be found among them), but against the 
shameful and those like you [Contoblacas]).”107 Trebizond, as has been discussed, went 
to great lengths to deny Agaso’s accusations of arrogance and levitas and to prove 
himself a learned rhetorician. His efforts should be considered attempts to present himself 
as the exception, a “good” Greek. Trebizond’s use of the degradation model allows him 
to maintain the value of Greek studies and turn Agaso’s appeal to Cicero against Guarino. 
Trebizond’s application of the model also works because he exploits the 
ambiguity in Agaso’s letter and at times actively misrepresents portions of it. An example 
of the latter is when he chides Agaso for claiming “the most shameful thing of all is to 
105 Cic., Flac. 16-17 and 62. For the earlier discussion of the degradation model see pages 37-38. 
 
106 See pages 36-37.   
 
107 Bravus, 60-64. Finem igitur scribendi faciam, si te prius hoc unum monuero, ut, etsi pro summa tua 
impudentia ne nimia quidem Latinorum latratus tuos maledicos, non propria illis, existimandum effugere 
uoluisti, hoc modestiae meae tribuas, quod verba mea non in omnes Graecorum (credo enim ex eis 
nonnullos reperiri bonos), sed in flagiciosos et tui similes fecisse uelim.  
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receive a method of speaking in Latin from a Greek man.” Agaso had in fact written that 
it was both absurd and shameful “to receive instruction in speaking Latin from a Greek” 
who hardly knows how to speak Greek, much less Latin.108 Trebizond essentially 
changes the terms of the dispute by interpreting Agaso’s statement not as an attack 
against a specific individual but as an attack against Greeks in general. Agaso’s 
ambiguous language leaves open the possibility that he intends to offer a blanket 
indictment of Greeks. That ambiguity allows Trebizond to characterize Agaso’s attacks 
as generally anti-Greek rather than specifically anti-Trebizond, and to accuse Agaso of 
inconsistency. “Agaso,” Trebizond explains, “scornfully refuses to learn from the 
Greeks” and yet argues that the RLV is inconsequential because a number of Greek 
authorities already sustain the study of eloquence. “If you read and approve Greek 
authors,” Trebizond asks, “why do you disparage me as a Greek?” He casts himself here 
alongside ancient Greeks who made valuable contributions to rhetoric. He even 
anticipates Guarino’s retort—that those men were learned whereas Trebizond himself is 
not—only to counter that if Guarino wants to claim Trebizond is unlearned he needs to 
prove it. Unlike the more general defense of Greek learning at the conclusion of the 
letter, this section is an explicit defense of Trebizond’s own credibility as a Greek 
scholar. It makes clear that, in addition to defending his Latinity, his defense of his Greek 
learning functions as a second way to justify his scholarly contributions. 
108 Collectanea, 383. (8) Primum omnium turpissimum esse Latinis a Greco ais homine rationem dicendi 
accipere. Deinde tui oblitus, non multo post subdis non fuisse mihi deplorandum si multi maioribus editi de 
disceptandi ratione codices amissi negligentia sunt quoniam Aristotelem, Isocratem, Hermogenem, 
Demosthenemque habeamus. O vere Agasonem, qui, cum a Grecis discere dedignetur, ad Grecos confugiat, 
claraque voce predicare non erubescat dedecori esse Latinis si quicquam ex Greco audiant cum habeant 
unde discant plerosque Grecie auctores! Nonne pro scriptis rectius nostris id dici videtur? Nam si Grecos 
legis et probas, cur me quasi Grecum contemnis? Si Georgium, quoniam Grecus est, spernis, cur 
Aristotelem, Isocratem, Hermogenem, Demosthenem Latinis legendos illico subiungis? Sed illi docti 
fuerunt, inquies, tu rudis. Illud ergo tibi tacendum fuerat; hoc comprobandum. Cf. Agaso’s comments, 
ibid., 365. See notes 36 and 60 above.  
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  A Classical Alternative 
  
If Trebizond’s defense of his Latinity was one strategy for countering Agaso’s 
anti-Greek attacks and his defense of Greek learning marks a second, his attempt to place 
Greek on the same level as Latin marks a third. Agaso’s attacks, as has been discussed, 
are based on an assumption regarding Latinity as the measure of true eloquence. At times, 
when he was not fervently defending his Latinity, Trebizond actually privileges Greek 
over Latin. On more than one occasion he chides Guarino’s shortcomings in Greek. The 
first instance occurs as Trebizond discusses his early education in Italy. Guarino was 
reading Pindar at the time, Trebizond recalls, and asked the young Cretan about Greek 
meter. He was so pleased with Trebizond’s ability to speak on the subject, for a period of 
two days no less, that he asked Trebizond to write down his thoughts because he “could 
not remember so many and such great ideas.”109 The second instance occurs later when 
Trebizond returns to a consideration of Greek poetry and admonishes Guarino for daring 
to say that Greeks—including Trebizond—know little. He issues a challenge in response: 
“If you form one [Latin] word from any Greek poet, I will acknowledge you are not 
completely unacquainted with Greek!” To emphasize the point, Trebizond recalls another 
conversation he had had with Guarino, again during his early years in Italy, about the 
Greeks and poetic license, word choice, and meter. Here, as in their discussion of Pindar, 
Trebizond had proven himself to be the more knowledgeable man.110  
109 Collectanea, 398. (72) Quo quidem tempore memini tibi Pindarum legenti ac a me petenti quidnam aut 
de illo poeta aut de metris suis sentirem, biduo me de metrorum omnium genere disseruisse, teque subinde 
flagitasse ut siquid haberem de his rebus, scriptis traderem quoniam tot tantaque memoria tenere non 
posses. Fecimus et obtulimus. See note 80 for the preceding text. 
 
110 Collectanea, 406. (105) Et tu Grecos homines Greca, in quibus nati, in quibus educati sumus, quibus 
etiam Latina illustravimus, parum scire audes dicere? Qui si unum verbum ex aliquo Greco poeta flexeris, 
fatebor te Greca non omnino ignorare! (106) Num venit tibi in mentem primis illis annis cum e Grecia 
venissem ac de poetica licentia sermo haberetur, asserentem te maximam habere Grecorum poetas 
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 Trebizond does more than merely point out Guarino’s shortcomings; he builds 
an alternate model of erudition based on knowledge of both Latin and Greek. It is the 
combination of both, he asserts, that makes him so formidable. To Guarino, he writes: 
“The copiousness of my speech is such that I do not fear you; the flood of my genius is 
such that I think little of you; this erudition in Greek as much as Latin is such that I can 
criticize you easily.” It is the breadth of his education, he continues, that will allow him, 
like a knight, to topple Guarino.111 Unlike his later boast proclaiming that his Latin 
eloquence is suited to Cicero’s Rome, Trebizond describes here the importance of both 
languages. The argument was surely familiar to Guarino, who argued similarly in 
response to da Monachi. Trebizond wields this standard of erudition against Guarino. At 
times, he yields a measure of Greek learning to the other man. Trebizond cites the “Greek 
manner of speech” in the Agaso letter as evidence of Guarino’s authorship, since “there is 
no one besides yourself who, learned in both languages, is a bit angry with me.”112 He 
later explains Guarino’s reputation as a function of the Italian’s Greek education, arguing 
“if you had not been instructed by Greeks, you would have languished in the dark.” Even 
so, Trebizond’s characterization of Guarino’s shortcomings in Greek allows him to argue 
licentiam quod omnia verba metri causa, ut vellent, commutarent, increpatum fuisse a me modestius 
quoniam rarissime poete nostri ea re quicquam permutent, sed linquarum esse rationem, quas, cum esse 
quinque constet, in unum confundere omnes liceat, ut Homerus precipue factitat, <et> quod ipsis non 
muniatur rarissime inveniri? 
 
111 Ibid., 382. (7) Nam, Guarine, nec enim molestum cuiquam futurum puto, quod multi preclarique viri 
natura ipsa duce fecerunt, si ad meam defensionem me laudavero, presertim cum tu in persequendo id 
facias. Ea mihi orationis copia est ut te non pertimescam; id ingenii flumen ut contemnam; ea tam Greca, 
quam Latina eruditio ut te facile possim exagitare; ea denique maiorum rerum doctrina ut, ne grande quid 
dicam, tanquam catafractus eques, insidentem te asino non hasta, sed solo afflatu currendi precipitem 
valeam deturbare. 
 
112 Ibid., 382. (4) Quasobres, Guarine…si statim ex inscriptione Grecum sermonem ostentasti, nec mihi 
utraque lingua doctus preter te subiratus est quispiam, et horum omnium uno aut altero posses argumento 
deprehendi, cum hec inter se mirifice sibi cuncta conveniant, multaque alia, que nunc enumerare longum 
esset, concurrant, audebis te illum non esse Agasonem qui hec ediderit impudenter asserere? 
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that he had surpassed the man by virtue of his skill in both languages.113 Not only does 
Trebizond contend that he is a skilled Latinist—contrary to Agaso’s accusations—but 
that he is a stronger Latinist, better educated and more eloquent, than Guarino is a student 
of Greek. It is a remarkably bold claim levied against one of a small number of men—
alongside Francesco Filelfo and Leonardo Bruni—renowned for their skill in both Greek 
and Latin.   
  On the whole, Trebizond’s defense of Greek and his arguments in favor of a 
combined knowledge of Greek and Latin are difficult to reconcile with those sections in 
which he so adamantly defends his Latinity. Given Trebizond’s clear struggles with 
Agaso’s anti-Greek attacks, the inconsistency in his response can be read as a result of 
the pressure that Greek stereotypes imposed. As a Greek, Trebizond felt the greatest 
amount of pressure to prove his Latinity and so that is where most of his effort went. This 
explains some of the inner conflict in his response but not all of it. His contemporaries—
including Guarino—had provided him a blueprint, based on classical Roman arguments 
on the need to study both Greek and Latin, with which he might defend himself. 
Trebizond, however, so overcompensates in his defense of his Latinity that his arguments 
about Greek studies are overshadowed. The irony is that Guarino and Barbaro ultimately 
make Trebizond’s argument better than he does. It is interesting to think—albeit 
counterfactual and ahistorical—that Guarino may have constructed a stouter defense of 
Trebizond against Agaso than Trebizond himself did.     
113 Ibid., 406. (107) in Greciam, inquam, unus omnium, quo te inscribis nomine dignissimus, in Greciam 
inveheris. Atqui si de aliquo Italo bene merita est Grecia, de te certe optime est, qui, nisi a Grecis institutus 
fuisses, in tenebris iacuisses. Levitatem, fallaciam integer tu homo Grecie increpas? 
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The Immoral Greek 
 
This analysis began by identifying Agaso’s two main strategies of attack: against 
Trebizond’s Latinity and against his moral character. The two, of course, are not mutually 
exclusive. We have already seen how Agaso employs both in characterizing Trebizond as 
not only ineptus and loquax but also as arrogans.114 His descriptions of Trebizond’s 
conduct are, however, a more integral part of his attacks than has so far been discussed. 
Agaso casts Trebizond as obstinate, untrustworthy, disloyal, and immodest, all of which 
contribute to his portrayal of Greek levitas and serve as key concepts in the dispute. The 
contrast between Roman gravitas on the one hand and Greek levitas on the other 
undergirds significant portions of Agaso’s letter. Trebizond addresses this contrast in his 
response to Guarino by means of the same attendant moral concepts, including honesty, 
fidelity, piety, and loyalty. For both Agaso and Trebizond, questions of moral rectitude, 
like questions of learning, were of paramount importance for humanists, particularly 
given their role as educators.   
The Immoral Student  
 
Perhaps the clearest example of Agaso’s contrast between gravitas and levitas is 
his accusation that Trebizond had mistreated Guarino. Agaso gives the topic ample 
consideration and casts him as an immoral Greekling—treacherous, dishonest, and 
shameless—in contrast to the morally upright Guarino. His argument is predicated on the 
premise that Trebizond “first formed an understanding of the Latin language, with 
Guarino instructing him.” Despite Guarino’s efforts, time that Agaso explains Guarino 
spent in vain on an ungrateful student, Trebizond slandered him in the RLV. That Agaso 
114 See page 39 and Agaso’s description of Trebizond as “stupid and impertinent, and without honor.”  
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considers these attacks a function of the author’s Greekness is implied by a reference to 
Paul calling Cretans liars and beasts, made in the context of a comment about “the men of 
this island and their character.”115 Agaso proceeds to detail Trebizond’s dishonorable 
actions including how he attacked Guarino without provocation or warning. He accuses 
Trebizond of pursuing an unknowing Guarino with his traps.116 Agaso describes him as 
an impetuous and rash reviler who uses slanderous language.117 “In the manner of a 
deceitful brigand,” he “ambushes his instructor unawares…with slanderous speech.” 
Agaso emphasizes that Guarino knew nothing of these attacks and in fact continued to 
commend the other man.118 He thus contrasts Guarino’s innate modesty, “by which he is 
accustomed to make light of revilers as he makes light of asses,” with “this Greekling’s” 
obstinacy, slander, and temerity.119 He also faults Trebizond with a failure to apologize 
for his insults, to recant them, and to admit his wrongs, “since the greater evidence of a 
good man is to prevent oneself from error rather than persist in it, and the path to good 
115 Collectanea, 368. (20) Hic idem est qui Latine lingue primum, Guarino docente cognitionem imbibit, in 
quo erudiendo oleum, ut dicitur, perdidit et impensam. Nam inania sunt beneficia que mortuo pariter et 
ingrato conferuntur. For the reference to Paul, see note 48.  
 
116 Collectanea, 370. (30) “Que si ab illo aut discendi aut docendi gratia dicebantur, cur non Guarino potius 
denuntiabat quam ignarum insidiis insectabatur, presertim ne verbo quidem lacessitus ab eo, nisi quod se ab 
illo cultum honoratumque noverat?”  
 
117 Ibid., 371. (34) “Cum igitur orationis eius initium tam acute, tam artificiose, ut studiosis videre licet, 
contextum sit (est enim, ni fallor, iambici metri ratione inchoatum), impetuosus conviciator ac temerarius 
irruit et, modo maledicam exerceat linguam, nihil quod dicat, advertit.” 
 
118 Ibid., 371-372. (36) “Plura refellenda restabant, viri patricii, que Guarino remittenda sunt. Namque ut ea 
rescierit, suam rem, si mihi audierit, suo, ut dicitur, marte decernet. Is enim, horum ignarus omnium, 
Trapezuntium commendare non desinit, ab quo et laudes expectare debuit, cum interim insidiosi more 
latronis Trapezuntius suum preceptorem, suum, inquam, preceptorem excipit incautum et maledictis 
insectatur.” 
 
119 Ibid., 372. (38) Tu vero Guarinum pro tua in eum fide et consuetudine hortare, immo urge, incende, 
anima ut huius Trapezuntii contumaciam confutet et discipulum preceptoris auctoritate castiget ne pro 
innata sibi modestia, qua velut asinos solet conviciatores parvi facere, tam honoris et fame negligens, huic 
ipsi Greculo maledicentiam, temeritatem, contumaciam sinat increscere quod studiorum non mediocre 
dedecus avertendum est. 
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mores is never too late.” He suggests Trebizond could recant “his wicked lies” easily in a 
short letter.120 It is for this reason that he solicits aid in leading Trebizond to “repair his 
mores” and “restore that student, ungrateful to his instructor, to observable gratitude, by 
which he may acquire for himself glory and praise.”121  
Agaso’s arguments are based on an assumption that as a student of Guarino’s, 
Trebizond is especially indebted to him. He is very clear that Guarino had a right to 
expect his student to praise and honor him.122 The instructor-student relationship was 
much valued in classical and early modern pedagogy, a reality that informs Agaso’s 
attacks. Quintilian, for instance, argues that since an instructor must inculcate morals as 
well as knowledge, it is crucial that he has an “impeccable character” by which he can 
“preserve the young pupils from injury” and “deter the more aggressive from licentious 
behavior.”123 This only works if the student loves and respects his teacher and is willing 
to listen to his lessons and imitate his character. “Better nourishment,” Quintilian 
explains, “comes…from a teacher whom, if they are properly taught, the pupils love and 
respect. It is difficult to overestimate how much readier we are to imitate those whom we 
120 Agaso writes that he suggested this in response to the patrician’s story which alleged Trebizond had 
publicly slandered Guarino. For the patrician’s story, see note 69. Collectanea, 369. (23) “Cur,” inquam, 
“Trapezuntius probra non retractat cum maius viri boni argumentum sit sese ab errato deterrere quam in 
errato perstare, et nunquam sera sit ad bonos mores via?” “Verecundia,” inquit, “impedimento est et, cum 
tot exscripta sint sue Rhetoric volumina, emendandi labor.” “Alia quaedam via restat,” dixi, “ut parvam per 
epistolam impia revocet mendacia, que in ipsum tandem conviciatorem retundentur.”  
 
121 Ibid., 371. (33) “Quod si tanta Trapezuntium cura solicitat ut inepta coaptare, turbata disponere, male 
posita struere conetur, queso ut discordem totamque sub arma coactam componat Italiam. Que si maiora 
viribus abnuat, hominem rogate, viri patricii, ut portus vestri latiorem reddat alveum et ituris rediturisque 
navibus utiliora concinnet hostia. Quod si rursum maius humeris opus respuet, suos concinnet mores et 
obliquam linguam dirrigat et ingratum sese preceptori discipulum gratum observantemque formet ac 
reficiat, que sibi decus laudemque parient.” 
 
122 Ibid., 371-372. (36) Trapezuntium commendare non desinit… . See note 118. 
 
123 The translations are Russell’s. Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, ed. and trans. Donald A. Russell 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 2.2.3-4. Nam et adulti fere pueri ad hos praeceptores 
transferuntur et apud eos iuvenes etiam facti perseverant, ideoque maior adhibenda tum cura est ut et 
teneriores annos ab iniuria sanctitas docentis custodiat et ferociores a licentia gravitas deterreat. 
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like.”124 To that end, he exhorts the instructor to “adopt a paternal attitude towards his 
pupils, and regard himself as taking the place of those whose children are entrusted to 
him.”125 The bond between instructor and student had to be sufficiently close, like that 
between parent and child, to create the best possible educational environment.  
The classical ideal that an instructor should function in loco parentis was well 
established in fifteenth-century pedagogy. Writing in 1450, Aeneas Silvius 
Piccolomini—the future Pope Pius II—echoes Quintilian in arguing that instructors 
should lead their students to a moral life “with teachings in keeping with a praiseworthy 
life and with admonitions from which the shoots of the most correct morals will 
germinate.”126 The goal, he explains, is to “incite [youths] to virtuous deeds” and 
“restrain them from disgraceful behavior.”127 “If you [the student] wish to act rightly,” he 
contends “you should love them [instructors] not less than your studies themselves, and 
you will consider them as parents, not of your body, but of your mind.” He emphasizes 
the point by citing Juvenal: “May fragrant saffrons and perpetual spring bloom over the 
ashes of those who deemed that a teacher should hold the place of a revered parent.” 128 
124 Quint., Inst. 2.2.8. tamen viva illa, ut dicitur, vox alit plenius, praecipueque praeceptoris quem discipuli, 
si modo recte sunt instituti, et amant et verentur. Vix autem dici potest quanto libentius imitemur eos 
quibus favemus. 
 
125 Quint., Inst. 2.2.4-5. Sumat igitur ante omnia parentis erga discipulos suos animum, ac succedere se in 
eorum locum a quibus sibi liberi tradantur existimet. 
 
126 Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini, De liberorum educatione, in Humanist Educational Treatises, ed. 
Kallendorf, 10. Horum officum est, ut sicut coloni suis arbusculis circumponunt saepes, sic tibi consona 
laudabilis vitae instituta admonitionesque circumferant, unde rectissima morum germina pullulent, 
honestatis enim fons atque radix est legitima disciplina. 
 
127 Ibid., 10. Nobilibus pueris et maxime regibus maiorum laudes ac vituperia quam verbera commoditatem 
magis afferunt. Illae ad honesta concitant, haec a turpitudine cohibent; in utrisque tamen adhibendus est 
modus, ne quid nimis sit. 
 
128 Ibid., 10. Discenti autem nihil magis adversum est, quam praeceptores odisse, quos tu, si recte facere 
volueris, non minus amabis quam ipsa studia, et parentes esse, non quidem corporis sed mentis tuae 
iudicabis. Multum haec pietas studio confert. Audi rursus Iuvenalem: dii maiorum umbris tenuem et sine 
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Battista Guarino argues similarly: “Let us not think our ancestors were rash when they 
deemed that a teacher should stand in the place of a venerated parent.” In this way “a 
teacher would instruct his pupils with greater care and good will, and his pupils would 
respect his words reverently as though they flowed from paternal affection.” The opposite 
also holds true, “if they scorn him [their instructor], they will also necessarily scorn his 
teaching.” He cites Plutarch’s example of Alexander the Great, “who used to declare that 
he owed no less to his teacher Aristotle than to Philip his father, because from the latter 
he had only received life, but from the former he had received the good life.”129 Agaso 
too clearly embraces the notion of an instructor functioning in loco parentis according to 
the will of “our venerable ancestors.”130 He, like Battista Guarino, offers the example of 
Alexander the Great to urge students to protect their instructors “like second parents.”131 
Agaso not only chastises Trebizond’s treatment of Guarino, he provides a clear 
indication of the moral obligations a student owes his instructor by describing those 
pondere terram spirantesque crocos et in urna perpetuum ver, qui praeceptorem sancti voluere parentis esse 
loco. Cf. Juv., 7.207-210. 
 
129 Battista Guarino, De ordine docendi et studendi, in Humanist Educational Treatises, ed. Kallendorf, 4. 
Deinde in praeceptore colendo paternam sibi constituant sanctitatem; nam si eum contempserint, eius 
quoque praeceptionem contemnant necesse est. Neque enim existimandum est maiores illos temere 
praeceptorem sancti voluisse parentis esse loco; sed ut ille maiore cum diligentia benivolentiaque eos 
instrueret, ipsi autem venerabundi eius dicta velut a paterna quadam affectione manantia observanda esse 
crederent. Quocirca ea in re Alexandri magni exemplum imitabuntur, qui non minus se Aristoteli 
praeceptori quam Philippo patri debere praedicabat, propterea quod ab hoc esse tantum, ab illo et bene esse 
accepisset. Cf. Plut., Alex. 8.3. 
 
130 Collectanea, 370. (30) “Num censetis, inquam, viri patricii causas fuisse Trapezuntio quibus in eius 
preceptorem inveheretur, quem maiores nostri sancti voluere parentis esse loco?” See note 116 for the rest 
of the passage. 
 
131 Collectanea, 372. (39) Vos etiam adolescentes et litterarie militie tyrones, alacres in hunc invadendum 
insurgite. Ubinam melius dicendi artem, cui nunc insudetis, exercere potestis quam ut bonos probetis, 
malignos accusetis, et doctores vestros quasi secundos parentes, pro vestra pietate tutemini? Octavianum 
Augustum ante oculos proponite, qui Athenodorum magistrum non minus quam Octavium observare, 
collaudare, defensare visus est. Idem ab Alexandro Magno factitatum est, qui Aristotelis pietatem vel 
anteponere vel equare Philippi caritati pre se tulit. 
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students of Guarino who show him the proper respect and affection. The discussion 
allows Agaso to cast in clearer terms Trebizond’s lack of honor. This is most evident 
when Agaso relates the testimony of the unnamed patrician. Agaso recalls first the 
patrician’s description of how quickly a crowd of Guarino’s students and supporters, in 
the presence of Trebizond, spoke in defense of their instructor. “Retaining still the recent 
memory and teaching of Guarino with affection,” they in turn proclaimed Guarino’s 
prudence, his elegance, his gravitas, the sweetness and clarity of his speech and his 
eloquence.”132 Agaso uses the patrician’s testimony to imply that such behavior was to be 
expected of morally upright students. He argues this more explicitly when expressing 
surprise that “since so many of Guarino’s students flourish” anybody could think 
Trebizond’s insults against Guarino would go unchallenged. These students, he suggests, 
were obligated to respond to Trebizond’s insults by returning like for like.133 He 
reiterates his surprise later and wonders why “since so many upright citizens and youths 
are bound to Guarino by the bond of an instructor and by intimate affection nobody 
stands forth to restrain the reviler.”134 He then urges Paulus Regius—the letter’s 
recipient, whom Agaso describes as a fellow student of Guarino’s—“because of [his] 
faith in [Guarino] and friendship,” to encourage Guarino to defend himself.135  
132 Ibid., 368-369. See note 69.  
 
133 Collectanea, 369. (24) “An quispiam existimet, cum tot etiam docti quidem viri auditores Guarini 
vigeant, hac impunita relicturos esse maledicta, quin par pari referant quod Trapezuntium remordeant?” 
This is part of Agaso’s argument that Trebizond should write a letter recanting his lies. See pages 70-71. 
 
134 Collectanea, 372. (36) “Nec satis mirari queo, cum hac in urbe tot cives integerrimi, tot adolescentes 
Guarino litteraria necessitudine et intima caritate devincti sint, extare neminem qui conviciatorem reprimat, 
memorem, qui non vetat peccare cum possit, iubet.” 
 
135 For the identity of Regius, see note 13 above. For Agaso’s exhortation to Regius, see note 119.  
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 As with the arguments regarding Latinity, Agaso’s accusation that he is an 
immoral student forces Trebizond to defend himself against allegations of moral wrong-
doing and levitas. He begins by rejecting the premise that Guarino provided him with any 
meaningful instruction in Latin: “You make yourself out to be my teacher, although…I 
received my Latin from Vittorino da Feltre.”136 Trebizond counters Agaso’s claim that 
Guarino taught him upon his arrival in Italy by explaining that initial instruction “hardly 
lasted two months.” During that time, he contends that he was “occupied in transcription, 
not in learning,” adding “if a confused examination of the most basic topics can even be 
called instruction.”137 Trebizond continues to belittle Guarino’s instruction as “some of 
the basic lessons which are usually given by women rather than men.”138 On the other 
hand, Trebizond praises himself for learning Latin in spite of this poor instruction and 
argues he learned nothing from Guarino, whom he describes as unskilled.139 These insults 
regarding Guarino’s lessons are likely indicative of the growing Quattrocento tendency to 
consider the teaching of grammar a less prestigious career, particularly compared to the 
136 Collectanea, 397. (67) Preceptorem enim te meum fingis, cum ego Greca a meis, Latina a Victorino 
Feltrensi acceperim. 
 
137 Ibid., 398. See note 80. (72) Vix duorum mensium…confusa cognitio.  
 
138 Collectanea, 398. (73) Videntur hec magna, preceptor, que abste accepimus? Communisima quedam, 
que femine magis quam viri monstrare solent, tradidisti. Oleum ac impensam amisisse quereris. Ego (ita me 
deus amet) pluris unicum ex his verbulum que tibi de metris subieci quam universam illam elementorum 
cognitionem facio. Hoc enim vulgo habetur; illud antequam invenies, et oleum multum profecto et 
impensam expones. Cf. Agaso’s claim, note 115.  
Monfasani does not note Trebizond’s abste but I follow Christopher Celenza in taking it as the 
combination of abs and te. See Celenza, Renaissance Humanism and the Papal Curia: Lapo da 
Castiglionchio the Younger’s De curiae commodis (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 100.  
 
139 The passage is part of an apostrophe to Vittorino whom Trebizond cites as his true Latin instructor. 
Collectanea, 398. (75) Guarinus tibi magis quam mihi invidet. Imo vero tibi soli hoc loco iniuriatur. Tuam 
enim in se, non meam, transferre gloriam nititur. Ego, Grecus homo, Latinas didici litteras. A quo nihil ad 
me. Quanto ab imperitiore didicerim, tanto mihi maior laus debetur, si bene didici. Ego te Guarino 
doctiorem et quidem multum duco, vel potius te doctissimum, illum ignorantissimum. Si fallor, mea hec est 
culpa. Nihil ad modestiam tuam. Illud dico: maiori mihi futurum laudi, si bene Latinitatem teneo, cum a 
Guarino, non abste me doctum dixero. Mentiri non est meum. Tacere honeste possum. Non taceo. Pietate in 
te mea cogor, qua non aliter ac parentem sancte te colui. 
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teaching of rhetoric.140 As Guarino was a renowned authority on grammar and Trebizond 
had recently published his own major rhetorical treatise, the slight would have provided 
Trebizond with another way to denigrate Guarino’s learning and applaud his own.141 By 
rejecting the premise that Guarino was his instructor, though, Trebizond also refutes 
Agaso’s depiction of him as an immoral student. In Trebizond’s account, he was not a 
bad student so much as Guarino was a bad teacher.  
 By naming Vittorino as his true Latin instructor, Trebizond also embraces the 
language of the instructor-student bond. It is an implicit response to Agaso’s criticisms 
that allows him to demonstrate that he actually is a grateful and respectful student to his 
true instructor. It also allows him to make his own accusations about Guarino’s immoral 
behavior. Trebizond employs the same set of concepts as Agaso—arrogance, dishonesty, 
and glory-seeking—although he cannot, as a foreigner in Italy, express them with a 
corresponding ethnic stereotype. He sharply criticizes Guarino for passing himself off as 
his teacher, a criticism he levies first by addressing Guarino and then in an apostrophe to 
Vittorino himself.142 Addressing Vittorino, Trebizond argues that Guarino “envies you 
140 Robert Black argues that the social and professional status of grammarians declined in the Quattrocento 
compared to professors of rhetoric and poetry. Robert Black, Humanism and Education in Medieval and 
Renaissance Italy: Tradition and Innovation in Latin Schools from the Twelfth to the Fifteenth Century 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 31-33. There is evidence of bias in the 1431/32 invective 
of Antonio da Rho against Antonio Panormita, edited by David Rutherford. Rho frequently mocks 
Panormita as a “measly teacher of ABCs [grammaticus]” and a “teacher of childish ABCs [litterator et 
paedagogus].” I cite the section numbers that Rutherford provides. Antonio da Rho, The Philippic of 
Antonio da Rho against Antonio Panormita, in Early Renaissance Invective and the Controversies of 
Antonio da Rho, ed. and trans. David Rutherford (Tempe: Arizona Center for Medieval and Renaissance 
Texts and Studies, 2005), 27 and 145. 
 
141 Guarino’s grammatical manual, the Regulae grammaticales, was composed prior to 1418, survives in 
almost forty manuscripts, and remained in use into the seventeenth century. Grendler, noting as Black does 
a shift in the status of grammar in the Renaissance curriculum, identifies Guarino as one of the last major 
figures to compose and publish a grammar text. Grendler, 166-169 and 194. Guarino also played an 
important role in the teaching of Greek grammar. See page 31 above. 
 
142 For the apostrophe as a rhetorical figure of speech see Rhet. Her. 4.22; Quint., Inst. 4.1.63-70, 9.2.38-40, 
and 9.3.26-28. 
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more than me” and “injures you alone.” He explains that by trying to claim him as his 
student, Guarino “struggles to claim your glory, not mine, for himself.”143 He 
characterizes Guarino’s attacks on the RLV as, by extension, criticisms of Vittorino as 
well, whom he urges to curb Guarino’s “obstinacy and arrogance…lest all those whom 
you teach are torn to pieces by your courteousness.” Trebizond relies on the instructor-
student bond to argue that it is Vittorino’s responsibility to defend his students. His 
appeal indicates that the commitments of that relationship work both ways. On the one 
hand, he adopts the in loco parentis language to describe the obligation he feels toward 
Vittorino, “by which I honor you no differently and piously than a parent.” He likens 
himself to one of Vittorino’s sons, whom “you begat for yourself by means of your 
instruction.” On the other hand, as one of Vittorino’s “sons,” Trebizond can expect 
support from his “father” and protection from “rapacious wolves” like Guarino.144  
As in Agaso’s characterization of Guarino’s students, Trebizond’s discussion of 
his own students plays a role in his self-presentation and his efforts to define Guarino as 
dishonorable. This discussion represents a direct response to Agaso’s claim that 
143 Collectanea, 397. (67) Nam scripta nostra huiscemodi sunt ut tu ipse, tu, inquam, ipse, ingenti 
admiratione perculsus, laudis ac gloriole nostre, quam sic solidiorem esse tua vides ut eterniorem futuram, 
aliquid callide coneris aucupari. Preceptorem enim te meum fingis, cum ego Greca a meis, Latina a 
Victorino Feltrensi acceperim. Deus mihi est testis, Guarine, contempsissem te, non  vexassem, neque tam 
rudi homini respondere voluissem nisi et scriptis meis, quibus doctior factus es, et Victorino preceptori, a 
quo, ut scis, cuncta que ad Latinitatem pertinent hausimus, et universe Grecie propter nos animo et 
voluntate detraxisses; Ibid., 398. (74) Sed te nunc appello, Victorine. Defende ac protege partes tuas. Siquid 
Latine lingue in me est, te doctore post deum est. Insurgit Guarinus et, quoniam prima elementa monstravit, 
maiorum quoque rerum scientiam se duce nos imbibisse proclamat. See also note 139, Guarinus…didici. 
 
144 Collectanea, 398-399. (76) Tu tacebis et Guarini amentiam non redargues tua rapientis, si non re, at 
minis, litteris, nuntiis? Si de hoc, cum ipso non egeris, si de hoc non questus fueris, si tantam huius 
impudentiam non castigabis, si contumaciam, si arrogantiam non infinges atque retundes, cave ne omnes 
quos doces facilitate tua distrahantur. O confidentiam hominis inauditam! O temeritatem incredibilem! 
Quod multi sciunt—multi? quin vero omnes ferme qui me cognoscunt et te, Victorine, in se transferre 
impudens homo conatur hinc atque illinc per maiorem invective partem. Hoc in loco moratur. Preceptorem 
se Georgio fuisse mentitur. Tu veritatem tacebis ac me deseres? Si liberos genuisses rapientibus traderes 
lupis? Non protegeres? Natura impulses, dices? Nunc quos doctrina filios tibi peperisti, qui, cum liberi non 
sunt, liberis etiam ipsis, maxime si quicquam de se pollicentur magni, cariores atque iocundiores esse 
solent, destitues et parvipendes? See note 139 for the preceding text. 
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Trebizond wrote against Guarino without provocation and therefore dishonorably. 
Trebizond explains that he had, in fact, been provoked on two separate occasions when 
advocates of Guarino had publicly proclaimed before his students the eloquence of their 
master above Trebizond’s.145 Clericinus Vincentinus was the first to do so. He brought 
one of Guarino’s orations with him and after it was read aloud he praised it and 
announced that “if he were able to command all Italy, nobody other than Guarino would 
be appointed to teach rhetoric.” Trebizond’s description of the scene makes clear that he 
and his students viewed it as an act of aggression and arrogance. His students were 
angered at Clericinus’ audacity and surprised that Guarino could think Trebizond “so 
lowly and common…that even in my own home you believed your unjust and fallacious 
attack would be tolerated.”  Like Agaso’s discussion of Guarino’s patrician students, 
Trebizond’s students actively defended their instructor against what they perceived to be 
unjust and slanderous attacks. One of them came forth at Trebizond’s behest to read an 
oration in the same category, the exordium of which was compared to the exordium of 
Guarino’s speech. Trebizond’s description of this episode seems an implicit refutation of 
Agaso’s claims that he was a poor and unloved instructor.146 The story casts Trebizond as 
145 This passage and the ones in the next two notes are consecutive. Collectanea, 405. (101) “At ne verbo 
quidem fuisti lacessitus.” Ego si lacessitus non fuissem, res ipsa, quam verissime scripseram, mihi 
satisfaceret. Nunquam enim a vero, presertim si ad utilitatem communem pertinet, ulla virum bonum 
voluptas vel dolor deflectet. Verum si lacessitum quoque demonstrem iam ipso Guarino iudice, omni 
molestia liberatus sum. (102) Explosum me quondam e Vincentia exibilatumque dicis. Tua opera qui me 
vicinum nolebas. Multa mihi fuerunt argumenta, que non scribo vel ut brevior sim, vel quoniam ad hanc 
urbem venire cupienti minus acerba. Hic rursus mihi molestiam afferre per tuos non cessabas, sed unum 
dicam e multis. Cf. note 116 for Agaso’s claim that Trebizond had not been provoked. See also note 49 for 
Agaso’s use of a Ciceronian cultural stereotype to make a similar but more general point about Greeks 
attacking learned men.  
 
146 Collectanea, 405-406. (103) Clericinus Vincentinus domum meam venit, apportans secum in 
Theodoram, ut opinor, nescio quam laudes. Perlecta oratio est, qua nescio siquid aridius atque squalidius 
unquam scripseris. Summis eam Clericinus efferebat laudibus, probus quidem vir, sed qui nimio in te 
studio aberraret. Nam ut odium, sic voluntas nimia et amor vel acutissimorum hominum iudicia corrumpere 
solet, itaque adiecit se, si toti posset imperare Italie, iussurum nequis preter Guarinum in ea rhetoricam 
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so loved that his students drove Clericinus away, speechless, perplexed, and embarrassed. 
Gerardus, Guarino’s secretary from Ferrara, arrived a few days later and “with many in 
attendance” voiced his master’s displeasure at the way Clericinus had been treated. 
Having rejected the claim that he was an ungrateful student, Trebizond presents the 
arrivals of Clericinus and Gerardus as unjust incursions to illustrate Guarino’s own 
dishonorable behavior.147  
Guarino the Philhellene 
 
Agaso’s characterization of Trebizond as an immoral student is only one of the 
ways by which he argues for his Greek levitas. A second strategy involves a story about 
Trebizond’s brother which, although it receives only a brief mention, he intends as 
another testament to the Cretan’s Greek conduct. The latter point is evident in that he 
follows the story immediately with his comment on the character of Cretan men.148 
Agaso alleges that Trebizond drove away his brother, “a good boy indeed,” and “reduced 
him, wandering, to beg through foreign cities.” It is hardly surprising, the passage 
doceret. Hec non tam me quam meos qui aderant pertulerant.  Circunspiciebant, murmurabant. Exarsi, 
fateor. An ita demissus ego et abiectus tibi et tuis visus sum ut etiam domi mee iniquum atque fallacem 
impetum vestrum laturum credideritis? Iubeo afferri orationem adolescentuli cuiusdam in eodem 
conscriptam genere. Legebatur; exordium conferebantur cum tuo. In singulis elegantius, significantius, 
expressius, et, quod permagnum est, prudentius te dicebat adolescentulus. Obmutuit Clericinus.Vultu 
confusus, abiit. Hec ego te duce fecisse ipsum suspicabar. Recens enim erat Vincentie memoria. Cf. pages 
44-46 above.  
 
147 Collectanea, 405-406. (104) Post paucos deinde dies venit Gerardus, librarius tuus, e Ferraria. Multis 
audientibus velle se dicere ait, que tu referenda mihi tradidisti: que Clericinus dixit aut audivit, tibi, narrat, 
litteris significata fuisse; dolere te mihique succensere quod ita de te sentiam. Ingentem vero regem! 
Regem, inquam, an tyrannum, qui vel domi sue homines aggreditur, petit, exagitat? Se solum dignum esse 
qui doceat denuntiet. Ceteros iubeat, si possit, tacere. Et cum re, quantum valeat, vexet, ne verbo quidem 
lacessere credi vult! Quod si tunc obticuissem, nonne (quod Vincentie mihi accidit) a meis ipsis Clericini 
verbis assensisse iudicarer? An uni mihi meorum de me existimationem domi in esse retinere non licebit? 
Tunc ergo certior factus de tuis insidiis, inimicum te mihi cognovi et, ut decet, ingenium aperta fronte 
odisse cepi. Odisse, dixi? Imo vero magis amare. Nam vitia tua in dicendo vere predicare id est, si sapis, 
meliorem te facere. 
 
148 That Agaso intends the story as further evidence of Trebizond’s Greekness is evident in that he follows 
it with his comment on the character of Cretan men. See pages 42-43 above. 
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suggests, that Trebizond would mistreat his instructor, a man whom he should respect but 
to whom he offers only a “chick-pea thanks,” if he showed such little regard for his own 
brother.149 Worse, Agaso seems to imply that Trebizond’s supposed ill-treatment of his 
brother was the reason for the younger man’s eventual death. “Do you want to know,” 
Agaso asks, “who this man is who so demolishes men deceased and living?” Guarino 
clearly was one of the living men, leaving Trebizond’s brother to represent the deceased 
men whom he demolishes. While Agaso clearly blames Trebizond for turning his brother 
away and forcing him to become a beggar, his phrasing suggests he may also be 
implicating Trebizond in his brother’s death.  
Whether or not the Agaso letter was truly blaming Trebizond for the death of his 
brother, Trebizond responds as if it had. He categorically denies Agaso’s version of 
events, both the explicit accusations and what he perceived to be the implicit allegations 
regarding his brother’s death, and offers his own version of his brother’s travels in Italy. 
In Trebizond’s hands, his younger brother’s story becomes part of a larger argument 
that—sometimes implicitly, sometimes explicitly—challenges Guarino’s morality and his 
philhellenic reputation. Here he portrays Guarino as an abuser of foreigners. He describes 
how his brother was “enticed from Crete” with hopes of serving as a papal secretary and 
149 Collectanea, 368. (19) Testis ipse sum quotiens ab Guarino in sermonibus amicorum et litteris, que 
complures extant, precipuis adornetur laudibus. Quid frontem caperasti? Num et fratem probum quidem 
adolescentem sua extruxit importunitate et alienas coegit errabundum per urbes mendicare ut minus mirer 
et preceptori suo arietinas referre gratias? Scire vis quisnam is est qui sic mortuos ac viventes exossat 
homines? E Creta dudum advectus, quo pruna et cotana, vento. For the surrounding text, including the 
description of the time and effort Guarino had expended on teaching Trebizond and Agaso’s contention that 
Trebizond should honor Guarino, see notes 44 and 48. 
 Monfasani’s apparatus notes that in one of the manuscripts Trebizond corrected Agaso’s fratem 
to fratrem and replaced extruxit with detrusit, which makes Agaso’s accusation clearer. Collectanea, 375. I 
take arietina gratia, “a chick-pea thanks,” as a reference to size that denotes the very little gratitude 
Trebizond offers his instructor. It is consistent with Agaso’s use of chick-pea elsewhere, as when he 
describes Trebizond not as a novus Cicero, an exceptional and eloquent man, but as a “chick-pea” [cicer], 
as unexceptional and ordinary. See Collectanea, 365 (2) Videre licet…alia milia que novus hic Cicero, vel 
cicer, magis sua quadam usurpat inscitia? 
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ventured to Rome at the behest of the pope. Unfortunately, Trebizond explains, he was 
too poor at the time to support his brother’s journey financially. Instead, he provided him 
with several Greek codices to sell to fund his way to Rome. That is why his brother 
stopped first at Ferrara and visited Guarino, who, Trebizond continues, “snatched up the 
books at a cheap price.” Far from helping his brother, Guarino cheated him. Now, 
Trebizond fumes, in the Agaso letter Guarino accuses him of having relegated his own 
brother to begging.150 Trebizond’s reworking of the tale shifts the responsibility for his 
brother’s plight and death back onto Guarino. The implication that Guarino contributed to 
his brother’s demise by rendering him penniless underscores his characterization of 
Guarino’s immorality. Trebizond’s accusations may very well also be read as implicit 
challenges to Guarino’s sincerity as a philhellene. Certainly, Guarino’s contemporaries, 
including Trebizond, were well aware of his interests in Greek studies.151 This is why, in 
Trebizond’s version, his brother stopped at Ferrara. Guarino would have been an obvious 
contact for someone interested in selling Greek codices. Guarino’s aid would have been 
invaluable to Trebizond’s brother because Byzantine émigrés depended so much on the 
support of influential Italians.152 Though he does not make the case explicitly, it is 
150 Collectanea, 397-398. (70) Ad hec extrusisse me fratrem arguit. Quis hoc unquam suspicari posset 
preter Guarinum? Fratrem habuisse me multi sciunt. Is clericorum spe illectus e Creta abiit invito patre ut 
Romam iret. Venit ad me priusquam Romam isset. Hoc quoque multi. Discedenti pecunias tenuis ego 
conferre ad iter non potui, fraterna caritate motus, non nullos codices Grecos dedi. Quos ut venderet, 
Ferraria<m> iter faciens, venit ad Guarinum, qui minimo pretio adolescenti libros eripuit. Ac ideo 
mendicare per alienas urbes putat eum qui eodem ipso anno diem suum obit. 
 
151 On Guarino’s philhellenic reputation and on Italian philhellenism in general, see pages 26-27 and 31-32. 
On Guarino’s stance regarding the importance of Greek studies, see pages 57-58.  
 
152 Trebizond acknowledges himself to have been a beneficiary when describing the support he received 
from individuals such as Barbaro. Other Byzantines enjoyed similar support, most notably the circle of 
scholars around Bessarion in Rome. He supported Trebizond for a time, as well as Theodore Gaza, 
Andronicus Callistus, Andronicus Contoblacas and others. Harris, 101, 128-140, and 189. 
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reasonable to conclude that Trebizond is challenging Guarino’s reputation by casting him 
not as a supporter or ally of Greek émigrés but as a predator of vulnerable foreigners.  
This interpretation gains credence when examining the conclusion of Trebizond’s 
letter—his defense of Greece and Greek learning—where he addresses Guarino’s 
philhellenic reputation and castigates his deceit, hypocrisy, and audacity. He laments that 
Guarino, of all men, attacks Greece and argues that “if Greece has deserved well from 
any Italian, from you certainly it has deserved the best, you who, if you had not been 
instructed by Greeks, would have languished in the dark.” He accuses Guarino of having 
the audacity to build a reputation for Greek studies and yet to cast aspersions on Greek 
culture. The passage is another of his attempts to portray Agaso’s attacks as against 
Greeks in general rather than Trebizond in particular. It is also another engagement with 
anti-Greek language and accusations of Greek levitas.153 Here he mocks Guarino’s 
hypocrisy and deceit—“you faultless man”—for reproving “the levitas and deceit of 
Greece.”154 The line turns Agaso’s arguments about Trebizond’s levitas against Guarino. 
Trebizond implies that in criticizing Greeks as deceitful and dishonorable, Guarino 
proved himself to be exactly those things. It is for good reason that Trebizond ends his 
response by taking aim at Guarino’s levitas—his deceit, audacity, and hypocrisy—since 
Agaso’s description of Guarino focused so much on his gravitas. According to 
Trebizond, Guarino was hardly in a position to judge anybody for levitas. Guarino’s 
career was built on Greek studies, Trebizond argues, yet he criticizes Greek culture, 
attacks scholars including Trebizond himself for being Greek, and, as the earlier story 
153 See pages 63-65 above.  
 
154 Collectanea, 406. (107) Verum huc loci factus, non possum non dolere quod in Greciam homo tu 
omnium…inveheris. Atqui si de aliquo Italo bene merita est Grecia, de te certe optime est, qui, nisi a 
Grecis institutus fuisses, in tenebris iacuisses. Levitatem, fallaciam integer tu homo Grecie increpas? 
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involving Trebizond’s brother suggests, abuses foreigners. Trebizond’s response to the 
numerous anti-Greek attacks of the Agaso letter thus at times engages directly with and 
seeks to undermine Guarino’s well-known philhellenic reputation.  
Greek Heterodoxy 
 
The question of Trebizond’s Greek morality functions in yet another way during 
the Guarino dispute, relative to fifteenth-century views of Greek religion. In his 
Responsio, Trebizond devotes a prolonged section to defending himself from what he 
claims was Agaso’s attempt to defame his religion. The anti-Greek language discussed 
thus far has been predominantly classical in its construction because of the frequency 
with which Agaso and Trebizond appeal explicitly and implicitly to classical Roman 
arguments, tropes, and authors. Religion, however, was a thoroughly current issue that 
deeply tinged attitudes toward Greeks in the west. To contextualize the conversation 
about religion it is necessary to consider long-standing medieval and early modern 
cultural assumptions about Greeks. In truth, the distinction between classical and post-
classical Greek stereotypes is slightly misleading. Classical conceptions of Greek levitas 
continued to inform anti-Greek perceptions long into the future. Eventually, however, 
additional stressors between the Byzantine Empire and the west began to add to these 
stereotypes. Not the least important of these was the divergence between Greek and Latin 
Christian doctrine and practices and the concept of the Greek heretic.  
By the fifteenth century, there was a mutual distrust between Latins and Greeks 
rooted in religious issues dating back centuries. The Latin addition of the Filioque clause 
to the Nicene creed in the ninth century served as a significant doctrinal and 
ecclesiological division between the Greek and Latin churches. Tia Kolbaba argues that 
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the ensuing debates about the clause served as the impetus for a good bit of “wall-
building” by both Latins and Greeks as each side developed arguments about the 
supposed heresies of the other. The debate effectively “created,” Kolbaba argues, both 
the Latin and the Greek heretic.155 Joseph Gill argues that the first three crusades created 
additional divisions and contributed to suspicion and distrust.156 Westerners blamed 
Greeks for the failure to recapture Jerusalem. Jonathan Harris describes how the 
Byzantine alliance with Saladin during the Third Crusade contributed to the western 
notion “of Greeks as scheming and untrustworthy.”157 On the other hand, the Fourth 
Crusade, the sack of Constantinople, the fifty-seven years of Latin occupation afterward, 
and the resultant Latinization of Greek religious rites contributed greatly to Greek 
antipathy toward the west.158 The outcome was the development of an anti-Latinism 
among Greeks that remained centuries later and included mistrust, suspicion, prejudices, 
and a consideration of racial differences.159 Mutual distrust hindered attempts to unify the 
Byzantine and Roman churches. The two sides were unable to overcome their differences 
at the Council of Lyons in 1274 or the Council of Florence in 1438-9.160 Gill gives anti-
Latin sentiment as the reason why the Greeks rejected union after the Council of Florence 
155 Tia M. Kolbaba, Inventing Latin Heretics: Byzantines and the Filioque in the Ninth Century 
(Kalamazoo, MI: Medieval Institute Publications, 2008), 1-3 and 131-139. 
 
156 Joseph Gill, The Council of Florence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959), 8.  
 
157 Harris, Greek Émigrés, 39. 
 
158 Gill, 13; Deno Geanakoplos, “The Council of Florence (1438-1439) and the Problem of Union between 
the Greek and Latin Churches,” Church History 24, no.4 (Dec. 1955): 332. 
 
159 Gill, 396; Donald Nicol, “The Byzantine View of Western Europe,” Greek, Roman and Byzantine 
Studies 8, no.4 (Winter 1967): 329-330, 338. 
 
160 Geanakoplos, “The Council of Florence,” 324-5. 
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and in the face of encroaching Turkish forces.161 When the Greeks at Florence first 
accepted union only to return to Constantinople and reject it, the action reinforced 
stereotypes among Latins who had long viewed Greeks as heretics, schismatics, 
untrustworthy, and deceitful.162  
Fifteenth-century Latin-Greek religious tension sometimes manifested itself in 
Latin texts as anti-Greek language. This is evident in the reactions to the fall of 
Constantinople in 1453 which raised the question of whether the west would, or should, 
launch a crusade. Some blamed the Greeks for the disaster. Poggio Bracciolini’s On the 
Misery of the Human Condition (1455) offers an example of this position. Although most 
in the dialogue grieve the loss of the city— “no previous century had ever witnessed such 
a terrible and dangerous fall of a city”—Matteo Palmieri blames the Greeks: 
I think simple humanity demands our sympathy at the fall of such a city. But if 
you consider the nature and customs of the Greeks, their treachery, idleness and 
avarice, it seems to me they deserved their punishment. As to the first, their nature 
and manner of life are sufficiently explained in Cicero’s speech for Flaccus. As to 
their trustworthiness and devoutness, the attitude they have always taken towards 
Christians is made clear above all by the destruction of Christian armies which 
Greek treachery wiped out as they made their way to recover the Holy Land. They 
have twice now abjured professions of Catholic faith made in church councils 
[Lyons, Florence]…They were forever imploring the popes for assistance in their 
hour of need: the help they could very easily have given themselves they sought 
of others, with the result that the disaster seems to have taken place not through 
chance but by divine judgment.163    
 
Palmieri’s response merges classical and post-classical Greek stereotypes. He advances 
characterizations of Greek treachery and untrustworthiness through Cicero and Greek 
161 Gill, 396; Geanakoplos, “The Council of Florence,” 324-5. 
 
162 Gill, 349. 
 
163 Poggio Bracciolini, On the Misery of the Human Condition, trans. Martin Davies, in Cambridge 
Translations of Renaissance Philosophical Texts, ed. Jill Kraye, vol. 1, Moral Philosophy (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), 20-21.   
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impiety through the councils of Lyons and Florence. Moreover, his position regarding 
divine punishment was not unique.164  
Bravus’ invective against Contoblacas includes allegations of divine punishment 
and accuses Greeks of disgraceful wickedness, perfidy, and heretical depravity. Greeks 
like Contoblacas, Bravus argues, “dare to mangle Christ with snarling teeth” and their 
minds are corrupt and entangled in heretical beliefs. Bravus describes them as heretics, 
schismatics, and inventors of wickedness. He criticizes Greeks for defending their false 
beliefs, which attests that “you are barbarians, not, as you say, Latins.” It is for this 
reason “and by the just judgment of God” that Constantinople was destroyed and its 
people were massacred or left to wander and pay the price for their beliefs. Even this 
catastrophe, he continues, does not “deter your obstinate minds from false beliefs, to 
which indeed you return like a dog to vomit.”165 As these fifteenth-century texts 
164 Hankins speaks at length about the notion of divine punishment. See also Arabatzis, 478-479 and Harris, 
41. 
 
165 Bravus, 21-45. Quo fit ut magis tibi et petulantiae tuae ignoscendum putem, si garrulis et ineptis 
quibusdam uerbis latinum genus lacessere non dubitaueris, quandoquidem Christus noster, cuius 
sacratissimam et integerrimam fidem tuis caninis morsibus lacerare ausus es, te superstitem patitur et terra 
ipsa te factoris sui hostem publicum ex hominum oculis non absorbet. Horum autem quae merito pateris 
malorum non tibi, ut affirmas, Latini causa fuere nec in eos tam precipiti et petulanti lingua maledicere 
debueras, uerum fedissima scelera tua, uel te potius ipsum (qui ad ea perpetranda quam facile currebas) ac 
perfidiam et hereticam prauitatem tuam tibi accusandum erat, ob que in huiusmodi non immerito 
calamitates incidisti. Et, nisi corruptam hactenus et hereticis opinionibus irretitam mentem omni falsitate 
penitus exueris, duriora (mihi crede) supplicia tibi subeundum erit. Nunc inter rosas ac lilia iocaris; audes 
preterea Graecos religionis excultores ac bonarum artium et omnium inuentores appellare. Hoc profecto tibi 
lubenter concesserim: illos semper religionis—sed heretice et scismatice—fuisse uerso excultores, bonarum 
artium a nonnullis Grecorum optimis uiris inuentarum corruptores et omnium demum scelerum inuentores, 
quod et Virgilius noster testatur: Scelerumque inuentor Ulixes. Hec tibi numquam negauerim. Compertum 
enim omnibus est quantum ecclesiae sacrosancte Romane rebelles semper extitistis, quae sepenumero, cum 
genus uestrum caeteris fidelibus aggregare uoluerit, uos hereses fallacesque opiniones uestras pro uiribus 
semper defensare studuistis. Que quidem omnia uos barbaros, non aut<em> Latinos ut ais, esse 
comprobant. Quamobrem et iusto Dei iudicio factum est ut, diruta Constantinopolis urbe non sine preu<i>a 
uestri generis strage, huc atque illuc uagantes pertinaciae uestre penas luatis. Neque hoc quoque tam dirum 
supplicium obstinatas mentes uestras adhuc a falsis sententiis ita deterrere potuit, quin ueluti canes ad 
uomitum redeatis. 
 The likening of Contoblacas to a dog returning to vomit derives from Proverbs 26.11 and is a 
staple of invective. Cf. Jer. Adv. Iovinian. 1.39-40. Among humanists, see the use in Petrarch, On His Own 
Ignorance and That of Many Others, in Francesco Petrarca: Invectives, ed. and trans. David Marsh 
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illustrate, east-west religious differences factored into the Renaissance Italian concepts of 
Greek morality.  
The issue of Greek religion emerges in the Trebizond-Guarino quarrel from 
Agaso’s passing remark criticizing Trebizond for using language “completely 
unbecoming of a Christian man” who “ought to both be and appear to be a good man” 
and “who professes to instill good mores in his students.” The problem was that a 
Christian, Trebizond, made a reference to plural gods by using the word “deorumque.” 
Agaso makes clear his disapproval by arguing first that “these utterances reflect a 
particular frame of mind” and then that it is “a sin to use [the name of God] even in 
jest.166 It is a short but potentially meaningful passage. On the one hand, it clearly 
questions Trebizond’s ability to serve as an instructor. It appeals to the early modern 
expectation that instructors were “both to be and appear to be” good men to inculcate 
morals and lead their students to virtuous lives.167 On the other hand, it may have been 
intended as yet another Greek slur in an attack that would have been wholly consistent 
with his other anti-Greek attacks. The evidence on this point is undoubtedly more 
tentative. There is nothing overtly anti-Greek about Agaso’s remark. Understood against 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 64 and Antonio da Rho, The Philippic of Antonio da 
Rho against Antonio Panormita, in Early Renaissance Invective, ed. and trans. Rutherford, 189. For each 
work, I cite the section numbers provided by the editors.  
 
166 Collectanea, 366. (8) Eodem in prohemio doctrinas ab auctore ac donatore laudaturus, cum deum 
hominum patrem satis esset dicere, adiecit “deorumque,” credo, ne ranarum patrem aut fortassis cicadarum 
aut asinorum lector minus cautus intelligeret. Nam vocales he sunt animantes. Verbum profecto Christiano 
indignum homine, cui deorum nomen vel ioco usurpare nefas est, nedum cum serio et in veritate dicit aut 
scribit is qui vir bonus et esse et videri debet et probos instillare discipulis suis mores pre se fert. 
Agaso is referring to a passage from Trebizond’s preface to the reader for the RLV. Monfasani has 
edited the section. Monfasani, George of Trebizond, 370-71. Ego id existimo nisi Bertolini, Alani, 
aliorumque huiusmodi libros nescio an satis utiles transcribere ab his qui docent coacta esset posteritas, aut 
loco harum nugarum bonorum auctorum opera invenirentur aut saltem auditores non imbuti his 
delirationibus nudos animos ad humanitatis doctrinas facilius applicarent, quibus nihil unquam utilius, nihil 
dignius homini a patre hominumque deorumque tributum est. 
 
167 See pages 71-72 above. 
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a backdrop of fifteenth-century characterizations of Greek religion, Agaso may have 
intended his comment as an attack against Greek heterodoxy. Such an attack would have 
allowed him to imply a host of attendant cultural vices—treachery, dishonesty, 
untrustworthiness, and obstinacy—that he charged against Trebizond elsewhere.  
Regardless of whether Agaso intended his comments as an anti-Greek attack, 
Trebizond responded as though they were. The question is why he chose to take Agaso’s 
remark as seriously as he did. Certainly, even Italian humanists could be and were 
accused of unchristian language.168 I argue that Trebizond felt pressured to respond to 
charges about his religion because he perceived them as implicit anti-Greek attacks. 
Given the variety of explicit anti-Greek attacks in the Agaso letter, it would be difficult to 
blame Trebizond for drawing this conclusion. Furthermore, as a foreigner in Italy, his 
religious beliefs had already factored into his self-presentation when he had converted to 
Catholicism years earlier. The pressure to convert can be viewed as another of the 
stressors Byzantine émigrés experienced.169 Moreover, the forcefulness of Trebizond’s 
reply amplified his characterization of Guarino’s aggression and the injustice of his 
attacks. He questioned Guarino’s motives for commenting on his religion.170 He has an 
168 Poggio Bracciolini accused Lorenzo Valla of heresy during their dispute. Christopher S. Celenza, The 
Lost Italian Renaissance: Humanists, Historians, and Latin’s Legacy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2004), 130.   
 
169 Trebizond had to explain this decision to his family outside of Italy. Monfasani, George of Trebizond, 
22. Monfasani argues that Byzantine scholars were all but required to convert as a part of assimilating to 
life in Italy. He adds that while Latins learning Greek simply had to add a new element to their professional 
competence, Greeks in Italy had to change their personal lives. He knows of no Latin figure who converted 
to Greek Orthodoxy. Monfasani, “Migrations,” 10.  
 
170 The passage in this note and the next are consecutive. Collectanea, 392. (45) Illud mirari non desino 
unde tu tam repente theologus factus sis, qui me deum patrem hominumque deorumque dicentem velut 
impium arguis. Tantane, Guarine, indomita tibi maledicendi libido inest ut cum asinos, pecudes, sues, 
canes, qui nasum inter doctores homines, qualis tu es, ingeramus, aliaque huiuscemodi superbia turbatus ac 
iracundia, quam biennio lenire non potuisti, nos monstra nomines, satiatus non sis, sed tanquam impiis ob 
illud verbum nobis insultes? Tanta tibi religionis est cura nostre quem omnes norunt, ‘deorum’ a Christiano 
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“indomitable desire for slander,” Trebizond argued, and is so “shaken by arrogance and 
anger” that he issues insults and claims of impiety.  
In replying to Agaso’s comments about his religion, Trebizond relied on the same 
strategies he used to defend his Latinity and RLV. The first and most prevalent of these 
was an appeal to authority. He argued that religious authorities including Dionysius the 
Areopagite—a “holy man and martyr” whom the “church honors as the highest master of 
theology”— justified his usage of ‘deorum.’ Trebizond described Dionysius as an 
“honest man” and “truly a Christian” and suggested that he himself was both honest and 
Christian for following Dionysius’ usage.171 This emphasis on honesty, holiness, and 
“true Christianity” was an implicit engagement with Latin characterizations of Greek 
dishonesty and impiety. Additionally, as he did when defending his Latinity, Trebizond 
chided Guarino for being unfamiliar with established authorities and for not following the 
example of Dionysius.172 He also appealed to his education, noting in a fairly offhand 
manner—“to make [Guarino] grieve more”—how he learned “the precepts of theology” 
during his early years in Italy and almost took holy orders. This comment appears almost 
dici homine non potest? Saltem adiecisses: nisi ea mente dixerim qua illud edidit propheta, ‘ego dixi dii 
estis.’ Sed vide quam multa tibi perlecta sunt theologorum volumina. Cf. Ps. 81.6 and John 10:34.  
 
171 Collectanea, 392. (46) Dionysius Ariopagita, quem tam ut summum theologie magistrum, quam ut 
sanctum virum et martyrem ecclesia colit, cuius nomen nescio an tibi, homini religioso et Christiane 
veritatis doctissimo, notum sit, is igitur Dionysius in XII De celesti hierarchia circa finem tam sanctos viros 
quam celorum virtutes non ab homine quodam qui errare possit, verum ab ipsa theologia deos non 
nunquam appellari his verbis ostendit: “invenies autem celestes etiam que super nos sunt, essentias et viros 
sacros deos a theologia vocari.” Audis, Guarine? Cernis oculis cuius auctoritate obrutus es? Viros sacros, 
inquit, ipsa theologia deos non nunquam vocat. Ego eloquenti homine, quem virum probum, idest, vere 
Christianum, esse volo, nullum magis sacrum duco, quem theologia eique similes cum deos nominet 
quoniam uni deo, quoad eius fieri possit, coniunguntur. Cf. De cael. hier. 12.3. Trebizond might also have 
mentioned Ps. 82. He does include an allusion to Cato’s definition of the orator as a “good man [vir bonus] 
skilled in speaking.” Quint., Inst. 12.1.1. 
 
172 Collectanea, 393. (47) Quod si forte credis non ea me mente deos scripsisse qua theologia dicit et 
Dionysius exponit, erras ignorantia. Nec enim maledicta, non dicam proferre ac scribere, sed ne cogitare 
quidem probo viro licet nisi prius exquirat, examinet, percipiat quid sit, quod dicitur. Quare, si tibi 
consultum vis, vita, fide, moribus Christianorum vive; priscorum linqua loquere. 
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as an aside. Coming so soon after a discussion of his piety, however, the implication is 
clear.173 Lastly, Trebizond’s defense of Greece at the end of the letter makes clear that he 
was treating Agaso’s attack as not just personal, but cultural. He articulated a position for 
which Bravus mocked Contoblacas, the idea that Greeks are truly pious, and referred to 
the “heroes” and “holy men” of his homeland, worshippers of true religion, men precise 
in their doctrines, upright in morals, and more pious than any others in the world.174  
Though a relatively small part of their dispute, the question of Trebizond’s piety 
reflects well the dynamics of the feud as a whole. Agaso’s criticisms drove the dialogue 
between the two; Trebizond responded in a way that acknowledged the cultural capital of 
anti-Greek biases. He challenged Guarino using many of the concepts used against him 
but faced additional obstacles in defending himself. Certainly charges of ingratitude, 
arrogance, and impiety were levied against Italians. Trebizond, though, had to fend off 
the added weight of classical and early modern stereotypes about Greek culture. 
Trebizond’s response therefore reflects his anxiety about his reputation as well as how 
best to combat the culturally loaded, anti-Greek attacks in the Agaso letter.  
 
173 Ibid., 394. (53) Paucissimis deinde annis et Latine ita locuti sumus ut in duabus causis duobus 
velocissimis in scribendo librariis eodem tempore dicendo suffecerimus, et <precepta> doctrinarum 
omnium bonarumque artium, addam etiam, ut magis doleas, ipsius theologie, cui relique omnes 
administrantur (pauca quidem, sed tamen que tibi ad celos usque coacervata viderentur) percepimus, et, nisi 
onere filiorum oppressi et valitudine deiecti, litterarum studia pene liquissemus. 
 
174 Ibid., 406. (107). Verum huc loci factus, non possum non dolere quod in Greciam homo tu omnium, in 
Greciam, omnium bonarum artium inventricem, in Greciam, deorum olim domicilium, non Iovis dico et 
Iunonis (non ad fabulas refugio), sed multorum heroum et sanctorum virorum (sive vetustissimos ac 
remotissimos a nostra etate consideres sive nostre, idest, vere, religionis cultores, quos numero plures, 
doctrinis subtiliores, eloquentia graviores, moribus probatiores, religione sanctiores quam ex reliquo 
terrarum orbe invenies), in Greciam, inquam, unus omnium, quo te inscribis nomine dignissimus, in 
Greciam inveheris. Cf. note 165. Bravus criticizes Contoblacas for daring to call Greeks “religionis 
excultores ac bonarum artium et omnium inventores.” 
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Conclusion 
 
The criticisms leveled against Trebizond in the Agaso letter were in many ways 
typical of the humanist invective that defined contests of honor. The characterizations of 
Trebizond as ignorant, arrogant, audacious, shameless, impious, and immoral were verbal 
strategies crafted to challenge his faculty with the Latin language, question his moral 
rectitude, and undermine his authority as a rhetorician and instructor. That these were 
common enough accusations against a professional competitor is evident in that 
Trebizond counters them by casting Guarino in the same negative lights. He chides 
Guarino for not understanding classical rhetorical authorities, he questions his knowledge 
of rhetorical precepts and grammatical usage, and he accuses him of slander, envy, 
jealousy, and arrogance. The Agaso letter is notable, however, for the extent to which it 
employs anti-Greek language and stereotypes. Anti-Greek language is in fact an integral 
part and defining characteristic of the Trebizond-Guarino feud.  
This chapter has analyzed the cultural stereotypes employed against Trebizond to 
demonstrate how anti-Greek language functioned in contests of honor. The purpose of 
this analysis has been to understand better the strategies of self-presentation and modes of 
expression available to competing scholars. Agaso used anti-Greek language to tap into a 
tradition of anti-Greek sentiment with roots in classical Roman literature—especially 
Cicero—as well as contemporary fifteenth-century thought. It allowed him to define—
both explicitly and implicitly—Trebizond as the “typical” loquacious, inept, dishonest 
Greekling, a man lacking honor, and the kind of man about whom Cicero warned his 
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brother Quintus. Trebizond recognized how damaging these accusations could be and 
struggled with how to counter charges of Greek levitas. 
Agaso’s letter and Trebizond’s response are valuable indications of how anti-
Greek language and a pro-Latin bias affected the experiences of Greek émigrés in early 
Quattrocento Italy. The present analysis has offered a different perspective from the 
prevailing arguments that have long focused on the resurgence and embrace of Greek 
learning during this period. It has argued that there were more obstacles to the acceptance 
of Greeks in Italy, even among humanists and so-called “elites,” than has been 
acknowledged. Skill in Greek absolutely created opportunities for émigrés but that same 
background also created additional problems that Italian scholars did not face. Like his 
Latin peers, Trebizond lived in a world defined by patronage and strove to cultivate a 
reputation as a knowledgeable rhetorician and teacher. His experiences, however, 
demonstrate how centuries of negative stereotypes resulted in additional stressors for 
Greeks fashioning their identities. Agaso labeled him as an inept, loquacious copyist and 
as another in a long line of deceitful, treacherous Greeklings. Trebizond not only had to 
prove his worth but he also had to contend with these stereotypes. Moreover, Agaso was 
able to use a verbal strategy Trebizond could not. Agaso could attack Trebizond as a 
Greek, but Trebizond could not attack Guarino as a Latin.    
The correspondence also encourages a reconsideration of the feud itself and of the 
individuals involved. At least one of his contemporaries, Poggio, chastised Trebizond for 
writing so aggressively and with so little evidence against Guarino. Modern 
commentators have also judged Trebizond to be morose, bitter, and angry. Trebizond’s 
response seems far less aggressive than it might have been given Agaso’s criticisms and 
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that Trebizond was still relatively early in his career. The RLV was a major treatise and a 
capstone for the work he had done since arriving in Italy. Trebizond hoped it would 
elevate him beyond the instruction of youths and afford him the financial security to 
which all humanists aspired.175 It is unsurprising that he responded vehemently in self-
defense, especially in light of the anti-Greek language used against him. These letters 
help us understand Trebizond’s more bombastic claims. When he proclaimed to Guarino 
that he speaks eloquently enough to have been born in Ciceronian Rome, this was more 
than simple boasting. It was an important statement about his Latinity to a culture that 
defined professional competency by ability in the language and characterized Greeks not 
as eloquent but as loquacious, not as knowledgeable but as inept. 
The most intriguing part of Guarino’s role in the dispute is that he never weighed 
in under his own name. He may or may not have written the Agaso letter. There are 
enough interesting parallels between that letter and other works—Guarino’s response to 
the da Monachi comments and Battista Guarino’s educational treatise—to suggest that 
Guarino may have written it. It is of course possible that these parallels were simply 
common literary tropes. Still, the idea that Agaso was a student of Guarino’s seems 
unlikely. His attitude toward Greeks seems inconsistent with what we know of Guarino’s 
other students, either Barbaro in writing to da Monachi or Battista Guarino in treating 
Greek learning in his treatise. It is hard to believe that a student of one of the most 
acclaimed philhellenes would publicly voice the kind of arguments that Agaso makes. 
Guarino, however, hiding his identity, might have been willing to do so to undermine a 
competing scholar who had recently challenged his reputation. This makes Guarino’s 
silence even more fascinating. Even if he did not write the letter, he made no attempt to 
175 Monfasani, George of Trebizond, 25-27 and 68. 
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defend himself against Trebizond nor did he say anything about Agaso’s anti-Greek 
attacks. Perhaps Guarino simply thought it beneath him to engage in the dispute, or 
perhaps by never speaking in defense of “Agaso” his silence should be read as a tacit 
rejection of the Agaso letter. It seems to me, though, that Guarino had some culpability 
for his silence given the pretense that Agaso was his student, that the real “Agaso” never 
stepped forward to prove Trebizond wrong, that the whole exchange grew out of 
Trebizond’s criticisms of Guarino, and that the dispute was public knowledge. Guarino 
could have simply issued a brief response producing Agaso, distancing himself from his 
pupil’s comments, and moderately censuring Trebizond for jumping to conclusions. To 
do so would not have required him to stoop to engaging in a controversy with a man he 
judged his inferior, but it would have allowed him to end it conclusively. Any 
conclusions about Guarino have to be tentative because his role in the dispute is far from
 clear, but the circumstances of this exchange raise questions about the nature and limits 
of Guarino’s philhellenism. It is possible, and I argue likely, that Guarino is a major 
example of an “elite” humanist who, despite his reputation as a philhellene, employed—
or condoned the use of—anti-Greek language to contest honor and reputation.   
The Trebizond-Guarino dispute occurred relatively early in Trebizond’s career in 
Italy. He had been in the west for approximately twenty years by the publication of his 
major rhetorical treatise, but had not yet achieved the kind of renown, professional 
position, and financial security he sought. The RLV was intended to elevate his status and 
his criticisms of Guarino can rightly be considered an attempt to carve a space for himself 
in the competitive community of humanist scholars. Eventually, though, Trebizond 
attained the reputation and position he sought. By 1443, he had arrived in Rome and 
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begun his service in the papal curia under Eugenius IV. In February 1444 he was sworn 
in as an apostolic secretary, a position highly coveted by his fellow humanists. He 
continued to serve Eugenius’s successor, Nicholas V, in that same position. Even having 
achieved this success, however, Trebizond continued to take an active part in the 
construction and perception of his reputation. Doing so became particularly important 
after a very public confrontation with a fellow secretary, Poggio Bracciolini, in the 
middle of the curia in May 1452. If Trebizond’s dispute with Guarino provides evidence 
of acts of self-presentation for a figure on the rise, someone seeking to establish and 
solidify his reputation, the conflict with Poggio illustrates the strategies of a figure 
desperately fighting to mitigate damage done to his reputation. 
Copyright  Karl R. Alexander 2013 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
TREBIZOND, POGGIO BRACCIOLINI, 
AND THE LANGUAGE OF RESTRAINT 
 
Introduction 
 
On May 4, 1452, George of Trebizond, then a papal secretary in the employ of 
Pope Nicholas V, engaged in a fist-fight in the middle of the chancery with one of his 
colleagues, Poggio Bracciolini. Conversing with another of his colleagues that day, 
Trebizond said something less than flattering about Poggio, though he later claimed not 
to remember what he had said. Poggio, who happened to be walking nearby, clearly 
overheard whatever it was Trebizond said and crossed the chancery to confront him. The 
two men came to blows, and the fight ended only when Trebizond reached for a sword 
from a bystander, sending Poggio into flight. For having threatened his colleague with a 
sword, Trebizond was imprisoned in the Castel Sant’ Angelo. He was released on May 9 
after composing a letter of apology, but was not welcomed back to the chancery. He tells 
us that he spent the next forty days seeking an audience with the pope. After failing to be 
admitted and after a return to the chancery resulted only in Poggio speaking publicly and 
adamantly for his expulsion, Trebizond left the curia and Rome. He spent the following 
years until 1455 in Naples under the patronage of King Alfonso of Aragon, during which 
time he wrote about the fight and Poggio in an attempt to mitigate the damage done to his 
reputation.1  
1 This chapter examines five letters related to the Trebizond-Poggio dispute. In January 1453, Trebizond 
composed letters to Poggio and Nicholas V, the former addressing the chancery fight and the latter 
Trebizond’s accusation that Poggio had sent assassins to Naples to kill him. Poggio renounced the 
assassination plot in a letter to Trebizond in February and Trebizond replied with a second letter to Poggio 
in March. For Trebizond’s letters, see Ernst Walser, Poggius Florentinus: Leben und Werke (Leipzig: 
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The conflict in the chancery has been a popular topic, particularly in recent years. 
John Monfasani established the details of the Trebizond-Poggio dispute in the 1970s. In 
2004, Christopher Celenza briefly discussed the chancery fight to construct his argument 
about the agonistic nature of the humanist community. In 2011, Stephen Greenblatt 
discussed the fight while examining the competitive nature of the curia in the early 
Quattrocento. The latter two are excellent examples of recent attempts to develop an 
understanding of the social practices of humanist scholars, of how they presented 
themselves to their peers and consciously acted to shape their reputations.2 Both works 
accurately identify the importance of the composition and circulation of humanist writing 
and the manner in which it was subjected to the consideration of one’s contemporaries. 
Humanist self-presentation emerged out of concern for financial security but also for 
popular approbation and honor that came from one’s peers.3  
The present chapter argues that Trebizond’s account of the chancery fight and of 
his relationship with Poggio afterward was a deliberate act of self-presentation derived 
from a concern about public perception and reputation. Trebizond was no different from 
his peers in cultivating honor and carefully crafting his reputation, as his dispute with 
Teubner, 1914), 501-514. For Poggio’s February letter see Poggii Epistolae, ed. T. Tonelli, 3 vols. 
(Florence, 1832-1861), 3:49-52. In June 1454, Trebizond wrote to his son Andreas accusing Poggio of a 
plot to frame Trebizond for writing letters insulting to the pope. For the letter to Andreas, see Collectanea 
Trapezuntiana: Texts, Documents, and Bibliographies of George of Trebizond, ed. John Monfasani 
(Binghamton, NY: Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 1984), 117-124.  
 
2 John Monfasani, George of Trebizond: A Biography and a Study of his Rhetoric and Logic (Leiden: E.J. 
Brill, 1976), 109-113; Christopher S. Celenza, The Lost Italian Renaissance: Humanists, Historians, and 
Latin’s Legacy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), 125-126; Stephen Greenblatt, The 
Swerve: How the World Became Modern (New York: W.W. Norton, 2011), 145-146. 
 
3 The financial benefits of working in the curia were substantial. On humanism and the secretariat see John 
D’Amico, Renaissance Humanism in Papal Rome: Humanists and Churchmen on the Eve of the 
Reformation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983), 31-34; Christopher S. Celenza, 
Renaissance Humanism and the Papal Curia: Lapo da Castiglionchio the Younger’s De curiae commodis 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 12-13. See also Chapter One, note 4.  
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Guarino in the 1430s illustrated, and it was for this reason that the fight in the chancery 
proved to be problematic for him. The vice chancellor investigating the fight concluded 
that Trebizond had acted inappropriately in wielding the weapon, and Nicholas agreed. 
Over the next two years, Trebizond embarked on a campaign to revise the public 
perception of his actions. His correspondence during this period—letters to Poggio, to 
Nicholas V, and to his son Andreas—lamented the harm done to his reputation. 
Trebizond frequently portrayed himself as the victim of Poggio’s attacks. At the heart of 
his defense of himself and criticisms of Poggio was a cultural ideal identifying emotional 
restraint and rational self-control as the keys to virtuous decision-making and action. The 
correspondence between 1453 and 1454, including an exchange with Poggio himself, 
centered on a dispute about emotion, reason, and restraint. 
The Trebizond-Poggio dispute offers a means to advance recent scholarship about 
the experiences of fifteenth-century humanists. The notion that humanists were 
concerned with status is long-standing, as is the idea that honor was won from one’s 
peers.4 Celenza’s recent work on the “lost Italian Renaissance” explains this process well, 
describing how humanists employed “oppositional categories” to vilify their opponents. 
The present chapter, like the preceding one, builds on existing studies that emphasize the 
importance of honor by examining how honor was contested.5 Chapter Two addressed 
this question by examining how anti-Greek language functioned in the experience of 
Greek émigrés like Trebizond. In Chapter Three, I expand the conversation about how 
4 See especially Hanna H. Gray, “Renaissance Humanism: The Pursuit of Eloquence,” Journal of the 
History of Ideas 24, no.4 (Oct.-Dec., 1963): 497-514. 
 
5 Lapo da Castligionchio the Younger, who wrote about the constraints placed on aspiring scholars, has 
been a popular figure in recent studies. See especially Celenza’s Renaissance Humanism and the Papal 
Curia and The Lost Italian Renaissance, 123-127. See also Elizabeth May McCahill, “Finding a Job as a 
Humanist: The Epistolary Collection of Lapo da Castliglionchio the Younger,” Renaissance Quarterly 57, 
no. 4 (Winter 2004): 1308-1345; Greenblatt, 138-142.  
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and why humanists expressed themselves as they did through a consideration of some of 
Celenza’s “oppositional categories.”6 The Trebizond-Poggio correspondence offers the 
chance to observe the language and categories humanists relied upon to make their 
arguments, and therefore the terms of engagement that shaped their contest. An 
examination of their correspondence allows us to peel back another layer in our 
understanding of humanist texts and learn more about the concepts and cultural 
expectations that undergirded the actions of their authors.   
Trebizond and Poggio each articulate their arguments about rational self-control 
and restraint with a similar set of oppositional categories that amounts to a language of 
restraint. Such language allows them to establish markers for the ideal, the man whose 
actions are governed by reason, and the opposite, the individual who is driven to action 
by unrestrained emotion. Three sets of oppositional categories guided the dialogue 
between the two men. First, prudence and imprudence served as identifying 
characteristics of the rational and emotional man respectively. Second, honesty and 
dishonesty functioned in the same manner. When action was guided by reason, a man and 
his actions were considered honest, forthright, and true. Lying, deception, plots, snares, 
and traps were the fruit of emotion, the sign of a man lacking self-control. Third, both 
men identified forgiveness as a marker of rational self-governance and resentment and 
the pursuit of revenge as indicators of failed restraint. Each man argued that the other’s 
attacks against him constituted revenge, that as revenge these attacks were impelled by 
emotion and thus irrational, and that his opponent’s behavior violated the bounds of 
propriety.  
6 Celenza, Lost, 121.  
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A long tradition of classical and medieval thought informed the ideal of restraint 
that Trebizond and Poggio articulated. Aristotle, Cicero, and the Stoics all wrote about 
rational self-governance and control of the passions. William Bouwsma laid out the 
humanist interest in Stoic thought and the role of reason in governing personal and social 
order in the 1970s in his essay “The Two Faces of Humanism.” Recent scholarship 
concerned with early modern identity has also explored Renaissance consideration of the 
passions. Michael Schoenfeldt has argued that the control of desire and discipline of the 
body became primary means for individuals to define themselves. This regulatory ideal 
had its foundation in the Stoic belief that, as Schoenfeldt states it, “all emotion is to be 
routed out, so that the rational self may rule unfettered by the claims of emotion.”7 Early 
modern concepts of self-control became the foundation for the rules of courtly etiquette 
that writers such as Baldassare Castiglione codified in the sixteenth century.8 An analysis 
of Trebizond’s feud with Poggio, though, reveals that this discourse on restraint was a 
vehicle for contesting honor in the fifteenth-century curia as well. There were definite 
rules governing the behavior of curial humanists, even if they had not yet been as clearly 
formalized as they would be in the next century.  
7 William J. Bouwsma, “The Two Faces of Humanism: Stoicism and Augustinianism in Renaissance 
Thought,” reprinted in A Usable Past: Essays in European Cultural History (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1990), 19-73; Michael Carl Schoenfeldt, Bodies and Selves in Early Modern England: 
Physiology and Inwardness in Spenser, Shakespeare, Herbert, and Milton (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), 17 and 42; Unhae Park Langis, Passion, Prudence, and Virtue in Shakespearean 
Drama (New York: Continuum, 2011), 2. The early modern concept of restraint has figured in studies on a 
number of topics. On the role of restraint in the family, see Steven E. Ozment, When Fathers Ruled: Family 
Life in Reformation Europe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), 135-141. On the emotions 
and early modern masculinity, see Todd W. Reeser, Moderating Masculinity in Early Modern Culture 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006). I explore the connection between restraint and 
masculinity in Chapter Four.   
 
8 Douglas Biow, In Your Face: Professional Improprieties and the Art of Being Conspicuous in Sixteenth-
Century Italy (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010). 
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I also argue that both Trebizond and Poggio understood themselves to be active 
participants, agents, in the shaping of their identities. Trebizond’s earlier feud with 
Guarino upholds such an argument as well, as Trebizond was clearly anxious about 
Agaso’s attacks and invested in responding to them to influence public perception of his 
Latinity and moral conduct. The fight in the chancery, imprisonment, and flight from 
Rome were, however, far more damaging moments for Trebizond than Agaso’s 
criticisms. Trebizond’s Naples correspondence therefore offers a chance to examine 
humanist self-presentation and thus agency from the perspective of one who was seeking 
not only to contest honor but also to regain lost honor. 
 In making the argument for humanist agency, the present analysis lends credence 
to recent attempts to modify the discussion of Renaissance self-fashioning introduced by 
Stephen Greenblatt and furthered by New Historicism. Douglas Biow’s study of 
professional etiquette in the sixteenth century is of interest given how prominently 
propriety figured in the Trebizond-Poggio dispute. He rejects the notion that early 
modern figures lacked agency. Instead he offers a “flexible” self that “was embedded in a 
host of social activities…all of which required negotiation of competing, interpersonal 
social obligations in a manner that enhanced self-hood, rather than completely 
determining it.”9 Social realities and cultural ideals clearly influenced their writing, but 
Trebizond and Poggio express not only a conscious awareness of these factors but also an 
9 Ibid., 26-27. Biow argues that viewing the self  “as a mere shackled historical and discursive construct,” 
or “as an empty cipher onto which familial, political, social, educational, and economic forces have freely 
inscribed themselves,” renders “the self merely the product of those forces” and void of agency. Biow 
follows two of John Martin’s studies in offering a modified version of Renaissance self-fashioning. See 
John Jeffries Martin, “Inventing Sincerity, Refashioning Prudence: The Discovery of the Individual in 
Renaissance Europe,” The American Historical Review 102, no. 5 (Dec., 1997): 1309-1342 and Myths of 
Renaissance Individualism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). For Renaissance self-fashioning, see 
Stephen Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning: From More to Shakespeare (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1980). See especially Martin’s discussion of Greenblatt’s Renaissance Self-Fashioning. 
Martin, “Inventing Sincerity,” 1314-1315. 
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ability to use them to advance their own interests. They understood identity as tenuous 
and malleable. For them, identity was the product of how one presents oneself as well as 
how one is viewed by others. They each articulate anxiety about the effect that lies and 
rumor could have on public perception, and the consequences of these for financial 
security and honor. Their anxiety bubbles up in the language they use, in attempts to 
present the other man as a liar, angry, bereft of reason, and as a slanderer. Accusations of 
deceptions or plots all are inherently active expressions. Both men also saw themselves as 
active participants in the process. They consistently incorporated ideals about virtuous 
behavior—prudence, honesty, and forgiveness—into acts of self-presentation. In doing 
so, they sought to defuse their anxiety about the impact that others could have on their 
reputation. Their writings reveal a sense of self that operated with agency, and their 
struggles to define themselves and others in a contentious professional world. Trebizond 
and Poggio each viewed themselves as agents, as active participants, in the shaping of 
their reputations and identities.   
Although Trebizond and Poggio exercised agency in their dispute and their letters 
should be read as deliberate acts of self-presentation, their attempts to mobilize cultural 
ideals of restraint were not without problems. Their correspondence also reveals a tension 
between cultural expectations and the pressures associated with public contests. 
Contesting honor meant, as Celenza noted, vilifying one’s opponent. It was not always 
easy to do this while maintaining the mantle of self-control. One had to appear rational 
and restrained in responding to attacks or risk being labeled the opposite. What 
constituted restraint, however, was debatable, and Poggio and Trebizond attacked one 
102 
 
 
another for perceived offenses and allegedly immoderate behavior. Both men exploited 
the tension between ideal and reality in their acts of self-presentation. 
The Trebizond-Poggio correspondence can certainly contribute to a more 
thorough understanding of humanist modes of expression, but it also helps us better 
assess a feud that has largely been reduced to the outrageous details of the chancery fight 
itself. Although the fight has garnered attention in recent studies, the correspondence as a 
whole has not been examined in detail since Monfasani. An examination of the scope of 
the dispute places us in a better position to understand why each man wrote as he did, 
Trebizond in particular. While Chapter Two situated Trebizond’s reply to Guarino in a 
context of humanist professional development and the challenges facing Greek émigrés, 
Chapter Three suggests additional modifications to Trebizond’s reputation are in order. 
Greenblatt, for instance, has described Trebizond as “notoriously morose” and both bitter 
and resentful after the chancery fight.10 Much of this comes from the fact that 
Trebizond’s letters were often insulting, abrasive, and self-pitying. Greenblatt’s 
conclusion, though, risks obscuring the circumstances that bound Trebizond’s actions. 
Many humanists struck a resentful tone when they encountered obstacles to financial 
success or honor, and the curia was particularly competitive.11 Trebizond’s 
correspondence certainly does reflect bitterness and not a small amount of resentment. 
This should not distract from the fact that reputation was a constant concern and that 
while in Naples he was arguing from a position of weakness. The most notable aspect of 
10 Greenblatt, The Swerve, 145-146. Greenblatt is only one example of a long-standing depiction of 
Trebizond as having had a difficult personality. Monfasani discusses this as well, though softens his 
assessment by noting that of the many feuds Trebizond engaged in, his opponents were often the 
aggressors. Monfasani, George of Trebizond, 103-105.  
 
11 See the studies regarding Lapo in note 5. 
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this correspondence, however, is the extent to which he and Poggio engaged with one 
another by means of the same concepts. Their shared strategies may not allow for a full 
revision of Trebizond’s personality, but they do help us understand better why he made 
the claims he did—outrageous though they may seem—and I argue that they help 
normalize his behavior. This can be seen in an examination of the shared language of 
restraint both men employ, the first example of which is their concept of prudence.   
Restraint and Prudence 
 
 Prudence is an important marker of restraint and rational self-control in the 
writings of both Trebizond and Poggio. It is one of the most frequently used concepts 
each man marshals to defend himself and vilify his opponent. Their concept of prudence 
is also extremely flexible, as it intersects with a host of other markers of restraint. 
Prudence is an especially useful starting point to a discussion of their dispute because 
much of the backlash against Trebizond in the aftermath of their fight was rooted in the 
judgment that he had acted imprudently. The chancery fight, though, was not the first 
disagreement the men had had, nor was it the first time Trebizond had been accused of 
acting imprudently. Poggio had criticized him for having acted imprudently during the 
Guarino feud in 1437. In January 1453 and again in March, when he wrote to Poggio 
about their fight in the chancery the previous May, Trebizond recalls Poggio’s earlier 
criticism. Poggio’s judgment regarding the Trebizond-Guarino dispute and Trebizond’s 
response to it illustrates how each man understood prudence, reason, and restraint.  
 Poggio, Trebizond, and their contemporaries had a wealth of classical and 
medieval authorities to draw upon in conceptualizing reason, prudence, and restraint. 
This included Aristotle’s discussion of prudence as practical reason guiding ethical 
104 
 
 
decision-making. For Aristotle, prudence entailed the use of reason to select the most 
ethical course of action when responding to events.12 Among Roman authors, Cicero also 
links reason and ethics.13 The De inventione lists prudence [prudentia]—defined as 
“knowledge of what is good, what is bad, and what is neither good nor bad”—as one of 
the four cardinal virtues. Another of the four, temperance [temperantia]—the parts of 
which include “continence, clemency, and modesty [modestia]”—is defined as “a firm 
and well-considered control exercised by the reason over lust and other impulses of the 
mind.”14 The De officiis lists both “the full perception and intelligent development of the 
true”—“in which we place wisdom [sapientia] and prudence [prudentia]”—and “the 
orderliness and moderation of everything that is said and done”—“wherein consist 
temperance [temperantia] and self-control [modestia]”—among the four cardinal virtues. 
It also advocates the “subjection of all the passions, and moderation in all things” and 
identifies as “proper” to “employ reason and speech rationally, to do with careful 
consideration whatever one does, and in everything to discern the truth and to uphold 
it.”15 Among medieval authors, Thomas Aquinas identifies prudence as virtue necessary 
to leading a good life. He describes it as the application of reason to action that helps stop 
one from acting out of impulse or passion. Likewise, he defines temperance as a virtue 
12 Arist., Eth. Nic. 6.5 1140a2-1140b2. 
 
13 For an excellent overview of Cicero’s views of prudence and of the importance of Cicero to Quattrocento 
concepts of prudence see Robert Cape Jr., “Cicero and the Development of Prudential Practice at Rome,” in 
Prudence: Classical Virtue, Postmodern Practice, ed. Robert Hariman (University Park: Pennsylvania 
State University Press, 2003), 35-66.    
 
14 Cic., Inv. rhet. 2.159-160 and 164. This and subsequent translations are Hubbell’s. Cicero, De inventione, 
trans. H.M. Hubbell (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1949).  
The Rhetorica ad Herennium likewise defines prudentia as “intelligence capable, by a certain 
judicious method, of distinguishing good and bad.” Temperance—here modestia—is “self-control that 
moderates our desires.” Rhet. Her. 3.3-5. This and subsequent translations are Caplan’s. Rhetorica ad 
Herennium, trans. Harry Caplan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004). 
 
15 Cic., Off. 1.15; 1.18-19; 1.93-94; 1.152-153. 
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that inclines man to act in accordance with reason and to moderate the passions.16 In each 
case, the emphasis fell upon the use of reason to guide decision-making, the goal being to 
discern the good from the bad and to select the good.  
The classical and medieval combination of reasoned decision-making and ethical 
behavior was evident in the writings of fifteenth-century humanist educators, 
contemporaries of Trebizond and Poggio. The humanist educational program asserted 
that instructors could guide their students not only through their studies, but also to 
virtue. The key was control of the emotions. Pier Paulo Vergerio (1370-1444), drawing 
on Aristotle, describes the weakness of the rational powers in the young: 
excessively credulous, for lacking worldly experience, they believe that whatever 
they hear is true. Also, their opinions change easily, since their humors are in 
motion due to growth and they have in abundance the heat which is the principle 
cause of motion. The soul, in fact, follows the complexion of the body, and thus, 
just as those who lack something are quick to desire it, so they are swiftly 
satisfied once they have obtained what they want. The young follow their 
passions above all and do everything with great vigor because they have keen 
desires which their bodily heat spurs on, while the rational powers [ratio] and 
prudence [prudentia] that could moderate their desires are weak.17 
 
Vergerio’s characterization, that emotion rather than reason governed behavior and that 
desire had to be moderated, was not uncommon.18 Renaissance figures understood a clear 
connection between prudence, reason, and virtue.19 When he described Trebizond’s 
16 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, IIa, q. 57, a5; IIb, q.47, a1, a4, a8; IIb, q. 141, a1 and a3. 
 
17 This and subsequent translations are Kallendorf’s. For all of Kallendorf’s edited texts, I cite the section 
numbers he provides. Pier Paolo Vergerio, De ingenuis moribus et liberalibus adulescentiae studiis liber, in 
Humanist Educational Treatises, trans. and ed. Craig W. Kallendorf,  (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2002), 19; Cf. Arist., Rh. 2.12.7.  
 
18 See also Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini, De liberorum educatione, in Humanist Educational Treatises, 
trans. and ed. Kallendorf, 21; Battista Guarino, De ordine docendi et studendi, in Humanist Educational 
Treatises, trans. and ed. Kallendorf, 3.  
 
19 Renaissance authors, as Vergerio indicates, also viewed prudence and rational self-control as a sign of 
manhood. They considered imprudence and emotional behavior as a sign of childishness. I return to these 
ideas in Chapter Four when discussing the concept of masculinity in humanist contests. 
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actions as imprudent in 1437, then, Poggio was stating that his opponent’s actions lacked 
reason and virtue. He was not only saying that Trebizond’s actions were inappropriate, 
but also that they were also literally irrational.20   
Poggio, Trebizond and the consultus homo  
 
In September 1437, Poggio wrote to Christopher Cauchus about Trebizond’s 
recent letter to Guarino in response to the letter written by “Andreas Agaso.”21 He argued 
that Trebizond’s reaction—including his assumption that Guarino had adopted the Agaso 
pseudonym to attack him—was unreasonable, unethical, and therefore inconsistent with 
the behavior of a prudent man, a consultus homo.22 He defined the consultus homo by 
virtue of the two main aspects of classical prudence, reason and ethics. Trebizond, he 
argued, responded to the Agaso letter by writing insultingly to Guarino based on mere 
conjecture. The implication was that the truly prudent man, by contrast, perceives 
circumstances well, considers them carefully, and does not respond to offenses 
insultingly. Poggio expressed confidence that Guarino had not written the letter, noting 
that it was composed in a manner inconsistent with the man’s eloquence, learning, 
20 Eventually the concept of prudence would change. Martin describes a shift in the concept over the 
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries leading eventually to Machiavelli in the sixteenth century and the divorce 
of prudence from ethics. Martin, “Inventing Sincerity,” 1323-1324 and Martin, Myths, 49-53. 
 
21 Poggii Epistolae, ed. T. Tonelli, 3 vols. (Florence, 1832-1861), 2:125-128. Tonelli’s edition is reprinted 
in Poggio, Opera Omnia, vol. 3, Epistolae (Turin: 1964). I cite Poggio’s sources as Poggii Epistolae. 
Poggio’s letter is an indication of the public nature of humanist disputes and the interest humanists took in 
the conflicts and reputations of others. Trebizond came upon the Agaso letter in February 1437, composed 
his response to Guarino in March, and by September Poggio was writing to Cauchus that he had received 
and read through both letters. Poggio was not directly involved in the dispute but he knew about it, wrote 
about it in his own letters, and even passed judgment on those involved. Just as the Trebizond-Guarino 
correspondence circulated among friends like Poggio and Cauchus, so did discussion of ongoing feuds. For 
an overview of the Trebizond-Guarino dispute, see Chapter Two, pages 24-25 and 30-31.  
 
22 Monfasani, George of Trebizond, 70. I follow Monfasani in reading consultus as prudent. Here and in 
subsequent correspondence, Poggio and Trebizond both articulate an ideal situated in reasoned decision-
making and thus prudence. 
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prudence, and style. He speculated instead that it was written “by one of [Guarino’s] 
students, or by anybody who loves Guarino and hates George.” He added that it would 
have been unlike Guarino to hide his identity or seek another’s protection rather than to 
defend himself openly. Poggio was critical of Trebizond’s belief that Guarino composed 
the letter given the lack of evidence to support the position: “To write with so many 
words and so insultingly, as though arguing against a clear crime, about which you offer 
no evidence except an opinion, and indeed an incorrect opinion—by the judgment and 
belief of others—does not seem to be truly the behavior of a prudent man [consultus 
homo].”23 
 Much of Poggio’s rebuke centered on the manner in which Trebizond had 
responded to Guarino, a manner Poggio considered insulting, lacking restraint, and 
unethical. Even as he identified Trebizond as a “most learned man and exceedingly 
eloquent,” Poggio argued he would prefer him “to expend his effort on a more honorable 
cause [causa honesta].” He lamented that Trebizond had chosen contempt and abuse 
rather than reasoned argumentation. He made clear the link between prudence and self-
control by offering an example of appropriate behavior drawn from his own prior dispute 
23 Poggii Epistolae, 2:126-127. Libellum quem ad me misisti perlegi diligenter: epistolam, quae Guarino 
ascribitur, procul dubio affirmarim non esse Guarini; cujus genus dicendi satis mihi est cognitum. Novi 
ingenium, novi eloquentiam, novi doctrinam, et scribendi morem, ut nihil in illa sit, quod ulla ex parte 
redoleat Guarinum. Epistolam vero illam arbitror esse conscriptam ab aliquo ex suis discipulis, vel altero 
quopiam, qui et Guarinum diligat, et odiat Georgium, ut uni se gratificari velit, alterum exagitare: nam 
plura in ea scribuntur, pace dixerim scribentis, quae ornatius, eloquentius, copiosius, prudentius, ut opinor, 
per Guarinum scripta, et objecta fuissent, sive vera, sive falsa existant. Neque etiam Guarinum adeo 
timidum ac formidolosum judico, vel ita jejunum in scribendo, ut aut sibi dubitandum fuerit, suscipere 
palam suam defensionem, aut ad alterius praesidia confugiendum. Trapezuntium vero doctissimum video 
hominem, et admodum eloquentem, cujus scripta mihi admodum placent. Sed mallem eum impendisse 
operam in causa magis honesta, magisque accomodata ad explicandas ingenii vires. Conjectura vult 
assequi, ut Guarinus auctor et scriptor extiterit epistolae conscribendae. At hoc neque me judice, neque 
quovis alio, qui recte Guarinum norit, unquam probabit, cum absint plurimum a scripturis suis; scribere tam 
multis verbis, tam contumeliose, tanquam in reum manifesti criminis, de quo nihil afferas praeter 
opinionem quamdam, et quidem ab aliorum opinione et sententia disjunctam, non recte consulti hominis 
esse videtur. 
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with Guarino. When Guarino had rebuked him for saying he preferred Scipio to Caesar, 
Poggio had defended himself in such a way as to offend his opponent as little as possible 
and had replied more moderately than Guarino’s initial comments.24 Poggio 
acknowledged that some offenses must be contested. The question was how to do so. He 
was clear on this point: “For when something ought to be fought with reason and 
arguments, voices bursting with insults and abuses, which to those listening are 
unpleasant, are completely rejected and render our case less commendable.”25 
Trebizond’s response was not only a sign of failed reason, according to Poggio, but of 
failed ethics. 
24 Poggio was referring to the “Scipio-Caesar controversy” of 1435. During that conflict, the participants 
disputed the relative merits of Scipio Africanus, defended by Poggio, and Caesar, defended by Guarino. 
The dispute was well-known in Ferrara, given Guarino’s school there and his friendship with Leonello 
d’Este, and in Florence, Poggio’s home. For Poggio’s initial letter in April 1435, see Poggio, Opera Omnia, 
1:357-365. Guarino’s responses in June 1435 are ep. 669 to Leonello and ep. 670 to Poggio in Epistolario 
di Guarino Veronese, ed Remigio Sabbadini, 3 vols. (Venice: A spese della Società, 1915-1919), 2:220-
254. Davide Canfora edited and included an introduction for these texts in La controversia di Poggio 
Bracciolini e Guarino Veronese su Cesare e Scipione (Florence: L.S. Olschki, 2001). Much of the 
scholarship on the dispute has centered on its political ramifications relative to a discussion of tyranny and 
republicanism and the respective governments of Ferrara and Florence. See for example Hans Baron, The 
Crisis of the Early Italian Renaissance: Civic Humanism and Republican Liberty in an Age of Classicism 
and Tyranny (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1955), 66-67 and 407-408. Others have followed 
in this vein: John W. Oppel, “Peace vs. Liberty in the Quattrocento: Poggio, Guarino, and the Scipio-
Caesar Controversy,” Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies 4 (1974): 221-265 and Mark Jurdjevic, 
“Civic Humanism and the Rise of the Medici,” Renaissance Quarterly 52, no.4 (1999): 994-1020. More 
recently there are the works of Marianne Pade: “Guarino and Caesar at the Court of the Este,” in The Court 
of Ferrara and its Patronage, ed. Marianne Pade (Modena: Edizioni Panini, 2001), 71-92 and Pade, The 
Reception of Plutarch’s Lives in Fifteenth-Century Italy, vol.1 (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 
2007), 233-247.  
In his response to the Agaso letter, Trebizond had criticized what he portrayed as Guarino’s habit 
of disparaging his opponents, and cited Guarino’s treatment of Poggio during the Scipio-Caesar 
controversy. Collectanea, 382. Caperare vero frontem aut detrahere tuum non est? At cum in doctissimum 
Poggium scriberes, tale quid tunc posuisti, ut et hic facis, cum opus acrimonia esse videretur? Multa sunt 
quibus irretitus teneris. 
 
25 Poggii Epistolae, 2:127-128. Quod autem is me suis verbis honorat, esset mihi gratius, si non vergeret in 
contemptum Guarini, cujus honori a me semper consultum fuit, et praesertim in nostra controversia, qua ei 
respondi, cum is me paulum lacessisset, quod Scipionem suo praetulerim Caesari. Egi tamen ita meam 
defensionem, ut eum minime offenderem, nisi ubi causa id necessario postularet. Hoc certe recte videor 
posse dicere, me parcius quam acceperim, nonnulla retulisse. Ubi enim ratione pugnandum est et 
argumentis, sunt omnino rejiciendae voces contumeliis et jurgiis refertae, quae et auditoribus sunt ingratae, 
et causam nostram minime reddunt probabiliorem. See note 16 for the preceeding material.  
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Poggio composed a second letter about the Trebizond-Guarino dispute in early 
1450, years removed from the letter to Cauchus, yet still before his chancery fight with 
Trebizond.26 The relationship between Poggio and Trebizond had changed by this point. 
Both served the papacy and they had worked closely in the translation of a pair of Greek 
texts, Xenophon’s Cyropaedia (1446) and Diodorus Siculus’s Bibliotheca Historica 
(1447-1449). In 1450, Poggio wrote of his appreciation for Trebizond’s aid with these 
translations.27 Still, when looking back on the letter to Cauchus, Poggio maintained his 
assessment that Trebizond had acted on conjecture, written insultingly, and that his 
actions did not seem consistent with the behavior of a prudent man. He promised 
Trebizond, however, on their friendship, that he intended no indignity, no slander, nor 
any dishonor against him, and stated simply that he thought Trebizond had acted 
wrongly.28 Poggio did admit he had not spoken carefully enough. He had not meant to 
imply that Trebizond was an imprudent man but merely that he had acted imprudently in 
that particular situation. He had, he explains, “slipped into writing those words that could 
approach the temerity of a false accuser.”29 Even this acknowledgment, though, sustained 
26 Monfasani, George of Trebizond, 70. The letter is not dated but Monfasani follows Tonelli in dating it in 
the beginning of 1450. Poggii Epistolae, 3:21-24. 
 
27 Poggii Epistolae, 3:23. Ego enim nedum tuo honori velim in aliquo detractum, sed accumulatiorem reddi 
mea opera, si fieri posset, cupio, atque etiam ampliorem. Debeo enim tibi plurimum, qui mihi adjutor 
praecipuus fueris in traductionibus meis. 
 
28 Ibid., 3:21-22. Scripsi olim Christophoro Cauco Veneto, cum mihi libellum quemdam destinasset, in quo 
epistola, quam Guarini existimas, adversus te scripta, et tua responsio continebatur, me procul dubio 
affirmare illam non esse Guarini, idque multis ex causis mihi persuadens, existimansque solummodo te 
conjectura moveri, addidi in epistolae meae calce, scribere tam multis verbis, tam contumeliose tanquam in 
reum manifesti criminis, de quo nihil afferas praeter opinionem quamdam, et quidem ab aliorum opinione 
et sententia disjunctam, non recte consulti hominis esse videri. Hoc tibi ex animo, proque nostra amicitia 
affirmo, mi Trapezunti, in nullam tuam contumeliam, nullam detractionem, nullum in dedecus ea verba me 
fuisse compulsum; putavi non recte a te factum, qui rem incertam pro certo crimine insectareris. 
 
29 Ibid., 3:23. Ego, ut dixi, existimans te non manifesto crimine, ut asseris, sed conjectura motum illam 
epistolam confutasse, dixi non videri mihi id recte consulti hominis fuisse, non quia recto fueris consilio 
usus, sed quia dum scriberem ita mihi videbatur, lapsus scribendo in ea verba, quae possent calumniatoris 
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the opinion that Trebizond lacked prudence. He had acted on impulse rather than reason 
and attacked a man without proof.  
Poggio’s semi-apology failed to persuade Trebizond, and his comments continued 
to be a point of contention during the following years. In a March 1453 letter to Poggio, 
Trebizond scoffed at the idea that Poggio’s apology in 1450 had satisfied him, and wrote 
that the only thing he desired from Poggio was that the man recant what he had said.30 
More importantly, the concepts of prudence and self-control that Poggio employed in 
1437 and 1450 figured prominently in the Trebizond-Poggio dispute, particularly in 
Trebizond’s reassessment of the chancery fight.  
Trebizond’s Account of the Chancery Fight 
 
In January 1453, Trebizond, writing from Naples, composed a letter to Poggio 
with his own account of their chancery fight.31 The letter was his first attempt to revisit 
the events of the previous May and to revise how his actions that day were viewed. He 
delivered his account via a language of prudence and restraint. It is clear that Poggio’s 
past condemnation was at the forefront of his mind, but the concept of prudence was also 
more immediately relevant for him. Trebizond had been judged—first by the vice 
chancellor of the curia, and subsequently by Nicholas V—to have acted imprudently by 
temeritatem subire. Non enim ad quadram philosophorum verba illa redegi, sed more hominum scripsi, qui 
libere, nec semper accurate, loquuntur.  
 
30 Walser, 511. Quod ais, credebam tibi esse ex mea defensione abunde satisfactum, quoniam scilicet alias 
epistolam ad me de iniuria tecum questum conscripseris. Vehementer erras et res forsan excidit ex tuo 
animo penitus. Nullam enim epistolam ipse abs te volui nisi que primam omnino ut falsam revocaret. 
 Trebizond was responding to Poggio’s claim in February 1453 that he thought his 1450 apology 
would be enough to satisfy Trebizond. Poggii Epistolae, 3:49. See note 58.  
 
31 For the unedited letter, see Walser, 501-504. 
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drawing a sword against Poggio.32 The similarities between his current situation and past 
dispute with Guarino were not lost on him, either. Indeed, he made a direct reference to 
Poggio’s earlier criticisms at the beginning of his letter. Reminding Poggio of all the help 
he had lent him in the translations of Xenophon and Diodorus—by which Poggio 
“acquired both money and everlasting honor”—Trebizond censured his opponent for 
thanking him with a letter “in which you write that I am a man too little prudent and 
provoked easily and without any reason.”33 It is this depiction of himself as a man easily 
provoked, whose actions lack careful consideration, which Trebizond sought to overturn. 
At the same time, he expressed his arguments more explicitly than Poggio did in 1437 
and 1450. Poggio’s discussion of prudence included no overt discussion of emotional 
restraint, even though it was clearly an implicit repudiation of what he considered to be 
Trebizond’s irrational—that is, lacking in reason—actions. Trebizond, on the other hand, 
consistently portrayed Poggio as rash and impelled by emotion. This can be made clear 
by parsing his description of the chancery fight and noting the markers of prudence he 
used to defend himself and defame Poggio. My purpose is not to establish what actually 
happened that day but to see how Trebizond described what happened. In relating the 
fight as it unfolded, Trebizond drew clear distinctions between what he claimed was his 
own prudent, restrained behavior and the emotional, imprudent behavior of his opponent.  
32 Trebizond does not explicitly state he was judged imprudent, but implies it based on how he describes 
the judgment against him and how he justifies his behavior. See note 39. Walser, 503. Nam si 
statim…cardinalis predicavit verbis tuis confusus… 
 
33 Walser, 501. Nunc autem econtra si conscientiam tuam scrutaberis aut si ab universa Cancellaria 
apostolica quesieris maxima invenies beneficia in te a Georgio profecta fuisse. Quis enim eorum qui cum 
locum petere hunc solebant, ignorat et Xenophontem et Diodorum te magnis meis ex Graeco in latinum 
laboribus vertisse? Unde tibi et pecunia accessit et honor sempiternus. Quibus pro maximis beneficiis quid 
retulisti, edidisti epistolam que ad manus meas pervenit, ubi scribis parum me consultum hominem esse et 
leviter et absque ulla ratione moveri.   
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Trebizond situates the related contrasts between prudence and imprudence as well 
as reason and emotion at the center of his account of the beginning of the fight. He was 
conversing with a colleague, he writes, when he said something against Poggio, who was 
walking nearby. Poggio overheard the comment and “answered with a shout” that he was 
lying. He rushed toward Trebizond “with a hurried step” and “in haste” and “with a burst 
of anger” shouted again that he was lying. The emphasis here is on Poggio’s emotion and 
aggression. He overheard a private conversation—albeit in a public place—and 
responded by shouting and charging across the chancery. Trebizond describes Poggio’s 
movements as swift, hasty, and angry. In contrast, he emphasizes his deliberate response 
and self-control. He claims he would simply have weathered Poggio’s accusations—
which he calls “slander” [maledicta]—“with patience, like a parent,” except that Poggio 
then rushed toward him. He stood to meet the man’s charge but only so that he would not 
be overpowered. Claiming self-defense, he recalls how he braced himself against 
Poggio’s charge by remaining fixed in his steps and holding out a hand to keep him at 
bay. This, he contends, was perfectly justifiable, “for everybody knows that violence 
ought to be fended off.”34  
Trebizond relies on a language of restraint and prudence to present the details of 
this initial encounter. He claims that Poggio approached him first and was the only one to 
34 Ibid., 502. Cur enim ipse magis quam tu deliqui? Dimidium facti qui cepit habet sed dices me incepisse. 
Verbis fateor nam cum omnes socii conquererentur de computo rationis communis, dixi nescio quid in te 
longius a consessu nostro per atria magna deambulantem. Quod certe non putavi ad aures tuas 
perventurum, audisti tamen et: Mentiri me magna voce respondisti. Utinam alia quoque huiusmodi 
congessisses nihil ego penitus replicassem. Sed maledicta tua magno animo quasi parentis audissem. Sed tu 
forsan quia ego silui, neque ipsum compressi contraxique sedens, putasti me timuisse. Citato enim gradu 
cursim irruisti adversus me, ego ne sedens opprimerer surrexi, nec vestigia movi, sed steti eisdem in 
vestigiis quasi fixus. Tu cursim atque impetu irruisti ad me clamitans Mentiris. Sicut ego ipse primus 
verbum dixi adversus te: quod nec auditurum quidem credidi sic tu primus impetum  fecisti, immo solus. 
Nam ego in iisdem steti vestigiis ac ut impetum tuum repellerem manum protendi, et tu in ipsam incurristi. 
Quid ergo peccavi, profecto nihil.   
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land a blow. Trebizond twice addresses the question of who hit whom. The first time, 
toward the beginning of the letter, he claims “I did not go for you with a fist, Poggio, but 
instead you ran into a fist.” He denies having struck a blow again, later: “Just as I spoke a 
word against you first (which I believed would not be heard), so you struck a blow first, 
or rather you alone struck a blow.” Instead, Trebizond claims “how moderately I held you 
off, for I extended a bare hand against your attack.” He makes an explicit argument that 
his actions were in fact prudent—here “moderate”—which he reiterates shortly thereafter 
when he asks Poggio to “consider with what dignity” he acted in remaining fixed in his 
steps and stretching a hand to fend him off.35 Each of Trebizond’s claims about who 
struck whom reflect his anxiety about the perception that he had acted imprudently.36  
Trebizond’s concept of prudence—linking practical reason and ethical decision-
making—and efforts to present himself as a consultus homo are evident again when he 
addresses the possibility that Poggio never intended to strike him. “Perhaps you will 
35 Ibid., 502. Vera sunt hec dices, sed tamen pugno postea me petiisti. Non petii ego te pugno, Poggi, sed tu 
incurristi in pugnum; Ibid., 502. Quid ergo peccavi, profecto nihil. Sed hoc aliorum et conscientie tue 
iudicium sit. Nemo enim est qui nesciat vim esse repellendam. Repuli et quam moderatissime, manum 
enim extendi nudam in irruentem. Si hec vera non sunt, precor ut omnia mala que dici fingique possunt 
veniant in me et in liberos meos. See note 34 for the preceding text; Ibid., 503. Vide quam graviter feci, non 
mutavi vestigia, sed ne me pulsares (ad id enim te irruere natura me ita docente putavi) manum ad 
propulsandum impetum protendi.   
Monfasani writes that Trebizond “stopped him [Poggio]with a punch,” citing Lorenzo Valla’s 
account of the fight as evidence. Monfasani, George of Trebizond, 110. For Valla’s account, see Lorenzo 
Valla, Opera Omnia, 2 vols. (Basel: 1540; repr., Turin: Bottega d’Erasmo, 1962), 273-274. Valla, it should 
be noted, was not present for the chancery fight and wrote of Trebizond’s punch while in the middle of his 
own feud with Poggio. The Poggio-Valla feud is discussed below, pages 136-138. Trebizond may very well 
have punched Poggio but whatever the facts the key issue for my analysis is how Trebizond relates the 
events in a way that challenges the perception of him as imprudent. 
 
36 Trebizond repeats his claims in subsequent letters. In his March 1453 letter to Poggio, Trebizond 
maintains that he had simply fended Poggio off. Walser, 509. Tunc ego fateor culpam in te retulisse qui 
longe aliquantulum a nobis deambulabas. Audisti verba mea et clamans: mentiris irruisti in me. Ego 
manum ad reppellendum te natura duce protendi. 
In June 1454, Trebizond argued the same in a letter to his son Andreas. Collectanea, 120. Nec 
dubitabant posse hoc se calumnia id facere, qui iam bis fallaciis me suis indicta causa oppresserunt: 
primum, quando irruentem in me Pogium manu repuli; deinde, cum me secretariatu privassent. On 
Trebizond’s spelling of Pogius, see note 88. 
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claim,” he writes to Poggio, that “yes, you did charge at me, but not with the intention of 
striking.” Trebizond counters that he had no way of knowing what Poggio was thinking 
but could only react to the evidence before him: “Was I so divine as to know in what 
spirit you charged against me? I heard you shout loudly ‘You lie, you lie,’ and I saw you 
advancing rapidly, even at a run.”37 Regardless of the accuracy of his account, he 
describes the fight in this manner to present himself as reasonable. Even as his colleague 
ran toward him shouting, Trebizond notes he had the rational state of mind not to attack, 
but to defend himself merely by putting his hand out. 
Trebizond focuses just as intently on his thought processes in describing the key 
moment in the conflict, his decision to use a sword. That decision led the vice chancellor 
to decide against Trebizond—who repeatedly laments that he was never allowed to 
explain his side of the story—and call for his imprisonment.38 Given his imprisonment 
and exit from Rome, Trebizond expends a great deal of effort explaining why he had 
wielded the sword. After fending off Poggio’s initial attack, Trebizond explains, 
Trebizond was helped to his desk by his colleagues. Poggio, however, continued his 
assault. Poggio stretched out a hand and stuck the index finger into Trebizond’s mouth 
while grasping his cheek with his thumb. With his other hand, Poggio stretched out his 
fingers “to dig out both my eyes,” even as Trebizond twisted in his seat to evade the 
attempt. Trebizond casts his response as prudent:  
37 Walser, 502-503. Id tu similiter non predicabis, sed dices forsan, quod prudenter se hic putavit quidam et 
quidem in cetu doctissimorum hominum pro te dixisse, te irruisse quidem sed non pulsandi animo. Deusne 
ego eram ut scire possem quo animo irrueres. Tonare te verbis audiebam Mentiris, mentiris, citatoque gradu 
immo cursim ferri videbam. See note 35 for the preceeding and following text. 
 
38 Monfasani speculates that the cardinal in question was Francesco Condulmer. Monfasani, George of 
Trebizond, 110. Trebizond also alleges that Poggio tricked the others in the curia into believing him, and 
claims this was why his side of the story was not heard. See pages 119-122. 
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O poor, unlucky me, how prudently I acted at that time and how irresponsibly I 
was judged to have acted. I could have justly bitten the finger driven into my 
mouth: I did not. It occurred to me, since I was sitting and you were standing, to 
crush your testicles with both hands and to lay you flat in this way: I did not. I 
asked for a sword from those present so that I might drive you away by fear of it. 
And this idea did not disappoint me. For in fact, you immediately hurried away 
from that place like a Florentine woman in flight. What wrong, then, did I do if I 
requested a sword to drive you away?39           
 
Restraint and prudence are crucial to Trebizond’s explanation. He claims he did not rush 
to action and was not impelled by his emotions, adding that he did not immediately reach 
for the sword when Poggio first charged him. Instead, he surveyed his options and chose 
to frighten the man rather than to harm him. Trebizond’s focus again falls on his thought 
process, which allows him to emphasize his reason, and on his action, which allows him 
to assert his ethical behavior. Like his account of the rest of the fight, his discussion of 
the sword was not simply a plea of self-defense, nor was it merely the bitter complaint of 
a man who had been judged guilty. It was a deliberate framing of his choices intended to 
refute the public perception of his actions as imprudent.  
Restraint and Deception 
 
Prudence and imprudence mark rational self-control or its lack, but honesty and 
dishonesty are equally markers of restraint and failed restraint. Each man used the 
39 Walser, 503. Cumque postea multis accurrentibus resedissem, tu dextra protensa indicem digitum in os 
meum immisisti et cum pollice simul teneram partem faciei tenebas. Aliam vero manum ad eruendos 
utrosque oculos duobus digitis protensis in ipsos circa meum caput vitantis et huc atque illuc caput 
circumferentis immitebas…O meme miserum, o me infelicem quam gravissime tunc feci et quam levissime 
fecisse iudicatus sum. Potui digitum in os immissum meum dentibus iure concidere: non feci. Venit in 
mentem, cum ego sederem et tu stares, utrisque manibus testes tuos comprimere ac te ita prosternere: non 
feci. Gladium a circumstantibus quesivi, ut eius timore te pellerem. Nec me fefellit opinio. Illico enim ut 
Florentina femina fuga inde te rapuisti. Quid ergo mali feci si gladium petii, ut te fugarem?  Nam si statim a 
principio cum te impetum in me ferri vidissem, gladium quesiissem: faterer a me peius factum fuisse, quam 
quidam cardinalis predicavit verbis tuis confusus… 
 Perhaps because of the absurd details of the fight, this passage has proven popular in recent 
studies. Greenblatt notes Trebizond’s attempt to present himself “as having acted with exemplary restraint,” 
although he addresses the issue of restraint only briefly. I argue that prudence and restraint were key parts 
of Trebizond’s self-presentation. Greenblatt, The Swerve, 145-146. 
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additional set of oppositional categories in a variety of ways, including of course 
accusations of lying, but also in references to deceptions, traps, snares, or plots. 
Trebizond and Poggio characterize honesty as the conformity of statement and action to 
fact and as an open and straightforward manner of behavior. They portray dishonesty as 
the disjunction between statement, action, and fact as well as a manner of behavior that 
obscures and hides rather than operating openly. Their language of honesty is rooted in 
the decision-making process. Trebizond and Poggio both describe dishonesty as an 
irrational and unethical reaction to events, and a sign of an emotional nature. Anger, 
cruelty, and savagery indicate a lack of reason and self-control and explain why an 
individual lies, deceives, and plots against others. Dishonesty is thus a marker of failed 
self-control and failed prudence. 
 It is in articulating this combination of honesty, prudence, and restraint that 
Trebizond and Poggio most clearly demonstrate their interest in self-presentation. Both 
men express anxiety about how lies and deception can influence public perception. The 
model of ethical prudence allows them to combat these effects. Each presents himself as 
mobilizing practical reason for ethical ends, to dispel lies and reveal rather than obscure 
the truth. Their arguments are also an indication of the tensions between the ideals and 
realities of the humanist experience. Practical reason and ethical decision-making may 
have been the ideal, but the worries of both men suggest this was not always upheld.  
Their correspondence allows for some modification of recent analyses that note a 
change in the early modern concept of prudence. Recent studies take Machiavelli’s The 
Prince and Baldassare Castiglione’s The Book of the Courtier as evidence of a sixteenth-
century shift from a prudence rooted in ethics toward what John Martin has termed a 
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“prudential rhetoric.” The phrase prudential rhetoric, as Martin explains it, denotes a shift 
from the classical conception of ethical prudence to a point when prudence became “an 
ethical strategy that gave new emphasis to the individual’s will” and was “divorced 
entirely from ethics.” Martin then cites Machiavelli and Castiglione on the importance of 
lying, dissimulation, and concealing one’s true beliefs in everyday interactions. The 
emphasis regarding prudence remained on deliberation, reason, and reaction to 
circumstance, but early modern authors began to embrace different actions—including 
dissimulation and craftiness—to attain one’s goals.40 As recent examinations of the curia 
have demonstrated, however, lying and dissimulation were characteristic of, and much 
lamented by, Quattrocento humanists. Trebizond and Poggio were not alone in their 
concern about dishonesty.41 Despite whatever changes were occurring in the Renaissance 
concept of prudence, ethical prudence and its qualms with lying and dissimulation 
remained a key part of the strategies of Trebizond and Poggio.  
Dishonesty figures prominently in Trebizond’s reassessment of the chancery fight 
in January 1453 and Poggio’s response the following month. This is especially true of a 
pair of accusations Trebizond levies against Poggio. First, he accuses Poggio of lying 
about his own role in the fight, of misleading the curia afterwards, and of engineering 
Trebizond’s expulsion from the chancery. Second, he accuses Poggio of having sent 
assassins to Naples to kill him. Trebizond warns Poggio that he wrote about the latter 
allegation to the pope himself in another letter of January 1453. Poggio’s February 
40 See the works of John Martin in note 9. Martin, “Inventing Sincerity,” 1324-1325. On the shift regarding 
prudence see Victoria Kahn, Rhetoric, Prudence, and Skepticism in the Renaissance (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1985) and Nancy S. Struever, Theory as Practice: Ethical Inquiry in the Renaissance 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1992). On Machiavelli and the new notion of prudence see Eugene 
Garver, Machiavelli and the History of Prudence (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987).  
 
41 See Greenblatt’s chapter on the “Lie Factory.” Greenblatt, The Swerve, 135-155. See too the studies on 
Lapo in note 5. 
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response directly addresses these allegations and, like Trebizond’s January letter, relies 
largely on a language of dishonesty and imprudence.  
The Exit from Rome and the Assassination Plot 
 
Trebizond devotes much of his January letter to claiming that his imprisonment 
and eventual departure from Rome were because of Poggio’s anger and lies. He makes a 
case for Poggio’s lack of restraint and unethical behavior by linking these lies to his 
emotions, including anger, rage, and cruelty. The crux of his argument is that Poggio 
misled the curia into believing that Trebizond bore sole responsibility for their conflict. 
Trebizond establishes this argument early, asking Poggio whether he is ashamed “to have 
so confused the whole truth that you flung me down into that foulest prison.” Trebizond 
accuses him of having tricked the curia, men who believed Poggio to be an honest man, 
and of having so confused the matter that Trebizond’s side of the story was never heard. 
He attributes Poggio’s deception to his emotional state, arguing that if he “had not been at 
that time completely unreasonable on account of [his] rage [furor],” he would have 
admitted his part in the fight.42 Poggio’s alleged dishonesty also allows him to explain 
how the vice chancellor, an otherwise “venerable and prudent man,” would render a 
verdict against him. The vice chancellor “erred greatly in this matter” “because, deceived 
[deceptus] by you, he refused to listen to the other [Trebizond’s] side.” He adds that 
Poggio’s influence over the vice chancellor convinced the pope that Trebizond’s 
testimony was unnecessary and then repeats his allegation that Poggio “misled him and 
42 Walser, 502. Nam per Deum immortalem Poggi, ut amicus enim te colloquor, non pudet te ita veritatem 
tunc omnem confudisse, ut in fedissimum me conieceris carcerem nec interrogatum quidem contemptum 
enim fuit clamoribus nonnullorum potentium qui cum te probum virum crederent, decepti fuerunt; 
contemptum inquam fuit illud aureum preceptum: audi alteram partem. Quod tu ideo fecisti quia non 
ignorabas quomodo res se habuit. Certe Poggi nisi pre furore omni tunc ratione caruisses te ipsum magis 
quam Georgium accusasses. See note 34 for the following text. 
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several other cardinals, who either think you are a good man, or love you by virtue of a 
prior relationship.” He ends the passage commenting on Poggio’s cruelty [crudelitas] and 
blaming his imprisonment on how Poggio had obscured the truth.43  
 Trebizond claims Poggio’s lies were also instrumental in his exit from Rome. At 
the beginning of his January letter, he argues that Poggio “cast [him] down into the 
filthiest prison” and also “shamefully drove [him] from the apostolic chancery.” After 
their fight, Trebizond explains, he “conceded the matter to [Poggio] and left Rome with 
the greatest loss of honor and property.”44 Trebizond’s concern for honor is clear but he 
also indicates the financial consequences of humanist contests. He reiterates these points 
in his letter to Nicholas V composed at the same time as his January letter to Poggio. The 
letter juxtaposes Poggio’s supposed anger and dishonesty with Trebizond’s own prudence 
and self-control. Trebizond left, he tells Nicholas, for fear of what Poggio might devise 
against him.45 He claims again that Poggio manipulated the curia against him and 
43 Walser, 503. Qui cum sit vir gravis et prudens in hoc tamen maxime erravit, quod alteram partem audire 
abs te deceptus neglexit. Non enim dubito, si audisset quod non tanto furore dominum nostrum decepisset. 
Sed tu illum et nonnullos alios cardinales qui te vel bonum virum putant, vel prisca coniunctione affinitatis 
diligunt, confudisti. Illi una tecum dominum nostrum nec mirum si multi unum sic, incitastis ut altera pars 
nec interrogata quidem fuerit. Sed de his satis. Non enim ut corrigantur, quod res preterite fere nequeunt, 
narravi:  sed ut ostendam quanta sit crudelitas tua, hominem de te bene meritum et in carcerem per iniuriam 
obfuscata veritate per te coniectum. See note 39 above for the preceding text.   
Cf. Trebizond’s June 1454 letter to Andreas, where he accuses Poggio and Giovanni Aurispa of 
circulating forged letters—purportedly written by the king of the Turks and insulting of Nicholas V—to 
block Trebizond’s return to papal service and see him imprisoned again. I return to the forged letter plot 
below, pages 139-146. Collectanea, 120. Quare sic? Ut cum omnes intelligant qui eas legunt non esse a 
rege Turcorum conscriptas, Georgius, qui Neapoli habitat, scripsisse criminaretur, et indicta causa vel furca 
vel perpetuis vinculis damnaretur.Unde id patet? Coniecerunt me biennio antea Aurispa et Pogius in 
vincula et quidem indicta causa.  Liberatus ad optimum omnium regum Alfonsum Neapolim profugi.  
 
44 Walser, 501. Tantusne Poggi adversus me furor tibi conceptus est, ut cum et fedissimo carcere afflixeris 
et ignominiose quantum ad te attinet e Cancellaria expuleris apostolica, cumque preterea ego ipse re tibi 
cesserim atque Roma cum maximo tam honoris quam rei familiaris detrimento abierim, tam longo tempore 
transacto non deferbueris? 
Trebizond’s claim that he lost property likely refers to his loss of the salary associated with his 
position as apostolic secretary. Monfasani reports no official move to strip Trebizond of his position, yet by 
being refused reentry to the chancery Trebizond had essentially lost that income. I know of no actual 
property that Trebizond lost. On the contrary, we know from a letter in June 1454 that his son Andreas 
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explains that Poggio’s anger still had not abated.46 He had tried to reconcile with Poggio 
after their fight, he writes, but was hesitant to do so in the chancery because he had heard 
a rumor that he would be expelled if he returned. Poggio refused to meet him anywhere 
else. Trebizond takes this as proof of his opponent’s insincere interest in reconciliation 
and continued animosity.47 He then describes how he had returned to the chancery after 
forty days to see whether Poggio was still angry. Upon his arrival, those in attendance 
sent for Poggio, who spoke publicly with the vice chancellor about expelling Trebizond. 
Rather than wait for the decision, Trebizond left the chancery and Rome. He “decided it 
was prudent to depart,” he explains, “because I understood [Poggio’s] mind was 
implacable [animus implacabilis], and because I saw that several cardinals said and did 
everything he wanted.”48 Trebizond emphasizes his own reasoning and prudence here 
continued working in the curia after his father left for Naples. Trebizond urges Andreas to leave Rome at 
the end of that letter. I think it likely that Trebizond retained holdings in Rome after his departure. 
Monfasani, George of Trebizond, 113-115 and 137 
 
45 For the letter to Nicholas see Walser, 504-506.  
 
46 Trebizond emphasizes the conflict with Poggio in his decision to leave Rome but also tells Nicholas he 
had previously considered leaving because he felt he was not receiving the proper respect for his translation 
work. See Monfasani, George of Trebizond, 109-113. Cf. Walser, 505. Quod libentius feci quantum id 
ipsum iam antea cogitaram propter iniurias improbissimi hominis Jacobi Cremonensis, quem non 
ignorabam aperte conari labores meos in se ipsum transferre. Sed postea B.P. Sanct. Tua que veritatis 
vicarius est omnem mihi certius aperuit veritatem, que humanitate insita sibi et veritatis manifestande 
amore commentarios meos ab ipso scedularum appositione fedatos cum affixis scedulis misit. Quarum 
alique aperte significant nonnulla me bona ab idoneis ut verbo suo utar auctoribus sumpsisse que cum ipse 
non intellexerim, se melius illa expositurum quando tempus dabitur. Ita vir bonus clam mihi insidiabatur 
perfecissetque nisi S. Tua luce hac clariores improbi atque ignorantis hominis insidias fecerit, ita ut negare 
nullo pacto possit. His ergo rationibus libenter Poggio cessi, presertim cum non minus Rome quam hic 
essem peregrinus, sed non sufficiunt hec omnia Poggio.  
 
47 This section is also an example of the related theme of resentment, discussed below, pages 130-146.  
 
48 Walser, 504-505. Ego sanct. Pater, nulla re alia magis istinc abii quam timore ne durities Poggii 
Florentini quicquam durius atque asperius adversus me innovaret. Nam post illum casum qui mihi culpa 
sua invectus fuit, quamvis rogatus litteris meis quas ex fedissimo carcere ad ipsum scripseram veniam 
dederit. Intellexi tamen ipsum ficto animo, quoniam tua S. ita volebat fecisse. Nam cum paratum me 
semper ad reconciliationem ubicumque preter quam in Apostolica cancelleria non ignoraret, ipse 
sepenumero simulavit se quoque paratum, sed non alibi quam in cancellaria. Cujus rei testis est Marcellus 
Rusticus. Id ego idcirco recusavi, quoniam certior factus rumoribus iam eram quod ignominiose 
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and throughout his January letters to Poggio and Nicholas. He conceded the matter to 
Poggio—at the loss of honor and property—because he understood that the man was 
unable to control his anger, that his lies had been effective, that the men of the curia 
believed Poggio to be honest, and that they would continue to take Poggio’s word over 
his own.  
 Trebizond’s narrative of his departure from Rome is essentially an amplification 
of his description of the chancery fight, where he argues that Poggio’s anger clouded his 
reason and impelled him to violence. When he discusses his imprisonment and departure, 
Trebizond speaks in greater detail about Poggio’s character. This is an important shift 
from describing an isolated outburst of emotion to a more substantial statement about the 
man’s very nature. Poggio attacked him, but then lied about it afterwards, confused the 
cardinals, feigned an interest in reconciliation, and even forty days later spoke publicly 
for Trebizond’s expulsion. The implacability of Poggio’s anger and his consistent 
dishonesty allows Trebizond to cast him not just as prone to emotion and deception but as 
defined by them.  
Trebizond’s portrayal of Poggio’s anger is a critical component of his third 
example of his opponent’s dishonesty and lack of restraint: the assassination plot. He 
writes about the supposed plot to both Poggio and Nicholas in January 1453. To 
Nicholas, Trebizond relates the details of one of what he alleges were Poggio’s three 
Vicecancellarius inde me expulsurus erat. Deinde cum propter peccata mea nullus mihi aditus ad S.T. 
daretur nec aliquis cubicularius vellet me cum aliis secretariis admittere, post XL dies experiri volui si iam 
furor in me suus deferbuisset. Petii ergo cancellariam. Et statim a nonnullis et quidem aperte missum fuit 
pro eo. Venit et cum Vicecancellario aperte de ignominiosa expulsione mea peregit. Quid statuerit nescio. 
Nam postquam Poggius inde abiit, ego etiam timens ne post abitum ipsius fieret, quod optabat, abii statim, 
non inde solum sed eodem ipso die ex Roma Neapolim versus. Nam quoniam vidi animum eius 
implacabilem vidique nonnullos cardinales omnia dicere ac facere, que ipse vellet, magni animi esse putavi, 
cedere. For the following material, see note 46. 
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attempts to send assassins to Naples to kill him.49 Trebizond’s focus shifts here from 
Poggio’s lies and obfuscation after their fight to the plots Poggio developed over time. He 
twice comments to Poggio on the duration of the man’s anger and dishonesty, first noting 
Poggio’s efforts to ruin him with plots and then his attempt to pursue him with a sword.50 
I read the latter as a comparison to the charges against Trebizond after their fight. 
Trebizond is suggesting that even though his prudence had been questioned for using a 
sword that day, it was Poggio who continued to threaten him in a similar manner long 
after the fight. The phrasing is undoubtedly exaggerative, as Poggio was not personally 
wielding a sword against him, but rather, if Trebizond’s accusation is to be believed, he 
hired men to do so. The statement amplifies Poggio’s error, though, and makes 
Trebizond’s own decision seem the less egregious of the two offenses. Poggio, after all, 
had had plenty of time to cool his anger. Trebizond implies the same to Nicholas, arguing 
49 The assassination accusation may sound outrageous but physical violence was not unheard of among 
fifteenth-century humanists. In May 1433 Francesco Filelfo was scarred by a knife attack from an assailant 
hired by an associate of Cosimo de ’Medici in Florence. Paul Grendler, The Universities of the Italian 
Renaissance (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 213. Trebizond, however, was likely 
trying to capitalize on public knowledge of Poggio’s vitriolic feud with Lorenzo Valla, another curialist. 
Trebizond hoped that the Poggio-Valla feud would help convince Nicholas and any who read his letter that 
Poggio capable of violence. In his March 1453 letter, Trebizond reminds Poggio of the man’s own 
proclamation that he intended to see Valla killed. See page 136.  
The Poggio-Valla feud was still ongoing when Trebizond wrote to Nicholas in January 1453. 
Poggio eventually left Rome after becoming the chancellor of Florence in April 1453 but that did not lessen 
the animosity between them. Monfasani reports how Niccolò Perotti—one of Valla’s supporters and the 
secretary of Cardinal Bessarion—sent an assassin to Florence to murder Poggio. The Florentine 
government sent a letter of protest to Bessarion and Perotti was forced to write a “humble apology.” 
Monfasani, George of Trebizond, 122. Poggio continued to bear ill-will toward Valla while in Florence. 
Writing to Pietro Tommasi in 1454, he cast Valla as a beast and a heretic who ought to be whipped, 
imprisoned, and burned at the stake. Celenza, Lost, 130; Salvatore Camporeale, “Poggio Bracciolini versus 
Lorenzo Valla: The Orationes in Laurentium Vallam,” in Perspectives on Early Modern and Modern 
Intellectual History, ed. Joseph Marino and Melinda W. Schlitt (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester 
Press, 2001), 31.  
 
50 Walser, 501. Sed per insidias me coneris occidere, ita nullum omnis honesta cogitatio de rebus humanis 
locum in te habet, ut non possis cogitare mortalem te quoque esse, divinique auxilii sicut omnes homines 
egere. For the preceeding text, see note 44; Walser, 503. Cuius iura qualiacumque sint: nunquam audita 
fuerunt, qui cum detrimento tam honoris quam rei familiaris tibi cessit adhuc longo tempore transacto longe 
absentem gladio prosequeris. For the preceeding text, see note 43.   
123 
 
                                                 
 
that Poggio was dissatisfied with his departure and that “the arrogant mind [superbus 
animus] of that man” could not be quelled even months later.51  
 Trebizond’s account to Nicholas of the assassination plot contrasts Poggio’s 
plotting and implacable anger with his own rational self-control. He relates how on 
December 15, 1452, he was studying when he was told that two armed men wished to 
speak with him. Trebizond notes that he thought this odd. He had the men told he was in 
the Castel and sent a member of his household to follow them. The men went 
immediately to the Castel, where they waited for the rest of the day. They came again 
another day, and Trebizond had them told he was at Sant’ Agostino, a nearby monastery. 
This time, however, they recognized Trebizond’s servant following them and retreated. 
Fearing they had been discovered, they reached out to Trebizond. They admitted to 
having been asked to kill him but contended they had agreed only in order to warn him. 
Although he had considered legal charges—he met with three people to discuss the 
option—Trebizond pardoned the men for fear that public opinion about the affair, even if 
false, would turn against Nicholas.52 Trebizond’s argument is predicated on the fact that 
51 Walser, 505. Nec semestri et ultra spatio temporis superbus hominis animus potui mitigari, sed mittit 
satellites hucusque ad occidendum me quam rem ter iam tentavit. Primo manifestissime Novembri mense 
deinde XV die Decembris et his diebus Tercio quamvis huius tertii aggressus coniecturalia signa non 
necessaria fuerint. Aliorum duorum manifesta necessariaque. Sed ne longior sim, secundum aggressum 
tantummodo narrabo. For the preceding material, see note 46. 
 
52 Walser, 505-506. Quintodecimo Decembris S.P. studenti mihi nuntiatum fuit, venisse duos armigeros qui 
mecum loqui vellent. Ego ipsa conditione, atque arte hominum perculsus responderi feci, quod essem in 
castello et statim misi qui eos sequerentur. Recta via petierunt castellum. Expectaveruntque ad primam 
usque horam noctis altero die similiter venerunt, responsumque ipsis a me per nuntium fuit quod essem in 
sancto A<u>gustino quod monasterium non minus quam mille passibus distat a domo mea. Misique 
similiter qui eos per totam diem illam observaret. Recto itinere Sancti A<u>gustini monasterium illi 
petierunt, collocaveruntque se in locis unde possent a monasterio exeuntem videre. Sed minister meus non 
potuit caute diutius eos observare. Nam post horam unam circiter ab illis perspectus fuit. Et statim inde 
recesserunt. Cognoverant enim illum esse ministrum meum, per quem sibi responsum fuit domi mee. Unde 
timore perculsi anteaquam ego de capiendis ipsis ordinem dedissem, prevenerunt et per quendam 
venerabilem fratrem et sacre Regie Maiestati in primis dilectum mihi nuntiarunt quod ipsi me ad salutem 
quesivissent meam: rogatos se fuisse Rome cum istac transirent ut me occiderent seque assensisse non ut 
facerent, sed quo me admonerent, ut caveam. Ita ego non precibus illorum magis victus quam quod viderem 
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Poggio was still working in the curia. He is suggesting that Poggio’s behavior, if it 
became public knowledge, could reflect poorly on Nicholas himself. Trebizond casts his 
actions as rational and restrained by relating how he accurately perceived the danger of 
the armed men and by framing his pardoning of them as an act of discretion. He brought 
the situation to Nicholas, he writes, so that a proper solution could be arranged.53  
 Trebizond’s reassessment of the fight, his imprisonment, his exit from Rome, 
and the assassination plot all reinforce his contention that Poggio was dishonest. He uses 
Poggio’s supposed dishonesty as an illustration that Poggio had acted wrongly in their 
dispute, that his actions were the result of failed restraint, and that his actions indicated an 
individual driven to action by emotion. Trebizond’s narrative is a complex account rooted 
in the charges against him after the fight—imprudence, the use of the sword—and in 
Poggio’s previous criticisms of Trebizond’s response to the Agaso letter. Poggio 
challenged this narrative and each of Trebizond’s allegations in his February 1453 letter. 
Poggio’s Response: Trebizond’s Pattern of Abuse 
 
Poggio’s response offers radically different accounts of the chancery fight and the 
assassination plot.54 Much of his letter consists of a rejection of Trebizond’s allegations, 
which he dismisses as clear lies. He denies ever having done anything offensive to 
hanc rem si patefieret nonnihil etiam ad Sanctitatem Tuam quanvis falso opinione tamen multorum 
pertinere libenter ipsis ignovi, nec ex me Deum testor et conscientiam meam quispiam aliquid hac de re 
percepit, preter tres apud regem non infimos quorum consilio usus sum de querendis capiendisque ipsis. 
For the preceding material, see the previous note. 
 
53 Walser, 504. Post oscula beatorum pedum sanctiss. pater. Audeo nonnihil fretus inaudita Tue Sanctitatis 
mirabilique humanitate referre. Que postquam pepercerit Sanctitas tua supplico ut dignetur oportunum 
remedium adhibere; Ibid., 506. Ita res se habuit Beatissime Pater quare S. Tue supplico ut primo propter 
deum, deinde propter te et conscientiam tuam, tercio propter homines (non enim omnino fama et 
existimatio negligenda est). Dignetur Georgii humillimi fidelisque servitoris ac filiorum suorum, et in hac 
re et in ceteris iura et rationes propius aspicere. 
 
54 For Poggio’s February 1453 response see Poggii Epistolae, 3:49-52.  
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Trebizond, disparaging him, or standing in the way of his interests.55 He argues that he 
had no part in the supposed assassination plot, and that Trebizond had so escaped his 
attention that he was unsure whether he was alive or dead. Poggio claims the very 
allegation is absurd. “Do you really think me so stupid, so imprudent [imprudens],” he 
asks, “as to be willing to commit my reputation [fama] and good name [existimatio]” in 
such a plot?56 Poggio’s disavowal is a clear articulation of his concern for reputation. He 
repeatedly characterizes Trebizond’s claims as false, unjust, slanderous, and ridiculous. 
The entire assassination plot is “nothing.” It is a “false and ridiculous complaint.” 
Nicholas knows him too well to believe such an accusation, and surely he is not “so noted 
an assassin and so occupied in the murder of men” that anybody else would believe him 
to have taken part in such a plot.57 
55 Ibid., 3:49. Ego nihil umquam, quod jure te deberet offendere, contra te egi; non verbo, non litteris tibi 
unquam detraxi; non commodis tuis unquam obstiti, sed dilexi ut virum doctum usque ad eam diem, qua tu 
acceptam de communi pecuniam per fraudem denegasti, quae nostri discidii causa fuit. Nunquam aliquid de 
te cogitavi, quod non solum tibi, quamvis iniquus sis judex, sed cuiquam bono viro debeat displicere: tu an 
idem feceris, tuae litterae satis impudenter scriptae testantur.  
Poggio levies a new charge in claiming that Trebizond had committed fraud. Trebizond denies the 
allegation in March 1453 and casts it as another example of Poggio’s attempts to ruin him. Walser, 509. 
Sed ad veritatem quam modo dixiti, falsum illud statim addidisti: usque ad eam diem ais, qua tu acceptam 
de communi pecuniam per fraudem denegasti: que nostri discidii causa fuit. Acceptam ego pecuniam 
negavi? Quis hoc preter te unquam dixit? aut quando tu id quod ego resciverim nisi modo? Nec fuit causa 
discidii ut tu appellas nostri. Non pudet te tam aperte mentiri? …Vide igitur prudentiam tuam ne stultitiam 
dicam. Furem me modo facis, quod nec tunc quidem quando pugno repulsus exarsisti adversus me dicere 
ausus fuisti.  
 
56 Poggii Epistolae, 3:51. Ego tibi persancte possum jurare, non solum tui tollendi consilium non coepisse, 
sed te ita excidisse ex animo, ut vivus ne, an mortuus esses non satis memoria tenerem: nimium, 
mehercules, ocio inerti abundarem, si de Trapezuntio cogitarem. Itaque neque fuit unquam, neque est ulla 
in me cura tale facinus perpetrandi; quippe qui multis de causis optem, ut diutius vivas, praesertim per 
foenus amissis pecuniis, quae tibi tantam superbiam subministrabant. An vero ita me stultum putas, ita 
imprudentem, ut nescio quibus vanis hominibus, qui te inani ostentione terrerent, meam famam et 
existimationem, ut de animae salute omittam, committere voluisse? Absit a me talis cogitatio, nedum opus. 
 
57 Ibid., 3:50-51. Non intelligebam, neque enim expresseras in litteris ad me tuis, quae causa te ad me 
lacerandum impulisset; sed in copia litterarum, quas ad Pontificem scribis, cognovi quid quereris, me 
scilicet percussores ad te occidendum ex Urbe misisse mense Decembris; quod totum cum nihil sit, 
honestum foret nihil quoque tibi a me responderi. Veruntamen rectius fuisset id facinus in tuis litteris inseri, 
ut a te ipso cognoscerem in quo me tam acerbe accusares. Nam quid opus fuit, nisi ad malivolentiam et 
infamiam adversus me excitandam, falsam et ridiculam querelam ad Pontificem deferri? Nunquid ita sum 
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Poggio renounced Trebizond’s charge as a falsehood contrived by a man who 
continued to harbor an enmity against him. He argued that Trebizond had concocted his 
false accusation to ruin Poggio’s reputation. His motive, according to Poggio, was 
Poggio’s prior comments about Trebizond’s treatment of Guarino in 1437. Even though 
he had later apologized and indeed praised Trebizond—a reference to his letter in 1450—
Poggio writes that Trebizond was dissatisfied. Still aggravated and unable to control his 
anger, Poggio continues, Trebizond made his false allegations about the chancery fight 
and the assassination plot. Regarding the former, Poggio claims that Trebizond “recounts 
a lengthy story” to blame him for the fight and accuses Trebizond of unjustly twisting 
events to support his weaker position.58 Regarding the latter, Poggio states that the 
assassination charge was Trebizond’s obvious attempt to harm his reputation: “For what 
need was there, except to excite ill-will and dishonor against me, for a false and 
ridiculous complaint to be brought to the pontiff?”59  Although he expressed confidence 
that Nicholas knew him too well to believe the accusation, Poggio understood and labeled 
it as Trebizond’s attempt to turn public opinion against him. Like Trebizond, he 
expressed anxiety about the effect that lies could have on reputation. 
ignotus Pontifici, aut notus sicarius, et in caede hominum hactenus versatus, ut existimes Pontificem, aut 
alios, credere me talium insidiarum fuisse auctorem? 
  
58 Ibid., 3:49-50. Arguis me ob rem antiquam, quod olim scripserim in quadam epistola, te nominans, 
parum bene consulti hominis videri; idque in tuam contumeliam scriptum putas. Quam rem alias et verbis, 
et per epistolam apud te purgavi; scribens multa in tuam laudem, quae rectius tacuissem, credebam tibi ex 
mea defensione abunde satisfactum. Sed animus tuus, ut video, exulceratus, quoniam alia desunt, ex inanire 
jurgandi causam quaerens, conceptum contra me odium nequivit continere, ne dum in Trapezuntio, sed ne 
in Catone quidem fuissent ea verba contumeliosa. Si tantum in te consilii esse putas, ut errare nequeas, 
nimis tibi omnium judicio arrogas; si errare te posse fateris, non mireris id de te dictum, quod 
sapientissimis quoque viris aliquando videmus objici, cum dicantur ea egisse, quae non bene consulti 
hominis esse videantur. Narras longam fabulam in rejiciendo in me praeteritorum culpam, quae 
existimabam tibi jam ex animo, prout mihi acciderat, excidisse; quae acta sunt, nequeunt immutari: sed ab 
iniquo interprete saepius in malam partem vertuntur. Cf. Poggio’s 1450 letter, pages 109-111. 
 
59 Poggii Epistolae, 3:51. Nam quid opus fuit, nisi ad malivolentiam et infamiam adversus me excitandam, 
falsam et ridiculam querelam ad Pontificem deferri? See note 57.  
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In dismissing Trebizond’s accusations, Poggio expands on his previous 
assessment of his opponent’s prudence with a consideration of what Trebizond’s lies 
reveal about his character. In 1437 and 1450, Poggio had criticized Trebizond for having 
acted rashly and without evidence in writing insultingly against Guarino. Poggio argues 
similarly here about the assassination plot, claiming that posterity would prove Trebizond 
had perceived the situation wrongly and lashed out without evidence.60 Now, though, 
Poggio draws substantive conclusions about Trebizond’s character. He describes 
Trebizond’s letter to him as “extremely insulting and insolent beyond what is proper of 
your habits and learning,” and proclaims that he forgives Trebizond for his nature and the 
perturbation of his mind.61 This statement establishes a connection between emotion—
Trebizond’s perturbation—and the resultant action—the writing of insulting letters—but 
also connects to his adversary’s nature. His characterization of Trebizond is similar to 
Trebizond’s portrayal of Poggio the previous month. Each man casts the other as captive 
to emotion in the moment as well as over time, a sure sign of someone whose very nature 
is lacking in self-control. They both portray the other’s anger as manifesting itself in lies 
or plots. Poggio proceeds to argue that the failure of his 1450 apology to satisfy 
Trebizond indicates his opponent’s arrogance. Even the wisest men, Poggio lectures, 
occasionally act in a way unbefitting a consultus homo, but he implies that Trebizond 
believes he ought not be held to that level of scrutiny. The truth, he continues, is that 
60 Poggii Epistolae, 3:51. Persuade tibi quod libet: futurum tempus te ostendet male sensisse, et incertam 
suspitionem pro certo maleficio accepisse. Cf. Poggio’s similar assertions in 1437 and 1450, pages 107-
111. 
 
61 Poggii Epistolae, 3:49. Recepi tuas litteras, ultraquam mores tuos et doctrinam deceat, contumeliosas 
nimium ac petulantes: ignosco naturae tuae et animi perturbationi, in qua ex tuis verbis intelligo te versari. 
Sed ne videar tacendo, vel assentiri, vel contemnere quae scribis, et ut me purgem in eo, quo me inique et 
falso accusas, respondebo paucis, et paulo modestius quam tu, ne in quo es reprehendendus te videar 
imitari.  
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Trebizond is simply an irascible man [iracundus homo] who lies to avenge an old grudge. 
It is for this reason that Poggio dismisses Trebizond’s account of the chancery fight, at 
the same time claiming for himself the mantle of restraint by refusing to stoop to 
disgraceful language, as he accuses Trebizond of doing.62 
Poggio juxtaposes a depiction of Trebizond’s enduring anger, lack of restraint, 
and lies with a characterization of his own rational moderation. His strategies are similar 
to Trebizond’s, who defended his actions as reasoned in contrast to Poggio’s alleged 
dishonesty. Poggio claims that his response will be more moderate than Trebizond’s 
insulting letter and that he refuses to alter his habits and use abusive language.63 He also 
declares that if Trebizond had imitated his moderation [modestia] in handling the 
assassination issue, he might have freed both men from having to deal with the 
accusation of a plot. As an example of his moderation, Poggio writes about a rumor he 
claims to have heard recently, that Trebizond had requested and procured from King 
Alfonso of Aragon Poggio’s property in Naples. Despite the report, Poggio continues, he 
neither complained nor wrote insulting letters to Trebizond. Instead, trusting in Alfonso’s 
prudence, he merely assumed the story was false.64 Whether true or not, and Monfasani 
believes it was not, the purported rumor fits well with Poggio’s characterization of 
62 Ibid., 3:50. Tua tamen verba tanti faciam, quanti hominis iracundi, et hac in re non rectum judicium 
sequentis: neque vero propter tuas calumnias mutabo mores meos, neque tecum verborum turpitudine, sed 
virtute contendam. See note 58 for the preceeding text. 
 
63 For Poggio’s claims of moderation, see the previous two notes. 
 
64 Poggii Epistolae, 3:51-52. Tuum est credere ut voles; ego mea conscientia contentus ero: si tamen 
modestiam a me praestitam, in qua me laudo, fuisses imitatus, et te, et me inani labore et molestia 
liberasses. Nam cum ad me, dum essem nuper Florentiae, a pluribus scriptum esset, te possessiones meas a 
rege inclito Aragonum dono postulasse, atque impetrasse, non sum tecum eam injuriam questus, neque 
quicquam ad te scripsi contumeliosum, existimans famam, quae ferebatur, non esse veram, et id factum a 
prudentia tanti principis alienum. 
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Trebizond as rash.65 Unlike Trebizond, Poggio implies, he does not leap to conclusions 
and attack others based on false allegations. Alongside his comments about Trebizond’s 
past impulsive behavior, Poggio’s response to the rumor, based on what he knows of 
Alfonso, is intended to demonstrate his own restraint.  
 Poggio and Trebizond employed very similar strategies in accusing each other 
of dishonesty and praising themselves for their own reasoned prudence. Dishonesty 
served as another marker of failed self-control, but over a long period of time, especially 
as a part of a pattern of abuse, dishonesty represented a substantial character flaw. Their 
concept of dishonesty also brings into sharper relief their anxiety about reputation and 
identity. Each presented the other as a deliberate actor whose lies were intended to distort 
public opinion. They understood that their identities were contingent on how others 
viewed them. Their language of dishonesty further reflects an underlying tension in 
humanist interactions. Both men condemn dishonesty, but in seeing it as a part of the 
other’s strategies, they illustrate that it remained a part of contests of honor. 
Restraint and Forgiveness 
  
Poggio’s February 1453 letter pushes to the forefront another significant marker 
of restraint, forgiveness. Here and in Trebizond’s March response, forgiveness functions 
as a sign of reasoned self-control. The concept of forgiveness in fact dominates the 
dispute from February into March. Each man emphasizes his ability to forgive offenses 
while claiming the other is unable to do so. Their discussion on this point intersects with 
their concepts of prudence and honesty. They each characterize those who are able to 
forgive as prudent and honest and those who are unwilling or unable to forgive as 
65 Monfasani, George of Trebizond, 123.   
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imprudent and dishonest. For both men, forgiveness serves as an ideal mode of conflict 
resolution. The expectation was that one responds to offenses by either forgetting or 
forgiving. A public display of forgiveness could also demonstrate the forgiver’s honor, 
while the refusal to forgive could be condemned as a sign of dishonor.66  
The concept of forgiveness that Trebizond and Poggio articulated was 
problematic for them both. The imperative to forget injuries does not in and of itself 
allow for the contests of honor that were so important to humanists. Each man struggles 
to balance the ideal to forgive with an impulse to respond to an opponent’s accusations 
that he worries could tarnish his reputation. Anxiety about reputation results in some 
moments of uncomfortable rationalization for both men. Each man leaves room in his 
concept of forgiveness to accommodate necessary responses to injury. The compromise 
involves issuing a moderate response. This compromise too, though, is problematic for 
both. It creates an ambiguity in the ideal, since what constitutes an injury, whether a 
response to an injury is actually necessary, and what qualifies as a moderate response all 
become subjective and a matter of perspective. Each man exploits this ambiguity to 
characterize his opponent not simply as dishonest or imprudent, but as hypocritical.  
Defining the Ideal 
 
Poggio’s renunciation of the assassination plot in February 1453 offers the 
clearest articulation of the ideal of forgiveness. Forgiveness is evident, of course, when 
he forgives Trebizond’s “nature and perturbation,” which led him to send Poggio 
66 Poggio had tried just such a public display when he wrote his letter of apology to Trebizond in 1450. 
When he wrote again to Trebizond in February 1453, he mentions that he thought his letter would have 
satisfied Trebizond. That it did not, Poggio implies, is a sign of Trebizond’s dishonor. See note 58.  
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“insulting and petulant” letters.67 Later, in addressing the assassination charge, Poggio 
claims that rather than taking part in such a plot, it is his habit to follow the teachings of 
wise men that injuries ought to be forgotten rather than avenged by force or violence.68 
This position differs from the one he had expressed during the Trebizond-Guarino feud, 
when he had declared that certain offenses can and ought to be answered with “reason 
and arguments.” Dealing with offenses was not as simple as merely forgiving, it seems. 
In the 1437 letter to Cauchus, Poggio noted that the appropriate way to respond was not 
in the insulting fashion in which Trebizond had attacked Guarino, but in a moderate 
manner, as he himself had done during his own dispute with Guarino. There is a practical 
purpose for doing so, as insults make one’s case appear less commendable, but he also 
argued that a prudent man should be mindful of an opponent’s honor.69 These two 
approaches, forgetting injuries or responding moderately, assume that a proper response 
requires rational self-control. Poggio vacillates between both in his February letter. First, 
he expresses his intent to respond to Trebizond—a necessary response, Poggio argues, so 
that his silence will not be misconstrued as assent—more moderately than Trebizond 
wrote to him. He adds to this his refusal to use shameful language. Second, his reference 
to the advice of wise men, that one should simply forget offenses, frames his discussion 
67 In January 1453, Trebizond sent Poggio two letters. The first was addressed to Poggio and included 
Trebizond’s reassessment of the chancery fight. The second was a copy of the letter Trebizond sent to 
Nicholas V detailing the supposed assassination plot. Ibid., 3:49. See note 61.  
 
68 Poggii Epistolae, 3:51. Est moris mei, tum reliquis in rebus, tum in hoc sequi praecepta sapientum, quae 
jubent oblivione potius, injurias esse, quam manu aut viribus ulciscendas. For the preceding text, see note 
56. For the following text, see note 60. 
 
69 For Poggio’s 1437 letter to Cauchus and the reiteration of his ideas in 1450 see pages 107-111.  
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of how he dismissed the rumor of Trebizond’s alleged acquisition of Poggio’s property in 
Naples.70  
Though Poggio shifts between the two responses, he also struggles to integrate 
them effectively, which suggests his awareness of and difficulties with the tension 
between them. Poggio’s inconsistency is evident in one extended passage. First, he 
attempts to craft a moderate response that avoids insults and abuse. Here he dismisses 
Trebizond as an irascible man and proclaims that he will not betray his standards and 
employ shameful language because of his opponent’s false accusations. Still, he stops to 
make one point and issues a suggestion: “See that you do not make false accusations 
against another that, once thrown back against you and yours by no means falsely, would 
cover you with disgrace.” Poggio’s statement serves as a warning to Trebizond that, if 
pressed, Poggio would take more drastic action. The possibility of a threat aside, even as 
a mere suggestion the statement seems condescending. Poggio prefaces it with dismissive 
name-calling, calling Trebizond irascible, that is consistent in its condescension with his 
assertions elsewhere that he had given Trebizond so little thought since their fight that he 
knew not whether he was alive or dead.71  
Second and immediately thereafter, Poggio appears unsure how to reconcile his 
repeated protests that Trebizond’s assassination accusation is absurd with the act of 
responding to it. The most telling example occurs when he explicitly states that since the 
70 Poggii Epistolae, 3:49. See note 61; Poggii Epistolae, 3:51-2. See notes 64 and 68. 
 
71 Poggii Epistolae, 3:50. Tua tamen verba tanti faciam, quanti hominis iracundi, et hac in re non rectum 
judicium sequentis: neque vero propter tuas calumnias mutabo mores meos, neque tecum verborum 
turpitudine, sed virtute contendam. Unum tamen dicam: vide ne alteri falso objicias, quae in te et tuos haud 
falso rejecta, te rubore perfunderent.  
See note 56. Poggio adds that if he had given any thought to Trebizond, it would have been a 
sign that he had too much free time on his hands. Poggio’s sarcasm is inconsistent with a moderate 
response that avoids insults.  
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whole accusation is nothing, it may be more honorable not to respond at all. He does not 
resolve the tension here, but instead simply moves past it to label the charge as false and 
ridiculous again.72 One might forgive Poggio’s response given that, as he points out, 
Trebizond made the assassination accusation to the pope without telling Poggio first, but 
the manner in which Trebizond made his accusation does not make Poggio’s response 
any less contradictory. If Trebizond’s claim was false and ridiculous and it would have 
been more honorable not to respond to it, then by his own standards Poggio ought not 
have responded. In both cases, Poggio gestures to the cultural ideal, outright forgiveness 
or at least a moderate response, but chooses to ignore it, even if to make just one point. 
Poggio’s inconsistency was indicative of a fundamental problem facing humanists 
contesting honor in the court of public opinion. Restraint may have been the ideal but it 
was not always easy to maintain in the face of challenges to one’s honor or, as in 
Poggio’s case, allegations of murderous plots. Poggio’s tenuous incorporation of these 
two models of conflict resolution became a focal point of Trebizond’s March letter.       
Poggio and Failed Forgiveness 
 
Trebizond’s March 1453 response exploits the tensions in the humanist concept of 
forgiveness to construct a portrait of Poggian hypocrisy. He is highly critical of what he 
argues is Poggio’s inability to abide by the ideal of forgiveness he espouses and takes 
advantage of the ambiguity concerning what qualifies as a moderate response. Trebizond 
begins his letter by challenging Poggio’s claims that he forgave Trebizond and that he 
72 Poggii Epistolae, 3:50-51. Non intelligebam, neque enim expresseras in litteris ad me tuis, quae causa te 
ad me lacerandum impulisset; sed in copia litterarum, quas ad Pontificem scribis, cognovi quid quereris, me 
scilicet percussores ad te occidendum ex Urbe misisse mense Decembris; quod totum cum nihil sit, 
honestum foret nihil quoque tibi a me responderi. Veruntamen rectius fuisset id facinus in tuis litteris inseri, 
ut a te ipso cognoscerem in quo me tam acerbe accusares. Nam quid opus fuit, nisi ad malivolentiam et 
infamiam adversus me excitandam, falsam et ridiculam querelam ad Pontificem deferri? 
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would write more moderately than Trebizond himself had.73 To the former, Trebizond 
asks why Poggio had responded at all, suggesting that the very act of response was a 
failure to forgive. “Does he forgive,” he asks, “who returns like for like?”74 To the latter, 
he argues that although Poggio had complained about his “insolent and insulting” 
language, he had himself used insulting language. “From the start,” he accuses Poggio, 
“you declare my letters to be insulting and insolent and by doing so declare I am as well.” 
He remarks later that hurling insults [convicior] hardly qualifies as replying more 
moderately than one’s opponent.75 Moreover, Trebizond denies Poggio’s premise that he 
had written insultingly and counters that he had spoken as the gravity of the assassination 
plot demanded. He contends that he had brought a fair complaint before Poggio, who 
responded by labeling his writing—and therefore himself—as insolent and insulting and 
dismissing the complaint as a lie. By Trebizond’s estimation, not only had Poggio failed 
73 For the March letter see Walser, 506-514. Walser, 507. Contumeliosas petulantesque ais a me recepisse 
litteras, deinde addis: Ignosco nature tue, et animi perturbationi, sed ne videar tacendo assentiri respondebo. 
Quid ais Poggi? Si ignoscis cur respondes? Ego nihil aliud quam litteras ad te misi, conquestusque sum de 
iniuriis a te mihi illatis. Tu respondes et quidem contumeliose et primum dicis, te ignoscere deinde 
respondes. Non exclamabo hic ignorantiam, nec conscientie stimulos convocabo. Omnem enim vim 
orationis modo tibi condono. Sed te moneo ut iterum atque iterum consideres, quid dicas. Igoscit qui par 
pari refert? Ubi hec didicisti? quis id te docuit? Nec certe id dicere potes, ideo te mihi ignovisse, quod non 
ita contumeliose scripseris. Nam ego nihil in te dixi contumeliose, sed acriter et vehementer ut res 
flagitabat. Tu statim incipiens, contumeliosas et petulantes litteras meas hoc est me ipsum appellas. Sed 
mee an tue littere petulantes, ut verbo utar tuo, magisque contumeliose sint, aliorum sit iudicium, devenient 
enim ad posteros usque. Ego id contendo non ignoscere ipsum, qui eo modo ulciscitur, quo lesum se putat 
etiam si minus reddat, sed cum non propter impotentiam sed propter modestiam nihil refert. Tu litteras 
accepisti, tu litteras reddis. Verbis te lesum conquereris et verbis falso ledis et ignoscis?  
 
74 Trebizond also articulated a moral imperative to forgive wrongs in his January 1453 letter as well, stating 
that even if he had wronged Poggio, his aid in the translations of Xenophon and Diodorus would have 
required Poggio to forgive him. Walser, 501. Si maxime in te deliquissem, si maximas tibi contulissem 
iniurias, fuisset tamen humanitatis tue ignoscere presertim cedenti. See note 33 for the following text. 
 
75 Walser, 508. Respondebo, ais, paucis et paulo modestius quam tu, ne in quo es reprehendendus te videar 
imitari. Modestius respondet qui nec respondet quidem sed conviciatur? 
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to truly forgive by responding at all, but he had also failed to reply moderately. Poggio 
had failed on both accounts.76  
 Poggio’s failed forgiveness figures prominently in Trebizond’s defense of the 
assassination plot accusation. He wrote to Nicholas, he tells Poggio, because he was 
aware of Poggio’s past refusal to forgive injuries and tendency toward irrational 
aggression. He presents Poggio’s feud with Lorenzo Valla, still ongoing at the time of the 
March letter, as evidence.77 Trebizond characterizes the dispute as a childish affair, and 
nineteenth-century accounts and recent studies have made similar assessments of 
Poggio’s lack of restraint.78 In a sign of the importance of audience in humanist contests, 
Trebizond appeals to the public Poggio-Valla dispute to denigrate Poggio. Such an appeal 
indicates how humanists read about, discussed, and even participated in each other’s 
76 Ibid., 510. Spondeamus igitur ut paulo ante dixi aut quavis alia grandi sponsione, que victum aut omnino 
perdat aut miserum perpetue faciat. Ego mediusfidius antea et te et me salvum volebam. Nunc his tuis 
litteris quibus furor tuus in me magis aperitur, quam purgetur, sic accensus sum ut nihil magis optem quam 
ut hac conditione turpissimam alter nostrum obeat mortem. Falso me scripsisse ais ergo, hanc epistolam 
testor, si hanc conditionem non acceptaveris, daturum me operam et scribendo et dicendo ut omnes si fieri 
potest homicidam, te sicarium mendacem, impudentem, iniquum, furiosum, ingratum, asinum et sentiant et 
predicent. Hec ita scribo, quia equam conditionem tibi affero, falsa me scripsisse dicis. 
 
77 The Poggio-Valla feud took place in Rome, as both worked in the curia, until Poggio left in April 1453 to 
become the Florentine chancellor. Occurring between 1452 and 1453 the dispute was one of the most 
vitriolic of the fifteenth century. The standard account is still Salvatore Camporeale’s biography of Valla, 
Lorenzo Valla: Umanessimo e Teologia (Florence, 1972). For his analysis from Poggio’s perspective, see 
“Poggio Bracciolini versus Lorenzo Valla: The Orationes in Laurentium Vallam,” in Perspectives on Early 
Modern and Modern Intellectual History, ed. Marino and Schlitt. For a shorter overview, see Ennio I. Rao, 
Curmudgeons in High Dudgeon: 101 Years of Invectives (1352-1453) (Messina: EDAS, 2007), 87-97. I 
examine Trebizond’s accusations that the feud was childish in my analysis of masculinity in Chapter Four, 
page 191, and in Chapter Five I analyze the first of Poggio’s four invectives against Valla.  
 
78 In the nineteenth century, John Addington Symonds described Poggio as a “fiery scholar” who 
“discharged his usual missile, a furious invective, against Valla” and added “nor did the quarrel end till he 
had added five of these disgusting compositions to his achievements in the same style, and had drawn a 
young Latinist of promise, Niccolo Perotti, into the disgraceful fray.” John Addington Symonds, 
Renaissance in Italy, vol. 2, The Revival of Learning (London: Smith, Elder, 1897), 174-175. In his recent 
description of the dispute as the high-water mark of humanist invective, Ennio Rao describes how Poggio 
and Valla “had scoured the Latin language and exhausted it in their search for obscene words with which to 
hail down scorn upon one another.” Rao, 96-97.  
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feuds.79 The dispute was quite the cause célèbre, dividing humanists in and beyond 
Rome into camps supporting the two men, and Trebizond almost certainly understood the 
resonance his comments would have.80 Poggio, he claims, had been rebuked by Valla and 
had become so enraged that he had resolved to end the man’s life. Trebizond, describing 
himself as a confidant of Poggio’s at that time, had urged him not to worry, counseling 
that a mind’s greatness is perceived in neglecting—or forgetting—an offense rather than 
in seeking revenge. He had added that if Poggio was intent on responding, he ought to do 
so in writing. Since Valla had castigated him in writing, this would be a fair manner of 
reply. Trebizond had laid out both models of conflict resolution here, but Poggio, captive 
to his resentment, had chosen neither. He had protested instead that Valla ought to be 
pursued with the sword, not the pen.81 Trebizond recalls this conflict to express his 
concern that Poggio would do the same in their feud. He had written to Nicholas, he 
contends, because the pope’s intervention had stopped Poggio from carrying out his plans 
against Valla, and he was hopeful that the same might be true for their current dispute.82  
79 Likewise, in one of his invectives against Poggio, Valla mocks Poggio for being punched by Trebizond. 
His comment is another example of the public nature of humanist contests. See note 35.  
 
80 Camporeale, “Poggio,” 29-30. Poggio wrote his first Oratio against Valla after one of Valla’s students—
Franscesco Rossi—emended some of Poggio’s works. Poggio blamed Valla for the affront, wrote to defend 
himself, and attacked the style of Valla’s Elegantiae. Camporeale writes that “Poggio’s move to Florence 
ended his direct confrontation with Valla. Yet it also spread the controversy to other humanist centers, and 
scholars from Naples to Venice joined the ranks of either ‘poggiani’ or ‘laurenziani.’”   
 
81 Cf. Poggio’s 1454 letter to Tommasi, in which he calls for Valla to be whipped and imprisoned. See note 
49.  
 
82 Walser, 512-513. An credis forsan immemorem me esse adeo ut non meminerim quando in re puerili 
vere in multis a Valla fuisses reprensus: ita te exarsisse ut vitam eius extinguere constitueris? Particeps ego 
tum ut amicus eram consiliorum tuorum et hortabar, ut nihil curares, quoniam magnitudo animi in 
negligendo non in ulciscendo perspicitur, vel si ulcisci velles scriptis id ageres. Equum esset si scriptis lesit 
ut scriptis ledatur; ferro cum illo esse agendum non calamo exclamabas. Deinde cum ad scribendum versus 
esses, laudabam te quod consilium mutasses. ‘Quid tu ita me credis quasi puerum moneri,’ cum 
indignitatione respondisti. Iste papa, ex quo vita mea pendet, mihi iussit nequaquam tale facere audeam. 
Hac ergo de causa querelam ad pontificem detuli, ut et tuum ab insidiis animum et me a periculo liberarem. 
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 Trebizond’s recollection of the Valla feud leads him back to consideration of 
Poggio’s self-control and a contrast between their respective characters. He claims that 
when he was threatened by Poggio—a reference to the assassination plot—he prayed that 
his opponent be granted a more upright mind. Poggio, on the other hand, responded by 
writing the February letter against him and circulating it publicly. Like Poggio, Trebizond 
clearly expressed anxiety about public attacks on his honor.83 Trebizond frequently 
attributes Poggio’s behavior to his emotions. A man cannot write in the manner Poggio 
has, he claims, unless he is without reason. Poggio’s perturbations are made clear by the 
rage of his letters.84 His resentment and the angry manner of his writing are evidence to 
Trebizond that Poggio lacks restraint. This is the note on which he ends his letter, turning 
to Poggio’s assertion that offenses ought to be forgotten rather than avenged. Trebizond 
is incredulous and he counters by noting Poggio’s well-known reputation for conflict.85  
 Trebizond’s account of Poggio’s resentment demonstrates the centrality of the 
ideals of forgiveness and restraint to their dispute and suggests Trebizond’s own 
difficulty upholding them. Like Poggio, he struggles to reconcile the need, in contesting 
honor, to vilify his opponent with the moral imperative to forgive, or at least to reply 
moderately. The act of writing the March letter is evidence. He had argued previously his 
83 Cf. Poggio’s allegation that Trebizond fabricated the assassination plot to harm his reputation. See note 
72. 
 
84 Walser, 513. Vide differentiam animorum. Ita et prius ego tibi cum conditione minatus sum et deum 
oravi, ut rectiorem tibi animum largiatur, tu omni conditione sublata, quod vero mihi minaris in calce 
litteram scripsisti. Deinde opes tuas mihi iactas et cognatos et patriam in his temporibus ceteraque 
huiusmodi quasi vero ad insidias presertim privatas multarum magnarumque copiarum sit opus. Non 
videtur mihi possibile, Poggi sic posse quemquam loqui et maxime litteris deditum nisi duplici turbatione 
insaniat. 
 
85 Ibid., 514. Quid quod precepta sapientum scribis et in aliis et in hoc te sequi, qui iubent oblivione potius 
iniurias quam manu aut viribus ulciscendas. Oblivione tu? oblivione tu? o deus bone, pugnum unum 
habuisti, omitto tua culpa, omitto subita commotione animi, que peccata multo leviora sunt. Sed pugno 
percussus sis ex premeditatione, ex insidiis, quantum ultionem acceperis, nemo est Rome qui nesciat. 
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willingness to reconcile, but had added that Poggio had refused to reconcile except in the 
chancery. Poggio’s February letter offered Trebizond another chance to choose 
forgiveness. He could have refrained from writing a second letter. Instead, he wrote a 
response far longer and more abrasive than Poggio’s. He criticizes Poggio for insulting 
language, but his own insults are only thinly veiled. He claims that he refuses to heap 
insults, but then lists the insults he will not use: that Poggio is known and proclaimed to 
be a lying thief, murderer, impudent, unjust, mad, an ingrate, an ass, and more.86 He 
likens Poggio to a child and describes his behavior during the Valla feud as childish. He 
is prone to exasperation. To Poggio’s claim that his January letter was written 
impudently, Trebizond replies, “O poor me, because I do not present my throat to you, I 
write impudently and you claim I write lies.”87  
On both counts, then, Trebizond, like Poggio, fails to uphold the ideals he praises. 
This is not to say that his criticisms of Poggio lack merit given the model of conflict 
resolution both men articulate. If the ideal is to forgive, Poggio should not have issued a 
response, as Trebizond argues and Poggio himself appears to understand. Likewise, 
Trebizond makes a fair case in concluding that Poggio’s characterization of his letters as 
insolent and insulting was, by extension, a criticism of Trebizond himself. Poggio’s letter 
frequently sounds condescending, as when he claims he did not know whether Trebizond 
was alive or dead. The issue is not whose violation of the norm is more egregious, but 
86 Ibid., 509-510. Non exclamabo hic O furem fradulentum, impudentem, stultum, amentem, mendacem, 
vecordem, ignorantem nec accumulabo alia ut tu soles, truncum, stipitem, asinum, lapidum, hec ceteraque 
similia: tibi relinquo ut in me dices. Nam me quidem pudet in alium hec dicere. Utrum vero actis et scriptis 
meis hec magis quam tuis conveniant aliorum iudicium sit et conscientie tue ac mee; Ibid., 510. Falso me 
scripsisse ais ergo…falsa me scripsisse dicis. See note 76. 
 
87 Walser, 510. Ais deinde: Tue littere satis impudenter scripte testuntur. O me miserum, quia iugulum tibi 
non prebeo, impudenter scribo, falsa me scribere dicis. 
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instead that they both violate for the same reason. Their ideal of forgiveness is difficult to 
reconcile with a professional imperative to contest honor. 
The Forged Letter 
 
Forgiveness plays an important role in the February and March 1453 letters, but 
also figures prominently in Trebizond’s final letter about his relationship with Poggio, 
which he composed to his son Andreas in June 1454. Trebizond’s letter outlines the most 
recent of Poggio’s alleged plots. He accuses Poggio and his associate Giovanni Aurispa 
(1376-1459) of composing and circulating a letter to ruin his reputation and cause him to 
be imprisoned again. He claims that the letter, addressed from Mehmed II to Nicholas, 
was written insultingly but in such a manner that any Western reader would recognize 
that a Western writer, not the Turkish ruler, was the true author. Their hope, Trebizond 
contends, was that he would be blamed for having written the letter.88 Nearly two years 
after the chancery fight, he continues to blame Poggio for his subsequent imprisonment 
and expulsion from the curia, and to proclaim his innocence in the fight itself. Here he 
combines a discussion of forgiveness, prudence, and honesty to reiterate his description 
of Poggio’s cruelty and his assertions that Poggio continued—even to that day—to craft 
plots to ruin him.  
 Failed forgiveness serves as Trebizond’s stated reason for writing to his son 
about the alleged forged letter plot. As in January 1453, Trebizond laments Poggio’s 
treatment of him despite the substantial aid he had provided in the translations of 
Xenophon and Diodorus. He presents himself as undeserving of such treatment, casting 
88 For the letter to Andreas, see Collectanea, 117-124. Monfasani cites one Renaissance copy of the letter, 
the autograph. He preserves the orthographical inconsistencies including the spelling of Poggius as Pogius.  
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himself as a loyal servant of the curia. In an interesting moment of reflection, he admits 
that some will ask why he still protests Poggio’s mistreatment two years later. He seems 
to recognize—like Poggio’s earlier admission that it may be more honorable to not 
respond to the assassination charge—that his discussion of these old affairs exceeds the 
bounds of propriety. Trebizond justifies his letter as Poggio had rationalized his, by 
focusing on his opponent’s resentment. He complains, Trebizond explains, because 
Poggio once again threatens him. As in his January 1453 letters to Nicholas V and 
Poggio, Trebizond accuses Poggio of a consistent pattern of dishonesty and abuse. Even 
with so much time having passed, he claims, Poggio’s insania—the madness of a an 
ungrateful and shameless man—had not ceased, but instead threatened Trebizond with a 
false crime and an extreme charge. A cruel mind, Trebizond adds, continues to contrive 
accusations, as it is accustomed to do, and it does not refrain from the most extreme 
measures to harm him.89  
 Trebizond returns to a consideration of Poggio’s character at the end of the 
letter, where he roots the reasons for his opponent’s hostilities in his lack of rational self-
control. It is perhaps the clearest articulation from Trebizond’s Naples correspondence of 
89 Collectanea, 117. (1) Si unquam, fili carissime, patuit quam scelestus est ingratus animus, quam durus 
atque perniciosus, quam denique in bene meritos crudelis et pestifer, his quoque temporibus cuilibet meas 
recensenti fortunas planum aptumque esse potest. Nemo enim pene ignorat quot quantaque mea in 
Florentinum Pogium merita extiterint. Universa enim apostolica cancelleria testis est quottidianis laboribus 
meis tum Xenophunticam Cyri Disciplinam, tum Diodori Egyptiam Historiam e Greco in Latinum vel 
vertisse illum vel pervertisse: illud, quod institutionibus meis factum est, quantum fieri quinquenio spacio 
potuit; hoc, quia durum atque agrestem animum, ne in tam longo quidem temporis spacio, ad meliora 
reducere potui. (2) Nec fui unquam ignarus malam illi mentem, malum animum inesse, sed pape Nicolao 
quinto roganti atque adeo iubenti obtemperare volui. Non enim eram nescius tanto magis iubere principes 
quanto vehementius rogant, sperabamque si etiam Pogius per ingratitudinem aliquando in furorem 
verteretur, potestate tamen illius qui iussit innocentiam meam facile posse defendi. Quorsum hec? Aut quid 
tandem tibi vis, quispiam dicet, qui biennio iam transacto post illius in te furorem quereris? Queror, queror, 
inquam, fili, de fortunis nostris <non> quia tanto tempore illius ingrati atque improbi hominis insania non 
cessavit, sed quia certior est quovis falso in nos ficto crimine, indicta causa extrema nobis imminere 
pericula. Non potest atrox leniri animus, sed fingit, ut solet, crimina, nec summis parcit ut me solum capiat. 
For Trebizond’s work with Poggio on these translations, see pages 109-111. 
 
141 
 
                                                 
 
the relationship between emotion, action, and character. He blames Poggio’s repeated 
attempts to ruin him on anger, which itself was a result of Poggio’s shame regarding 
Trebizond’s aid in the translations of Xenophon and Diodorus. To demonstrate this, he 
begins with a general discussion of the nature of ingratitude—drawn, it seems, from 
Xenophon and Diodorus—and then applies this to his relationship with Poggio.90 When a 
naturally ungrateful individual, he writes, has substantial kindnesses conferred upon him, 
that individual struggles with the resulting obligation. The problem is bad enough if the 
debt is owed to someone of a higher status but completely unbearable if owed to someone 
of equal or lesser status.91 The ungrateful man can try to deny the obligation, but 
sometimes the kindness is so great it cannot be ignored or concealed. Believing his 
ingratitude to be public knowledge, he will come to regard his benefactor with hatred. 
The shame he feels regarding the debt will lead him to become more savage by the day 
90 Monfasani’s apparatus does not note the classical references, but Trebizond’s description of gratitude 
seems to come from Xenophon and Diodorus. In the Cyropaedia,  Xenophon identifies ingratitude as the 
offense the Persians hate the most and notes “if they know that any one is able to return a favour and fails 
to do so, they punish him also severely. For they think that the ungrateful are likely to be most neglectful of 
their duty toward their gods, their parents, their country, and their friends; for it seems that shamelessness 
goes hand in hand with ingratitude; and it is that, we know, which leads the way to every moral wrong.” 
Xen., Cyr. 1.2.7. The translation is Miller’s. Xenophon, Cryopaedia, trans. Walter Miller (New York: G.P. 
Putnam, 1914). Xenophon’s Memorabilia argues much the same—he who does not show gratitude for 
benefits received is ungrateful, ingratitude is an injustice— and adds that the greater the benefits one 
receives, the greater the injustice of not showing gratitude. Xen., Mem. 2.2. Diodorus likewise connects 
gratitude and virtue when describing the Egyptian practices associated with benefactions, and Egyptian 
treatment of benefactors. Diod., Hist. 1.70.5-6 and 1.90.2. I take Trebizond’s description of gratitude, if 
drawn from Xenophon and Diodorus, as an implicit reminder of Poggio’s debt to him.  
 
91 Collectanea, 122. (26) Pogium vero quid vexat? Attende, queso. Nam opere precium est scire quibus 
rebus usque ad effundendum bene de se meriti hominis sanguinem ingratus animus incitatur. Multos certe 
fuisse huiusmodi homines historici narrant, et nos Pogium modo re ipsa cognovimus. (27) Sed causas 
breviter aperiamus ut facilius cavere possis, quamvis ipse aut non potuerim omnino effugere aut nesciverim 
qui hec non ignorabam. Tantum tamen mihi cavi ut adhuc vivam. Si ergo ad ingratitudinem magnitudo 
beneficii primo accedat, deinde talis collatio ut nullo pacto negari possit, hec tria, ingratitudo, magnitudo 
beneficii et aperta manifestaque collatio, si uno in animo coniunguntur, benemeriti homini sanguis semper, 
quousque uterque vivit, petetur si condicio etiam eius qui contulit minor aut equalis vel certe non multo 
maior sit quam eius in quem collatum beneficium est. Ingratitudo enim facit ut nequeat animus ferre alicui 
non nimium maiori, sed aut minori aut fere equali valde obligatus videri. The following two notes continue 
the argument.   
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until he becomes unable to consider anything other than ending his benefactor’s life. By 
doing so, the ungrateful man believes he will no longer be subject to the debt, and his 
benefactor will no longer stand as a continued reminder of the obligation.92 His problem 
with Poggio, Trebizond argues, is the result of the man’s ungrateful nature and the 
services he had done for him in the past.93 He made Poggio famous, he declares, a man 
ignorant of Greek letters who he claims had composed nothing in Latin except some 
shameful stories and invectives.94 In fact, Trebizond claims Poggio was so incapable of 
handling Greek that he had to feed Poggio individual words as he would a child. For 
92 Ibid., 122-123. (28) Magnitudo autem meriti nimium obligatum reddit. Quare si tantum est beneficium ut 
non possit quasi minimum flocci pendi, nullum ingrato refugium relinquitur nisi negatio. Ubi hoc ille mihi? 
Aut quando? Quod si res etiam sic manifesta est ut nullus celandi sit locus, tunc ingratus. Quousque vivit 
ille qui bene de se meritus est, imaginem quamdam ingratitudinis sue, et quidem vivam atque loquentem 
circumferri arbitratur. Et ita omnes qui benefactorem suum oculis cernant, de ingratitudine sua loqui 
opinatur creditque subiectum se nimium esse obligatumque ei quem odio propter ingratitudinem animi 
maximo habeat. (29) Hanc tantam ignominiam (summam enim putat minori aut equali nimium obligari) 
cum fugere cupiat, atrocior in dies fit, nec aliud crudelis eius animus cogitare potest quam quomodo vitam 
bene de se meriti eripiat. Hoc enim solummodo pacto nemini se subiectum putat, si nemo vivat cui debeat. 
A vita enim benefactoris turpitudinem ingratitudinis sue predicari estimat. Nolo hic exempla priscorum 
congerere ne historiam contexere videar. Multa possem narrare que nostra memoria acciderunt; sed vereor 
ne aliquos ledam. Satis mihi res ipsa per se facit. (30) Nemo enim est qui nescit ingratos, cum impune 
possint, bene de se meritos ad interitum usque persequi, presertim si magnitudo beneficii et manifesta, ut 
diximus, collatio concurrerint.  
 
93 Ibid., 123. (30) Quid autem maius excogitari potest quam quod nos opera nostra Pogio contulimus? 
Ignarum litterarum Grecarum hominem qui nihil Latine preter turpissimas conscripserat fabulas et 
invectivas quasdam, quo quasi ad sentinam omnium turpium verborum que melius re ipsa quam vocabulis 
novit multitudinem congessit, perpetuum nostris laboribus fecimus. Unde non parvam quoque pecuniam et 
gratiam consecutus videtur. (31) Opera nostra et labore quinquenio pene sic abusus est, ut omnis id 
Romana curia sciat, ne ipse quidem summus pontifex ignoret, primo Xenophontis Pediam Cyri pervertisse 
illum, deinde Diodori Egyptiacam historiam, singula nobis verba illi sicuti puero ingerentibus. Is 
impunitatem maleficiorum suorum nactus quiescet? Iusticia, credo, animique modestia movebitur. Estne 
hodie usquam iusticia, ubi timor non sit? Priscis etiam temporibus, quot tu mihi recensebis iustos fuisse, qui 
nullo timore id facerent? Perpauci, perpauci, inquam, iusti propter ipsum equum et bonum sunt sed alii 
dedecus et infamiam, alii poenas timent, non nulli utrumque. Invidi autem nostri omnem semper in nos 
peregrinos et habuerunt et habebunt impunitatem. Decus vero esse putant non servare inopem atque 
peregrinum, sed opprimere atque conculcare. Illud enim deiecti, hoc magni animi opinantur. 
 
94 The “shameful stories” are Poggio’s Facetiae, jokes and anecdotes Poggio purportedly collected from his 
curial colleagues. Though some, including Trebizond here, criticized the Facetiae as vulgar, Poggio’s work 
was extremely popular. Greenblatt, The Swerve, 142-144. Trebizond’s reference to Poggio’s Latin 
invectives is a gesture to Poggio’s reputation as a polemicist. Trebizond had already, in March 1453, 
attempted to make use of Poggio’s feud with Valla, but Poggio clashed with other humanists as well. He 
had a well-known feud with Francesco Filelfo, against whom he composed four invectives, during the 
1430s in Florence. See Rao, 53-75. 
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nearly five years, he laments to Andreas, his work had been squandered, and he had 
received neither money nor thanks in return. All the features of Trebizond’s prior 
characterizations of Poggio are evident here. The man’s character led him to yield to his 
emotions—shame and anger—which manifested themselves as plots against his 
benefactor.  
Trebizond’s reiteration of Poggio’s cruel nature and resentment frames his 
account of the forged letter plot. Poggio’s cruel mind could not be mollified and he was 
unable to control his emotions. His plotting is a sign of resentment indicating his inability 
either to forget offenses or to respond moderately. His willingness to wage a dispute by 
means of deceit and dishonest actions signifies his failed restraint. Poggio, he tells 
Andreas, had heard of Trebizond’s plans to return to Nicholas’s service and composed 
the forged letter so that when he returned, he would be imprisoned once again.95 
Trebizond situates this new plot in a pattern of abuse, noting it would not be the first time 
that Poggio would have succeeded with his deceit and managed to have him imprisoned 
without a hearing.96 The plot required that the letters be circulated so that Trebizond 
95 Collectanea, 117-118. (3) Nam cum audisset redeundi Romam mihi animum esse, nec verisimile aliquid 
posset excogitare quo me neci traderet, vide quo eius prorumpit improbitas! Litteras sane turpes summo 
pontifici nefandeque contumelie plenas quasi a rege Turcorum ad pontificem ipsum missas composuit. Eas 
sic conscripsit ut nemo sit mentis compos qui non intelligat non ab illo rege, sed a Christiano aliquo fuisse 
confictas. Quare sic? Ut, cum vi litterarum et sensu ficte non vere Turchi littere videantur, in Georgium id 
totum inferat crimen. Quod ita esse illi et hac racione factum ante oculos ponam si ordine per quedam 
capita quasi per limites pergam. (4) Veritati enim omnia, ut ait Aristoteles, consonant; falso autem cito 
dissonat verum. Tria ergo mihi docenda confirmandaque sunt: primum, quod huiusmodi littere non sunt a 
rege Turcorum conscripte; alterum, quod Pogius scripsit et Iohannes Aurispa edidit; tertium, quod hec 
omnia, ut ipse opprimar, conficta sunt.   
 
96 Trebizond refers to his imprisonment without a trial after the chancery fight. See pages 118-121. 
Collectanea, 120. (15) Ut cum omnes intelligant qui eas legunt non esse a regeTurcorum conscriptas, 
Georgius, qui Neapoli habitat, scripsisse criminaretur, et indicta causa vel furca vel perpetuis vinculis 
damnaretur. (16) Unde id patet? Coniecerunt me biennio antea Aurispa et Pogius in vincula et quidem 
indicta causa. Liberatus ad optimum omnium regum Alfonsum Neapolim profugi. Redii Romam post 
decem et octo mensibus ad pedes summi pontificis, cui iubenti ut ad servicium redirem suum spem dedi si 
prospere hic negocia mea procederent, ad mensem Martium rediturum. Id Rome publicum fuisse scio. Nec 
enim omnino ignotus sum. Pogius deinde scripsit Turquicas huiusmodi litteras, et Aurispa edidit. Quando? 
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could reasonably be blamed for their authorship. Poggio and Aurispa conspired to make it 
seem as if the letter had come from Constantinople to Noto, a city in Sicily. Trebizond 
explains that he had hosted a student from Noto for the better part of a year, and that 
Aurispa and Poggio intended that connection to allow the letter to be traced back to 
him.97 Trebizond’s description of the plot is an elaborate unraveling of the motives of his 
alleged assailants. He presents it as another in a long list of Poggio’s hostilities, whose 
animosity was the result of his ungrateful character. Even two years after the fight, 
Poggio continued to fabricate lies.98  
Ultimately, as Trebizond tells Andreas, the forged letter plot failed because 
Trebizond was in Rome when he was alleged to have sent the letter from Naples to 
Rome. The case was rejected, and the claims against him declared fraudulent.99 Still, he 
Eodem ipso tempore quo ego Rome expectabar? Cur? Ut si Romam venissem, quod illi omnino credebant, 
statim accusatus in vincula raperer. Nec dubitabant posse hoc se calumnia id facere, qui iam bis fallaciis me 
suis indicta causa oppresserunt: primum, quando irruentem in me Pogium manu repuli; deinde, cum me 
secretariatu privassent. 
 
97 Collectanea, 121. (20) Idcirco nunc Noto Romam et Roma Neapolim littere ficte volant ut ego, qui 
Neapoli sum quique Leonardum Notensem annum domi tenui, scripsisse videar. Non enim poterit vere 
dicere ideo misisse Neapolim, quoniam edere ipsas cupiebat. Nam si publicas facere voluisset, in apostolica 
cancellaria certe edidisset. Nullus enim est locus illo celebrior, nullus accommodatior editioni litterarum. 
Ab omnibus Europe partibus homines ibi, et quidem clari, adsunt qui litteras illico singuli ad patriam 
mitterent suam. Si edere igitur cupiebat, cur in cancellaria apostolica, vel cur omnino Rome non edidit? 
Quia editionem hanc tunc fieri ad opprimendum Georgium opus erat quando ipse adesset Rome; Ibid., 121. 
(22) Id enim maxime considerandum est cur fecit. Quia summopere fictioni sue ac oppressioni Georgii 
conveniebat ut littere he a Neapoli, ubi Georgius moram trahit, alio tran<s>funderentur, et sic turpium in 
pontificem litterarum conscriptio in Georgium redundaret. Sed sunt etiam alii in Neapoli, quispiam dicet, 
qui scripsisse potuissent; quare non omnino ad te posset culpa impingi. Hec profecto ratio Aurispam 
induxit ut primum originem litterarum Notensem fecerit, ubi nec aliquis est qui eas posset componere, et 
quo misisse Notensis Leonardus, qui mecum erat, aperte videri poterat.   
 
98 Ibid., 122. (25) Illud non pretermittam nequis miretur cur Aurispa nunquam a me lacessitus, Pogius vero 
summis etiam meis ornatus meritis, ita me prosecuntur ut expleri nequeant. In vincula me suis artibus 
intruserunt, ex apostolica cancellaria eiecerunt, fortunas nostras dirripi Rome fecerunt, Neapolin usque 
siccarios ad occidendum me miserunt. Et nunc, si Romam venissem, non dubito quin in perpetua me 
vincula per litteras Turci fictas coniecissent.  Cur igitur adeo furunt ut nullum preter figuram servent 
hominis vestigium? Aurispam nulla re alia magis moveri credo quam invidia in me primum, deinde 
affinitate mutua qua Pogio semper fuisse coniunctum constat. 
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ends his letter by warning his son of his enemies’ continued animosity and the danger 
they pose to the entire family. The warning comes just after one of Trebizond’s 
complaints about Poggio’s ingratitude, and interestingly Trebizond even refers to his own 
status as an immigrant. He suggests that Poggio had “obtained impunity for his crimes” 
and laments the abuse of foreigners: “Our enemies, however, have always had and will 
always have total impunity against us foreigners. In truth, they think it dignified not to 
look after the needy and the foreigner, but to oppress and trample him.” Trebizond 
amplifies his portrayal of Poggio’s ingratitude with an accusation characterizing him as 
an abuser of foreigners and suggests that such abuse was common and accepted in 
Italy.100 He urges Andreas, who still worked in the curia as a scriptor, to leave Rome 
before the rage of his father’s enemies turned against him. Trebizond’s reference to his 
Greek origins is notable because it is one of only two such references he makes during his 
dispute with Poggio.101 Here though, his background functions in a concise summation of 
99 Ibid., 121-122. (24) Nolo rem verbis ampliorem reddere. Satis ipsa per se ipsam intelligenti faciet, 
presertim cum usque a mense Octobri, quando ipse Rome fui, hanc fallaciam incusserint. Cardinalis enim, 
scio quis et quidem in consistorio, litteras a me accepisse retulit a Turcorum rege ad summum pontificem 
scriptas. Sed reiecta res fuit quoniam hinc me Romam misisse illis diebus affirmabat quibus ego Rome 
eram. Id mihi cardinalis, vir omni virtutis numero excellens, Romane curie decus et dignitate cardinalatus, 
que summo sacerdotio proxima est, dignissimus, cum risu simul et indignatione narravit. 
 
100 Ibid., 123. (31) Is [Poggio] impunitatem maleficiorum suorum nactus quiescet?...Invidi autem nostri 
omnem semper in nos peregrinos et habuerunt et habebunt impunitatem. Decus vero esse putant non 
servare inopem atque peregrinum, sed opprimere atque conculcare. Illud enim deiecti, hoc magni animi 
opinantur. (32) Latius hec scripsi, quoniam, ut re ipsa video, nimium te delectat habitatio Romana. Alter 
iam annus exactus est ex quo solus istic habitas sine tuis. Timeo ne inimici mei, cum rescierint previdisse 
me insidias suas, nec animum ignorare, ideoque istuc nec rediisse nec rediturum, timeo, inquam, ne in te 
omnem suum vertant furorem. Quid facis? Eia age. Rumpe moras. Nec natus nec educatus Rome fuisti. 
Non sumus omnino peregrini quando simul sumus. Malis pauper vivere cum tuis quam vitam cum alienis 
dives trahere. For the preceeding complaint regarding Trebizond’s aid to Poggio, see note 93.   
 
101 Trebizond also referred to himself as a peregrinus to Nicholas in January 1453. He expressed concern 
that others—specifically Jacob Cremonensis—were claiming credit for his translation work: “For these 
reasons, therefore, I yielded freely to Poggio, especially since I would be a foreigner [peregrinus] no less in 
Rome than here [Naples]…” Walser, 505. See note 46. 
Trebizond’s complaint suggests that he perceived, or at least found it rhetorically useful to 
allege, a status difference between himself and Poggio rooted in his Greek background. I suspect the 
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his overall depiction of Poggio. With that, Trebizond’s reflection on the chancery fight 
comes to an end. His final word on his relationship with Poggio is another attempt to cast 
his opponent as an individual who, in failing to forgive, in demonstrating imprudence, 
and in his consistent contrivance of plots and deceptions, utterly lacked restraint.  
Conclusion 
  
In April 1455, nearly three years after the chancery fight with Poggio, Trebizond 
returned to Rome and the curia. Nicholas V had died the previous month. The election of 
Calixtus III offered Trebizond the chance to come back to Rome, which he did just 
twelve days after the papal election. Many of his old colleagues had left the curia—
including Poggio—and Trebizond returned to his post of apostolic secretary and began 
teaching publicly again.102 By that time, Trebizond and Poggio had put their feud behind 
them. 
One of the purposes of the present analysis has been to examine the language and 
oppositional categories that humanists used in contests of honor. The Trebizond-Poggio 
dispute was undoubtedly such a contest. For Trebizond, it represented a crisis. Ousted 
from the chancery, he spent the next few years trying to vindicate his behavior during the 
chancery fight and discredit Poggio. Poggio, for his part, characterized Trebizond’s 
accusations as slander intended to engender ill-will and harm Poggio’s reputation. The 
passage is in part an outgrowth of Trebizond’s financial situation during his time in Naples. Monfasani 
explains how, despite having achieved financial success in Rome, once in Naples Trebizond’s finances 
began to suffer. His economic hardships were the result of bad business decisions and, according to 
Trebizond himself, disreputable bankers. For Trebizond’s finances, see Monfasani, George of Trebizond, 
114-115. Additionally, if Trebizond felt like he was not getting enough respect for his translations, which 
was a popular task for Greek émigrés, he may have sincerely felt his status as a foreigner affecting him 
negatively.  
 
102 Monfasani, George of Trebizond, 137-140. Monfasani notes there is no evidence that Trebizond actually 
ever resigned his post as secretary or was officially removed from it. 
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dispute is an excellent example of how humanists contested honor by fashioning 
presentations of themselves and of their opponents. Both men demonstrated an active 
engagement in the framing of their identities, and each expressed an anxiety about and 
sought to shape public opinion regarding their respective behaviors. The letters of each 
indicate concern about their identities, particularly in how lies could negatively impact 
public perception. In response to their anxiety, they mobilized a language of restraint to 
defend themselves and to vilify their opponent. Their discussions of prudence, honesty, 
and forgiveness were related to one another through a common motif: a cultural ideal 
emphasizing restraint, the rational self-control of one’s emotions.   
The preceding analysis contributes to a richer knowledge of humanist modes of 
expression, but can also modify the current understanding of the Trebizond-Poggio 
dispute and modern characterizations of Trebizond himself. During his own lifetime 
Trebizond had a reputation for being difficult. Although admitting that Trebizond was 
“somehow fair,” Lorenzo Valla described him as bitter and morose. Trebizond’s 
reputation has not improved with time. Monfasani offers a softer appraisal, noting that his 
opponents were the aggressors in many of his feuds, but subsequent scholarship has 
retained much of the negative assessment of his character.103 Stephen Greenblatt, for 
example, characterizes Trebizond as “notoriously morose,” angry, bitter, and resentful. 
None of this is necessarily incorrect, but it offers only a partial picture of Trebizond’s 
experiences and of humanist culture. Trebizond’s Naples correspondence was 
undoubtedly angry in tone and more than a little resentful, but not without, at least in his 
mind, good reason. He had lost his privileged position in Rome and had to leave for 
Naples. Alfonso’s patronage was hardly insignificant, but the chancery fight was a 
103 Ibid., 104.  
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considerable blow to his reputation. Moreover, current scholarship now knows enough 
about the pressures involved with fifteenth-century professional life, particularly in the 
curia, to normalize at least somewhat Trebizond’s resentment. The correspondence 
between the two men suggests this as well. They both articulated their anxiety about 
public perception, and both indicated a sense of self developed in the court of public 
opinion. Trebizond was no different from Poggio in his anxiety about reputation. The 
difference between the two, and likely what allowed Poggio to avoid seeming bitter and 
resentful here, is that Trebizond had lost more as a result of their fight than Poggio had.  
Beyond this, both men waged their dispute by means of a shared concept of 
restraint. It is difficult to be too critical of Trebizond when his methods were so similar to 
those of his opponent. That is not to say that the two men were completely alike in their 
approaches. Poggio was not wrong when he argued that Trebizond had a habit of writing 
too insultingly against his opponents. He does write insultingly, and is unable to abide by 
the same principles of forgiveness that he espouses in his March 1453 letter. For his part,
Poggio engages with Trebizond on the broader issues of reason and restraint but does not 
issue the same quantity or kinds of explicit criticisms or insults. It was all too common 
for fifteenth-century humanists to lament the lies and hostility that came with being a 
professional scholar, particularly in the curia. Trebizond was quite like his 
contemporaries in this regard, Poggio included. His major problem was that he was less 
successful at expressing himself during this feud in a culturally accepted manner. His 
letters reflect the tension between humanist ideals, particularly regarding moderate 
language and forgiveness, and the realities of an agonistic community devoted to 
contesting honor. As Poggio noted in 1437, insults and abuse are typically not well 
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accepted but are instead scorned, and tend to “render our cases less commendable.” 
Trebizond seems not to have taken that lesson to heart.   
 Having examined separately Trebizond’s feuds with Guarino and Poggio—one 
early in his career as he sought to establish a reputation, the other later in his career after
 having achieved financial success and renown—the next chapter analyzes these two 
disputes together. The quarrels with Guarino and Poggio were waged under different 
circumstances and the terms of those debates differed accordingly, resulting in one 
conflict revolving around anti-Greek biases and the other around concepts of restraint. 
Nonetheless, there were certain similarities in the strategies employed during these 
distinctive encounters. Chapter Four focuses on one of these similarities, the use of 
concepts of manhood in acts of self-presentation and, alternatively, denigration.  
Copyright  Karl R. Alexander 2013 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
CONSTRUCTING THE MAN: 
MASCULINITY IN CONTESTS OF HONOR  
 
Introduction 
 
 The previous two chapters have examined the roles that anti-Greek language and 
the concept of rational self-control played in the verbal strategies used during George of 
Trebizond’s feuds with Guarino of Verona and Poggio Bracciolini. The present chapter 
examines a third theme in these feuds: masculinity. The invective in both feuds makes 
frequent reference to manhood. As in the preceding chapters, the present analysis 
addresses how the language and concepts humanists used functioned in the acts of self-
presentation characteristic of contests of honor. During Trebizond’s feuds with Guarino 
and Poggio, each author uses concepts related to masculinity to praise himself and vilify 
his opponent. Authors cast themselves as the ideal man—rational, learned, and 
moderate—and their opponents as unmanly, accusing them of childish, womanly, or 
beast-like behavior. The current analysis revisits events and texts addressed in previous 
chapters, but does so in new ways to explore additional themes that characterized 
Trebizond’s feuds with Guarino and Poggio.  
As an examination of the humanist concept of manhood, this chapter makes two 
main arguments. First, humanists derived their understanding of manhood from classical 
and medieval antecedents, and so understood reason as the identifying quality of 
manhood. Second, Trebizond and his contemporaries used gendered language to verbally 
emasculate their opponents in the public eye. As discussed in previous chapters, humanist 
contests of honor were public affairs. Insults, including slurs on a rival’s manhood, 
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spread by means of invectives and letters that passed hand to hand, from friend to friend, 
and circulated through and between different cities. Friends, enemies, colleagues, and 
patrons were read about, gossiped about, and sometimes took part in these quarrels. 
Emasculation happened not just in the mind of the individual voicing the insult or of the 
person slandered, but in public perception. 
The first goal of the present chapter is to demonstrate that humanist concepts of 
manhood were predicated on the use of reason. The invective in Trebizond’s feuds 
illustrates how one had to be learned, knowledgeable, and skilled on the one hand and 
moderate, prudent, and restrained on the other to be considered truly manly. Trebizond 
and his opponents frequently contrasted manhood and reason with failed manhood and 
ignorance or irrationality. They did not use the phrase “failed manhood,” of course, but 
described those who lived up to the ideal of a fully rational manhood as masculine and 
those who failed to do so as something other than masculine. Humanists followed 
classical and medieval models in understanding there to be a connection between reason 
and manhood.  
The categories of failed masculinity involved groups deemed to be not fully 
rational and included, but were not limited to, those whose behavior was disparaged as 
womanish, as when Trebizond accused Poggio of fleeing during their chancery fight “like 
a Florentine woman in flight.” Although discussions of early modern masculinity have 
largely examined the construction of masculinity in contrast to femininity, the individuals 
in the feuds considered here were far more likely to use other categories in defining 
manhood.1 Agaso and Trebizond used beast or monster images (asses, fish, wolves; the 
1 Christopher S. Celenza, The Lost Italian Renaissance: Humanists, Historians, and Latin’s Legacy 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), 121. Celenza’s chapter on reputation is a fine example 
152 
 
                                                 
 
Charybdis) more often than they used feminizing imagery. Trebizond and Poggio were 
more likely to cast each other as children than as women. Trebizond and his opponents 
also frequently used multiple, overlapping characterizations of failed masculinity, as 
when depicting an opponent’s beast-like behavior as childish. Both labels drew 
distinctions between masculinity and failed masculinity to illustrate one’s own honor and 
denigrate an opponent. These disputes reveal that there were many ways to use 
masculinity in crafting presentations of others.   
 The second goal of this analysis is to demonstrate that the purpose of using 
gendered language was to verbally emasculate an opponent, by which I mean to rob him 
of his masculine identity and impose upon him an alternative identity conceived of as not 
fully or truly masculine. For humanists this was a problem of definitions that reflected the 
role that the audience of their fellow scholars and patrons played. As the previous 
chapters have examined, humanist honor was won, lost, and contested in a public forum 
wherein contemporaries rendered judgments about an individual’s learning and conduct 
and verdicts concerning conflicts between scholars. The public forum to which scholars 
appealed extended beyond the recipients of individual invectives and letters, and to the 
friends and colleagues of those individuals who, as texts were copied and circulated, 
heard and read about particular contests.2 Humanists understood manhood, like other 
aspects of their identities, as publicly negotiated and contested. Emasculation, then, was a 
verbal strategy on the part of the attacker to reorder public perception and define his 
of applying gender studies to a consideration of humanist honor. His analysis centers on the feminizing 
antitype. Examples of additional studies examining masculinity and femininity include the works by Pitkin, 
Milligan, and Finucci in note 6 and the collection edited by Milligan and Tylus.  
 
2 The composition, presentation, and circulation of the letters for Trebizond’s feuds with Guarino and 
Poggio has been discussed in the previous chapters. For a discussion of the public nature of the Trebizond-
Guarino correspondence, see Chapter Two, note 2. For the letters of the Trebizond-Poggio quarrel, see 
Chapter Three, note 1. For the public aspects of the feud, see Chapter Three, pages 135-136. 
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opponent. It was a gesture that could succeed or fail based on how a broader audience 
received it. Emasculation is certainly a provocative way of describing what was at stake 
in these texts, but humanist invective was itself provocative. Challenges to masculinity 
need not always entail an intended annihilation of the opponent’s masculine status, of 
course. Challenges to masculinity ranged from mild censures of inappropriate, childish 
behavior to allegations that an opponent’s cruelty and savagery indicated a sub-human—
that is, brutish or beast-like—character. Regardless of the level of challenge, the concept 
of failed masculinity, with whatever oppositional categories and to whatever extent it was 
expressed, was intended to sway the author’s audience and thus deprive his opponent of 
his masculinity in whole or in part.   
As a verbal strategy, emasculation was intended to shame a rival and cast into 
doubt his credibility as a professional. Fundamental to this strategy is the implicit 
assumption of a hierarchy, at the top of which, above the various types of failed 
masculinity, stood the ideal, the man. Trebizond and his opponents negotiated this 
hierarchy in two main ways, each of which emphasized the opponent’s failed exercise of 
reason. The first was by attacking an adversary’s knowledge and capability as a scholar 
and teacher. The second was by attacking a foe’s moral conduct. In the first case, 
humanists presented themselves as having the intellectual capacities of an adult man with 
a robust and polished understanding of complex subjects. In contrast, they characterized 
their opponent’s level of learning as childish, womanish, or brutish. The implication of 
this was that an opponent’s learning was rudimentary at best and far more often 
unpolished and crude. In the second case, humanists depicted their own moral rectitude, 
suitable to a true man, as a function of greater reason and restraint. They described the 
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real man, whose behavior was guided by reason, as prudent, honest, and moderate, and 
their opponents as failed men whose lack of emotional control led them to imprudent, 
dishonest, and immoderate behavior. Attacking an opponent in either of these two ways 
stripped him of reason and emasculated him. It also allowed a writer to assert his own 
masculinity and reason.   
An examination of masculinity in Trebizond’s feuds with Guarino and Poggio 
advances scholarship about early modern humanism in two ways. The first is by 
indicating how humanists conceived of masculinity. Studies of early modern masculinity 
are relatively few compared to the situation in medieval studies, although this scarcity has 
begun to change in the last fifteen years.3 Ruth Mazzo Karras and Derek G. Neal have 
addressed concepts of masculinity in the late medieval period, roughly contemporaneous 
with the early Quattrocento.4 A number of studies emerging out of New Historicist 
interest in self-fashioning have examined masculinity in England. They have considered 
the construction of masculinity and the pressure men felt—often termed “anxious 
masculinity”—to prove their manhood to others.5 Studies of Italian masculinity have 
been less numerous. The best received of these is Valeria Finucci’s The Manly 
Masquerade, which examines how concepts of manhood were tied to paternity during the 
3 On this disparity, see Celenza, 115-121; Todd W. Reeser, Moderating Masculinity in Early Modern 
Culture (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 11-15. 
 
4 Ruth Mazzo Karras. From Boys to Men: Formations of Masculinity in Late Medieval Europe 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003); Derek G. Neal, The Masculine Self in Late 
Medieval England (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008). 
 
5 For example Mark Breitenberg, Anxious Masculinity in Early Modern England (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996); Michael Carl Schoenfeldt, Bodies and Selves in Early Modern England: 
Physiology and Inwardness in Spenser, Shakespeare, Herbert, and Milton (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999); Bruce R. Smith, Shakespeare and Masculinity (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2000); Jennifer C. Vaught, Masculinity and Emotion in Early Modern English Literature 
(Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2008).  
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Italian Renaissance.6 To a reader of the correspondence in Trebizond’s feuds, the relative 
inattention to early modern masculinity, especially humanist masculinity, is surprising 
given how gendered the language was that Trebizond and his competitors used. The 
present chapter contributes to studies of early modern masculinity by focusing on 
humanists, a category of individuals whose concept of manhood has thus far received 
little attention. 
A second contribution this analysis makes is to a richer understanding of humanist 
experiences. Understanding the frequent references to manhood in these letters means 
understanding some of the significant verbal strategies humanists used and better 
understanding humanist texts. As Christopher Celenza has noted, studies of Renaissance 
intellectuals have largely neglected social factors, including gender. He adds that gender 
studies allow us to understand better Renaissance texts and authors, and an examination 
of Trebizond’s feuds with Guarino and Poggio confirms his observation. A consideration 
of humanist masculinity also allows us to bring humanist experiences into line with 
existing studies of early modern masculinity. Trebizond and his correspondents 
understood masculinity as their medieval and early modern peers did, as an aspect of 
identity that was constructed and contested through interpersonal relationships. Insults 
about manhood could be effective because humanists perceived masculinity as something 
6 Valeria Finucci, The Manly Masquerade: Masculinity, Paternity, and Castration in the Italian 
Renaissance (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003). See also Michael Rocke, “Gender and Sexual 
Culture in Renaissance Italy,” in Gender and Society in Renaissance Italy, ed. Judith C. Brown and Robert 
C. Davis (New York: Longman, 1998), 150-170. There are some interesting studies on masculinity and 
Machiavelli as well, including Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, Fortune is a Woman: Gender and Politics in the 
Thought of Niccolò Machiavelli (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984) and Gerry Milligan, 
“Masculinity and Machiavelli: How a Prince Should Avoid Effeminacy, Perform Manliness and Be Wary 
of the Author,” in Seeking Real Truths: Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Machiavelli, ed. Patricia Vilches 
and Gerald E. Seaman (Boston: Brill, 2007), 149-172. Milligan has also co-edited a collection of essays on 
masculinity with Jane Tylus, The Poetics of Masculinity in Early Modern Italy and Spain (Toronto: Centre 
for Reformation and Renaissance Studies, 2010). For an overview of anxious masculinity, see Sex Before 
Sexuality: A Premodern History, ed. Kim M. Phillips and Barry Reay (Malden, MA: Polity, 2011), 6.    
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that could be contested, gained, lost, and regained, just like other aspects of one’s 
reputation. The result was an identifiable anxiety about how one’s manliness was 
presented to and perceived by others, which suggests this correspondence can contribute 
to existing studies of “anxious masculinity.” Even as Trebizond, Agaso, and Poggio 
characterized each other as childish, brutish, or womanish, they articulated distress that 
their opponent was challenging their own manhood and worked hard to demonstrate their 
manliness in response. 
The following analysis is divided into two main sections according to the primary 
avenues of attack used by Trebizond and his competitors. The first half examines 
masculinity in insults about an opponent’s knowledge and learning. These insults are 
especially prevalent in the Trebizond-Guarino feud, which serves as the focal point of 
this section but are also evident in the Trebizond-Poggio conflict. The second half 
addresses masculinity and allegations about immoral conduct. Concepts of moral 
rectitude sat at the center of the Trebizond-Poggio dispute because of their chancery 
fight. That feud is the focus of the second half of this analysis, which then addresses 
conduct in the Trebizond-Guarino feud. Each half examines how language of failed 
masculinity—including childish, womanish, or beast-like imagery—functioned in these 
two different kinds of attacks. I begin, however, with a discussion of the classical models 
from which humanists drew when they discussed what it meant to be a man. 
Reason and Manhood 
  
In adopting verbal emasculation as a strategy for contests of honor, humanists 
situated themselves in a tradition considering reason to be the identifying quality of 
manhood. Erudite fifteenth-century scholars followed Greco-Roman and medieval 
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precedents in linking maleness with reason and excluding others, including women, 
children, and animals, from the category of those possessing the full capacity for 
reasoning. This tradition had roots in Aristotelian thought. The De anima identified three 
kinds of soul, the vegetative, sensitive, and rational, and specified that only humans 
possessed the rational soul and therefore the capacity for reason.7 The Politics argued that 
although men, women, and children all possessed the rational soul, they did so in 
different ways: “For the slave has no deliberative faculty at all; the woman has, but it is 
without authority, and the child has, but it is immature.”8 The difference between man 
and woman or child was the fully actualized capacity for reason present in men but 
lacking in others. The Aristotelian model posited man as the perfect human and women 
and children as imperfect, a distinction made implicitly or explicitly in other works. In 
the Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle defined the function of humans as rational activity in 
pursuit of the good. True virtue depended on the exercise of reason, and since women 
were not considered fully rational, the implication seems to be that they were unable to 
attain true virtue or the fully human good.9 In the Rhetoric, Aristotle describes youths as 
captive to their emotions and desires, impulsive, and immoderate.10  
 Roman and medieval authors maintained the link between reason and manhood. 
In the De officiis, Cicero, like Aristotle, distinguishes man from beast by virtue of reason. 
7 Arist., De an. 413a20-25.   
 
8 Arist., Pol. 1.13. 
 
9 Arist., Eth. Nic. 1098a 1-18 and 1178a 6-8. See Ruth Groenhout, “The Virtue of Care: Aristotelian Ethics 
and Contemporary Ethics of Care,” in Feminist Interpretations of Aristotle, ed. Cynthia A. Freeland 
(University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998), 174. 
 
10 Arist., Rh. 2.12. 
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For Cicero, man is the only animal with a sense of propriety and moderation.11 Cicero too 
differentiates men from youths and casts the young as devoted to the senses and the 
passions. He emphasizes the importance of moderation through the exercise of reason 
and identifies restraint as a marker of manhood.12 The Aristotelian model influenced 
scholastic figures such as William of Moerbeke, who translated the De anima, and 
Thomas Aquinas, who wrote a commentary on William’s translation. In his commentary 
on Aristotle’s Politics, Aquinas follows Aristotle’s contrast between human slaves and 
irrational animals, noting that although slaves lack sufficient reason to participate in 
deliberation they do not completely lack reason as animals do.13 He follows Aristotle as 
well in his Summa theologiae arguing the reasoning capabilities of women and children 
to be defective, as when he lists children and women among those groups whose 
testimony is problematic.14 Additionally, in discussing sobriety he remarks that the desire 
for pleasure thrives in the young and that women lack the ability to resist desire.15  
Early modern scholars adopted the classical model linking manhood and reason 
and excluding animals, women, and children from the ranks of those with full rationality. 
The distinction between human and animal has been the focus of a growing number of 
recent studies of Renaissance beasts. The central figure in this field is Erica Fudge, who 
examines how animals featured in debates about reason in seventeenth-century 
11 Cic., Off. 1.11 and 1.14. 
 
12 Cic., Off. 1.106 and 1.122; Cic., Sen. 11.36 and 12.39-40. 
 
13 Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Politics, trans. Richard J. Regan (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 
2007): 1.3.11. 
 
14 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, II, q.70, a.3; Ibid., I, q.92, a.1 and a.1 reply 2; Aquinas, 
Commentary, 1.3.4-5.   
 
15 Aquinas, ST, II, q.149, a.4. 
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England.16 She argues that beasts served as an “other” against which Renaissance 
individuals judged human status and that the Renaissance conception of beasts reveals the 
fragility of human status. She identifies classical antecedents to early modern ideas, 
including Aristotle’s identification of the vegetative, sensitive, and rational souls.17 The 
concern, Fudge explains, was that if humanity was predicated on the exercise of reason—
a faculty that distinguished human from beast—then the lack of reason and the undue 
influence of the passions could essentially transform a human into a beast. For the 
authors Fudge studies, cruelty—a vice Trebizond consistently ascribes to Poggio—
“reveals the frailty of human reason; cruelty makes a human like a beast.”18 Others also 
examine the consequences of this notion. Kathryn Perry’s study of seventeenth-century 
invective addresses how anxiety about the boundary between human and animal provided 
structure to formal invective featuring  “abusive animal epithets.” Anxiety could be 
heightened, James Knowles argues, where particular animals such as apes were 
concerned. Apes, he explains, “raised questions about the boundaries of the human and 
animal, a highly uncertain and contested limen.”19 The early modern concept of beasts 
provoked considerable anxiety. Fudge notes how the animal became “a symbol of all that 
humans should not be” and she argues that humanity was “a status achieved not merely 
16 Erica Fudge, Perceiving Animals: Humans and Beasts in Early Modern Culture (Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 2002); Renaissance Beasts: Of Animals, Humans, and Other Wonderful Creatures, ed. Fudge 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2004); Fudge, Brutal Reasoning: Animals, Rationality, and Humanity 
in Early Modern England (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006). See also Steve Baker, Picturing the 
Beast: Animals, Identity, and Representation (New York: Manchester University Press, 1993).  
 
17 Fudge, Brutal Reasoning, 8-10. 
 
18 Ibid., 68. 
 
19 Kathryn Perry, “Unpicking the Seam: Talking Animals and Reader Pleasure in Early Modern Satire,” in 
Renaissance Beasts, ed. Fudge, 19-36; James Knowles, “‘Can ye not tell a man from a marmoset?’: Apes 
and Others on the Early Modern Stage,” in Renaissance Beasts, ed. Fudge, 138-163. 
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through struggle within the individual but also through struggles between individuals.”20 
Although Fudge focuses on seventeenth-century England, the themes she and others 
explore are also evident in the works of Italian humanists. Petrarch, for instance, used a 
host of beast metaphors in his invectives, as David Marsh observes.21 
 Quattrocento humanists situated both classical and medieval models at the heart 
of their program of studies. Aristotle remained immensely popular during the 
Renaissance, and a number of notable humanists translated different parts of the 
Aristotelian corpus. Leonardo Bruni’s translations of the Ethics, Politics, and Economics 
were widely circulated.22 Trebizond translated some of Aristotle’s biological works while 
in Rome, as did his fellow Byzantine émigré Theodore Gaza.23 Aristotle’s works 
informed one of the key components of the humanist educational program, which was the 
assertion that educators could not only teach their students but help them become 
20 Fudge, Brutal Reasoning, 66-67. 
 
21 David Marsh, introduction to Francesco Petrarca: Invectives, ed. and trans. David Marsh (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), xiii-xvi. 
 
22 Bruni published a translation of the Nichomachean Ethics in 1416-1417, of the Economics in 1420, and 
of the Politics in 1437. Paul Grendler, The Universities of the Italian Renaissance (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2002), 395-396. On Bruni’s translations, see Paul Botley, Latin Translation in 
the Renaissance: The Theory and Practice of Leonardo Bruni, Giannozzo Manetti, Erasmus (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 70-82. John Argyropoulos (1415-1487), a Byzantine émigré who 
taught in Florence from 1457 to 1471 and again from 1477 to 1481, produced a translation of the Ethics in 
1464 that was “used as the base text for numerous commentaries and university lectures.” David Lines has 
“counted at least ninety editions of the work between 1478 and 1698.” David A. Lines, “Aristotle’s Ethics 
in the Renaissance,” in The Reception of Aristotle’s Ethics, ed. Jon Miller, 171-193 (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), 176.  
 
23 On Trebizond’s translations, see John Monfasani, ed., Collectanea Trapezuntiana: Texts, Documents, 
and Bibliographies of George of Trebizond (Binghamton, NY: Medieval and Renaissance Texts and 
Studies, 1984), 705-707 and Monfasani, George of Trebizond: A Biography and a Study of his Rhetoric and 
Logic (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1976), 71-77.  Monfasani offers a concise overview of fifteenth-century 
translations of Aristotle in “The Pseudo-Aristotelian Problemata and Aristotle’s De animalibus in the 
Renaissance,” in Natural Particulars: Nature and the Disciplines in Renaissance Europe, ed. Anthony 
Grafton and Nancy G. Siraisi (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), 205-206.   
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virtuous.24 This assertion was rooted in an understanding of the differences between 
youths and adults. Youths, so it was argued, were slaves to their emotions. Drawing on 
Aristotle, Pier Paulo Vergerio (1370-1444) described youthful emotion and the weakness 
of the rational powers among the young: “The young follow their passions above all and 
do everything with great vigor because they have keen desires which their bodily heat 
spurs on, while the rational powers and prudence that could moderate their desires are 
weak.”25 Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini, the future Pope Pius II (1405-1464), shared 
Vergerio’s views. He added that devotion to pleasure was the hallmark of a beast: “We 
ought to chasten the body and hold in check its violent urges as if it were a savage beast, 
curbing with the rein of reason its reckless revolts against the soul.”26 Battista Guarino 
(1434-1513), the son of Guarino of Verona, echoed his father’s views about youths and 
the duty of educators:  
But if, owing to the feebleness of their age, young persons lack the discernment to 
acknowledge this truth, it will be the duty of their parents to accustom their tender 
ears to it with winsome words and to deter them from pleasure with threats, so 
that the zeal (for learning and virtue) they have imbibed from infancy may grow 
as they get older…27  
 
24 For the purposes of this analysis, it is the model that humanists expounded that is important. It is worth 
noting, however, that whether educators could truly inculcate virtue, or whether they even wished to do so, 
has been a topic of dispute. See Anthony Grafton and Lisa Jardine, From Humanism to the Humanities: 
Education and the Liberal Arts in Fifteenth- and Sixteenth-Century Europe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1986). 
 
25 This and subsequent translations are Kallendorf’s. For all of the texts edited in this collection, I cite the 
section numbers Kallendorf provides. Pier Paolo Vergerio, De ingenuis moribus et liberalibus 
adulescentiae studiis liber, in Humanist Educational Treatises, trans. and ed. Craig W. Kallendorf, 
(Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 14. Cf. Arist., Rh. 2.12.7.   
 
26 Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini, De liberorum educatione, in Humanist Educational Treatises, trans. and ed. 
Kallendorf, 21. 
 
27 Battista Guarino, De ordine docendi et studendi, in Humanist Educational Treatises, trans. and ed. 
Kallendorf, 3.  
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Humanist educators, contemporaries of Trebizond, Guarino, and Poggio, thus organized 
their curricula around a basic concept of manhood rooted in the exercise of reason. 
 The Renaissance debt to classical models of reason and manhood is also evident 
in that fifteenth-century humanists advocated different methods to lead their charges to 
exercise reason. Vergerio argued that “those who are good should be strengthened and 
assisted through practice and precept, but those who are bad and blameworthy should be 
corrected.” “Good behavior,” he explained, “must be acquired and bad behavior either 
curtailed or entirely rooted out.” There were various ways of accomplishing this. 
Vergerio, drawing on the De officiis, considered it “a good outcome whether we are led 
to virtue by the hand of precept or compelled thereto by force and necessity; and 
fortunate indeed is the necessity that drives one to the good.”28 Following Quintilian and 
Plutarch, Piccolomini stated that “boys must be led to honorable practices, not by wounds 
or blows, but by admonitions and explanations.” Praise and blame functioned in 
important ways: “the former incites [students] to virtuous deeds, the latter restrains them 
from disgraceful behavior.”29 Educators also believed instructors could cultivate reason 
and virtue by serving as models to their students. Vergerio, relying on Plutarch, 
emphasized the importance of the instructor’s character:  
They [students] should only be entrusted to those whose character and entire life 
has been thoroughly scrutinized, who do not present an example leading to sin but 
possess the authority to deter them from it. For as stakes are bound to young 
treeshoots to prevent them being bent over by their own weight or by the wind, so 
also young people should depend on companions from whose advice they may 
28 Vergerio, De ingenuis moribus et liberalibus adulescentiae studiis liber, in Humanist Educational 
Treatises, trans. and ed. Kallendorf, 11; 15; 29. Cf. Cic., Off. 1.32.118.  
 
29 Piccolomini, De liberorum educatione, in Humanist Educational Treatises, trans. and ed. Kallendorf, 10. 
Cf. ps. Plut., De educ. 12 and Quin., Inst. 1.3.14-17. 
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learn, by whose conscience they may be restrained, and in imitation of whom they 
may improve themselves.30  
 
Modeling appropriate behavior allowed instructors to guide good behavior and curtail 
bad behavior. According to Vergerio, it was important to “maintain at all times a 
consistent pattern of gravity and discretion,” as the young “are inclined to make mistakes, 
and unless they are restrained by the example and authority of their elders, they will 
always slip easily into worse conduct.”31 Piccolomini, like Vergerio, argued the 
importance of an instructor’s character: “the lives of teachers should be faultless and their 
morals irreproachable: this is the best proof that they neither have nor tolerate vices.”32 
He echoed Vergerio on the role of the instructor and used the same Plutarchan metaphor:   
Just as farmers place fences around their young trees, so it is the duty of your 
instructors to encircle you with teachings in keeping with a praiseworthy life and 
with admonitions from which the shoots of the most correct morals will 
germinate, for to receive a proper education is the source and root of virtue.33   
 
Whether by admonition or modeling, educators—mature, rational men—were expected 
to curb their students’ passions, remedy the natural deficiencies of their student’s rational 
capacities, and help them cultivate and exercise their reason.  
  Humanist educators established a program that emphasized the role of 
instructors in the attainment of virtue, but it was also a program that essentially made one 
more manly. Educators such as Vergerio and Piccolomini, observing what they described 
as a state of emotional disorder, likened children to beasts rather than men and identified 
30 Vergerio, De ingenuis moribus et liberalibus adulescentiae studiis liber, in Humanist Educational 
Treatises, trans. and ed. Kallendorf, 17. Cf. ps. Plut., De educ. 7. 
 
31 Vergerio, De ingenuis moribus et liberalibus adulescentiae studiis liber, in Humanist Educational 
Treatises, trans. and ed. Kallendorf, 10.  
 
32 Piccolomini, De liberorum educatione, in Humanist Educational Treatises, trans. and ed. Kallendorf, 9.  
 
33 Ibid., 10. Cf. ps. Plut., De educ. 7. 
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instructors as guides to proper behavior. For them, true manhood came at the end of the 
program when, guided by a virtuous instructor and true man, one had acquired the 
learning suitable of an erudite man and had reached a state of emotional maturity and 
rational self-control. The characterizations of manhood outlined here are clearly visible in 
the correspondence of Trebizond’s feuds with Guarino and Poggio and particularly in the 
authors’ attacks against their opponent’s knowledge and learning. 
The Knowledgeable Man 
 
Some of the most explicit expressions of the humanist concept of masculinity 
during Trebizond’s feuds with Guarino and Poggio are found in attacks leveled against an 
opponent’s knowledge. The attacks involved insults about an adversary’s learning, 
understanding of complex issues, or general intellectual capacity and were framed by 
language denoting failed masculinity. To label a rival as unlearned or lacking in his 
intellectual capabilities was to label him as less of a man. Trebizond’s feud with Guarino 
illustrates these points well. The feud began in the spring of 1437 when Andreas Agaso 
composed a letter attacking Trebizond, whose Rhetoricorum libri quinque (RLV) had 
contained criticisms of one of Guarino’s encomia. Agaso claimed to be a student of 
Guarino’s, but Trebizond suspected Guarino wrote the letter himself, adopting a 
pseudonym to attack the RLV anonymously.34 Agaso and Trebizond used concepts of 
failed masculinity to characterize each other as lacking knowledge and as unsuited to 
teach rhetoric. Each author verbally emasculated the other by likening his opponent’s 
34 For the figures Andreas Agaso and Paulus Regius and the origins of the dispute, see Chapter Two, pages 
24-25. As in Chapter Two, I refer to the authors by the names provided by the texts. When discussing the 
Agaso letter, I refer to the author as Andreas Agaso rather than Guarino because the authorship of that letter 
and Agaso’s existence are in question. When discussing Trebizond’s response to Guarino, I typically 
follow Trebizond and refer to “Agaso” as Guarino. Trebizond does occasionally discuss Agaso and 
Guarino separately, usually when trying to prove the two were the same person, and in those cases I make 
the distinction as well. 
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intellectual capacities to those of a child, a beast, or a woman. Agaso repeatedly used 
animal imagery to insult Trebizond’s learning particularly in comparison with Guarino’s, 
which he exalted. Beasts dominate the Trebizond-Agaso correspondence more than any 
other category of failed masculinity. Trebizond, fixated on Agaso’s language, used the 
same images to attack Guarino’s learning. These were definitional acts that relegated an 
opponent to a lower hierarchical status based on the portrayal of one’s level of learning. 
The herd, the fish, and the ass 
 
Agaso relies on an assortment of animal images to ridicule Trebizond’s eloquence 
as crude and his teachings as commonplace. This is evident in the beginning of Agaso’s 
letter to Paulus Regius, dated March 15, 1437, where a play on words becomes a 
flashpoint for the feud. Agaso claims that Trebizond treats rhetoric not exceptionally [ita 
egregie], but rather “from the herd” [e grege], in an ordinary or vulgar manner.35 He 
builds on this contrast to characterize Trebizond not as a master of rhetoric but as a brute. 
Later in the letter he explicitly describes Trebizond as having the “inordinate audacity” 
and stupidity of a herd animal [pecus] for suggesting Guarino should have used 
scriptorum instead of scribentium in his encomium.36 Agaso’s attack is more implicit 
shortly thereafter when, in listing ancient authorities to support Guarino’s usage, he 
introduces “an example more familiar to Trebizond,” a reference to flocks of sheep in the 
35 Collectanea, 365. (2) Unum enim tuo vel cachinno vel stomacho dignum opus in manus incidit, 
cazambanicam redolens loquacitatem verius quam eloquentiam, quo cum auctor Greculus Latinis dicendi 
rationem aperire profiteatur (est enim De rhetorica liber inscriptus). Ita egregie, vel e grege potius, disserit 
ut tam facile ei Latine sciendi consuetudinem ademeris quam eloquentie peritiam denegaris.  
 
36 Ibid., 369. (26) Memini siquidem nuper me legentem id ab eo de Guarino reprehensum annotasse: ‘Cur 
etiam scribentium, non scriptorum dixerit?’ O ingentem pecudis bipedis confidentiam-nisi excusandum 
pingue illud duxeritis ingenium, quod mox non intelligere sese fatetur! 
For the initial criticism in the RLV, see Ibid., 363. (8) Cur etiam “scribentium,” non “scriptorum” 
dixerit non intelligo, nisi quod timidum in dicendi hominem, ne a “scripto” “scriptorum” dicere videretur, 
inscitia deterruit. Sed hec infinita sunt atque idcirco pretermittenda. See also Chapter Two, pages 41-42.  
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Aeneid written greges balantum, not greges balantricum. Trebizond, a stupid, brutish 
animal who writes e grege, is sure to be familiar with a reference to flocks of sheep.37 
Agaso uses repeated references to the ass, another herd animal. An example follows the 
reference to Virgil just mentioned. As Agaso marshals authorities to defend Guarino, he 
notes that “books are filled with phrases of this kind, pleasing to the sense of learned 
men, not the ears of asses.”38 Agaso situates Trebizond, by virtue of his incorrect usage, 
on the wrong side of this contrast, implying he too has the ears of an ass, and thus is an 
ass himself. Shortly, he criticizes Trebizond’s style of composition by calling it the way 
of rustics, who “are accustomed to hearing braying asses” and so “prefer the harsh sounds 
of toads and cicadas to the music of Orpheus and Apollo.”39  
Agaso also employs fish metaphors to characterize Trebizond’s style as mediocre 
and to establish a low-class theme he develops to denigrate Trebizond. The first example 
occurs as Agaso casts Trebizond as a mere copyist of “many brilliant authors” and asks 
why anybody would want to read Trebizond’s works. He draws a distinction between “so 
many teachers and the most learned men [peritissimi viri] of this age” and those who 
know “nothing great or difficult” beyond “mackerel [scomber], sardines [saperda], little 
37 Ibid., 370. (28) Et quoniam pervicaces non facile cedere solent nisi multis obruantur exemplis, legisse 
debet… (29) Virgilius: ‘et amans et femina Dido;’ utque Trapezuntio familiarius inducatur exemplum: 
‘quinque greges illi balantum,’ non balantricum. Monfasani cites Verg., Aen. 4.95 and 101.   
 
38 Collectanea, 370. (29) Quid plura? Referti sunt codices huius generis dictionibus peritorum sensum, non 
asinorum auriculas, oblectantibus, usu etiam approbante, “quem penes arbitrium est et ius et norma 
loquendi.” Cf. Hor., Ars. P. 72. 
 
39 Collectanea, 370. (31) “Dein quis risum teneat cum eiusdem orationis compositionem suis concinnat 
auribus et per nares absone quadret. Verborum colligatio totum pervertit ordinem. Hic rusticorum mos est 
ut, cum rudentes asinos audire soliti sint, rubetarum atque cicadarum stridones vel Orphei et Apollinis 
cithare preferant, velut cum illam suo more concinnat seriem: ‘Nulla enim tam ingens, tam clara, tam 
admirabilis res gesta est quam non vetustas obscuret et oblivio nisi litterarum splendor et scribentium 
lumen accenderit.’” 
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tunny fish [pelamis], and salted fish [tarichos].”40 Each is a common variety of fish and 
though Agaso does not state it directly, his use of fish metaphors seems designed to liken 
Trebizond to a low-class fishmonger with mediocre wares, in this case his teaching and 
the precepts of the RLV. The implication is that, like all of these ordinary fish, 
Trebizond’s works are common, cheap, and not suited to the tastes of the truly learned 
men of his age. This reading is upheld later in Agaso’s letter when he describes 
Trebizond as a bellowing ass who prefers the sound of toads to the lyre of Orpheus, and 
then laments the “callous taste, completely devoid of elegance, which thinks there is no 
difference between ambrosia and salted fish!”41 The passage paints Trebizond as ignorant 
but also contrasts Guarino’s wares—the sweet style of his encomium—with Trebizond’s 
by likening the former to luxurious, rich ambrosia and the latter to cheap, preserved fish.  
The context of Agaso’s fish imagery indicates that he intends it to be insulting to 
Trebizond, but his choice of words is especially meaningful because he refers to specific 
fish commonly known as small, cheap, repulsive, and potentially harmful. The particular 
fish to which Agaso refers are almost certainly drawn from classical Latin authors and 
lend weight to his intended insults and depiction of Trebizond the Fishmonger. The 
scomber appears in Pliny’s Natural History and is generally believed to be a mackerel. In 
his notes on the text, John Bostock writes the scomber was “a very common fish of 
40 Ibid., 366. (6) Sin in tanta dicendi copia, doctrina ordine, subtilitate, dulcedine tam preclara negliguntur 
auctores, a quibus librarius ipse, si que eruditius ab eo dicta sunt, cuncta transcripsit verius quam 
excogitavit, quis sua legere volet? An huic, qui inter tot huius etatis doctores et viros peritissimos vult solus 
scire videri, nova quedam artis acumina et aptiora dicendi documenta perperit, usus aliquis et in perorandis 
causis exercitatio quam in senatu vel in foro vendicaverit, qui preter scombros, saperdam, palamides, 
tarichon nil magnum novit aut arduum? 
 
41 Ibid., 370-371. (31) “‘Quam commodius hoc,’ inquit Trapezuntius, ‘et robustius ita diceretur: Nulla enim 
tam ingens, tam clara, tam admirabilis res gesta est, quam vetustas et oblivio, nisi litterarum splendor et 
scribentium lumen accenderit, non obscuret?’ O callosum vere gustum et mundiciarum prorsus expertem 
qui inter ambrosiam et tarichon nil interesse sentiat!” See note 39 for the preceding text. 
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Rome, of small size, and was in little repute.”42 Persius’s first satire alludes to the fact 
that bad poetry was typically used to wrap the scomber when it was put out for sale.43 
The fish had a reputation as the fate of bad poets. M. Terentius Varro casts the saperda as 
repulsive and harmful: “We are jolly and jovial, so we think. Though in fact like rotten 
fish, we stink.”44 Varro also attributes to Lucilius a passage describing the death of L. 
Cornelius Lentulus Lupus, a Roman consul in 156 B.C., as the result of different kinds of 
fish, including the saperda.45 Sextus Pompeius Festus, the grammarian, defines the 
saperda as “a species of the worst fish.”46 Modern commentators relying on these sources 
describe the saperda as a “particularly cheap and nasty fish” and a “species of quite 
dreadful fish, suggesting that it was far from fêted for its culinary qualities.”47 Pliny 
describes the pelamis, the third of Agaso’s fish, as a young tunny fish, “called mudfish or 
pelamydes (from the Greek for ‘mud’).”48 Festus identifies the pelamis similarly. The 
connection to mud is enough to cast the pelamis as another lowly fish, but Pliny adds that 
42 Plin., HN 9.49. The Natural History of Pliny, trans. John Bostock (London: H.G. Bohn, 1855).  
 
43 Pers., 1.43. “an erit qui velle recuset os populi meruisse et cedro digna locutus linquere nec scombros 
metuentia carmina nec tus?” Susanna Braund notes the comparisons to Cat. 95.9 and Hor. Ep. 2.1.269-270. 
All translations of Persius and Juvenal in this chapter are Braund’s. Juvenal and Persius, ed. and trans. 
Susanna Morton Braund (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004).  
 
44 Var., Men., 312. omnes videmur nobis esse belli festiui, saperdae cum/simus σαπροί. See Brian A. 
Krostenko, Cicero, Catullus, and the Language of Social Performance (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2001), 57.  
 
45 Var., Ling., 7.47. Apud Lucilium: ‘Quid est? Thynno capto cobium excludunt foras’ et ‘Occidunt, Lupe, 
saperdae te et iura siluri’ et ‘Sumere te atque amian.’ Piscium nomina sunt eorumque in Graecia origo.  
 
46 Fest., 324-325. Saperda, genus pessimi piscis. 
 
47 Krostenko, 4; L.B.T. Houghton, “The Wolf and the Dog (Horace, ‘Sermones’ 2.2.64),” The Classical 
Quarterly 54, no.1 (May 2004): 303. 
 
48 The translation is Rackham’s. Pliny, Natural History, trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1940). Plin., HN 9.47-48. Pelamys genus piscis dictum, quod in luto moretur, quod 
Graece dicitur πηλός. Cf. Fest., 207. 
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“they must be eaten only when they are quite fresh, and even then they cause severe fits 
of flatulence.” The pelamis appears in Juvenal’s seventh satire as the reward advocates 
attain for plying their rhetorical skill in court: “What reward does your voice get? A tiny 
shoulder of dried-up ham and a jar of little tunnies.”49 The last of Agaso’s examples, the 
tarichos [τάριχος], seems to be a simple stock expression for any preserved meat, or in 
this case salted fish.50  
There may also be a cultural component to Agaso’s fish imagery. In addition to 
the negative depictions of the saperda, modern commentators also note that the fish was 
associated with the east and with Greeks in particular. Persius’s fifth satire links the 
saperda to the Black Sea as does Aristotle in discussing the σαπέρδης, and Varro 
describes it as Greek in origin.51 Brian Krostenko argues that the “presence of a Greek 
adjective [σαπροί]”—meaning rotten or stale—with saperda in Varro suggests “not only 
the meanness” of the fish, but also “the decadent Greek east.” L.B.T Houghton explains 
that “the fact that it [the saperda] had to be imported from Greece (or even from Egypt) 
might be taken to support its status as a recherché commodity, difficult to obtain and 
costly to transport despite the poor return it offered when finally served up in Rome.”52 
All this hardly proves Agaso intended the saperda to be a slight of Trebizond as a Greek, 
as he makes no such explicit statements, yet such a use would certainly be consistent with 
49 Juv., 7.120.  
 
50 Liddell and Scott define τάριχος as “anything preserved or pickled by artificial means” or “generally, 
meat preserved by smoking, salting, or pickling, dried or smoked fish.”  
 
51 The Satires of Juvenal, Persius, Sulpicia, and Lucilius, trans. Lewis Evans and William Gifford (New 
York: Harper, 1881), 253. The notes on Persius’ fifth satire contain a reference to Aristotle. The city of 
Trebizond, of course, was on the Black Sea. George identified with the city of Trebizond throughout his 
life despite having been born a Cretan. Monfasani reports that George stated his great-great-grandfather had 
emigrated to Crete from Trebizond. George himself routinely signed his name “Georgius Trapezuntius 
Cretensis,” an indication of his pride in both locations. See Monfasani, George of Trebizond, 4-5. 
 
52 Krostenko, 4; Houghton, 303.   
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Agaso’s other anti-Greek language. Trebizond, an émigré rhetorician in Italy, came under 
fire by Agaso as common. He was hardly a suitable instructor of youths, or so Agaso 
contends by likening Trebizond to Heraclides in Cicero’s Pro Flacco.53 One of Agaso’s 
other main arguments, furthermore, is that Guarino expended too much time and money 
on Trebizond after the latter’s arrival in Italy. Given Agaso’s other attacks, I suggest that 
he chose the saperda as a fitting metaphor. The fish allow him to imply an image of 
Trebizond as an émigré scholar who, lacking a sufficient knowledge of Latin, deals in 
commonplace lessons just as a fishmonger peddles cheap mackerel and unappetizing, 
though exotic, wares.  
The manner in which Agaso employs his fish imagery also carries undertones of 
classical Roman satirists who—like Lucilius, Varro, and Persius above—not only 
identified some of Agaso’s fish as common, cheap, and rotten but incorporated them into 
attacks against particular individuals and vices. Humanists appreciated authors such as 
Horace, Persius, Juvenal, and Martial. Guarino’s commentaries on Juvenal were popular 
and widespread, and Juvenal occupied a place in his curriculum.54 Guarino was also 
involved in the spread of Greek satire, including his translations of Lucian’s Slander, The 
Fly, and The Parasite.55 Agaso’s fish insults call to mind Juvenal’s fifth satire, which 
features fish and other seafood at a dinner party as part of a commentary on the inequities 
53 For Agaso’s comments on Trebizond as an instructor, see Chapter Two, pages 44-47. 
 
54 On Juvenal’s place in the humanist curriculum, see Battista Guarino, De ordine docendi et studendi, in 
Humanist Educational Treatises, trans. and ed. Kallendorf, 25. Battista Guarino pairs Juvenal, “the prince 
of satirists” with Terence and argues “with these two authors at one’s disposal, one may be confident, not 
only of being able to hold forth elegantly on any subject that arises in day-to-day speech, but also of having 
some maxim suitable for every subject.”  
 
55 Guarino translated Lucian’s Slander and The Fly between 1403 and 1408 while in Constantinople. In 
1418, he translated The Parasite. David Marsh, Lucian and the Latins: Humor and Humanism in the Early 
Renaissance (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press: 1998), xi. 
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between the feasts of a rich man and the scant fare of a poor man.56 While those of high 
status feast on lobster, the poor eat crayfish garnished with half an egg. On the one hand, 
the wealthy host Virro feasts on exquisite food, “a lamprey [muraena], the biggest that 
comes from the Sicilian whirlpool.” On the other hand, the lowly guests such as Trebius 
are presented with “an eel [anguilla], cousin of the long snake, or a Tiber fish spattered 
with gray blotches, like you a slave bred on the banks, bloated from the gushing sewer.”57  
In Agaso’s insults, the quality of the fish illustrates the difference not between 
rich and poor but between learned and unlearned.58 The food motif remains, too, as 
Agaso distinguishes Guarino’s eloquence from Trebizond’s by contrasting ambrosia, the 
food of the gods, with common salted fish, the food of mere mortals, but more to the 
point of low-class mortals, and by lamenting the taste that cannot distinguish between the 
two. Like the food at Juvenal’s dinner party, one of these is exquisite and one is not. The 
contrast bears even more weight because, as Agaso maintains throughout the letter, 
Trebizond arrogantly believes that his own eloquence, his rhetorical taste, surpasses 
Guarino’s. Trebizond did, after all, dare to correct Guarino’s encomium. The fish 
metaphor thus functions as an assault on Trebizond’s arrogance, as well as his ignorance. 
Trebizond’s response, addressed to Guarino himself, indicates that he was aware of the 
implications of Agaso’s language and imagery.  
56Emily Gowers, The Loaded Table: Representations of Food in Roman Literature (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1993), 211-219; Kirk Freudenburg, Satires of Rome: Threatening Poses from Lucilius to 
Juvenal (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 264-277; Maria Plaza, The Function of Humour in 
Roman Verse Satire: Laughing and Lying (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 108-110; Catherine 
Connors, “Epic Allusion in Roman Satire,” in The Cambridge Companion to Roman Satire, ed. Kirk 
Freudenburg (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 124-125. 
 
57 Juv., 5.80-87 and 99-106.  
 
58 Plaza discusses the use of exaggeration in establishing “raised objects” in satirical humor. Plaza, 53-166.  
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 Trebizond’s response to Guarino in 1437 frequently mentions Agaso’s animal 
images and reflects his anxiety about the metaphors and their intent. The opening 
sections, in which he argues that Guarino had written as Agaso, offer an example of how 
he too marshals the language of masculinity. Like Agaso, Trebizond challenges his 
opponent’s eloquence. He claims that beyond the fact that nobody had ever heard of an 
“Andreas Agaso,” Guarino’s authorship is evident given the letter’s rigidity, shallowness, 
and contradictions. “The speech,” he continues, “is crowded with asses, mackerel, sheep 
(and these two-legged!), tunny, salted fish, sea fish,59 and others of these kinds suited to 
your taste.”60 Trebizond’s attacks are blunter than Agaso’s insinuations depicting 
Trebizond as Fishmonger, but he uses the same images as his opponent, including asses 
and all the varieties of fish. He even retains the food motif in reference to taste. Guarino’s 
authorship is also clear, Trebizond adds, from the tone of the Agaso letter, which he 
characterizes as typical of Guarino’s habits of attacking others, including “the most 
learned Poggio.”61 The mention of Poggio is a reference to the recent and well-known 
59Sus might mean swine, but Lewis and Short list a secondary definition, based on Ov. Hal. 132, as “a kind 
of fish.” The Oxford Latin Dictionary cites Ovid and defines it as a “sea-fish, perh.=Greek ὗς, an unknown 
fish of the Euxine.” Considering Agaso’s use of fish, I understand Trebizond to be referring to a another 
type of fish.  
 
60 Collectanea, 381. (2) At primum, nullum in Italia qui litteraturam profiteatur hoc nomine appellari 
constat; nec sane invenies aliquem preter te qui se ita velit vocitari. Deinde, si Agasones doctorum 
hominum aliquos nuncupari constaret, quis tamen ea scripta Guarini esse non intelligat qui tantam orationis 
duritiem, tantam sententiarum levitatem tantam argumentorum inter se repugnantiam videat? Nihil enim est 
in ipsis commode, graviter, robusteque dictum; nihil non pueriliter atque inepte, ne stultissime dicam, 
excogitatum. Asinis, scombris, pecudibus (et his bipedibus!), pelamidibus, taricho, suibus, ceterisque 
huiuscemodi tuo stomacho dignis, imo vero Agasone dignissimis referta oratio est.Trebizond emphasizes 
the bipes to make clear his response to Agaso. Cf. Ibid., 369, note 36. O ingentem pecudis bipedis 
confidentiam… . 
 
61 Collectanea, 381-382. (3) Que res ita etiam in aliis Guarino factitata est ut et que ita scripta sint a 
Guarino et qui sic scribat Guarinus esse videatur…. Quid enim illa “egregie vel e grege,” “suo vel suis,” et 
que horum similia sunt tua negabis, Agasoniam hanc redolentia scurilitatem? Caperare vero frontem aut 
detrahere tuum non est? At cum in doctissimum Poggium scriberes, tale quid tunc posuisti, ut et hic facis, 
cum opus acrimonia esse videretur? Multa sunt quibus irretitus teneris. Cf. Ibid., 365, note 35. 
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literary dispute, the Scipio-Caesar controversy, between Guarino and Poggio in 1435.62 
Trebizond then asserts that the name “Andreas Agaso” is further evidence of Guarino’s 
authorship, since it is characteristic of Guarino “to think that you alone are a man, and 
others whom you drive before you are asses.” Monfasani’s note on the text explains the 
joke. He translates “Andreas Agaso” from the Greek Ἀνδρείᾳ ἀγάζω as “I rejoice 
exceedingly in [my] manliness.”63 Trebizond’s comments indicate that he perceived 
Agaso’s animal insults as attempts to emasculate him verbally by robbing him of his 
learning and eloquence. His reflection on Agaso’s name is an indictment of those 
attempts.  
 As fervently as Trebizond criticizes Agaso’s animal imagery, he is more than 
willing to use it himself to denigrate Guarino and to adopt the social status theme in the 
Agaso letter. Whereas Agaso casts Trebizond as a fishmonger, Trebizond describes 
Guarino as a donkey-driver to depict his opponent as lacking the eloquence, taste, and 
learning of a true learned man. For example, in response to Agaso’s criticism of 
Trebizond’s characterizations of Poggio would not always remain so positive. He later revised his 
response to Guarino to reflect his changing opinions of Poggio. He changed doctissimus Poggius to 
indoctus Poggius, skilled [peritissimus] to unskilled [imperitissimus], and famous [clarus] to infamous 
[infamosus]. See Monfasani’s notes on the text, Collectanea, 407-408.  
 
62 On the Scipio-Caesar controversy, see Chapter Three, note 24. Trebizond also accuses Guarino of 
habitually attacking learned men in a cover letter accompanying the present response, composed in 1437 
and addressed to Leonello. Leonello was familiar with Guarino’s participation in disputes, including the 
Scipio-Caesar controversy. It was he who, during a trip to Florence, encountered Poggio’s piece defending 
Scipio and attacking Caesar and alerted Guarino to its existence. Guarino penned his defense of Caesar 
shortly thereafter. Mark Jurdjevic, “Civic Humanism and the Rise of the Medici,” Renaissance Quarterly 
52, no.4 (Winter 1999): 1002-1003. Collectanea, 377-378. (1) Guarinus Veronensis, humanissime 
princeps, vir etate nostra, ut credit, doctissimus, eloquentia sua fretus invectivam in me edidit, que his 
diebus tandem in manus incidit. Letarer profecto, quoniam in plerosque doctos viros Guarinus scripsit, in 
eorum acervo me quoque connumerari nisi peritorum hominum iudicio viderem non visum Guarino 
dignum Georgium in quem nomine suo scriberet, quamvis et sui gratia non parum doleam quod videam 
acuto in dicendo homini, si adversarius voluerit, idipsum, quod sibi indidit, nomen hesurum perpetuo. 
 
63 Collectanea, 382. (4) Sed mihi id sufficit quod te Andream Agasonem inscripsisti (tuum enim est te 
solum virum, ceteros quos agas asinos estimare) quodque apertissime Agaso litteratura se Greca infectum 
ostendit, quam qui teneat, Georgio iratum invenies neminem. See also Monfasani’s note, ibid., 407.  
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Trebizond’s addition of “cum amplificatione” to Cicero’s definition of demonstrative 
oratory, Trebizond exhorts Guarino to learn from him or other learned men. If Guarino 
thinks it too shameful for such a divine man [divinus homo] as himself to learn from 
others, Trebizond urges him to leave “letters and teaching to others. You can watch over 
asses.”64 The comment implies that Guarino’s arrogant refusal to learn from others and 
his view of himself as a divinus homo is evidence that he is suited only to teach asses. 
Trebizond uses the ass metaphor again when describing Agaso’s criticisms as “braying,” 
and when he suggests that if his arguments have failed to convince Guarino, it is because 
Guarino is too occupied with “driving asses.”65 He alludes to the Latin proverb purus 
grammaticus purus asinus to cast Guarino as an ass and again encourages him to limit 
himself to asses—to grow old in directing them. Both Agaso and Trebizond, then, 
express their technical arguments through concepts of manhood, contrasting the learning 
64 Ibid., 385. (19) Nam cum demonstrativum genus esse dicamus quod in alicuius certe persone laudem vel 
vituperationem cum amplificatione attribuatur, “cum amplificatione” particula tibi, in diffiniendo 
acutissimo, quoniam laus etiam cum amplificatione nobis esse asseratur, minime adiiciunda videtur. Nam 
que formis insunt, in diffinitione generis ponenda non arbitraris. Disce a me, quousque tibi discendi tempus 
conceditur, aut, si dedignaris, dialectice doctos interroga. Sin ab his etiam discere turpe divino tibi homini 
putas, quoniam preter dialectum id docere te poterat nemo, litteras et doctrinam aliis omitte. Tu asinos 
custodias. 
Agaso had argued that Trebizond included the addition to Cicero’s definition to seem as if he had 
contributed something of his own. See Chapter Two, page 40. 
 
65 Ibid., 386. (20) Quare nec ita se habere potest ad laudem ut ad consumptionem vite mortalitas, quod 
Agaso rudit. Nam hec quidem idem possunt. Amplificatio tam laudem quam vituperationem, oppositas 
formas, complectitur. Nam que toti insunt, eodem de subiectis partibus modo predicantur. Persuasimus 
quod demonstravimus? An in agendis asinis occupatus, minus advertis? Crede mihi, crede, inquam, 
Guarine, verum est quod vulgo dicitur, purus grammaticus, purus—nosti quod sequitur. Quare si sapis, 
tabesces in casu, senesces in flectendis asinis. In schemate Agasonum, quod tute tibi elegisti, moraberis. In 
promiscuo genere diligentissime te retinebis. Nam si terminos tuos egredere, cave ne, cum per ora virorum 
ut doctissimus credas volitare, ut Agaso verius volites. 
Lewis and Short define rudo as “to bray,” specifically in reference to asses, as well as “to make a 
loud noise, roar or bellow,” as an orator might. Trebizond clearly relies on the former definition but the 
insult probably encompasses part of the latter definition as well. He uses the word several times, and 
elsewhere describes Guarino as grunting like a pig. Cf. Ibid., 388-389. (31) At Cicero (o, quomodo te 
appellabo? Nihil enim habere hominis videre.) hanc ipsam concertationem dixit, cui tu contentionem 
conferre videris. Si ergo recte Cicero, et nos non insulse; sin Cicero hec parum perspexit, dimitte nos qui 
cum eo errare malimus quam cum Agasonibus rudere; Ibid., 399 (77) Tu nos iniuria queris occupare. 
Utrum maiorem nobis hinc ex ingratitudine infamiam an tibi gloriam, quod tales docuisses conflare putasti? 
Sed ne longior sim, hec aliud in tempus, si grun<n>ies, reserventur. 
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of true men with that of those who teach only the common and lowly. This is a 
definitional act that raises one man higher on a hierarchy of masculinity and relegates his 
opponent to a lower position. The fishmonger and donkey-driver accusations imply the 
same thing. By catering to the less educated crowd and offering only mackerel or salted 
fish, an instructor reveals himself to be lacking true learning and thus true manhood.  
Trebizond’s discussion of demonstrative oratory is not the only time he attacks 
Guarino’s eloquence through animal images. He accuses Guarino of having been 
educated in a donkey stable and makes multiple references to such stables.66 He also uses 
animal imagery when alleging that Guarino was so angry about the criticisms in the RLV 
that “unable to mollify your anger, you turned to lies, and clothed neither in the pelt of a 
lion…nor in the pelt of the fox…but in that of the ass, as all are familiar with your 
dullness, you polished the Agaso invective against me.”67 Here Trebizond uses the 
animal metaphor not to advance the social status theme and describe Guarino as a 
donkey-driver but more directly to liken Guarino to an ass. The description of Guarino 
66 Ibid., 390. (36) Unum illud oramus atque obtestamur, sicui harum rerum cura est, Partitionum Ciceronis 
principium perlegat ut ad hec que dicta sunt Ciceronis quoque sententia valeat in asinorum Agasones 
intrudere stabula, ubi qui in me invectivam scripsit educatus videtur. Cf. Ibid., 398. (71)…si hec preterea in 
ultionem Guarini dicuntur, omnia que nemo teneat preter illum qui semper mihi invidit, quis mente sanus 
dubitabit e libris atque scola in asinorum stabula prosiliisse Guarinum ibique Agasonem factum hanc in me 
invectivam erudisse… 
 
67 Ibid., 387. (24) Tanto assumpto temporis spatio, cum sepe ac multum tecum quidnam scribendum in me 
tibi esset volveres, tamen, quia nihil inveniebas et iracundiam lenire non poteras, conversus in mendacia es, 
neque leonis, ut Hercules (nam id adversario reliquisti) neque vulpecule, ut fallax (nam id turpe tibi 
existimasti), sed asininam indutus pellem, ut hebetudinem tuam omnes cognoscerent, Agasoniam in nos 
invectivam erudisti. Verum mendacem te paulo post acrius arguemus. 
 Trebizond’s remark may be a response to Agaso’s mockery of Trebizond’s disparagement of 
classical and medieval rhetorical authorities. Agaso had likened Trebizond to Aesop’s raven which, to fit in 
among a group of peacocks, had dressed itself as one. For Agaso’s comment, see Ibid., 366. (7) At Espoi 
meminisse corvi debuit, qui cum inter pavones simulata veste irrupisset, tanto mox ludibrio et irrisioni fuit 
ut et pavonis et corvinis expilatus pennis vix tandem implumis effugerit… . Corpus Fabularum 
Aesopicarum, ed. A. Hausrath and H. Hunger, 1.1, 129-130, no. 103 (Leipzig: Teubner, 1970). 
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adopting the dress—or behaviors—of the ass, especially in contrast to donning the dress 
of a truly intimidating animal such as a lion, implies that Guarino is himself an ass.  
The “dullness” Trebizond ascribes to Guarino reflects a lack of eloquence that he 
contrasts with the learning of a true man. The contrast sits at the center of one of his most 
boastful claims, that he will easily vanquish Guarino with the strength of his eloquence. 
Here he casts himself among the “many and distinguished men” [multi praeclarique viri] 
who defend themselves against the persecution of others. He claims that he does not at all 
fear Guarino, listing the “copiousness of my speech,” the “flood of my genius, and “my 
erudition in Greek as much as Latin” as reasons why “I, like a mailed knight, am able to 
topple you, seated upon an ass.”68 The vivid contrast between the virile knight on a 
charger and the non-combatant seated on an ass identifies learning and eloquence as 
essential components of true manhood. Trebizond presents himself as the better equipped 
of the two for combat, given his skills in two languages. The description also fits 
alongside another of Trebizond’s recurring claims, that Guarino had devised the Agaso 
pseudonym because he feared Trebizond’s eloquence: “Indeed everyone sees and 
understands that you have disguised yourself so cunningly because you cannot endure 
George’s eloquence, at whose force of speaking you have now long trembled.”69 Fear 
68 Ibid., 382. (7) Nam, Guarine, nec enim molestum cuiquam futurum puto, quod multi preclarique viri 
natura ipsa duce fecerunt, si ad meam defensionem me laudavero, presertim cum tu in persequendo id 
facias. Ea mihi orationis copia est ut te non pertimescam; id ingenii flumen ut contemnam; ea tam Greca, 
quam Latina eruditio ut te facile possim exagitare; ea denique maiorum rerum doctrina ut, ne grande quid 
dicam, tanquam catafractus eques, insidentem te asino non hasta, sed solo afflatu currendi precipitem 
valeam deturbare. The passage is also an example of Trebizond’s response to Agaso’s anti-Greek language. 
See Chapter Two, page 67. 
 
69 Collectanea, 382 (5) Vident enim omnes atque intelligunt versute sic te inscripsisse quoniam orationem 
Georgii ferre non posses, cuius vim dicendi iam exhorruisses. Itaque credidisse te aiunt, si nomine inaudito 
scriberes, vel nil scripturum Georgium vel, si ad te scriberet, deum hominesque testari posses magnam tibi 
horum omnium ignaro iniuriam fieri. See also ibid., 381 (2) Nam ut latere possis, ne tibi respondeam, vel 
inter asinos ita te intrusisti ut Agaso factus sis et posteris hoc te nomine tuis scriptis commendes. Quid enim 
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drove Guarino to hide behind a pseudonym rather than to meet Trebizond in open battle, 
armed only with their respective skills and eloquence, the weapons of a true man.     
The child and the man 
 
The beast imagery that Agaso introduced is the predominant expression of failed 
masculinity during the Trebizond-Guarino feud, but it is not the only one. Each man 
attempted to emasculate his opponent by likening his knowledge and eloquence to that of 
a child and thus effectively giving him the status of a pupil or student. As with the beast 
imagery, labeling an opponent childish typically situated the author as the true man—
learned and knowledgeable—above the failed man—the child who lacked knowledge and 
skill—on a hierarchy. Agaso’s use of this strategy was more subtle than his beast 
imagery, though Trebizond—sometimes but not always in direct response to the language 
of the Agaso letter—employed it quite explicitly. It is worth noting too that age was no 
obstacle to allegations of childishness. Trebizond (1395-1472) was the junior of both 
Guarino (1374-1460) and Poggio (1380-1459) but accused both men of childishness and 
cast himself as the learned master in contrast to his depictions of each of them as 
students.     
The contrast between manhood and childishness in the Trebizond-Guarino feud is 
at times straightforward, as when Agaso criticizes Trebizond’s “childish diligence” in 
correcting Guarino’s encomium. For Agaso, childish diligence means an excessively 
ornamented style that is wordy and clumsy, and obscures meaning. It is ostentation for 
celare nomen tuum, et Agasonem nescio quem, non te in Georgium invehi credituros homines putasti? See 
note 60 for the following text.   
 I understand inscribo as another of Trebizond’s references to Guarino adopting  the “Agaso” 
pseudonym. In furnishing himself with the pseudonym, Trebizond accuses Guarino of disguising himself in 
order to hide. See pages 194-195. 
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the sake of ostentation, so that Trebizond can appear to be learned.70 The result, 
according to Agaso, is not that Trebizond appears learned but that his corrections appear 
so contrived as to violate Cicero’s warning that “a speech especially loses its conviction, 
and a speaker his authority” if it seems too pleasant. While Guarino laid “aside flattery of 
his listeners” and was therefore “devoted to serious ideas and to gravity,” Trebizond’s 
changes so obscured the sense of the text that it was nearly unrecognizable.71 Citing 
Cicero, Agaso argues that Trebizond’s flattery—his style, which he undertakes with 
“truly childish diligence” [puerilis diligentia]—harmed his authority as a speaker and 
rendered him suspect [suspectus], unintelligible [obscurus], and hateful [invisus]. He 
characterizes Trebizond’s changes as needless, excessive, and error-ridden. He accuses 
Trebizond of changing the arrangement—already so sweet and elegant—of Guarino’s 
words for the worse, exhausting the manner of the speech—presumably a comment about 
Trebizond’s wordy ostentation—and obscuring its sense “by a too lengthy and wandering 
display.” Agaso’s contention that Trebizond’s changes were “childish” stands in contrast 
to Guarino’s implicitly manly style, which he casts as carefully considered, more 
restrained, and reliant on ratio.  
70 Cf. Agaso’s criticism of Trebizond’s definition of demonstrative oratory, note 64 above and page 182 
below. 
 
71 Collectanea, 371. (35) Accedit quod Guarinus id diligenter ex artis institutione servavit ne festiva nimis 
in principio et apparata sit oratio quoniam ea res, ut a Cicerone traditum est, ‘maxime orationi fidem, 
oratori autem adimit auctoritatem.’ Et omissis aurium lenociniis, Guarinus sententiis gravitatique servivit. 
Ab sententia namque duplici partes primas sumpsit exordii, utrique rationem aptam gravemque subiiciens. 
At Trapezuntius ita suavem ita concinnum in peius permutat ordinem et longiore ac vitioso quodam 
hyperbato pronuntiationem fatigat, sensum obscurat, et prolixiore ac errabundo tandem ambitu vix quid 
dicat intelligitur et fucose cuidam vereque puerili diligentie intentus, priusquam receptus sit auditori 
suspectum obscurumque se reddat et invisum.  
Monfasani notes the comparison to Cic., Inv. rhet. 1.25. The translation is Hubbell’s. Cicero, De 
inventione, trans. H.M. Hubbell (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1949). “The 
exordium…should contain very little brilliance [splendor], vivacity [festivitas] or finish of style 
[concinnitudo], because these give rise to a suspicion of preparation and excessive ingenuity. As a result of 
this most of all the speech loses conviction and the speaker, authority.” 
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 Trebizond is often far more explicit than Agaso in his characterizations of his 
opponent’s childish knowledge and style. He accuses Guarino of childishness, for 
instance, when discussing the Scipio-Caesar controversy between Guarino and Poggio in 
1435. During that dispute, Guarino had appealed to Livy to defend Caesar. Trebizond 
claims that Guarino expounded Livy’s text like a schoolboy [discipulus]. His attack 
presumes a link between undeveloped skills and childishness. “What is cruder,” 
Trebizond asks, than Guarino’s handling of Livy’s text?72 Trebizond again questions 
Guarino’s manly knowledge when discussing how accusers and defenders frame their 
arguments. Here he mocks Guarino for not knowing things that not only men but even 
boys know.73 This is a common refrain. Elsewhere, Trebizond pauses during a litany of 
technical arguments to reflect. “Why do I go over all these things,” he asks, “You confuse 
everything...Will you not consider it shameful if even boys understand, and you, veteran 
orator, are ignorant?”74 Trebizond later censures Guarino for Agaso’s comment about 
72 Collectanea, 386. (22) Quid enim rudius quam cum scribat Livius prestantem fuisse virum P. Scipionem, 
belli tamen artibus quam pacis prestantiorem, his verbis, ‘pacis artibus,’ pusillanimem illum putare neque 
videre prestantiam in omnibus attestatum homini Livium? Que cum in pacis et belli artibus ei partita sit, si 
utraque in re qualis fuerit Scipio scire cupis, prestans, inquit; si in utra prestantior, in belli artibus, inquit. 
Tu prestans illud, quod Livius quasi genus posuerat, pro pusillanimo interpretaris. Ita litteraturam tenes. Sic 
textus discipulis exponis. 
 
73 Ibid., 388. (27) Nam etsi docendi commoditate adducti, non nunquam pauca quedam separatim 
exponamus, undique tamen apparet nullum ad refellendum excogitari posse preceptum quod confirmationi 
reddi non possit. Et enim que quis observat in argumentatione adversarii diluenda, eadem ipse, nisi 
diligentius ut vitet circumspiciat, fetor erit magis quam rhetor et tui similis. Lege Ciceronem ubicunque de 
his tractat. An saltem que ad Herennium scribit, queque non viri tantum, sed pueri etiam intelligunt, infans 
tu vidisti? A causa, vita, collatione, loco, tempore, ceterisque huiusmodi nonne tam accusator quam 
defensor, ut suam stabilit, sic adversarii coniecturam labefactat?   
 
74 Ibid., 396. (63) Exornationes tanquam colores distingunt orationem. Eas occupare loco et modo non 
vulgare, sed ubivis communissimum. Tu, qui primum probe factitare deberes, nec alterum quidem potes 
attingere. Nihil enim unquam graviter repetis, nihil asseveranter concludis; nihil acute expedis; nihil 
prudenter distribuis; nihil acriter subiicis. Cur cuncta recenseo? Omnia confundis. In omnibus heres. 
Nullius naturam, nullius locum, nullius modum perspicis. Que orationis tue vitia ignorantiam vi, loco 
imperitiam, modo hebetudinem, numero ruditatem, re dementiam pre se ferunt. Non igitur operies te atque 
obvelabis, sed detecto capite in ora hominum amplius aspicere audebis? Non turpe duces sique vel pueri 
sciunt, veteranus tu rhetor ignorabis? 
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“childish diligence:” “Surely these comments, if they were said thus to women or 
children or real ‘Agasos,’ would still seem unbecoming to them. You, who think yourself 
learned, will boast about them. You are ignorant, completely ignorant of the art of 
speaking, Guarino!” This comment also offers one of Trebizond’s few attempts to 
feminize his opponent.75 Alongside another reference to children, it is clear that 
feminization functions as another expression of failed masculinity, as a means of 
emasculating an opponent. Indeed, Trebizond then describes again Guarino’s arguments 
in the Agaso invective as childish [argumentum puerile].76 
 Even as Trebizond characterizes Guarino as childish, he condemns Guarino for 
doing the same to him. As with the beast imagery, Trebizond’s protests indicate his 
recognition that attacks on masculinity could be employed to great effect, and that 
humanists experienced—or at least articulated—anxiety as a result. An excellent example 
is when Trebizond is bristling at the long list Agaso compiled of the supposed errors in 
the RLV. Trebizond describes the compilation as frivolous and childish [leve et puerile], 
not to say “Agasonian.” It is likely not a coincidence that Trebizond casts Agaso’s 
behavior as leve, given that, as discussed in Chapter 1, accusations of levitas featured so 
prominently in Agaso’s attacks on Trebizond’s conduct. Emasculating Agaso’s 
behavior—and thus Guarino’s—gave Trebizond access to criticisms of levitas that he 
75 Ibid., 401. (85) Ad haec festivam nimis et apparatam appellas permutationem meam, et fucosam, 
puerilem diligentiam… Si festiva lenociniisque referta oratio est, quomodo longiore hyperbato 
prolixioreque ambitu obscura et pronuntiatione fatigas? Hec enim robuste nimis sunt compositionis. Que, si 
vera sunt, quomodo rursus fucose ac puerilis diligentie? (86) Hec profecto, si aut mulieribus aut pueris aut 
veris Agasonibus sic dicerentur, tamen eis indigna viderentur. Tu qui te doctum putas, his gloriaberis. 
Ignorans, ignorans omnino es dicendi artis, Guarine! For the importance of the feminizing antitype, see 
pages 151-152. 
 
76 Collectanea, 401. (87) Nam et hanc invectivam, quamvis absonam et deiectam et tam verbis squalentem 
quam sententiis et argumentis puerilibus et repugnantibus sordidam, meliusculam tamen quam soleas 
edidisti. See note 86 for the rest of the section. 
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could not advance, as Agaso had done to him, through cultural stereotypes. He chides 
Guarino for assuming the errors in the RLV to be a sign of ignorance rather than assuming 
that Trebizond does, in fact, know “those things most familiar to children.”77 The truth, 
Trebizond explains, is that his alleged errors were the fault of a copyist, “since it is 
impossible for a man to note down so great and so many volumes without error.” He 
suggests that the implicit assumption that he does not know what even boys know is itself 
a childish strategy, unjust, and an indication of Guarino’s levitas.    
  Aside from their explicit accusations of childishness, both Agaso and Trebizond 
incorporate the contrast between childishness and manliness in more complex, implicit 
arguments. The most prevalent of these involves the distinction between students 
(portrayed as poorly informed and childish) and instructors (portrayed as mature and 
manly). This distinction is evident in Agaso’s attempts to label Trebizond a false 
magister and childish upstart who challenges learned authorities, who are of course the 
true men.78 Here too, we can perhaps see the impact of the fact that Trebizond was nearly 
twenty years younger than Guarino. Agaso condescendingly describes Trebizond as a 
77 Collectanea, 383-384. (12) Illud quale sit consideremus, quam leve ac puerile, ne Agasonium dicam, quo 
me carpis, quod non nulla in tanto codice minus Latine dicta te offendissent. Quid ais, Guarine? Si mea 
manu transcripta tam multa magnaque forent volumina in quibus litterarum quadam additione vel 
detractione corruptius, que dicis, reperirentur, cogitatione scribentis alio rapta, “egritudinem” pro 
“egrotatione,” “ad presentiarum” pro “ad presens,” “exorditus” pro “exorsus,” “doctrinas” pro “doctrine,” 
ignorantie id signum putares? Nec vel gravitate orationis vel preceptorum multitudine, subtilitate, ordine 
motus, infantibus hec communissima nobis concederes? Adeo rudis atque agrestis es ut te fugiat accidere 
homini posse, quod plerumque tibi evenisse certior sum, ut querat quod teneat, postulet quod in manibus 
habeat? Nisi forte tu deus sis aut deum te credi velis? ...(13) Animadverte igitur quam iniquus es: que si 
manu mea scripsissem, non ignorantie dares, hec aliena manu confecta mihi non pudet ingerere. Quod si 
ego quoque levitatem tuam sequendam ducerem, quam plurima huiusmodi ex tuis presto sunt! Nihil enim 
est integrum, nihil non absonum, nihil non barbare scriptum. Verum nos ita tibi omnia condonamus ut que 
fortassis etiam tu committis librariis. Tu, siquid in nostris transcriptorum culpa mendosum est, nobis 
attribuis. Nos etiam magna tibi vitio non damus. Tu minima hec et aliena non vereris colligere, quamvis et 
qui nostra, quod tot tantaque volumina impossible sit absque lapsu hominem exarare, deprecari errorem, et 
qui tua transcribunt, librarii propter tuorum paucitatem iure in te reiicere culpam possunt, nisi tam breves 
epistolas scopulose orationis fastidio se affectos minus attendisse in transcribendo dicant. 
 
78 Chapter Two examines Agaso’s false magister argument as a part of his depiction of Trebizond as an 
arrogant Greekling who, though unqualified, purported to teach the art of speaking. See pages 40-45.  
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“young doctor” [novellus doctor].79 He is a magister who, so that he might seem to 
contribute something of his own, added “so foolishly and stupidly ‘cum amplificatione’” 
to Cicero’s definition of demonstrative oratory.80 He is a “Neptunian magister” who 
misunderstands the number of parts of an oration.81 He is a magister whose practices run 
counter to those of Servius, “no less an eloquent rhetor than a learned grammarian.”82 He 
is a “new Cicero, or chickpea” who creates thousands of new doctrines.83 Agaso 
amplifies these insults by explicitly characterizing Trebizond not as a master, but as a 
student: “Therefore let the Greekling go and learn how to be a student, since he does not 
know how to be a teacher.”84 Each of these is part of Agaso’s portrayal of Trebizond as 
arrogant and unlearned, particularly in contrast to true authorities.  
 Naturally, Trebizond responds to Agaso’s false magister argument by reversing 
roles and presenting himself as the learned instructor and Guarino as the student. To 
Agaso’s contention that he was an ungrateful student of Guarino’s Latin instruction, 
Trebizond recalls his lessons to Guarino on Pindar and Greek meter, lessons for which he 
79 Collectanea, 366. (7) …quamquam quid dicet doctor ipse novellus, quod tot eruditos, peritos, suaves in 
dicendo tulit hec etas sine ipsius preceptione ut priscis illis haud dissimiles dixerim, sicut multifariam 
illorum scripta et dicta testantur? 
 
80 Ibid., 366 (9). See note 64.  
 
81 Collectanea, 366. (11) Inde non longe post Neptunius hic magister inventionem divisurus contra veterum 
omnium et posterorum auctoritatem atque sententiam, quattuor tantum partes enumerat, cum sex esse nemo 
sanus eat inficias. Sic enim partitur in exordium, narrationem, contentionem, et perorationem. 
 
82 Ibid., 370. (29) Accedit et Servius, non minus rhetor facundus quam grammaticus eruditus, qui in tertio 
Georgicorum commento: ‘scimus,’ inquit, ‘esse concessum scribentibus ut iteratione prohemii legentium 
reficiant interdum laborem,’ magis quam scriptoribus et lectorum, ut magister imperat Trapezuntius… 
The passage is a part of Agaso’s response to Trebizond criticizing Guarino’s use of scribentium 
in his encomium. See note 36.   
 
83 Collectanea, (2) …id est, doctrine doctrinas, et alia milia que novus hic Cicero, vel cicer, magis sua 
quadam usurpat inscitia? De nomine si queris, quod ad tuas aures pervenisse non arbitror, dicam postea. 
 
84 Ibid., 367. (15) Eat igitur Greculus ipse, et discipulus esse discat qui magister esse nescit. Alioquin 
dimidio stultiores redditurus est discipulos quam accepit. Et intercepta salaria revomenda. 
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claims Guarino was quite grateful. Trebizond’s assertion is an important part of his 
defense against Agaso’s anti-Greek language, but it also demonstrates his attempts to 
emasculate Guarino by placing him in the schoolroom. He describes his lessons on Pindar 
and meter as topics far more complex than those Guarino claimed he had taught 
Trebizond. He adds that Guarino had given him only those rudimentary lessons, “which 
women rather than men usually give,” and had done so poorly.85 Trebizond’s verbal 
emasculation of Guarino is also evident in his contention that his criticisms in the RLV 
had improved Guarino’s style. He suggests that as squalid and childish a piece as the 
Agaso invective was, it was still an improvement over Guarino’s typical offerings. Here 
he implores the “noblest men, and finally whoever follows Guarino,” to compare what 
they know of Guarino’s past teachings and speech to what they hear now. They will find, 
he declares, that Guarino treats issues differently and writes more ornately and sweetly. 
“George made you more learned,” he concludes, adding that the changes in Guarino’s 
practices are “easily conferred on you by George’s teaching.”86 Trebizond makes a 
85 Ibid., 398. (72) Vix duorum mensium illa tua fuit doctrina in transcribendo, non in discendo me penitus 
occupato, si tamen doctrina sit appellanda primorum elementorum confusa cognitio… Quo quidem tempore 
memini tibi Pindarum legenti ac a me petenti quidnam aut de illo poeta aut de metris suis sentirem, biduo 
me de metrorum omnium genere disseruisse, teque subinde flagitasse ut siquid haberem de his rebus, 
scriptis traderem quoniam tot tantaque memoria tenere non posses. Fecimus et obtulimus. (73) Videntur 
hec magna, preceptor, que abste accepimus? Communisima quedam, que femine magis quam viri 
monstrare solent, tradidisti. Oleum ac impensam amisisse quereris. Ego (ita me deus amet) pluris unicum 
ex his verbulum que tibi de metris subieci quam universam illam elementorum cognitionem facio. Hoc 
enim vulgo habetur; illud antequam invenies, et oleum multum profecto et impensam expones. On 
Trebizond’s spelling of abs te as abste, see Chapter Two, note 138. 
This is another of the few times he feminizes Guarino, although again the characterization serves 
the same purpose as beast imagery or accusations of childishness, to demonstrate a lack of learning that is 
expected of men. On the trend in Renaissance studies to examine masculinity in opposition to femininity 
see page 151-152. The passage is also likely a slight against Guarino as a grammarian. For the changing 
perception of grammarians during the fifteenth century see Chapter Two, note 140. 
 
86 Collectanea, 401. (87) Nam et hanc invectivam, quamvis absonam et deiectam et tam verbis squalentem 
quam sententiis et argumentis puerilibus et repugnantibus sordidam, meliusculam tamen quam soleas 
edidisti. Quasobres tyrones omnes tuos et veteranos discipulos ego appello. Vos, vos, inquam, nobilissimi 
viri, quicunque tandem estis qui Guarinum sectamini, tenete, obsecro, memoria quecunque de arte Guarinus 
ad hunc usque diem vobis preceperit. Revolvite vobiscum que in dies audietis. Videbitis, mihi credite, 
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similar proclamation in a cover letter to Leonello d’Este that he appended to his 
Responsio to Guarino: “See, please, how much more honorable my actions are. I 
criticized Guarino rightly, as I see it…Indeed, I believe you noticed how much better he 
writes since he read the books of my Rhetoric.”87 
 For both Agaso and Trebizond, the instructor-student contrast emasculates an 
opponent by attacking his learning, but it is also a way to portray oneself as learned and 
manly. In other words, the instructor-student contrast allows one to argue “I know more 
than you, child” and to exhort someone with the knowledge of a child to “learn from me.” 
The sparring in the Agaso and Trebizond letters is thus quite meaningful. Arguments 
regarding who taught whom, or who is even capable of teaching whom, are crucial points 
of contention over learning and reputation. The link between learnedness and masculinity 
is a means of expressing one’s superiority and of situating two figures at different places 
in a clearly conceptualized hierarchy of manhood.  
 The instructor-student contrast also has a conspicuous place in Trebizond’s feud 
with Poggio beginning in May 1452. The pivotal moment in that feud was the fight in the 
chancery, which began as Trebizond was speaking with a colleague and said something 
derogatory about Poggio, who was walking nearby. What he said likely dealt with his aid 
to Poggio in the Latin translations of Xenophon and Diodorus. A consistent contention of 
pleraque a Guarino aliter atque antea vobis callidius subiici. Quod cum sentietis, siqua vobis cura veritatis 
est, exclamate illico: doctiorem te fecit Georgius, Guarine! Vos etiam appello qui eius aliqua scripta 
diligentius perlegistis. Si ornatius, gravius, suavius aut omnino meliuscule quicquam scripserit Guarinus 
quam nunc scribat, eam facilitatem preceptione Georgii sibi collatam arbitramini. Que si facietis, et 
veritatem magis quam Guarinum amabitis et eum ipsum licentius ac ardentius ad meliora dicendi studia 
incumbere facietis. 
 
87 Ibid., 380. (10) Vide, queso, quam honestiores mee partes sint. Carpsi Guarinum vere, ut puto. Id ei 
quoque ipsi perutile fuerat. Nam quam melius scribat ex quo meorum Rhetoricorum libros legit teipsum 
animadvertisse arbitror. 
 For the cover letter to Leonello, see Chapter One, page 5. I discuss the letter to Leonello in more 
detail below, pages 194-196.  
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Trebizond’s correspondence during the feud is that he never received proper recognition 
or gratitude for his assistance. Writing to Poggio in January 1453, Trebizond complains 
that even though Poggio gained “both money and everlasting honor” from the 
translations, he expressed his thanks with a letter “in which you write that I am a man too 
little prudent and am provoked easily and without reason.” 88 Writing to his son Andreas 
in June 1454, Trebizond declares that the translations were “completed by means of my 
instruction.” “What greater service can be imagined,” he asks, “than that which we 
bestowed by our work on Poggio?”89 Trebizond laments again that he made Poggio 
“famous” by his labors, “a man ignorant of Greek letters, who composed nothing in Latin 
except the most shameful stories and some invectives.” Poggio so lacked skill, he 
continues, that Trebizond had to supply him with “individual words as he would a 
88 Trebizond’s letters during this dispute, with the exception of the June 1454 letter to his son Andreas 
quoted in the following note, are all found in Ernst Walser, Poggius Florentinus: Leben und Werke 
(Leipzig: Teubner, 1914), 501-515. His January 1453 letter to Poggio is in Walser, 501-504. For a brief 
overview of the Trebizond-Poggio conflict see page 96. The conflict is discussed at length in Chapter 
Three. Walser, 501. Nunc autem econtra si conscientiam tuam scrutaberis aut si ab universa Cancellaria 
apostolica quesieris maxima invenies beneficia in te a Georgio profecta fuisse. Quis enim eorum qui cum 
locum petere hunc solebant, ignorat et Xenophontem et Diodorum te magnis meis ex Graeco in latinum 
laboribus vertisse? Unde tibi et pecunia accessit et honor sempiternus. Quibus pro maximis beneficiis quid 
retulisti, edidisti epistolam que ad manus meas pervenit, ubi scribis parum me consultum hominem esse et 
leviter et absque ulla ratione moveri.   
 Trebizond is referring to Poggio’s letter to Christopher Cauchus in September 1437, in which 
Poggio wrote that he thought Trebizond had acted inappropriately in writing his invective against Guarino 
earlier that year. Trebizond’s criticism of Poggio in January 1453 is another indication of the public nature 
of humanist disputes. Trebizond is not accusing Poggio of writing an insulting letter to him, but of having 
written insultingly about him in a letter to another. Not only had Poggio heard about the Trebizond-Guarino 
dispute, he had discussed it with a friend via his personal correspondence which then itself circulated, 
making its way back to Trebizond. The letter to Cauchus is discussed below, pages 204-206.  
 
89 Collectanea, 117. (1) Nemo enim pene ignorat quot quantaque mea in Florentinum Pogium merita 
extiterint. Universa enim apostolica cancelleria testis est quottidianis laboribus meis tum Xenophunticam 
Cyri Disciplinam, tum Diodori Egyptiam Historiam e Greco in Latinum vel vertisse illum vel pervertisse: 
illud, quod institutionibus meis factum est, quantum fieri quinquenio spacio potuit; hoc, quia durum atque 
agrestem animum, ne in tam longo quidem temporis spacio, ad meliora reducere potui; Ibid., 123. (30) 
Quid autem maius excogitari potest quam quod nos opera nostra Pogio contulimus? Ignarum litterarum 
Grecarum hominem qui nihil Latine preter turpissimas conscripserat fabulas et invectivas quasdam, quo 
quasi ad sentinam omnium turpium verborum que melius re ipsa quam vocabulis novit multitudinem 
congessit, perpetuum nostris laboribus fecimus. Unde non parvam quoque pecuniam et gratiam consecutus 
videtur. I discuss Trebizond’s argument to Andreas about Poggio’s debt in Chapter Three, pages 140-143.  
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child.”90 As during the feud with Guarino, Trebizond challenges his opponent’s 
masculinity to demonstrate his own learning. Doing so allows him to strengthen his 
argument for the value of his aid and the debt Poggio owes him.  
In both of Trebizond’s feuds, concepts of masculinity functioned as attempts to 
cast an opponent as unlearned. The purpose was to define an opponent—as a child, a 
woman, a fishmonger, or donkey-driver—in a way detrimental to the other’s attempts to 
cultivate a reputation. These definitions also expressed one’s own intellectual superiority. 
When Agaso cast Guarino as Trebizond’s instructor, when Trebizond boasted he 
improved Guarino’s style, or when Trebizond lamented his aid to Poggio, these were all 
expressions of one man’s dominance over another. Masculine language was an effective 
tool because humanists conceptualized an ideal man and set that ideal over and above a 
host of alternatives that represented in one way or another failed masculinity. Attacks 
against an opponent’s learning were only one avenue for demonstrating one’s superior 
reason, however. Equally significant were insults about an opponent’s moral conduct, in 
which immoral behavior was described as the result of a lack of reason and restraint. 
The Moderate Man        
  
Trebizond’s feuds with Guarino and Poggio illustrate how the humanist 
understandings of masculinity and restraint, indebted to the classical and medieval 
models discussed at the beginning of the present chapter, were fundamentally 
connected.91  Manhood was defined by the markers of restraint examined in Chapter 
90 Collectanea, 123. (31) Opera nostra et labore quinquenio pene sic abusus est, ut omnis id Romana curia 
sciat, ne ipse quidem summus pontifex ignoret, primo Xenophontis Pediam Cyri pervertisse illum, deinde 
Diodori Egyptiacam historiam, singula nobis verba illi sicuti puero ingerentibus. 
 
91 For the tradition identifying reason and restraint as indicators of manhood see pages 156-164.  
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Three, including prudence, honesty, and forgiveness. The expectation was that the true 
man governed his emotions and used reason to identify and make virtuous choices. 
Defining an opponent as overly emotional and lacking restraint on the one hand and 
demonstrating one’s own reasoned behavior on the other allowed an author to express his 
dominance over another. Like attacks against an opponent’s learning, insults about 
conduct also situated individuals within a hierarchy of masculinity.  
Perturbationes animi and Failed Masculinity 
 
Trebizond’s feud with Poggio is a natural place to begin an examination of 
masculinity and moderation. The fight in the chancery, Trebizond’s use of the sword, and 
his imprisonment and expulsion from the chancery placed moral conduct squarely in the 
center of their dispute.92 In letters from Naples between January 1453 and June 1454, 
Trebizond was intent on proving that he, not Poggio, had acted moderately in the 
chancery and during the following two years. To do so, he constructed a detailed portrait 
presenting Poggio’s behavior as lacking restraint and a result of “disturbances of the 
mind” [perturbationes animi]. The concept of perturbationes animi, used by Trebizond 
and his opponents either implicitly or explicitly, refers to the passions and stands in 
opposition to one’s reasoning faculties.93 It is a separate issue from learnedness, as it 
deals not with the rational capabilities associated with knowledge but with the exercise of 
reason in decision-making and in action. Trebizond’s Naples correspondence begins by 
casting Poggio as the less rational of the two during the chancery fight, but over time his 
92 Arguments about moral conduct certainly play an important role in the Trebizond-Guarino dispute as 
well. I suggest, though, that moral conduct plays an even more significant role thematically in the 
Trebizond-Poggio correspondence given the acts and accusations of physical violence and harassment in 
that feud. For this reason, I begin a discussion of conduct with the Trebizond-Poggio feud.  
 
93 The phrase has classical roots. See for instance Cicero’s discussion of “disturbances of the mind,” 
emotions, in books three and four of the Tusculan Disputations.  
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description of Poggio becomes far more negative. He describes Poggio as less rational, 
and more angry, jealous, and emotional in detailing the assassination plot to Poggio in 
March 1453 and the forged letter plot to his son Andreas in June 1454 than he had in his 
initial letters to Poggio and Nicholas V in January 1453. At the same time, his depiction 
of Poggio becomes increasingly dependent on imagery denoting failed masculinity. His 
attacks thus transition from allegations of immoderate, unjust behavior to accusations of 
an underlying childish character that completely lacks reason and thus manhood.    
 In his January 1453 letter to Poggio, Trebizond employs the language of 
masculinity to criticize Poggio’s immoderate behavior at three critical points in his 
account of the chancery fight. The first occurs during Trebizond’s description of the 
beginning of the fight. Angered by what Trebizond had said about him, Poggio shouted 
that he was lying and charged across the chancery to confront him. Trebizond’s 
presentation of his response challenges Poggio’s masculinity: “If only you had heaped up 
other things of this kind, I would have paid no mind. Instead, I would have listened to 
your slander with great patience, like a parent’s.”94 Poggio, of course, did more than 
simply shout, and Trebizond then explains how he braced himself against the other’s 
charge. Like the typical youth, Poggio’s emotions impelled him to action. Trebizond 
deliberately contrasts his own restraint and patience, and thus manhood, by likening 
himself to a parent coping with a child’s outbursts.  
The second overt reference to masculinity occurs when Trebizond justifies his use 
of the sword in their fight—which had been a significant part of the decision rendered 
against him—by framing it as a rational act of self-defense. He argues that he intended to 
94 Walser, 502. Quod certe non putavi ad aures tuas perventurum, audisti tamen et: Mentiri me magna voce 
respondisti. Utinam alia quoque huiusmodi congessisses nihil ego penitus replicassem. Sed maledicta tua 
magno animo quasi parentis audissem. 
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scare Poggio away with the weapon, and that he selected that course rather than to bite 
the man’s fingers or crush his testicles, implying that he had chosen the least violent and 
most responsible method of ending the confrontation. He notes that his plan worked, for 
Poggio “immediately hurried away from that place like a Florentine woman in flight.”95 
Feminization allows Trebizond to stress Poggio’s inability to control his emotions, in this 
case his fear. The contrast between each man’s decision-making process is notable too. If 
Poggio’s emotional flight is womanish, Trebizond’s rational thought-process is implicitly 
manly. 
Trebizond returns to the contrast between man and child in the conclusion of his 
letter, adding that childish emotion is a sign of a bestial nature: 
God knows, Poggio, I never intended to harm you. And for this reason I resolved 
to engage with you in letters now so that I might put aside my distress in writing 
and find peace. For believe me: If, provoked by your injuries against me, I imitate 
your bestial character, I shall not settle the matter as you have, like a child. 
Instead, I shall dispatch you without the least difficulty, even if you were far 
greater and far more powerful than I.96  
 
Trebizond labels Poggio’s handling of their dispute as both bestial and childish to address 
the concept of rational self-control. He declares that he never intended to harm Poggio 
but implies that Poggio did mean him harm. The difference between the two rests in their 
respective characters, one bestial and childish, and the other indicative of the true man.  
95 Ibid., 503. Potui digitum in os immissum meum dentibus iure concidere: non feci. Venit in mentem, cum 
ego sederem et tu stares, utrisque manibus testes tuos comprimere ac te ita prosternere: non feci. Gladium a 
circumstantibus quesivi, ut eius timore te pellerem. Nec me fefellit opinio. Illico enim ut Florentina femina 
fuga inde te rapuisti. Quid ergo mali feci si gladium petii, ut te fugarem? This is another of Trebizond’s few 
attempts to feminize his opponents. See pages 151-152 as well as pages 179-180 and 183 for additional 
examples. 
 
96 Walser, 503-504. Deus scit Poggi nunquam me induxisse animum ad nocendum tibi. Ac ideo literis 
modo agere tecum constitui, ut perturbatione animi in scribendo deposita quiescam. Nam crede mihi: si tuis 
iniuriis commotus bestialem animum tuum imitabor, non ut tu quasi puer rem ordinabo. Sed facillime te 
conficiam, si etiam multo maior atque potentior esses.    
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Trebizond’s portrayal of Poggio’s lack of manly moderation features prominently 
in his description of their relationship after the fight as well. His account of Poggio’s 
perturbationes animi becomes an indication not of one instance of childish behavior, as 
when he let his emotions sweep him away in the chancery, but of a recurrent theme, and 
therefore of his intrinsically childish, and sometimes implicitly beast-like, character. 
Trebizond’s allegations of childishness thus take on new features, and his verbal 
emasculation of Poggio becomes more pronounced. In his January 1453 letter to Nicholas 
V, Trebizond describes Poggio’s relentless hostility, reporting his repeated efforts to send 
assassins to Naples to kill him. He never explicitly characterizes Poggio’s actions or 
character as beast-like, but he attributes to him a cruelty and savagery that invokes that 
imagery. Trebizond builds an implicit argument that like an animal, Poggio lacks the 
rational capacity for restraint and his passions lead him to savage behavior.97 Trebizond 
tells Nicholas that he left Rome after the chancery fight because he feared Poggio would 
“devise something more cruel and savage against me.”98 He cites Poggio’s continued 
anger as the reason why the two never reconciled and why he fled the chancery again 
forty days after their fight—alleging that Poggio had turned the cardinals in the curia 
against him.99 It was Poggio’s arrogance—his superbus animus—that led him to send 
assassins to Naples on three occasions. Trebizond casts Poggio’s failure to forgive, his 
97 For the link between beast imagery and cruelty, see Erica Fudge on Renaissance beasts, pages 158-160.  
 
98 The January 1453 letter to Nicholas V is in Walser, 504-506. Walser, 504. Ego sanct. Pater, nulla re alia 
magis istinc abii quam timore ne durities Poggii Florentini quicquam durius atque asperius adversus me 
innovaret. 
 
99 Ibid., 504-505. Deinde cum propter peccata mea nullus mihi aditus ad S.T. daretur nec aliquis 
cubicularius vellet me cum aliis secretariis admittere, post XL dies experiri volui si iam furor in me suus 
deferbuisset…Nam quoniam vidi animum eius implacabilem vidique nonnullos cardinales omnia dicere ac 
facere, que ipse vellet, magni animi esse putavi, cedere. 
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refusal to reconcile, and his continued harassment as signs of his immoderate nature and 
of the cruelty, arrogance, and obstinacy of his animus.100  
In the March 1453 letter to Poggio, Trebizond reiterates his portrayals of Poggio’s 
animus, perturbationes, and failed manhood.101 He explains that he wrote to Nicholas 
about the assassination plot so the pope would help return Poggio to his senses. As 
Trebizond tells it, he feared Poggio’s anger would lead him to resort to violence. The 
assertion is a criticism of Poggio’s proclivity for childish, emotional, and violent 
outbursts. Trebizond underlines this allegation by recalling Poggio’s feud with Lorenzo 
Valla, a “childish affair” [puerilis res] by Trebizond’s estimation, during which Poggio 
threatened to murder Valla.102 Trebizond’s depiction of the dispute as childish, alongside 
the claim that Poggio needed to come to his senses in their own feud, casts Poggio’s 
immoderate, emotional actions as a function of his very nature. Against the backdrop of 
the Valla feud, Trebizond suggests, Poggio’s childishness represents not an isolated 
incident or a momentary lapse of judgment but a flawed character. 
Trebizond also finds evidence of Poggio’s childish character in what he argues are 
the frequent contradictions in Poggio’s February 1453 letter to him. Poggio composed his 
letter in response to Trebizond’s two January letters, the one addressed to Poggio in 
which he reframed the chancery fight and the other addressed to Nicholas describing the 
alleged assassination plot. In March, Trebizond explains Poggio’s February letter as a 
100 Ibid., 505. His ergo rationibus libenter Poggio cessi, presertim cum non minus Rome quam hic essem 
peregrinus, sed non sufficiunt hec omnia Poggio. Nec semestri et ultra spatio temporis superbus hominis 
animus potui mitigari, sed mittit satellites hucusque ad occidendum me quam rem ter iam tentavit. 
 
101 Trebizond’s March 1453 letter to Poggio is in Walser, 506-515. 
 
102 Walser, 512. An credis forsan immemorem me esse adeo ut non meminerim quando in re puerili vere in 
multis a Valla fuisses reprensus: ita te exarsisse ut vitam eius extinguere constitueris?; Ibid., 512-513. Hac 
ergo de causa querelam ad pontificem detuli, ut et tuum ab insidiis animum et me a periculo liberarem. For 
a discussion of the Poggio-Valla feud, see Chapter Three, pages 135-139. 
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sign of its author’s perturbationes animi.103 He notes the supposed inconsistency between 
Poggio’s denials that he had ever written anything derogatory about Trebizond and his 
admission that he had once rebuked Trebizond’s conduct during the Guarino affair.104 He 
asks of Poggio—sarcastically referring to him as a “most learned and prudent man”—
whether this is not a clear contradiction and suggests such an obvious inconsistency was 
the result of Poggio having been “stirred up, like a child or a reed blown by the wind.” If 
Poggio had written consistently like a man, he argues, he would not have to instruct him 
as he would instruct a child.105 Trebizond presents Poggio’s inconsistency as an 
indication of a fundamental disconnect between what Poggio’s conscience tells him is the 
truth, that he had disparaged Trebizond, and what he claims to be the truth. It is an 
103 Walser, 513. Non videtur mihi possibile, Poggi sic posse quemquam loqui et maxime litteris deditum 
nisi duplici turbatione insaniat. Nam cum animus modo huc modo illuc varietate turbationum feratur, tunc 
necessario verba etiam que imago animi sunt herere inter se non possunt. Certe verba inconstantissima sunt 
et aliena penitus ab omni humanitate, que modo huc modo alio tendentia turbationes animi produnt, 
conscientiam occidendi hominis bene de te meriti cupiditatem, qua fiebat ut dum licere quasi tibi sperares 
scriptis te contendere nolle diceres, indignationem quoniam animum tuum explere nequis timore pontificis. 
Que ita esse satis iam tuarum litterarum furore mihi produntur. 
 
104 Cf. Poggio’s February 1453 letter in Poggii Epistolae, ed. T. Tonelli, 3 vols. (Florence, 1832-1861), 
3:49-52. Tonelli’s edition is reprinted in Poggio, Opera Omnia, vol.3, Epistolae (Turin: 1964). I cite 
Poggio’s sources as Poggii Epistolae. Poggii Epistolae, 3:49. Ego nihil umquam, quod jure te deberet 
offendere, contra te egi; non verbo, non litteris tibi unquam detraxi; non commodis tuis unquam 
obstiti…Arguis me ob rem antiquam, quod olim scripserim in quadam epistola, te nominans, parum bene 
consulti hominis videri; idque in tuam contumeliam scriptum putas. Poggio’s letter about the Trebizond-
Guarino affair to Cauchus in September 1437 and his February 1453 letter to Trebizond are discussed 
below, pages 204-206.  
 
105 Walser, 508-509. Sed mirum est quomodo nunquam te modo litteris detraxisse scribis, deinde paucis 
interiectis, sicut insanus, scripsisse te olim in me fateris. Semel enim scripsisse et nunquam scripsisse 
contradicunt o vir doctissime tu atque prudentissime? Ignosce mihi oro si, quicquam apertius in te dico. Res 
enim ipse ita cogunt facere. Nam si tu constanter ut vir scripsisses, neque ut puer aut calamus vento 
concussus agitareris, nec ego quasi puerum docens hoc docendi genere uterer. Culpa ergo tua est, qui 
repugnantia scribis, non mea, qui levitatem scriptorum tuorum aperiens congruis cogor nonnumquam 
verbis exclamare.  
 Trebizond’s use of the reed analogy may be a biblical reference. Cf. Matt 11:7 and Luke 7:24. 
Vergerio and Piccolomini also use this language in discussing emotions and inconstancy. See pages 162-
163. Vergerio writes that instructors should help prevent youths from “being bent over by their own 
weight,” perhaps their own character, “or by the wind,” by circumstance and their emotional responses.  
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example of how Poggio’s emotions impel him to dissimulation—he was “stirred up”—
and therefore of a childish lack of rational self-control.  
Trebizond’s strategies during the dispute with Poggio are strikingly similar to 
those Agaso and Trebizond used in the earlier Trebizond-Guarino feud. Both individuals 
made ample use of the links between moderation and manhood on the one hand and 
perturbationes animi and failed manhood on the other. Agaso does not explicitly refer to 
perturbationes animi in casting Trebizond as an arrogant assailant of rhetorical 
authorities, but he does portray him as a slave to his emotions. At times, this argument 
contains an anti-Greek component. Asking his reader if he wants to know “who he is who 
so demolishes men deceased and living,” Agaso identifies Trebizond as a Cretan and 
suggests that a Cretan “is a liar, an evil beast [mala bestia].”106 The likening of Cretans to 
beasts leads into a discussion of Trebizond’s dishonorable and emotional behavior. Here 
Agaso recalls a story of how Trebizond had slandered Guarino in the presence of 
Guarino’s former students. Hearing these men praise their instructor, Trebizond was 
furious. Agaso indicates Trebizond’s emotional upheaval by describing him as animosus. 
Trebizond then disparaged Guarino, who was not present, and “vomited forth these 
slanderous statements against him.” Trebizond’s actions were the result of his emotions: 
he was “vexed by the stings of jealousy and incensed by the flames of rivalry.”107 In light 
106 Collectanea, 368. (19) Scire vis quisnam is est qui sic mortuos ac viventes exossat homines? E Creta 
dudum advectus, quo pruna et cotana, vento. (20) De cuius insule hominibus et eorum ingenio tacebo ipse, 
ne homini litterato conviciari videar, sed beatum Paulum audies, qui acceptum ab vetusto poeta versum 
hexametrum de illis breviter explicat: “Cretensis mendax, mala bestia, segnis, et alvus.” Cf. Titus, 1:12. 
 
107 Collectanea, 368-369. (22) Tum frequentes ad eum, ut ad pharmacopolam, auditores accurrebant, 
recentem adhuc Guarini cum caritate memoriam disciplinamque retinentes. Proinde audire erat varias de 
Guarino predicationes: alius prudentiam, ille comitate conditam gravitatem, nonnulli ingenium et legendi 
suavitatem ac evidentiam, quidam scribendi facundiam nec minus orandi dulcedinem extollebant, cum ex 
eius lingua, ut de Nestore dixit Homerus, melle dulcior flueret oratio. Quas ob laudes animosus in primis 
homo Trapezuntius eum sibi parem ferre non valens absentis honori detractare cepit et invidie stimulis 
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of the preceding passage suggesting such behavior is typical of Cretans, Agaso is clearly 
saying that Trebizond’s dishonorable behavior was beast-like.    
 Agaso follows his depiction of Trebizond as a Cretan beast slandering Guarino 
with a characterization of Trebizond’s behavior as childish. Here he argues that 
Trebizond should recant what he had written about Guarino. Claiming Trebizond was too 
ashamed to do so, Agaso maintains that to recant is not only right but the proof of a good 
man [vir bonus] who corrects error rather than persisting in it. Trebizond could prove 
himself a good man by recanting, since, as Agaso explains, the path to good mores is 
“never too late.” To emphasize the point, he appeals to Cicero, who in De oratore cast 
aside his earlier De inventione: “But to return to the point, does not Cicero castigate his 
own errors and correct his writings…?”108 Agaso’s appeal to an author correcting the 
errors of his youth portrays Trebizond in a childish light. Like a child, Trebizond wrote 
“unfinished and crude essays”—a description consistent with Agaso’s assault on the 
RLV—and in this case, also shameful insults. He is clearly not a good man, at least by 
Agaso’s estimation. To correct one’s errors, particularly the errors of youth, is evidence 
of manhood. Instead, Trebizond, driven by emotion and shame, refused to recant and 
proved himself a boy. 
agitatus et emulationis facibus incensus ista in eum maledicta scriptis evomuit… Agaso is reporting a story 
he claims was told to him by an unnamed patrician. See Chapter Two, page 50-51. 
 
108 Collectanea, 369. (23) “Cur,” inquam, “Trapezuntius probra non retractat cum maius viri boni 
argumentum sit sese ab errato deterrere quam in errato perstare, et nunquam sera sit ad bonos mores via?” 
“Verecundia,” inquit, “impedimento est et, cum tot exscripta sint sue Rhetoric volumina, emendandi labor.” 
“Alia quaedam via restat,” dixi, “ut parvam per epistolam impia revocet mendacia, que in ipsum tandem 
conviciatorem retundentur. An quispiam existimet, cum tot etiam docti quidem viri auditores Guarini 
vigeant, hac impunita relicturos esse maledicta, quin par pari referant quod Trapezuntium remordeant? Sed, 
ut redeam, nonne Cicero propria interdum castigat errata et per lapsum etatis scripta saniore lima corrigit, 
que, ut ait ille, ‘pueris aut adolescentulis nobis aut ex commentariolis nostris incohata aut rudia 
exciderunt’? Cf. Cic., De. or. 1.5.  
 
195 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
 Trebizond, like Agaso, expresses his arguments via the connection between 
perturbationes animi and failed masculinity. One of his most consistent contentions is 
that Guarino used the Agaso pseudonym in an inherently dishonorable and childish way 
and that his emotions compelled him to do so. In the cover letter to Leonello, he 
comments that Guarino’s response to the RLV’s criticisms, the Agaso letter, was 
unwarranted. He describes Guarino as “agitated against me more than is proper for a 
learned man [doctus vir]” and motivated “by an excessive perturbation of the soul” “to 
feign a fight under the name Agaso.”109 Trebizond maintains the argument in the letter to 
Guarino, albeit without explicit reference to perturbationes animi. By attacking “not 
openly under your own name…but secretly and timidly” as Agaso, Trebizond explains, 
“you attacked too childishly and attacked yourself more than me.”110 He adds later that 
Guarino adopted the pseudonym because he “cannot endure George’s eloquence, at 
whose force of speaking you have now long trembled.”111  
Trebizond’s portrayal of Guarino’s childish emotional response to the RLV stands 
in contrast to how he describes his own reasonable and therefore manly treatment of 
Guarino. The strategy is similar to how he later reframes the chancery fight with Poggio. 
109 Collectanea, 378. (1) Credo eum nimia pertubatione animi, quoniam genus orationis sue in Rhetoricis 
carpsimus, non vidisse quid sibi accidere posset si pugnam sub Agasonis nomine dissimularet. Ego id, etsi 
magis quam doctum virum deceat in me commotus sit et indignum quocum certet putaverit, tamen cum sui 
ipsius causa (est enim clarus vir) tum et maxime reverentia erga te mea, quoniam eum non parvi facis, 
condonare sibi constitui. 
 
110 Ibid., 381. (1) Postquam vero ad me tua oratiuncula vix delata est, non his que scripsimus tantum, hoc 
est, communi utilitati, indigne detrahi, sed librorum quoque auctorem contumeliis peti abste iniuria 
perspexi, quodque iniquissimum est et tibi vel tuorum iudicio turpissimum, non tuo in me aperte sed, ne 
commodius me defendam, occulte ac timide sub Agasonis nomine invectus es. Acriter quidem, ut tu putas; 
ut vero ii sentiunt qui hoc altius intelligunt, pueriliter nimis ac in te magis quam in me, Guarine, invectus 
es. 
 
111 Ibid., 382. (5) Vident enim omnes atque intelligunt versute sic te inscripsisse quoniam orationem 
Georgii ferre non posses, cuius vim dicendi iam exhorruisses. Itaque credidisse te aiunt, si nomine inaudito 
scriberes, vel nil scripturum Georgium vel, si ad te scriberet, deum hominesque testari posses magnam tibi 
horum omnium ignaro iniuriam fieri.   
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In both cases, he emasculates his opponents by emphasizing their emotions and presents 
his own masculinity by relating his reasoned moderation. Trebizond maintains that he 
never insulted Guarino but had always honored him.112 In the cover letter to Leonello, he 
argues that Guarino will never convince anyone that Trebizond had provoked him. 
Instead, he claims that his grievous offense was that “although we commended him to 
posterity as an honest and learned man [probus et doctus vir],” he did not yield to 
Guarino alone the composition of eloquence. Trebizond’s portrayal focuses on his 
opponent’s purported arrogance and is hardly flattering. Trebizond continues to explain 
to Leonello the difference between himself and Guarino, noting that it was his 
“considerable esteem for the man” that led him to limit his censures of Guarino’s 
encomium.113 Far from having provoked the other man, Trebizond proclaims that he 
actually exercised restraint in his criticisms.  
In each of these passages, Trebizond also hints at his changing perception of 
Guarino. He once thought Guarino to be a good, honest, and learned man—and he places 
an emphasis on the vir—but Guarino’s emotion-driven behavior has led him to believe 
otherwise. Writing to Guarino, whom Trebizond claims he believed “to be a good man 
[bonus vir] and learned,” Trebizond explains that he initially refused to believe Guarino 
had “condemned those books [the RLV] that we wrote.”114 Later he defends the criticisms 
112 For Agaso’s various accusations that Trebizond slandered Guarino see pages 192-193. 
 
113 Collectanea, 378. (2) Non enim quia carpsimus iure se unquam commotum cuiquam persuadebit, nisi 
adversarius taceat. Nam cum ipsum et probum et doctum virum posteritati commendaverimus, 
compositionem solam orationis sue doctrine idoneam non concessimus. …Non eram adhuc reprehendendus 
si ita locutus sum ut et sensi et sentio, presertim cum maiora sui gratia tacuerim et minima que ad 
propositum de compositione orationis scribenti occurrerant perstrinxerim. For the preceding text, see note 
109. 
 
114 Collectanea, 381. (1) Cum multorum sermonibus iam ante percrebruisset eos libros quos de ratione 
dicendi conscripsimus non verbis te solum, ut prius, verum etiam scriptis vehementius improbare, quamvis 
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in the RLV as an acceptable scholarly practice and argues that “this can happen to men 
more learned than [Guarino]…[and] does not indicate for certain a lack of skill in 
Guarino’s speaking.” Guarino’s response, however, was decidedly unreasonable. The 
criticisms “vexed” him, and he “becomes inflamed, he becomes angry.”115 These 
arguments establish two personas. Guarino appears passionate and irrational, a nature that 
leads him to childishly adopt the Agaso pseudonym, while Trebizond appears reasonable 
and even respectful.   
Trebizond further advances the contrast between himself and Guarino with a 
passage that is highly sarcastic, more than a little arrogant, and that contains some of the 
most overtly masculine language in the letter. He suggests that he ought to treat his 
dispute with Guarino like the play fighting he engages in with his two little sons, during 
which “I turn over my weapons so they may attack their unarmed father more boldly, I 
think I ought to do the same with you, an inarticulate child in speaking.” “Behold how I 
tremble,” Trebizond continues, rebuking Guarino’s immoderate behavior, “You become 
angry. I teach you. You slander me. I suffer you.” Just as he arms his children, Trebizond 
urges Guarino—an inarticulate child—to “read our books about elocution” and to find the 
weapons of the orator with which he can then attack Trebizond.116 The passage is as 
non satis credidi te, quem bonum virum et doctum putabam, ea vilipendere, que et multi et clari viri 
precipuis laudibus efferunt, tamen tanto maiore tue vidende orationis cupiditate ardebam quanto melius de 
tua eruditione faciebam iudicium. Nam quoniam me hominem esse qui errare facile ac decipi posset 
cognosco, tua doctrina (que utinam fame respondeat!) revocari ab erratis cupiebam. For the rest of the 
passage, see note 110.  
 
115 Collectanea, 404. (97) Verum unum illud velim mihi respondeat. Immutavi non nulla suorum in melius. 
Quod et doctoribus quam ipse sit hominibus accidere potest. Quare id imperitiam in dicendo Guarini certo 
signo non indicat. Momordit hec res eum. Tumescit, irascitur, pati non potest. 
 
116 Ibid., 404. (98) Tu te ipsum defendis et leviora persequeris. Letale hoc fame existimationisque tue telum 
ne quidem unico verbo avertere audes. Erat enim maiorum virium huius loci, quam tue sunt, deprecatio 
atque depulsio, quam ego tibi nunc adaperiam ut te recte queas tutari. Nam quod sepe cum filiolis ludendi 
causa nostris facimus ut ad pugnandum nobiscum incitemus, tela nostra eis concedimus quibus in inermes 
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evocative as Trebizond’s contrast between himself, the virile knight, and Guarino, seated 
upon an ass.117 Like that contrast, it firmly defines the identities of each combatant, one 
as masculine and the other not. It also builds upon one of Trebizond’s major recurring 
arguments, that he, not Guarino, is the true knowledgeable man. Trebizond again strikes 
the pose of the instructor, exhorting Guarino, whom he again thrusts into the role of 
student and child, to learn from him.  
 Trebizond’s language of masculine conduct is also a key part of his assertion 
that Guarino had acted dishonorably in claiming himself to be Trebizond’s Latin 
instructor.118 Trebizond’s assertion contains some of the most expressive and vitriolic 
language in the letter, particularly during his apostrophe to Vittorino da Feltre, whom he 
credits as his true instructor. Reframing the terms of the dispute, Trebizond suggests that 
Guarino’s attacks on him are by extension attacks on Vittorino. He calls upon Vittorino 
to defend and protect what is his, the credit for Trebizond’s instruction. Trebizond notes 
Guarino’s belief that since he taught Trebizond a few of the basics of the language, 
Trebizond “imbibed [from him] the knowledge of all the advanced issues as well.”119 On 
nos audatius irruant, id mihi tecum puero in dicendo atque infanti faciundum censeo. Vide quam 
perhorrescam. Irasceris. Ego te doceo. Maledicis. Ego te fero. Insurgere cupis. Congredi et luctari non 
potes. Ego pedem confer et armis te instruo. Quod in te misimus telum evitare vis. Non potes. Taces. 
Nullam de hoc facis mentionem ne ulcus, quod curare diffidis, exagites. (99) Non vides remedium, quod 
unicum est. Confundere te omnia temeritate diximus: quid forense dicendi genus, quid quietum, quid 
historicum unica verborum parte ignorare te penitus. Si calumniati sumus, tu de his dissere breviter 
quomodo hec fiant. Si declarasses, me quoque ipsum penituisset tale in te ementitum fuisse. Non facis 
quoniam ignoras. Admonuimus que sint arma. Que si invenire cupis, de elocutione libros nostros lege. 
 
117 See page 176. 
 
118 Chapter Two examines Trebizond’s claim as a response to the anti-Greek language of the Agaso letter. 
See pages 75-77. 
 
119 Collectanea, 398. (74) Sed te nunc appello, Victorine. Defende ac protege partes tuas. Siquid Latine 
lingue in me est, te doctore post deum est. Insurgit Guarinus et, quoniam prima elementa monstravit, 
maiorum quoque rerum scientiam se duce nos imbibisse proclamat. Habes multos testes patritios ac 
integerrimos homines qui te illis temporibus Venetiis adolescentes audiebant, quibus audaciam huius 
monstri facile comprimes. Habes omnes huius florentissime urbis claros litteris viros quibus ora exertantis 
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the contrary, Vittorino has “many witnesses, patricians and the most honorable men 
[integri homines]” who can attest to Vittorino’s instruction of Trebizond, “by means of 
whom you will easily subdue the audacity of this monster [monstrum],” “by which you 
will beat back the speech of this clear Charybdis,” and the “firm reputation of so many 
years…with which you will crush the hard face of that monster [prodigium] as though 
against a stone.” The monster imagery and violent language is a much heightened form of 
expression compared to Trebizond’s likening of Guarino to an ass or a donkey-driver 
elsewhere. The image also contrasts strongly with the honorable and good men described 
as witnesses on Vittorino’s behalf. Trebizond continues, repeating to Vittorino that 
Guarino “struggles to claim your glory…for himself” by stealing credit for Trebizond’s 
Latin instruction.120 He calls upon Vittorino to defend him from Guarino and to lay claim 
to Trebizond and therefore to his rightful glory. In doing so, he positions himself as 
defending Vittorino and casts himself as a son protecting his father’s glory.121 Beyond 
this, Trebizond links Guarino’s monstrous behavior to madness [amentia] and asks 
Vittorino to castigate his impudence, obstinacy, arrogance, temerity, and shamelessness. 
The passage contains all the hallmarks of failed masculinity. Guarino is compelled by 
envy and amentia, not reason, to impudent, brash, and obstinate behavior. He is not a 
huius Charybdis contundes. Habes tot annorum constantem famam, quod ego semper non discipulus modo, 
sed filius tuus habitus sum, qua duram huius prodigii faciem sicuti saxo collides. This passage and the ones 
in notes 120 amd 122 are consecutive. 
 
120 Ibid., 398. (75) Guarinus tibi magis quam mihi invidet. Imo vero tibi soli hoc loco iniuriatur. Tuam enim 
in se, non meam, transferre gloriam nititur. Ego, Grecus homo, Latinas didici litteras. A quo nihil ad me. 
Quanto ab imperitiore didicerim, tanto mihi maior laus debetur, si bene didici. Ego te Guarino doctiorem et 
quidem multum duco, vel potius te doctissimum, illum ignorantissimum. Si fallor, mea hec est culpa. Nihil 
ad modestiam tuam. Illud dico: maiori mihi futurum laudi, si bene Latinitatem teneo, cum a Guarino, non 
abste me doctum dixero. Mentiri non est meum. Tacere honeste possum. Non taceo. Pietate in te mea 
cogor, qua non aliter ac parentem sancte te colui. 
 
121 The relationship between instructor and student was of vital importance to early modern educators, as 
discussed above, pages 160-164. See also the discussion in Chapter Two, pages 71-73 of how instructors 
were to function in loco parentis. 
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man but a monster. Trebizond also cautions Vittorino with an explicit image that 
identifies what is at stake in all of this. If Vittorino does not castigate Guarino and 
forsakes his student, others would likely be “torn to pieces by your courteousness.” “If 
you had fathered sons,” he asks, “would you leave them to rapacious wolves? Would you 
not protect them?”122  
The apostrophe to Vittorino is Trebizond’s attempt to establish himself as the 
arbiter of Guarino’s humanity. The savagery he ascribes to Guarino, the rapacious wolf, 
is an attempt to strip his opponent of his reason and depict him as other than a man and 
other than human. This is a substantial challenge to Guarino’s moral conduct and 
masculinity. He is not simply mildly censuring Guarino but exploiting the Renaissance 
anxiety about man and beast essentially to dehumanize Guarino.123 It is an indication 
that, at times, humanist challenges regarding masculinity could stand as attempts to 
annihilate an opponent’s masculine status and impose upon him another. It is also likely 
that classical satire influenced Trebizond’s language. Satirical tropes such as monsters 
were naturally suited to humanist invective and the denigration of one’s opponents.124 In 
depicting Guarino as a monster, Trebizond raises the stakes for each of the main figures 
122 Collectanea, 398-9. (76) Tu tacebis et Guarini amentiam non redargues tua rapientis, si non re, at minis, 
litteris, nuntiis? Si de hoc, cum ipso non egeris, si de hoc non questus fueris, si tantam huius impudentiam 
non castigabis, si contumaciam, si arrogantiam non infinges atque retundes, cave ne omnes quos doces 
facilitate tua distrahantur. O confidentiam hominis inauditam! O temeritatem incredibilem! Quod multi 
sciunt—multi? quin vero omnes ferme qui me cognoscunt et te, Victorine, in se transferre impudens homo 
conatur hinc atque illinc per maiorem invective partem. Hoc in loco moratur. Preceptorem se Georgio 
fuisse mentitur. Tu veritatem tacebis ac me deseres? Si liberos genuisses rapientibus traderes lupis? Non 
protegeres? Natura impulses, dices? Nunc quos doctrina filios tibi peperisti, qui, cum liberi non sunt, liberis 
etiam ipsis, maxime si quicquam de se pollicentur magni, cariores atque iocundiores esse solent, destitues 
et parvipendes? 
 
123 See the scholarship on Renaissance beasts discussed above, pages 158-160.  
 
124 Maria Plaza notes that Juvenal’s satires “are swarmed with monsters” which add “a touch of the literally 
inhuman and supernatural” and heighten the author’s indignation against particular individuals or vices. 
Plaza, 305-310. 
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in his apostrophe to Vittorino. The Charybdis reference amplifies Guarino’s savagery, 
audacity, and passions, which Trebizond describes as substantial a breach of good 
conduct as the Charybdis is a dreadful monster. The Charybdis raises the stakes for 
Vittorino as well, a man Trebizond describes as his intellectual father and portrays in an 
heroic manner: Vittorino should smash the monster’s head against the rocks, lest others 
be torn to pieces by his courteous refusal to act and the unchecked appetite of the 
rapacious wolf. Vittorino’s actions would not only protect Trebizond but also others 
whom the monstrous Guarino might otherwise savage. The imagery casts Vittorino as the 
hero of the story and furthers Trebizond’s depiction of himself as the victim. He presents 
himself not as the victim of mundane insults but of attacks so reprehensible they can only 
be adequately expressed in mythical terms.   
 One final observation remains: Trebizond employs the imagery of failed 
masculinity to accuse Guarino of levitas. Chapter Two examined the concept of levitas as 
a key component in the classical Roman model for anti-Greek language upon which 
Agaso drew in attacking Trebizond’s Greekness. Trebizond struggled with Agaso’s 
accusations of levitas and looked for ways to turn those charges back against Guarino. 
Surely, charges of levitas were not limited to attacks against Greeks. As a term of 
disapproval, levitas could be and was wielded against Italians as well, as Trebizond 
himself does. Against Greeks however, levitas carried the added weight of long-standing 
cultural biases that provided Italian authors modes of expression to which Trebizond did 
not have access. Agaso could criticize Trebizond’s Greekness as the reason for his poor 
moral conduct. Trebizond could accuse an Italian of levitas, but lacked the ability to 
make the charge through the kinds of ethnic slurs in the Agaso letter. The language of 
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failed masculinity offered Trebizond an alternative means of charging Guarino with 
levitas and its attendant concepts—arrogance, dishonesty, obstinacy, and the like. 
Trebizond’s strategy is explicit when he attacks Guarino for nitpicking errors in the RLV 
that he contends were the fault of copyists. “Let us consider how dishonorable [leve] and 
childish [puerile]” this tactic is, Trebizond states, adding that if he himself “followed 
after your levitas,” he could find many such examples in Guarino’s writings. Worse, 
those would be due to the author’s incompetence, not the copyist’s.125 Nearly all of the 
moral failings Trebizond attributes to Guarino—hiding behind the Agaso pseudonym, 
attacking a man who had commended him to posterity, being envious of Vittorino and 
falsely claiming Trebizond as his own student—are presented as indications of Guarino’s 
levitas. In the above passage, that dishonorable behavior is defined as an indication of 
levitas and childishness. Trebizond later argues similarly, though implicitly, when 
criticizing Guarino for attacking Greece: “But if Greece had deserved well from any 
Italian, from you certainly it had deserved the best, you who, if you had not been 
instructed by Greeks, would have languished in the dark. Do you, faultless man [integer 
homo], reprove the levitas, the deceit of the Greeks?”126 Guarino is neither faultless nor a 
true man because of his hypocrisy. His actions prove his levitas and reveal him to be a 
child, a rapacious wolf, and a Charybdis. 
125 See pages 180-181. 
 
126 Collectanea, 406. (107). Verum huc loci factus, non possum non dolere quod in Greciam homo tu 
omnium, in Greciam, omnium bonarum artium inventricem, in Greciam, deorum olim domicilium, non 
Iovis dico et Iunonis (non ad fabulas refugio), sed multorum heroum et sanctorum virorum (sive 
vetustissimos ac remotissimos a nostra etate consideres sive nostre, idest, vere, religionis cultores, quos 
numero plures, doctrinis subtiliores, eloquentia graviores, moribus probatiores, religione sanctiores quam 
ex reliquo terrarum orbe invenies), in Greciam, inquam, unus omnium, quo te inscribis nomine 
dignissimus, in Greciam inveheris. Atqui si de aliquo Italo bene merita est Grecia, de te certe optime est, 
qui, nisi a Grecis institutus fuisses, in tenebris iacuisses. Levitatem, fallaciam integer tu homo Grecie 
increpas? 
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 The preceding discussion indicates how humanists used the tropes associated 
with children, beasts, monsters, and women as verbal weapons to express arguments 
about moral rectitude and immoderate behavior. These authors not only used these 
strategies against one another, but, as examined in the first half of this analysis, often 
chafed at having them used against themselves. There is at times an almost palpable 
anxiety in this correspondence about being cast and perceived as less than a man. That 
anxiety speaks to an aspect of humanist masculinity that deserves further attention: its 
inherent instability. The way these authors talk about manhood suggests that they 
understood it to be a contested and negotiated part of one’s public identity and believed it 
could be lost, won, gained, and regained through interactions with others.  
Masculinity Lost, Masculinity Regained 
 
The notion that masculinity could somehow be lost is evident in the letters of each 
of the authors of these two feuds, who use the idea in their acts of self-presentation. The 
underlying assumption in these strategies is that actions demonstrate manhood or, 
alternatively, that manhood is contingent upon actions. Immoderate, irrational behaviors 
certainly indicate unmanly conduct but can also indicate a loss of manhood itself, most 
often portrayed as the result of out-of-control perturbationes animi.127 Trebizond 
expresses these ideas when he argues to Guarino and Leonello that he had always thought 
of Guarino as a “good man and learned” and an “honest and learned man.”128 As 
Trebizond asserts throughout the response to Guarino, though, his estimation of the other 
had changed because of what he perceived to be the unjust attacks of the Agaso letter. He 
127 See the scholarship regarding Renaissance beasts, which argues a similar position, pages 158-160.  
 
128 See pages 195-196. 
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now viewed Guarino not as a man, but as a child, beast-like, and so forth. Agaso similarly 
claims that Guarino continues to honor Trebizond because he does not know of 
Trebizond’s attacks against him. He says that when Guarino finds out that Trebizond is a 
“deceitful brigand,” his opinion of the man will change—perhaps Guarino might even 
consider Trebizond less of a man—and he will be roused to defend himself.129 In each 
case, Agaso and Trebizond suggest that masculinity was contingent on actions. 
Poggio articulates a comparable, though far more measured, argument about the 
contingency of manhood in his comments to Christopher Cauchus regarding the 
Trebizond-Guarino dispute. Written in 1437, that letter long predates Poggio’s conflict 
with Trebizond. Poggio was simply a bystander offering his perspective on the 
controversy. He writes that he believes Trebizond’s treatment of Guarino was not that of 
a prudent man nor was it suitable of a man of his learning. He adds that Trebizond acted 
rashly by assuming Guarino had written the Agaso letter—an assumption Poggio claims 
was baseless—and then composing such a virulent response. Poggio’s comments are 
notable because of how he qualifies his criticism. He makes clear that he still believes 
Trebizond to be a “most learned man and exceedingly eloquent” and that he wishes only 
that Trebizond had “spent his effort on a more honorable endeavor.”130 On the one hand 
129 Collectanea, 371-372. (36) “Plura refellenda restabant, viri patricii, que Guarino remittenda sunt. 
Namque ut ea rescierit, suam rem, si mihi audierit, suo, ut dicitur, marte decernet. Is enim, horum ignarus 
omnium, Trapezuntium commendare non desinit, ab quo et laudes expectare debuit, cum interim insidiosi 
more latronis Trapezuntius suum preceptorem, suum, inquam, preceptorem excipit incautum et maledictis 
insectatur.” 
 
130 The letter to Cauchus is in Poggii Epistolae, 2:125-128. Poggii Epistolae, 2:127. Trapezuntium vero 
doctissimum video hominem, et admodum eloquentem, cujus scripta mihi admodum placent. Sed mallem 
eum impendisse operam in causa magis honesta, magisque accomodata ad explicandas ingenii vires. 
Conjectura vult assequi, ut Guarinus auctor et scriptor extiterit epistolae conscribendae. At hoc neque me 
judice, neque quovis alio, qui recte Guarinum norit, unquam probabit, cum absint plurimum a scripturis 
suis; scribere tam multis verbis, tam contumeliose, tanquam in reum manifesti criminis, de quo nihil afferas 
praeter opinionem quamdam, et quidem ab aliorum opinione et sententia disjunctam, non recte consulti 
hominis esse videtur. 
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Poggio acknowledges Trebizond’s learning, one aspect of manliness, and on the other 
hand he expresses concern about Trebizond’s behavior, another aspect of manliness. 
Although he considers Trebizond’s actions unjust, he does not claim they amount to a 
loss of masculine status. The links between prudence, restraint, and manhood essentially 
force him to clarify that he does not consider Trebizond’s actions unmanly, just an 
instance of inappropriate behavior. I suspect Poggio so carefully phrased his comments 
because of how often authors expressed allegations of imprudence and the like by the 
language of failed masculinity, allegations which could be construed ipso facto as attacks 
against another’s manhood. Poggio, as an outside observer of the Trebizond-Guarino 
dispute, had no real reason in 1437 to make a stronger attack against Trebizond’s 
behavior by impugning his masculinity, a strategy he would later employ during their 
own dispute in 1453.    
Unsurprisingly Poggio articulates a much different estimation of Trebizond’s 
masculinity in his response to Trebizond’s account of the chancery fight and alleged 
assassination plot in February 1453.131 Although less explicit than Trebizond’s arguments 
against Guarino, Poggio now strongly implies that he thinks Trebizond less of a man 
because of his behavior. Protesting that he had “never done anything hostile” to 
Trebizond, that “neither orally nor in writing have I ever disparaged you,” and that he has 
“never stood in the way of your interests,” Poggio claims instead that “I thought highly of 
you as a learned man.”132 Both the denial that he had provoked his opponent and the 
131 Poggio’s February letter is discussed at length in Chapter Three. Trebizond’s response to it in March 
1453, as well as Trebizond’s letters to Poggio and Nicholas in January 1453, which were the occasions for 
Poggio’s February reply, are discussed above, pages 187-192.  
 
132 Poggii Epistolae, 3:49. Ego nihil umquam, quod jure te deberet offendere, contra te egi; non verbo, non 
litteris tibi unquam detraxi; non commodis tuis unquam obstiti, sed dilexi ut virum doctum usque ad eam 
diem, qua tu acceptam de communi pecuniam per fraudem denegasti, quae nostri discidii causa fuit. 
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counter claim regarding his high esteem for him are similar to what Trebizond had 
written about Guarino. Poggio continues to deny having provoked Trebizond by 
appealing to the hypothetical “good man”: “I never planned anything regarding you that 
ought to displease you… or any good man.” The argument casts Trebizond as 
unreasonable, but the appeal to “any good man” also implicitly portrays him as unmanly. 
A good man would not be upset by Poggio’s conduct, and by being upset, Trebizond 
proves he is not a good man. Poggio even ascribes to Trebizond the same motive 
Trebizond ascribed to Guarino, anger. According to Trebizond, the criticisms in the RLV 
had so angered Guarino that he lashed out in the Agaso letter. According to Poggio, 
Trebizond was so upset about the comments to Cauchus—comments for which Poggio 
insists he had apologized both verbally and in writing—that he fabricated the 
assassination plot.133 Poggio chastises Trebizond’s inability to forgive and argues that if 
Trebizond cannot admit he is capable of making mistakes, then “by the judgment of all 
you claim too much for yourself.” The charge of imprudent behavior, he explains, is 
sometimes leveled against even the wisest men [sapientissimi viri].134 Poggio implies 
Nunquam aliquid de te cogitavi, quod non solum tibi, quamvis iniquus sis judex, sed cuiquam bono viro 
debeat displicere: tu an idem feceris, tuae litterae satis impudenter scriptae testantur. 
 
133 Poggio’s claim that he had apologized for the Cauchus comments is a reference to the letter he 
composed in 1450. Poggii Epistolae, 3:21-24. Poggio thanked Trebizond for his aid with the Xenophon and 
Diodorus translations and assured him that he had intended no insult or dishonor in commenting on the 
Guarino feud. He still maintained that Trebizond’s treatment of Guarino had been inappropriate. For 
Poggio’s 1450 apology, see Chapter Three, pages 109-111. 
 
134 This section continues the passage in note 132. Poggii Epistolae, 3:49-50. Arguis me ob rem antiquam, 
quod olim scripserim in quadam epistola, te nominans, parum bene consulti hominis videri; idque in tuam 
contumeliam scriptum putas. Quam rem alias et verbis, et per epistolam apud te purgavi; scribens multa in 
tuam laudem, quae rectius tacuissem, credebam tibi ex mea defensione abunde satisfactum. Sed animus 
tuus, ut video, exulceratus, quoniam alia desunt, ex inanire jurgandi causam quaerens, conceptum contra 
me odium nequivit continere, ne dum in Trapezuntio, sed ne in Catone quidem fuissent ea verba 
contumeliosa. Si tantum in te consilii esse putas, ut errare nequeas, nimis tibi omnium judicio arrogas; si 
errare te posse fateris, non mireris id de te dictum, quod sapientissimis quoque viris aliquando videmus 
objici, cum dicantur ea egisse, quae non bene consulti hominis esse videantur. 
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here that wise men accept their mistakes. Since Trebizond has not done so, he is neither 
wise nor truly a man. Poggio does not characterize Trebizond in childish or beast-like 
terms, but his arguments suggest a distinction between the actions of good men and those 
of Trebizond. Compared to the Cauchus letter and alongside Poggio’s protests that he had 
hitherto always esteemed Trebizond, Poggio’s February letter strongly suggests that 
Trebizond’s less-than-manly actions had damaged his masculine status. He had lost his 
manhood.  
The connection between conduct and manhood meant not only that masculinity 
could be lost but also that it could be regained, and humanists employed this facet of their 
concept of masculinity to their advantage as well. Immoderate behavior was frequently 
described as a leaving or losing of one’s senses—as a result of furor, madness, 
perturbationes animi—and characterized as evidence of failed masculinity. On the other 
hand, regaining one’s senses—exercising reason and acting reasonably—could restore 
manhood. The idea that one’s masculine status could be regained served multiple 
purposes. First, it allowed an author to criticize his opponent as lacking reason and thus 
manhood. An individual had to lose his masculine status before it could be regained, after 
all. Secondly, that initial criticism allowed an author to express his superiority—by virtue 
of his reason and masculinity—over his opponent. Thirdly, the notion that masculinity 
could be regained allowed an author to present himself as a means of restoring an 
opponent’s senses and manhood. The regaining of masculinity is one of the clearest 
examples in these letters that humanists conceptualized masculinity as a hierarchy. Not 
only did they relegate their opponents to lower positions in this hierarchy, but they 
offered hope that they, higher in the hierarchy, could help their foes become true men.  
208 
 
 
 Trebizond argues that he can help both Guarino and Poggio regain their respective 
masculine statuses. During the feud with Guarino, he writes to Leonello that Guarino 
suffered an “excessive perturbation of the soul because we critiqued the style of his 
oration,” and was “agitated against me more than a learned man is permitted.”135 In other 
words, Guarino had lost his senses. Trebizond proceeds to ask Leonello to arrange a 
public contest to demonstrate to everyone, especially Guarino, that Trebizond was the 
more learned of the two. The contest would also help return Guarino to his senses. It 
would convince him to abandon his anger and dishonorable attacks—hiding behind the 
Agaso pseudonym, for instance—in favor of an open competition befitting learned men:  
…it was always most pleasing to those who labor at the good arts to write, to 
read, and to handle competitions and conflicts of this kind not with hatred, but 
with love, not with anger, but with affection, not with any spite, but with 
benevolence… For this reason learned men declaim; poets debate against one 
another; dialecticians, philosophers, doctors pass their days in disputation; and all 
of these men try to prove themselves more learned than others… not by abuse, 
nor by fraud, nor by deceit…136 
 
Trebizond maintains that public disputation is the proper field of battle for scholars. It is a 
perversion of mores, obstinacy and insolence, he explains, that leads some to fight with 
swords, spears, and torches instead.137 It was Guarino’s anger about RLV’s criticisms that 
135 See pages 194-195.  
 
136 Collectanea, 379. (7) Nam omnibus qui bonis artibus insudarunt iocundissimum semper fuit 
contentiones huiuscemodi ac concertationes non odio, sed amore, non ira, sed caritate, non livore aliquo, 
sed benivolentia scribere, legere, pertractare. Nec enim eos fugiebat quantum ea re sua studia excitarent. 
Hac de causa diserti declamabant; poete versus suos conferebant; dialectici, philosophi, medici dies suos in 
disputatione transigebant; cunctique re ipsa nullo convicio, nullo dolo, nulla fallacia doctiores se ceteris 
prestare conabantur adeo ut non nulli vel cum periculo in huiuscemodi certamen descendere non 
dubitaverint. 
 
137 Ibid., 379-380. (9) Itaque ut clarius omnes sopitam iam multis seculis eloquentiam tua diligentia 
excitatam intelligant, si ad regiam gloriam accedere tibi videtur non gladiis, non telis, non facibus pugnare, 
sed oratione disceptare, si multis etatibus omissum pravitate morum et ignorantia declamandi usum, ut 
debes, revocare cupis, me tibi dedo. Paratus adero quandocumque iusseris. Hortare Guarinum ad hoc tam 
preclarum munus subeundum, quod apud maiores tanti fuit ut etiam seniores iam et defuncti non nunquam 
honoribus oratores domi ad excitandum ingenium declamarent. Atque utinam tua magnificentia extinctam 
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turned him to insults instead of disputing Trebizond honestly and openly.138 At the same 
time, Trebizond notes that unlike his opponent he was not affected by any perturbationes 
but instead responded to Guarino to defend the value of the RLV and to protect both 
Greece and Vittorino from the slander of the Agaso letter.139 Trebizond’s cover letter to 
Leonello is an appeal for aid in returning Guarino to his senses. It enlists Leonello to help 
him lead Guarino from his path of irrational action to the behavior of learned, honest 
men. In that way, it is a call to restore Guarino to manhood.  
 Trebizond’s suggestion to Leonello that they could restore Guarino’s senses and 
the implication that they could restore his manhood bear the hallmarks of Quattrocento 
humanist education.140 His arguments are even more meaningful viewed through the lens 
of humanist pedagogy which argued that learned, virtuous men could lead youths to 
rational and moderate behavior, and thus to manhood. The notion that masculinity can be 
regained offers him further means of denigrating Guarino. He does so by using the 
methods of inculcating virtue—praise, blame, the modeling of appropriate behavior—that 
humanist educators such as Vergerio and Piccolomini advocated. His censures of 
eloquentiam suscitasse mores hominum, qui huic rei impedimento sunt, correxisse per Guarinum atque 
Georgium in posterum predicetur! Crede mihi, princeps illustris, nemo est qui non regiam hanc et te 
dignam laudem existimet. Quam ut facilias per Guarinum et Georgium consequi possis ceterique imitari 
rectius queant, omittamus convicia que hanc rem tam utilem funditus evertunt. Contumacia enim hominum 
ac insolentia effecit magis quam ignorantia ut rem agendam contemnant et ad iniuriandum rapiantur. 
 
138 Ibid., 380. (10) Cur ergo rem suam non agit? Cur de generibus dicendi non disserit? Cur scribendo non 
efficit ut posse videatur, quod eum posse negavimus? Ad convicia conversus est, qui mos declamandi usum 
destruxit. 
 
139 Ibid., 379. (6) Nam que modo ei respondimus, non odio aut ira aut quavis alia perturbatione affecti 
respondimus, sed partim propter utilitatem communem, nequis Rhetoricorum nostrorum libros, quos 
posteritati et humanitatis studiis consulentes edidimus, verbis eius deceptus negligat; partim pietate, tum in 
patrem, tum in patriam, quoniam et Greciam vituperare et a Victorino in se nos traducere callidus homo 
ausus est. 
 
140 I discuss the humanist educational model in the introduction, pages 162-164, including the belief that 
instructors could lead their charges into manhood by inculcating virtue. The instructor-student paradigm 
also played an important role in arguments about learning and knowledge. See pages 181-185. 
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Guarino’s perturbationes animi and so-called childish behavior are an example of 
wielding blame to improve conduct. Trebizond also casts himself as a model of virtuous 
behavior. His appeals to Leonello to help him coerce Guarino into a public declamation, 
the appropriate means of conflict resolution for scholars, can be viewed as attempts to 
present himself as a positive role model for Guarino. He was suggesting that with 
Leonello’s help he could correct Guarino’s behavior and teach him to act like a man. 
Trebizond was striking the pose of an instructor guiding a student’s behavior. It is 
doubtful that his attempts were sincere, but the educational model and the contingency of 
masculinity provided convenient means to attack Guarino’s honor. 
 Trebizond articulates a similar desire to return Poggio to his senses and help him 
regain his manhood during their feud. His March 1453 letter to Poggio illustrates this 
well. The letter responds to Poggio’s accusation of the previous month that Trebizond 
fabricated the assassination plot and wrote to Nicholas V about it to tarnish Poggio’s 
reputation.141 Trebizond denies this and argues that he wrote to Nicholas partly out of 
self-defense and partly out of concern for Poggio himself. Here he cites Poggio’s 
“childish affair” with Lorenzo Valla, whose life Poggio had threatened.142 Although 
Trebizond argues that he had counseled Poggio to exercise restraint, he adds that it was 
only Nicholas’s intervention that had stopped Poggio from violence. Poggio’s anger 
toward Valla, Trebizond explains, had compelled him to write to Nicholas about the 
assassination plot: “I brought this complaint to the pope to free your mind from plots and 
free myself from danger.” When he received Poggio’s February letter, he explains, he 
141 Poggii Epistolae, 3:50-51. Non intelligebam, neque enim expresseras in litteris ad me tuis, quae causa te 
ad me lacerandum impulisset… Nam quid opus fuit, nisi ad malivolentiam et infamiam adversus me 
excitandam, falsam et ridiculam querelam ad Pontificem deferri?  
 
142 See page 191. 
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knew “that you had been commanded by the pope to completely cast aside from your 
mind thoughts of this kind [violence]… that he had turned you to writing.”143 Trebizond 
uses the Valla affair to cast Poggio as childish and himself as rational and manly. The 
story bears another suggestion as well, though. First during the Valla affair and then 
during their own conflict, Trebizond claims he had tried to guide Poggio to proper 
behavior, in effect to return him to his senses. The implication is that Poggio’s behavior 
could be corrected, he could regain his senses, and his actions would cease to be childish. 
Trebizond situates all three men in a hierarchy. Poggio is the child whose perturbationes 
animi compel his actions, and Trebizond and Nicholas are the men who can “free his 
mind from plots” and teach him how to act like a man.  
Trebizond’s account of the Poggio-Valla feud also offers another indication of the 
humanist anxiety regarding masculinity. As Trebizond tells it, once Poggio had 
abandoned his plans for violence and written to Valla—as Trebizond had counseled—
Trebizond praised him for changing his mind. Poggio, again according to Trebizond, 
“replied with indignation… ‘Why do you think to admonish me as if I were a child?’” 
Poggio may not have actually said this, of course. It may simply be Trebizond’s 
rhetorical attempt to make his opponent seem foolish and childish, since he frames the 
response as an overreaction. That humanists could resent insinuations of childishness is 
certainly plausible, however, as this chapter has shown. At the same time, there are 
143 Walser, 512-513. Alia de causa detuli nisi ut iussu eius resipiscas. An credis forsan immemorem me esse 
adeo ut non meminerim quando in re puerili vere in multis a Valla fuisses reprensus: ita te exarsisse ut 
vitam eius extinguere constitueris? Particeps ego tum ut amicus eram consiliorum tuorum et hortabar, ut 
nihil curares, quoniam magnitudo animi in negligendo non in ulciscendo perspicitur, vel si ulcisci velles 
scriptis id ageres. Equum esset si scriptis lesit ut scriptis ledatur; ferro cum illo esse agendum non calamo 
exclamabas. Deinde cum ad scribendum versus esses, laudabam te quod consilium mutasses. ‘Quid tu ita 
me credis quasi puerum moneri,’ cum indignitatione respondisti. Iste papa, ex quo vita mea pendet, mihi 
iussit nequaquam tale facere audeam. Hac ergo de causa querelam ad pontificem detuli, ut et tuum ab 
insidiis animum et me a periculo liberarem. 
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numerous indications that appropriate scholarly behavior required accepting fair criticism 
from one’s peers. Trebizond held this standard against Guarino when defending the 
criticisms in the RLV in March 1437. Likewise, Poggio offered Trebizond’s assassination 
plot allegation as evidence that he was unjustly angered about the Cauchus comments. 
Here Trebizond describes his advice as good counsel and evidence that he had tried to 
lead Poggio to the path of good conduct. In that context, Poggio’s alleged anger at 
Trebizond’s so-called admonishment stands as further evidence of his unmanly behavior. 
The comment leaves a strong impression at the end of Trebizond’s story. Even after 
Nicholas’s intervention, when Poggio had in theory returned to his senses, he was still 
childishly defensive toward Trebizond’s praise. That impression fits well in Trebizond’s 
argument that he feared Poggio’s irrational behavior because of the prior feud with Valla. 
 The Agaso and Poggio letters add further evidence of how humanists understood 
the loss and restoration of masculinity. Their arguments against Trebizond are 
substantively similar to, but also stylistically different from, his. They tend to lack 
explicit references to masculinity—Agaso is more explicit than Poggio, but less than 
Trebizond—but still rely upon the same attendant concepts. Agaso, for instance, 
repeatedly casts himself and Guarino’s patrician students in the role of rational, moderate 
men in contrast to Trebizond, the arrogant, shameless Greekling.144 The contrast 
criticizes Trebizond’s failed masculinity and insinuates that he had lost all or part of his 
masculine status. Like Trebizond’s account of the Poggio-Valla feud, at times Agaso 
offers advice to Trebizond to recant his lies, apologize for them, and retract what he had 
written in a short letter. He notes that it is never too late to choose the path to good 
mores. The advice is Agaso’s attempt to improve Trebizond’s behavior, which he 
144 See for instance the discussion of Trebizond “slandering” Guarino, pages 192-193.  
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elsewhere characterizes as typical of arrogant Greeklings, children, and beasts.145 This is 
his effort to cast himself, as Trebizond does, as an aid to restoring another’s senses, and 
helping another regain his manhood. Agaso frequently admonishes Trebizond’s bad 
behavior, but his admonitions are framed by an expressed interest—genuine or not—in 
improving his conduct. To that end, Agaso discusses “repairing [Trebizond’s] mores,” 
and leading him to the proper gratitude he owes to Guarino. That change, Agaso adds, 
would gain him glory and praise.146 Agaso’s letter, like Trebizond’s, thus incorporates 
the instructor-student paradigm into arguments about masculine conduct. This is the case 
as well when Agaso exhorts his reader to “encourage Guarino…to put down this 
Trebizond’s obstinacy and chasten the student with an instructor’s authority.”147 As 
severe as Agaso’s assessment of Trebizond is, it includes a sense that Trebizond’s 
childish and beast-like behaviors can be overcome and, by extension, that he can regain 
his manhood through proper conduct.   
Poggio too appropriates the role of humanist educator and claims to teach his 
opponent modesty, prudence, and the markers of manly restraint. His chosen method of 
instruction is to offer his own behavior as worthy of imitation. This is not to say that he 
145 See note 108. 
 
146 Collectanea, 371. (33) “Homine enim imperito et inepto nunquam quicquam iniustius est, qui nisi quod 
ipse fecit nil rectum putat. Quod si tanta Trapezuntium cura solicitat ut inepta coaptare, turbata disponere, 
male posita struere conetur, queso ut discordem totamque sub arma coactam componat Italiam. Que si 
maiora viribus abnuat, hominem rogate, viri patricii, ut portus vestri latiorem reddat alveum et ituris 
rediturisque navibus utiliora concinnet hostia. Quod si rursum maius humeris opus respuet, suos concinnet 
mores et obliquam linguam dirrigat et ingratum sese preceptori discipulum gratum observantemque formet 
ac reficiat, que sibi decus laudemque parient.” 
 
147 Ibid., 372. (38) Habes peregrinationis mee redditam tibi rationem, non autem repertorium, ut confidebas 
et ego sperabam, librorum. Non desinam tamen interea tabernas quasque librarias odorari ut et tue faciam 
satis cupiditati et mee pro tuis mandatis diligentie testimonium reddam. Tu vero Guarinum pro tua in eum 
fide et consuetudine hortare, immo urge, incende, anima ut huius Trapezuntii contumaciam confutet et 
discipulum preceptoris auctoritate castiget ne pro innata sibi modestia, qua velut asinos solet conviciatores 
parvi facere, tam honoris et fame negligens, huic ipsi Greculo maledicentiam, temeritatem, contumaciam 
sinat increscere quod studiorum non mediocre dedecus avertendum est. 
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does not explicitly criticize his opponent, because he does. He is far less likely, though, to 
call Trebizond childish or beast-like, and his arguments seem more moderate as a result. 
They are, however, no less an effort to challenge Trebizond’s masculinity and to suggest 
that Poggio can guide him to a state of true manhood. His modeling tactic is first evident 
when in 1437 he laments Trebizond’s contempt of Guarino and argues that the better path 
is the one he followed in his own dispute with Guarino: offend your opponent as little as 
possible and respond more moderately than the one who offended you. After all, he 
explains, our cases are rendered less commendable when made with insults and abuse.148 
Poggio is more explicit in response to the assassination plot. Having rejected the plot as 
absurd, he claims that he follows the ancients in believing that offenses ought to be 
forgiven rather than avenged. He argues that if Trebizond had simply imitated his own 
moderate behavior, he would have saved them both from having to deal with the 
annoyance of the assassination charge.149 In both examples, Poggio offers his own 
148 Poggii Epistolae, 2:127-128. Quod autem is me suis verbis honorat, esset mihi gratius, si non vergeret in 
contemptum Guarini, cujus honori a me semper consultum fuit, et praesertim in nostra controversia, qua ei 
respondi, cum is me paulum lacessisset, quod Scipionem suo praetulerim Caesari. Egi tamen ita meam 
defensionem, ut eum minime offenderem, nisi ubi causa id necessario postularet. Hoc certe recte videor 
posse dicere, me parcius quam acceperim, nonnulla retulisse. Ubi enim ratione pugnandum est et 
argumentis, sunt omnino rejiciendae voces contumeliis et jurgiis refertae, quae et auditoribus sunt ingratae, 
et causam nostram minime reddunt probabiliorem. See also pages 204-206. 
 
149 This is part of Poggio’s argument that he had heard a rumor that Trebizond had both requested and 
procured from Alfonso of Aragon Poggio’s property in Naples. See Chapter Three, pages 128-129. Poggio 
contends that even in light of the rumor he exercised restraint in his treatment of Trebizond. Poggii 
Epistolae, 3:51-52. An vero ita me stultum putas, ita imprudentem, ut nescio quibus vanis hominibus, qui te 
inani ostentione terrerent, meam famam et existimationem, ut de animae salute omittam, committere 
voluisse? Absit a me talis cogitatio, nedum opus. Est moris mei, tum reliquis in rebus, tum in hoc sequi 
praecepta sapientum, quae jubent oblivione potius, injurias esse, quam manu aut viribus ulciscendas. 
Persuade tibi quod libet: futurum tempus te ostendet male sensisse, et incertam suspitionem pro certo 
maleficio accepisse. Tuum est credere ut voles; ego mea conscientia contentus ero: si tamen modestiam a 
me praestitam, in qua me laudo, fuisses imitatus, et te, et me inani labore et molestia liberasses. Nam cum 
ad me, dum essem nuper Florentiae, a pluribus scriptum esset, te possessiones meas a rege inclito 
Aragonum dono postulasse, atque impetrasse, non sum tecum eam injuriam questus, neque quicquam ad te 
scripsi contumeliosum, existimans famam, quae ferebatur, non esse veram, et id factum a prudentia tanti 
principis alienum.     
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behavior as worthy of imitation, a posture he adopts throughout the letter. His protest at 
the outset that he will “reply in a few words, and somewhat more moderately than you” is 
an implicit invitation for Trebizond to moderate his speech and act with dignity.150 The 
letter as a whole can be taken as Poggio’s attempt to act out the ideal he voiced in the 
letter to Cauchus, that one should return less to one’s opponent than one first received. 
Given that dictum, it is unsurprising that Poggio casts his response as reasoned and 
moderate. Beyond that, Poggio’s tone suggests that he, like Trebizond and Agaso, wants 
to present himself as a guide to virtuous behavior and thus to true manhood.   
The second half of this analysis has examined how humanists incorporated 
imagery depicting failed masculinity into attacks against an opponent’s conduct. 
Trebizond, Agaso, and Poggio each linked concepts of restraint and moral rectitude to 
manhood, and by contrast, a lack of restraint and immoral behaviors to failed masculinity. 
They expressed the latter through references to children, women, beasts, and monsters, 
each of which was conceived in opposition to men whose actions were reasoned and 
moderate. These authors also understood manhood to be fluid rather than a static state, a 
view that made possible creative uses of the instructor-student paradigm as a vehicle for 
insults. At the same time, their letters also reveal an anxiety about being cast as a failed 
man, for instance as a child whose behavior needed correction.   
Trebizond later denies Poggio’s tale, arguing that the lie was another of Poggio’s plots against 
him. Walser, 513-514. Deinde paulo post te laudas, quod mecum non fueris questus, cum tibi nuper 
Florentie moram trahenti complures amici scripsissent, me possessiones tuas a rege inclyto dono postulasse 
atque impetrasse… Nam cur saltem non explorasti si quicquam hic tale dictum est, nec veritus es dicere ab 
inclyto rege, me postulasse; an pertimuisti pondus testimonii eius? immo nec cogitasti quidem. Cur quia 
cupiditas perpetrandi facinoris te exagitat quia exarsisti iussus non facere. Quid quod fateri videris ad 
terrendum me insidias te struxisse? 
 
150 Poggii Epistolae, 3:49. Recepi tuas litteras, ultraquam mores tuos et doctrinam deceat, contumeliosas 
nimium ac petulantes: ignosco naturae tuae et animi perturbationi, in qua ex tuis verbis intelligo te versari. 
Sed ne videar tacendo, vel assentiri, vel contemnere quae scribis, et ut me purgem in eo, quo me inique et 
falso accusas, respondebo paucis, et paulo modestius quam tu, ne in quo es reprehendendus te videar 
imitari. 
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Conclusion 
  
An examination of Trebizond’s feuds with Guarino and Poggio reveals the rich, 
varied language and categories related to masculinity that these figures had at their 
disposal. Their letters indicate how they understood manhood and folded a language of 
masculinity into their contests. They used categories of masculinity in oppositional ways 
to praise their own learning and conduct and to attack that of their opponent. In doing so, 
they challenged the masculine status of their opponents. These challenges—depending on 
the author and the argument at stake—could range from mild censures of individual 
instances of inappropriate—childish or beast-like—behavior, to stronger accusations that 
essentially verbally emasculated an opponent, annihilating or effacing his masculine 
identity and replacing it with something else. Agaso used his concept of manhood to 
amplify his depiction of Trebizond as a Cretan beast and as an ungrateful student by 
casting his treatment of Guarino as childish. Trebizond used accusations of failed 
masculinity to criticize Guarino’s rhetorical style as childish and unlearned, and to 
describe Poggio as having an emotional, violent, and childish nature. Lastly, this chapter 
has argued that the humanist language of masculinity presumed a hierarchy that 
distinguished the true man from the failed man. The man was defined by his use of 
reason, measured both by his learnedness and by the rational control of his emotions. 
Beneath him were the various iterations of the failed man—the child, the woman, the 
beast. In some ways, these categories stood on equal footing. They were all defined 
primarily by their contrast with true manhood. In certain cases, though, humanists made
distinctions between them. Those who violated cultural norms more frequently were seen 
as less manly and more childish, beast-like, or womanish than those who erred less often, 
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acknowledged their mistakes, and repented. Given this hierarchy, the concept of 
masculinity allowed an author to proclaim his superiority over another by virtue of his 
reason. In the end, masculinity represents another example of the verbal strategies 
available to humanists to self-present and contest honor.   
The previous three chapters have given ample attention to Trebizond’s feuds with 
Guarino and Poggio and assessed their shared verbal strategies, acts of self-presentation, 
and modes of expression. The next and final chapter expands the examination of 
humanist contests to consider the larger community of scholars of which Trebizond was a 
part. My analysis shifts from a study of Trebizond to one of Guarino, Poggio, and their 
feuds with other scholars. In considering two new feuds, the focus of the investigation 
will be not on the themes that each author relied upon, although those will be discussed, 
but on the vehicle for their acts of self-presentation: invective as a literary genre.
Copyright  Karl R. Alexander 2013 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
HUMANIST INVECTIVE  
AND SELF-PRESENTATION 
 
Introduction 
 
 Quattrocento humanists contested honor through written acts of self-presentation 
that allowed them to fashion desirable identities for the purpose of professional 
advancement and individual glory. George of Trebizond’s feuds with Guarino of Verona 
and Poggio Bracciolini demonstrate how acts of self-presentation had concrete 
consequences for scholars and how humanists used a variety of shared categories and a 
common language of honor —involving concepts of restraint and manhood, for 
example—in their disputes. The preceding chapters have examined this language of 
honor both to assess how and why humanists engaged in disputes as they did and to 
develop a richer and more accurate understanding of humanist social practices. The 
letters of Trebizond and his opponents, however, are also examples of invective, a literary 
genre that was often the favorite vehicle for humanist self-presentation. The present 
chapter illustrates how Trebizond’s experiences with self-presentation and invective were 
typical of Quattrocento humanism. To discuss such typicality and humanist culture more 
generally, the chapter will step back from a deep reading of Trebizond’s feuds to consider 
two other examples of how invective functioned as a tool for the rhetorical presentation 
of self. The first involves Guarino’s invective against Niccolò Niccoli in Florence in 
1413, and the second Poggio’s first of four invectives written against Lorenzo Valla 
between 1452 and 1453 in Rome. These contests are of value to a study of Trebizond 
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because they show his opponents engaging in similar means of self-presentation and 
expressing the same kind of anxiety regarding audience, reputation, and honor as he did. 
The analysis here argues three main points. The first is that invective was one of 
the primary modes of expression available to humanists for the rhetorical presentation of 
self and that scholars understood invective to have discernible limits. The second is that 
the guidelines for humanist invective were indebted to the classical Latin oratorical 
tradition and then adapted to contemporary contests of honor. The third is that an 
understanding of humanist invective as a literary genre with classical antecedents 
demonstrates a clear need to reevaluate how existing scholarship regards fifteenth-
century invective and those who wrote it.  
The Latin rhetorical tradition had developed clear guidelines for verbal and 
literary abuse. Classical theorists situated invective in demonstrative oratory as a part of 
the rhetoric of praise [laus] and blame [vituperatio] and used it to argue court cases. The 
purpose, “rather than supplying logical proofs,” was to add “pathos [emotion] to logos 
[reason] and turn the audience against the orator’s opponent and toward his own cause.”1 
1 Valentina Arena, “Roman Oratorical Invective,” in A Companion to Roman Rhetoric, ed. William J. 
Dominik and Jon Hall (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2007), 149-151. The scholarship on classical invective is 
substantial. The same cannot be said for the scholarship on Renaissance invective, the limitations of which 
I discuss below, pages 225-230. For useful monographs addressing classical invective see Amy Richlin, 
The Garden of Priapus: Sexuality and Aggression in Roman Humor (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1992), 96-104; Anthony Corbeill, Controlling Laughter: Political Humor in the Late Roman Republic 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996); Brian A. Krostenko, Cicero, Catullus, and the Language 
of Social Performance (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001); Catherine Steel, Roman Oratory, 
Greece and Rome. New Surveys in the Classics 36 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press for the 
Classical Association, 2006). For useful articles, see Corbeill, “Ciceronian Invective,” in Brill’s Companion 
to Cicero: Oratory and Rhetoric, ed. James M. May (Boston: Brill, 2002), 197-217 and Corbeill, 
“Rhetorical Education and Social Reproduction in the Republic and Early Empire,” in A Companion to 
Roman Rhetoric, ed. Dominik and Hall, 69-82; C.P. Craig, “Audience Expectations, Invective, and Proof,” 
in Cicero the Advocate, ed. J.G.F. Powell and Jeremy Paterson (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2004): 187-213 and Craig, “Self-Restraint, Invective, and Credibility in Cicero’s ‘First Catilinarian 
Oration,’” The American Journal of Philology 128, no.3 (Autumn, 2007): 335-339. See also Anna A. 
Novokhatko, The Invectives of Sallust and Cicero: Critical Edition with Introduction, Translation, and 
Commentary (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2009). Novokhatko’s first three chapters discuss the 
invectives, their context, and their manuscript tradition. 
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As Antonius remarks in Cicero’s De oratore, “nothing in oratory…is more important 
than to win for the orator the favour of his hearer, and to have the latter so affected as to 
be swayed by something resembling a mental impulse or emotion, rather than by 
judgment or deliberation.”2 Orators accomplished this by ad hominem attacks and used 
ethical preconceptions to accuse opponents of unacceptable behavior.3 The strategies 
they used were laid out in Cicero’s De inventione and the Rhetorica ad Herennium. 
“Praise and censure,” the De inventione explains, “will be derived from the topics that are 
employed with respect to the attributes of persons…these may be divided into mind 
[animus], body [corpus] and external circumstances [res externa].” The Ad Herennium 
expands on this division and details the kinds of considerations the orator must make. 
The orator must “consider his [opponent’s] virtues and defects of character… [and ask] 
‘Has he been rich or poor? What kinds of power has he wielded? …With what loyalty, 
goodwill, and sense of duty has he conducted his friendships?’”4 Personal attacks were 
2 Cic., De or. 2.178. This and subsequent translations are Sutton’s. Cicero, De oratore, trans. E.W. Sutton 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1959). Antonius goes on to explain how an orator can “excite 
in the minds of the…audience…love, hate, wrath, jealousy, compassion, hope, joy, fear or vexation…” 
Cic., De or. 2.205-211. See also the discussion of the very important role that humor played in winning 
favor for an orator. Cic., De or. 2.236. I provide a more specific sketch of the classical consideration of the 
rules and limits of humor below, pages 267-268. 
 
3 Corbeill, Controlling Laughter, 17-20; Novokhatko, 12-15. 
 
4 I discuss these categories in greater detail below, pages 248-249. See Cic., Inv. rhet. 1.34-36 and 2.177-
178; Rhet. Her. 3.10-15. The translations from De inventione, unless otherwise noted, are Hubbell’s. 
Cicero, De inventione, trans. H.M. Hubbell (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1949). The 
translations from the Rhetorica ad Herennium are Caplan’s. Rhetorica ad Herennium, ed. Harry Caplan 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964). For the rhetoric of praise and blame in Quintilian see 
Quint., Inst. 3.7, especially sections 19-22. On the important place of the De inventione and Rhetorica ad 
Herennium—the latter commonly attributed to Cicero in the fifteenth century—in early modern education 
see Paul Grendler, Schooling in Renaissance Italy: Literacy and Learning, 1300-1600 (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1989), 212-213. For an overview of their role in Quattrocento invective see 
Ennio I. Rao, Curmudgeons in High Dudgeon: 101 Years of Invectives (1352-1453) (Messina: EDAS, 
2007), 13. Martin Davies explains that humanists also relied on the De oratore, Cicero’s speeches—
particularly In Pisonem—and the exchanges with Sallust attributed to Cicero. M.C. Davies, “An Emperor 
without Clothes? Niccolò Niccoli under Attack,” in Maistor: Classical, Byzantine, and Renaissance Studies 
for Robert Browning (Canberra: Australian Association for Byzantine Studies, 1984), 274.  
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crucial since “there can be little foundation for a motive for a crime unless such suspicion 
is cast on the character of the accused that it will seem not to be inconsistent with such a 
fault…Therefore the prosecutor ought to discredit the life of the accused.” If unable to 
demonstrate that the accused has the character to perpetrate a particular crime, Cicero 
suggests the orator should “show that other vices are not foreign to his nature, and that it 
is no wonder if one who in that other affair acted basely, passionately and wantonly 
should have transgressed in this case also. For everything that detracts from the 
defendant’s honour and repute, lessens in so far his chance for a complete defense.”5  
Roman forensic models appealed to humanists because reputation was critical to 
their careers. Humanists viewed their peers and patrons as Roman advocates viewed their 
juries, used ad hominem attacks, and engaged in the public acts of censuring and 
denigrating another based on societal ethical preconceptions to sway their audience. Their 
insults were carefully constructed arguments they assumed would be made public via an 
active third party who would read and spread them to new people and places. Invective 
was often composed as a letter to a friend, enemy, or interested third party, a medium that 
reflected the general humanist use of letter-writing as a means of self-presentation. By the 
early Quattrocento, letter-writing had become the main “means by which 
scholars…disseminated their ideas and made their case in scholarly controversy.”6 
Petrarch was an early figure in this development. After the discovery of Cicero’s letters 
to Atticus and Quintus in 1345 he composed his own Familiares. Guarino taught Cicero’s 
5 Cic., Inv. rhet. 2.32-33.  
 
6 Surpassing the oration, according to Cecil H. Clough, “The Cult of Antiquity: Letters and Letter 
Collections,” in Cultural Aspects of the Italian Renaissance: Essays in Honour of Paul Oskar Kristeller, 
ed. Cecil H. Clough (New York: A.F. Zambelli, 1976), 33. 
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Epistolae ad familiares, discovered in 1345, in Verona in April 1419.7 Humanists also 
took an interest in the publication of their letters, a venture that “was beginning to serve 
as a sign that one was a serious scholar.” Leonardo Bruni edited his own letters, recalling 
them from his correspondents to do so, and arranged them into an eight book collection in 
1440. Poggio arranged his own collection as well, as did Francesco Filelfo. Guarino did 
not, but approximately one thousand of his letters survive nonetheless, an indication of 
their value among his contemporaries.8 Each of these activities were typical of a period 
“when humanists labored to compose their letters in Ciceronian Latin; when these letters 
were transcribed for dispatch in humanistic script; when a letter writer himself edited his 
letters into a collection of the classical models.” Their letters were “written and 
dispatched by means of messengers” and composed “not only for their correspondents 
but with a view to the publication of some, at least, of their correspondence during their 
lifetime.” As a form of self-presentation the writing, collection, and publication of letters 
was aimed at “the preservation only of that which was meritorious” about an author.9 
7 Ibid., 36; Elizabeth May McCahill, “Finding a Job as a Humanist: The Epistolary Collection of Lapo da 
Castiglionchio the Younger,” Renaissance Quarterly 57, no.4 (Winter 2004): 1309-1310. On the use of 
Cicero’s letters in the early modern classroom see Grendler, 222-229 and Robert Black, Humanism and 
Education in Medieval and Renaissance Italy: Tradition and Innovation in Latin Schools from the Twelfth 
to the Fifteenth Century (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 352-355. On Guarino’s school see 
William H. Woodward, Studies in Education during the Age of the Renaissance, 1400-1600 (New York: 
Russell & Russell, 1965), 40 and 42-43. 
 
8 Letters, especially Bruni’s, were valued as models for students to follow in their studies. Clough, 37-39; 
McCahill, 1309; Davies, 287. The advent of printing aided the circulation of these collections. Clough 
reports that Filelfo’s self-edited letter collection appeared in print around 1472 in Venice, and was reprinted 
eighteen times before 1501. Bruni’s collection was reprinted five times during the same period, while 
Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini’s—the future Pope Pius II—collections were reprinted twenty times. Clough, 
41-42. Guarino did not collect and edit his letters. Leonello d’Este, however, did pay to have some of 
Guarino’s letters bound in 1437. Ian Thomson, “Studies in the Life, Scholarship, and Educational 
Achievement of Guarino da Verona (1374-1460)” (PhD diss., University of St. Andrews, 1969), 301, 
http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2965. 
 
9 Clough, 34-35. On the script Clough describes, invented by Poggio and Niccoli, see B.L. Ullman, The 
Origins and Development of Humanistic Script (Rome, 1960). 
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As a means to cultivating one’s reputation, letter-writing was naturally suited to 
invective.10 Humanists exercised great care in crafting, revising, and disseminating their 
invectives and making sure they were public knowledge, as they did with all their letters. 
Petrarch, for example, adapted the letter model to the writing of invective and took the 
enterprise seriously. David Marsh comments that Petrarch “evidently viewed them [his 
invectives] as important, since he took the trouble to revise and publish them.” Ennio 
Rao, author of an important recent overview of fifteenth-century invective, adds that 
Petrarch “showed towards the texts of his invectives the same care that he showed 
towards his other writings. His invectives were always considered an integral part of his 
literary output and were copied and bound with manuscripts of his works.”11 The figures 
examined in the present chapter also composed their invectives as letters. Guarino wrote 
against Niccoli first in a letter to Blasio Guasconi before revising his piece for a wider 
distribution. We have also seen multiple examples in the preceding examinations of 
Trebizond’s feuds indicating the public nature of invectives, how they circulated hand-to-
hand, among friends and patrons, and passed from city to city, and how they were 
commonly composed as letters. Trebizond issued his Responsio to Guarino in the spring 
of 1437, for example, and later that fall Poggio had not only received both the Agaso 
10 On the value of printed letter collections to humanists, Clough comments “scholars are often known for 
their sharpness rather than for their humility and kindness…the second half of the fifteenth century 
witnessed excessive acrimony and vituperation…frustrated and bitter scholars criticized one another as 
rivals. Scholars were quick to appreciate the value of the press as a means of bringing their work and 
criticisms to notice.” Clough, 46.  
 
11 David Marsh, introduction to Francesco Petrarca: Invectives, ed. and trans. David Marsh (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), viii; Rao, Curmudgeons, 17. For Petrarch’s care with his letter 
collections see the articles by Aldo S. Bernardo, “Letter-Splitting in Petrarch’s Familiares,” Speculum 33, 
no.2 (April 1958): 236-241 and “The Selection of Letters in Petrarch’s Familiares,” Speculum 35, no.2 
(April 1960): 280-288. John M. Najemy includes a brief discussion of Petrarch’s letters in his Between 
Friends: Discourses of Power and Desire in the Machiavelli-Vettori Letters of 1513-1515 (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1993), 25-30. See also McCahill, 1309. 
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letter and Trebizond’s response but had written to a friend about the dispute.12 As a 
vehicle for self-presentation, invective was a crucial part of the construction of the 
humanist persona and flourished because it was a tool that could influence public 
perception. Moreover, the consequences of humanist insults were often far more prosaic 
than the often-mentioned pursuit of glory. Invective that successfully persuaded its 
audience could lose a person his job or force him to relocate, as in the case of Trebizond 
after his fight with Poggio in the curia. 
To support the first two arguments, the chapter is structured around three topoi 
common to humanist invective that reflect the fifteenth-century debt to classical models. 
The goal is to examine how and why Guarino, Poggio, and ultimately Trebizond wrote as 
they did and to understand the rules associated with invective as its purveyors understood 
them. The idea that invective has rules at all may at first seem difficult to believe given 
how aggressive and insulting the texts themselves often are. Reading past that aggression 
explains how humanists articulated a sense of when and how it was appropriate to attack 
another. The first trope examined is the concept of provocation. Humanist invective is 
littered with claims that an author had been provoked into defending himself. The second 
trope involves the use of a set of standard categories—divided according to classical 
12 On invectives as letters see Rao, Curmudgeons, 24. When Trebizond wrote to Guarino in response to 
Andreas Agaso’s letter, he sent a copy with a cover letter to Leonello d’Este. His invective against Guarino 
was also a letter. As Monfasani notes, the manuscripts of the Agaso letter and Trebizond’s response were 
frequently bound together, providing an indication on how they were circulated and read. Collectanea 
Trapezuntiana: Texts, Documents, and Bibliographies of George of Trebizond, ed. Monfasani 
(Binghamton, NY: Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 1984), 364. See also Chapter Two, note 2. 
Likewise, Trebizond and Poggio exchanged letters with one another. As to the public nature of humanist 
disputes, when Trebizond wrote in March 1453 to Poggio, he criticized Poggio’s behavior towards Lorenzo 
Valla, indicating his knowledge of the very public Poggio-Valla dispute. On the Poggio-Valla dispute and 
on its status as a cause célèbre in and beyond Rome, see Chapter Three, pages 135-136. The Scipio-Caesar 
controversy between Poggio and Guarino in 1435 was another public dispute carried out and later discussed 
via letter. For Trebizond’s criticism of Guarino treatment of Poggio during that conflict, see Chapter Four, 
pages 172-173. Poggio used the Scipio-Caesar conflict as an example of his moderation when commenting 
on the Trebizond-Guarino conflict in 1437. See Chapter Three, pages 108-109.   
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models into insults of animus, corpus, and res externa—from which humanists drew. 
Many of these pertained to an opponent’s moral behavior—including accusations of 
pretentiousness, arrogance, avarice, abuse of family and friends, and sexual 
misconduct—and learning.13 The third trope involves wit and mockery as forms of 
humor. The purpose in examining these topoi is not to reduce invective to a list of 
mechanical tropes or humanist contests to mere formal rhetorical exercises. These tropes 
were crucial to wielding invective successfully and negotiating honor. 
The third argument of the present chapter, underlying the examination of the topoi 
just outlined, is that it is necessary to reconsider how fifteenth-century invective and its 
authors are characterized in existing accounts of humanist conflicts. I argue there is an 
analytical problem in Renaissance studies, a tendency towards moralizing and 
condemnatory views of humanist invective that has created distorted and sometimes 
undeservedly negative portraits of individual humanist scholars. This tendency is evident 
in classic nineteenth-century works that struggled to reconcile the idea of erudite 
humanist scholars writing scurrilous, vitriolic compositions. William Shepherd, whose 
Life of Poggio Bracciolini (1802) is still the major English language biography of the 
humanist, viewed invective and its practitioners in a decidedly negative manner. He 
characterized the invectives exchanged between Poggio and Francesco Filelfo in the 
1430s as “exhausting every topic of obloquy,” an “odious mass of…allegations,” 
13 The use of these categories by classical writers has been amply studied, as in the works listed in note 1. 
Renaissance studies rarely explore them in a detailed manner, as in Davies, 272; Marsh, xi-xvi. Diana 
Robin addresses some of these categories in her consideration of sexual misconduct and avarice in the 
invectives against Francesco Filelfo. See her “A Reassessment of the Character of Francesco Filelfo (1398-
1481),” Renaissance Quarterly 36, no.2 (Summer 1983): 204-214. The most substantial treatments of these 
categories in humanist invective are in Rao, Curmudgeons, 99-120 and David Rutherford, introduction to 
Early Renaissance Invective and The Controversies of Antonio da Rho (Tempe: Arizona Center for 
Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 2005), 1-40. Rutherford’s introduction is particularly useful 
but his analysis of the tropes he identifies in the texts he examines is limited. 
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“virulent and foul abuse,” and as acrimony that “defeated its own purpose.”14 Shepherd 
expressed disappointment at Poggio’s participation in such exchanges: “[Poggio] 
unfortunately indulged, to the latest period of his life, that bitterness of resentment, and 
that intemperance of language, which disgraced his strictures on Francesco Filelfo.”15 
John Addington Symonds also lamented the Poggio-Filelfo invectives in his Renaissance 
in Italy (1897):  
Raking that literary dunghill, it is now impossible to distinguish the true from the 
false; all proportion is lost in the mass of overcharged and indiscriminate 
scurrility. That such encounters should have been enjoyed and applauded by 
polite society is one of the strangest signs of the times; and that the duelists 
themselves should have imagined they were treading in the steps of Cicero and 
Demosthenes is even more astounding.16  
 
He made similar remarks about the later Poggio-Valla dispute, describing it as a 
“disgraceful fray” and Poggio’s orations as “disgusting compositions.” He added that 
“there is no sort of vituperation which the antagonists do not vomit forth against each 
other, no obscenity and roguery of which they are not mutually accused.”17  
 Surprisingly, some modern studies continue to draw moralistic conclusions as 
they too seek to make sense of the aggressive and sometimes savage tone of humanist 
invective.18 Marsh speaks to this trend, writing, “the violent language of [Petrarch’s] 
14 William Shepherd, The Life of Poggio Bracciolini, 2nd ed. (Liverpool: Harris, 1837), 252. 
 
15 Ibid., 439. On Shepherd’s disappointment with humanist invective and polemicists see David Rundle, 
“Un amico del Roscoe: William Shepherd and the First Modern Life of Poggio Bracciolini (1802),” in 
Roscoe and Italy: The Reception of Italian Renaissance History and Culture in the Eighteenth and 
Nineteenth Centuries, ed. Stella Fletcher (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2012), 192-193. 
 
16 John Addington Symonds, Renaissance in Italy, vol. 2, The Revival of Learning (London: Smith, Elder, 
1897), 173-174.  
 
17 Ibid., 174-175. 
 
18 I do not mean to suggest that modern authors read nineteenth-century accounts such as Shepherd’s and 
Symond’s uncritically. Even so, both works were important in their own right and are cited in modern 
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invectives will shock readers who are more familiar with Petrarca as the sweet celebrant 
of his love for Laura.” Marsh’s remark indicates that even today some readers are 
“shocked” by the violent language of invective.19 Rao’s Curmudgeons in High Dudgeon 
(2007) is indicative of this and frequently condemnatory of humanist polemicists.20 In 
labeling the subjects of his study “curmudgeons,” Rao provides a glimpse into his views 
about humanist polemicists. One of his key arguments is that invective became 
increasingly severe as the Quattrocento progressed, a development he attributes to the 
characters of particular humanist authors. He describes Leonardo Bruni as a “prickly” 
figure with an “irritable nature” and credits him as an early “transitional figure in the 
development of the genre from a sober, restrained accusatory or defensive oration to a 
merciless, vicious catalogue of crimes” featuring the use of “unsolicited, unjustifiable 
objurgations.”21 Rao likewise attributes the quarrels of Filelfo to “Filelfo’s character and 
that of his antagonists. He was a man of uncommon arrogance… [and] it was inevitable 
that he should find in [Niccolò] Niccoli, given the latter’s prickly disposition and 
patronizing attitude, his chief adversary.”22 Not unlike Shepherd and Symonds, Rao is 
critical of the Poggio-Valla feud and struggles to reconcile the “seriousness” of humanist 
scholarship with Poggio’s attacks. Rao remarks that Poggio was “resentful of anyone 
else’s good fortune” and “actively connived to discredit any potential competitor. The 
studies. Shepherd is the first source Ennio Rao, discussed below, cites when offering his own short 
biography of Poggio. Rao, Curmudgeons, 53.    
 
19 Marsh, xi. Marsh’s own surprise—if not shock—is evident shortly thereafter when he notes Petrarch’s 
preference for “abusive epithets to denigrate his opponents. Quite strikingly, Petrarca employs far more 
abusive language than the Latin models he cites as precedents.”  
 
20 Rao’s overview of fifteenth-century invective is an important, recent contribution to growing field of 
Renaissance invective scholarship which I discuss below, pages 229-230. 
 
21 Rao, Curmudgeons, 10 and 39-41. 
 
22 Ibid., 60-61.  
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more brilliant his would-be competitors…the more ruthless his methods.”23 Of Poggio’s 
fifth invective against Valla, Rao comments “One would expect Poggio to…treat some 
equally serious subject. Instead…he resorted once against to base ad hominem insults.” 
Rao’s condemnation of polemics is evident in his characterization of the mid-
Quattrocento. The Poggio-Valla contest represented for him the “high water mark of the 
humanist invective” after which “the first generation of humanists gave way to a second, 
more refined and better suited for sober debates on sophisticated questions.” “The cruel 
age of dagger and poison,” Rao concludes “was yielding to a milder one (though still 
cruel by our modern standards).”24 In Rao we find an example of a modern reader who, 
like nineteenth-century accounts, condemns the “base ad hominem” insults of humanist 
invective and favors conduct he describes as more sober, restrained, and serious. 
Although some recent accounts including Rao’s remain focused on the question 
of character, others have begun to situate humanist conflicts in their professional context. 
Of particular note are recent studies of the Roman curia and the anxiety humanists 
experienced in competing for highly coveted, lucrative positions in the papal service. In 
The Lost Italian Renaissance (2004), Christopher Celenza writes of humanist contests 
that “we cannot properly understand these seemingly exaggerated, immensely vitriolic 
Renaissance polemics between cultivated individuals…unless we situate the debates 
where they belong: in the social, political context of the acquisition, protection, and 
23 Ibid., 54. See also Benjamin Kohl’s brief comments. He describes how criticism of Poggio’s Latin style 
led him to “fume” and try to have Valla assassinated, “but the quarrel soon settled down to a series of 
bloodless, though savage, invectives on correct Latin style.” Kohl describes Poggio as “not popular with 
many of his contemporaries” and as “arrogant, mocking, quarrelsome, quick to criticize, quicker to retort 
and refute with a fine, ironic wit.” Benjamin G. Kohl, introduction to Poggio Bracciolini, On Avarice, trans. 
Kohl and Elizabeth B. Welles, in The Earthly Republic: Italian Humanists on Government and Society, ed. 
Kohl and Ronald G. Witt (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1978), 237.   
 
24 Rao, Curmudgeons, 95-97.  
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maintenance of masculine honor.” Likewise, commenting on the Poggio-Valla dispute, 
Stephen Greenblatt writes: “the extravagance and bitterness of the charges—in the course 
of a quarrel over Latin style…discloses something rotten in the inner lives of these 
impressively learned individuals…These intellectuals were committed to pleasing their 
masters, on whose patronage they utterly depended, but they were cynical and 
unhappy.”25 Celenza and Greenblatt both read humanist contests as an outgrowth of the 
competitive nature of professional life. In their analyses, humanist disputes are not a 
reflection of an individual’s nature, but instead, humanist anxiety and anger are functions 
of the demands imposed on scholars by the realities of professional life.  
 Following recent scholarship on humanist anxiety, I propose to shift the focus of 
invective studies from a consideration of humanist character to a consideration of 
humanist context. This shift positions the present chapter to make two primary 
contributions to the growing field of invective studies. First, although modern readers are 
certainly reading invective more critically than their predecessors, Rao’s work 
demonstrates that there is still a tendency to draw moralizing conclusions. Second, 
Renaissance scholarship has not thoroughly or adequately examined humanist invective 
as a literary form.26 This is partly because the sources themselves have remained largely 
25 Christopher S. Celenza, The Lost Italian Renaissance: Humanists, Historians, and Latin’s Legacy 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), 130; Stephen Greenblatt, The Swerve: How the World 
Became Modern (New York: W.W. Norton, 2011), 146. Rao’s Curmudgeons offers a surprising treatment 
of professional context. In his introduction, Rao writes: “The invective’s peak in popularity and artistic 
quality coincides exactly with the struggle of humanists to win acceptance and respect for their movement 
and for their personally held ideas.” Rao, Curmudgeons, 7. Although Rao gestures towards the demands of 
scholarly life, his analysis of particular invectives routinely characterizes disputes as a function of 
individual character, losing sight of his initial and promising framework situating invective in its socio-
economic context. 
 
26 Martin Davies argues that although “the invective was a favorite form of the fifteenth-century 
humanists…The spadework for a full treatment of Renaissance invective remains to be done.” He intends 
his article to “cover a small part of the ground” associated with invective. Davies, 270. In his work on 
Facio’s invectives in the 1970’s, Ennio Rao wrote of his intention to produce a monograph on humanist 
230 
 
                                                 
 
unavailable—unedited, untranslated, or in manuscript form—before the middle of the 
twentieth century. Scholars since the 1970s have begun to remedy this and there have 
been some important recent editions of particular texts, but analyses of these texts or of 
the genre as a whole have been few. Martin Davies’s article on the invectives against 
Niccolò Niccoli is an important exception, as are David Rutherford’s introduction to the 
invectives of Antonio da Rho, Marsh’s introduction to Petrarch’s invectives, and Rao’s 
Curmudgeons.27 These works have identified some of the important tropes that gave 
humanist invective substance and structure and represent growth in a field of study that, 
although lagging behind the robust and comparative wealth of studies of classical 
invective, has begun to recognize and advocate for the value of invective as historical 
evidence.28 Although scholars are addressing the structure and content of invective more 
directly than in the past, the field can benefit from additional analyses that not only 
identify classical tropes but examine them at work in humanist contests.  
Guarino’s invective against Niccoli and Poggio’s against Valla offer an 
opportunity to reframe the conversation about invective as one not of humanist morality 
but of humanist literary activity, and thereby to assess invective on its own terms. This 
invective, which he published in 2007. In the roughly thirty years between the two works, no other such 
analysis had appeared. Bartolomeo Facio, Invective in Laurentium Vallam, ed. Ennio I. Rao (Naples: 
Società Editrice Napoletana, 1978), 9. In the introduction to Curmudgeons, Rao echoes Davies in noting 
that “despite the invective’s popularity, the remarkably frequent use which the humanists made of it, and 
the high regard which they held their compositions in the genre, before the 1950’s the invectives were little 
known and rarely read, as with a few exceptions they were available only in manuscript form or in rare 
sixteenth-century editions.” Rao, Curmudgeons, 7. 
 
27 For an account of the major editions of Renaissance invective see Rao, Curmudgeons, 7-10. For Marsh 
see note 11. For Rutherford see note 13.   
 
28 See also W. Scott Blanchard’s review of Early Renaissance Invective and the Controversies of Antonio 
da Rho, by David Rutherford, Renaissance Quarterly 59, no.4 (Winter 2006): 1167-1169. Blanchard writes 
about the great value of humanist invective to literary and social historians and notes his surprise that it has 
garnered so little attention. He credits Rutherford with providing “the groundwork for a more 
comprehensive investigation” and describes invective as an “understudied genre.” Blanchard, 1168-1169.  
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analytical shift can help us reconsider our understanding of humanists whose use of 
invective has resulted in their being cast as bitter, angry, and morose. It has been a 
recurring argument in previous chapters that Trebizond’s character requires reassessment 
because his attacks on others have been viewed as signs of his personality.29 Trebizond is 
not the only figure for whom this moralizing analytical tendency is an issue, as the 
assessments of Poggio above attest. In addition, Diana Robin has argued that Francesco 
Filelfo’s character ought to be reassessed insofar as our historical understanding of him 
has been unduly influenced by the invectives of his rivals.30 A focus on the literary genre 
Guarino and Poggio used to make their accusations, including the rules and limits of 
invective, can help us reassess traditionally distorted humanist portraits. To be clear, I do 
not contend that individual humanists were not angry or bitter or that assessments of them 
as such are necessarily incorrect. Instead, I argue that attention ought to be paid to why 
they may have been so, rather than reducing their actions to a simple problem of 
character. Humanists were living under a set of circumstances that compelled them to use 
language in particular ways to meet professional needs. To further contextualize and 
normalize the language of Guarino and Poggio, and to incorporate some of the newly 
available translations of humanist invective, I will also occasionally draw parallels in my 
notes between the invectives of Guarino and Poggio and those of Petrarch, Antonio da 
Rho, and Trebizond. I will not provide in-depth analyses of these texts here—I have dealt 
with the Trebizond material in previous chapters—but will refer to them to better 
29 Monfasani addresses the problem of Trebizond’s reputation. John Monfasani, George of Trebizond: A 
Biography and a Study of his Rhetoric and Logic (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1976), 75 and 104. 
 
30 Robin explains that all scholarship on Filelfo has relied on the invectives written against him by his 
enemies. The result has been an unbalanced assessment of Filelfo’s character. Robin, “Reassessment,” 211-
214. See also her monograph, Filelfo in Milan: Writings 1451-1477 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1991). 
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illustrate how humanists used shared literary strategies when they used invective as a 
vehicle for self-presentation. Guarino, Poggio, and Trebizond were hardly unique in how 
they crafted their depictions of themselves, a point made clearer by the addition of the 
voices of Petrarch and Rho. Ultimately, we should be less surprised—or “shocked,” 
following Marsh—by the language of these erudite, fifteenth-century men. Instead, 
through continued analysis of newly available sources, we should come to understand 
that being an erudite man in the competitive environment of early fifteenth-century Italy 
required the use of strategies that deemed the denigration of an opponent’s honor a key 
part of audience persuasion.  
Guarino’s In auripellem poetam (1413/1414)  
 
To begin, I offer a brief overview of each of the two feuds under consideration, 
the details of which are discussed in my analysis below, to establish time, place, and the 
individuals involved in each dispute. Guarino wrote his invective against Niccolò Niccoli 
(1364-1437) in Florence in 1413. Niccoli was a preeminent Florentine intellectual who 
had dedicated his career to classical antiquities. He was so dedicated that he exhausted 
his personal wealth and afterward relied on his Medici supporters to finance his 
pursuits.31 He is perhaps most famous for his friendship with Poggio and their joint 
ventures, which Niccoli frequently funded, to recover lost works of classical writers.32 
31 Mark Jurdjevic, “Civic Humanism and the Rise of the Medici,” Renaissance Quarterly 52, no.4 (Winter 
1999): 1009-1012.  
 
32 For Niccoli’s friendship with Poggio, see Two Renaissance Book Hunters: The Letters of Poggius 
Bracciolini to Nicolaus de Niccolis, trans. Phyllis Walter Goodhart Gordan (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1974). See also the recent discussion in Greenblatt, 126-134. Poggio wrote excitedly to 
Niccoli about his discoveries, including Quintilian’s Institutio oratoria and Lucretius’ De rerum natura. On 
the latter, see Greenblatt, 180-181, 203-204. Niccoli transcribed a copy of the Lucretius for himself that 
served as the basis for “dozens” of further copies. 
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Niccoli had a reputation for collecting other items as well—art work, goblets, glassware, 
cameos, and the like—and contemporary accounts describe his home as a museum.33 His 
judgment in scholarly matters was highly valued by many, for which reason he enjoyed a 
position of authority in Florence. In 1410, he invited Guarino to come to the city to 
teach.34 Guarino was to be the virtual successor to his old instructor Manuel Chrysoloras, 
who had inaugurated Greek studies in Italy at the end of the fourteenth century. Niccoli 
controlled the funds for Guarino’s position and made similar invitations to Giovanni 
Aurispa in 1424 and Francesco Filelfo in 1429.35 Guarino began teaching in Florence in 
March 1410. For Guarino, who became one of the foremost schoolmen of the fifteenth 
century, it was his first foray into education.  
The relationship between Guarino and Niccoli had soured by 1413 when Guarino 
was unable to accept an offer for the university chair of Greek studies at the Florentine 
Studio because of Niccoli’s opposition.36 We can only rely on Guarino’s accusations—
33 Greenblatt and Alison Brown both discuss how Poggio’s copy of Lucretius almost became a piece in 
Niccoli’s collection. He held the copy for twelve years. Greenblatt, 208-209; Alison Brown, “Lucretius and 
the Epicureans in the Social and Political Context of Renaissance Florence,” I Tatti Studies in the Italian 
Renaissance 9 (2001): 11-12. Poggio expressed his discontent in a letter to Niccoli in December 1429. 
Poggio Bracciolini, Lettere, ed. H. Harth, vol. 1 (Florence: L.S. Olschki, 1984), 89. 
 
34 For an overview of the Guarino-Niccoli feud see Rao, Curmudgeons, 29-31. 
 
35 Trebizond taught briefly in Florence as well. Monfasani reports that when Trebizond was in Venice in 
1433 he so impressed Ambrogio Traversari that Traversari recommended him to Niccoli for the chair of 
Greek studies in Florence. The chair was currently held by Filelfo, but Traversari wrote that he considered 
Trebizond the superior scholar. Monfasani, George of Trebizond, 24. It should be noted that Traversari was 
also one of Filelfo’s main detractors, which may have influenced his glowing recommendation. See Robin, 
“Reassessment,” 203-204. Monfasani adds that Trebizond taught in Florence during the period 1440-1442. 
He may have taught between the years 1438-1439 as well, though Monfasani is skeptical of the evidence 
for that period discovered by Park. See Collectanea, 856 and K. Park, “The Readers of the Florentine 
Studio According to Communal Fiscal Records (1357-1380; 1413-1446),” Rinascimento 20 (1980): 296. 
 
36 The feud is discussed in Remigio Sabbadini, Vita di Guarino Veronese (Genoa: Instituto Sordo-Mutti, 
1891), 19-21. Martin Davies, note 4, drew new attention to it and others have followed him. See Marianne 
Pade, The Reception of Plutarch’s Lives in Fifteenth-Century Italy, vol. 1 (Copenhagen: Museum 
Tusculanum Press, 2007), 167-169 and Anthony Grafton, Commerce with the Classics: Ancient Books and 
Renaissance Readers (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997), 39-40. 
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that Niccoli was jealous of a fellow student and blamed Guarino for not expelling the 
other man and that Niccoli was angry that Guarino would not loan him books—to 
account for Niccoli’s campaign against Guarino.37 The loss of the position indicates the 
socio-economic consequences of humanist quarrels. Guarino left Florence in the summer 
of 1414—Davies speculates this may have been because Niccoli was appointed as one of 
the annual officials of the Florentine Studio that May—and travelled to Venice with 
Francesco Barbaro. Guarino’s troubles with Niccoli inspired him to pen a letter addressed 
to his friend Biagio Guasconi expressing his complaints in either 1413 or 1414.38 Guarino 
later expanded and revised the piece for a wider audience, reflecting his concern in 
crafting his public image, and titled it In auripellem poetam.39 The title offers a sense of 
Guarino’s criticisms. Auripellis, as Rao notes, is gold-leaf, “an alloy made of copper, 
zinc, and tin leaf used to give base substances the appearance of gold.” The title can thus 
be read as Against the Fake Poet.40  
Guarino’s invective is a clear sign of humanist anxiety regarding reputation and of 
the pressures of scholarly life in Florence. Letters such as his are filled with complaints 
about the damage rumor and insult could do to one’s reputation. Looking back in 1423 on 
his time in Florence Guarino lamented how “there was no day in Florence when I wasn’t 
tormented by insults, arguments, and petty quarrels.” He added that there was “such 
37 Guarino’s accusations are discussed in detail below, pages 255-256 and 261-263. 
 
38 Davies, 271-273. Davies writes that although “the date of the redactions is not ascertainable with 
certainty,” evidence in both versions points to them both having been written sometime in the period 1413-
1414. For Guasconi see Dale Kent, The Rise of the Medici: Faction in Florence, 1426-1434 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1978), 319-321.   
 
39 Unless otherwise noted, my analysis is of the revised version. I cite letter as IAP and provide the line 
numbers according to Sabbadini’s edition. The IAP is ep. 17 in Epistolario di Guarino Veronese, ed. 
Remigio Sabbadini, vol. 1, Testo (Venice: A spese della società, 1915), 33-46.  
 
40 Rao, Curmudgeons, 32. 
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wicked madness, such avarice for glory…that in order to get it people have no regard for 
the reputations of others.” Describing the animosity among those in Florence, Guarino 
described how “rather than friendships, there are political alliances” between people. 
Guarino was not alone in his complaints. Giovanni Aurispa (1376-1459), who taught in 
Florence for one year, 1425-1426, echoed Guarino’s sentiments in 1426: “here feuding 
and intriguing go on everywhere; I can find no peace of mind at all. The whole place is 
full of hostility and petty jealousies: here all the literati, all the elite are engaged in 
backbiting, and there is paranoia everywhere.”41 For Guarino, invective offered a means 
to address his anxiety, appeal to his peers, and exercise a measure of control over his 
conflict with Niccoli. 
Poggio’s Invectiva in L. Vallam Prima (February 1452) 
 
No account of humanist invective can be complete without Poggio, one of the 
most accomplished polemicists of the early Quattrocento. He made observations about 
the professional environment in the Roman curia similar to those Guarino and Aurispa 
made about Florence. Poggio’s Facetiae, a collection of anecdotes and jokes told in the 
curia, describes how “at the Roman Court, good Fortune generally prevails, and there is 
but seldom room for talent or honesty; everything is obtained through intrigue or luck, 
not to mention money.”42 It was in the curia that Poggio waged his famous campaign 
41 The translations of both letters are Robin’s. Robin, “Reassessment,” 217-218. For Guarino’s letter, see 
ep. 245 in Epistolario, ed. Sabbadini, 382-384. Guarino and Niccoli had long since reconciled by 1423. 
Guarino writes that Niccoli was trying to draw him back to Florence. For Aurispa’s letter, see Carteggio di 
Giovanni Aurispa, ed Remigio Sabbadini (Rome: Tipografia del Senato, 1931), 41. For Aurispa’s 
appointment in Florence see Paul Grendler, The Universities of the Italian Renaissance (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2002), 209.  
 
42 Poggio Bracciolini, The Facetiae or Jocose Tales of Poggio, 2 vols. (Paris: Isidore Liseux, 1879), 1:49-
50. In Curia Romana ut plurimum Fortuna dominatur, cum perraro locus sit vel ingenio, vel virtuti; sed 
ambitione et opportunitate parantur omnia, ut de nummis sileam, qui ubique terrarum imperare videntur. 
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against Lorenzo Valla (1407-1457). His first invective against Valla was the initial volley 
in a feud that lasted from early 1452 through the first half of 1453.43 The cause of the 
conflict was Poggio’s discovery that Francesco Rosi—a Catalan pupil of Valla’s—had 
criticized Poggio’s style, claiming that it included barbarisms. Poggio blamed Valla for 
the affront and responded with his first oratio in February 1452, defending himself and 
attacking Valla’s Elegantiae. Valla replied with the first three “books” of his Antidotum 
against Poggio, addressed to Nicholas V, between May and June 1452.44 Six months 
later, Poggio had written three more orations while Valla was trying to keep pace, 
working first on his Apologus against Poggio and then a second Antidotum. Poggio 
released a fifth oration before Valla could publish his second Antidotum.45 Their quarrel 
began in the curia but spread after Poggio left Rome to become chancellor in Florence in 
1453. The dispute was public knowledge and divided humanists into camps supporting 
The theme is repeated in 1:57-58. For secondary sources on humanist anxiety in the Roman curia, see 
Celenza, Lost, 123-133; Celenza, Renaissance Humanism and the Papal Curia: Lapo da Castiglionchio the 
Younger’s De curiae commodis (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999); Greenblatt, 135-154. 
 
43 For Poggio’s first invective against Valla, hereafter cited as Oratio I, see Poggio Bracciolini, Opera 
Omnia, ed. T. Tonelli, 4 vols. (Basel, 1538; rpt. Turin, 1964-1969), 1:188-205. In the secondary literature, 
the standard account is Salvatore Camporeale, Lorenzo Valla: Umanessimo e Teologia (Florence: 1972). 
For Camporeale’s analysis from Poggio’s perspective, see “Poggio Bracciolini versus Lorenzo Valla: The 
Orationes in Laurentium Vallam,” in Perspectives on Early Modern and Modern Intellectual History, ed. 
Joseph Marino and Melinda W. Schlitt (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press), 27-49. See also 
Rao, Curmudgeons, 87-98. For older accounts and particularly for their discussion of invective see 
Shepherd, 443-452 and Symonds, 174-177. 
 
44 Poggio’s feuds with Trebizond and Valla therefore occurred concurrently. In the first Antidotum, Valla 
claims Trebizond punched Poggio and mocks Poggio for it. Likewise, in his March 1453 letter to Poggio, 
Trebizond criticized Poggio for his “childish” dispute with Valla. For further discussion see Chapter Three, 
pages 135-139 and Chapter Four, page 191. The overlapping conflicts may help explain why Poggio 
appeared relatively restrained in his treatment of Trebizond after the curia fight. Trebizond’s letters were 
understandably passionate given his ipso facto exile to Naples but Poggio issued only a short response in 
February 1453. In the battle for public opinion, Trebizond’s wielding of the sword against Poggio probably 
damaged his reputation enough that Poggio thought he did not have to engage in a protracted literary battle, 
especially since he was already in one with Valla. 
 
45 For Poggio’s orationes, the “books”—I use Camporeale’s description of the compositions—of Valla’s 
Antidotum, and Valla’s Apologus see Camporeale, “Poggio,” 29.  
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each man. The Poggio-Valla invectives have historically been recognized as some of the 
most virulent of the Quattrocento.46  
The feud with Valla was far from Poggio’s first foray into invective. Unlike 
Guarino, who largely avoided conflicts and so cultivated a reputation as relatively 
restrained, Poggio frequently engaged in literary duels, including one with Guarino 
himself.47 The so-called Scipio-Caesar controversy in 1435 about the merits of the 
respective generals attracted attention in Florence and Ferrara. The controversy was mild 
by Poggio’s standards.48 Far more virulent were Poggio’s four invectives against Filelfo 
begun in 1433 in Florence.49 Their dispute was an extension of the political struggle 
between the Medici and the oligarchic republicans led by the Albizzi.50 When Filelfo 
wrote against Cosimo de’ Medici he incurred the man’s wrath, for which he was left 
scarred by a knife attack and forced into exile, both of which indicate the possible 
consequences of humanist literary activity.51 He also brought upon himself the anger of 
46 See the descriptions of the dispute by Symonds and Rao above, pages 226-228. 
 
47 If Guarino wrote as Agaso against Trebizond, that feud can be added to his list of quarrels. Cf. Chapter 
Two, pages 30-31.  
 
48 I discuss the controversy in Chapter Three, note 24. Poggio referred to the dispute when he censured 
Trebizond’s invective against Guarino in response to the Agaso letter. Poggio held himself as a model of 
virtuous, moderate behavior claiming he had treated Guarino with respect during their dispute. Poggii 
Epistolae, ed. T. Tonelli, 3 vols. (Florence, 1832-1861), 2:125-128.   
 
49 The first three are printed in Poggio, Opera, 1:164-187. The fourth is in Ernst Walser, Poggius 
Florentinus: Leben und Werke (Leipzig: Teubner, 1914), 461-472.  
 
50 For the relationship between Florentine politics and the Studio see Grendler, Universities, 21; Robin, 
“Reassessment,” 202-204; Kent, 234-235. 
 
51 The knife attack occurred in May 1433 when, as Grendler relates, “a person hired by an associate of 
Cosimo’s attacked Filelfo with a knife in an attempt to drive him from the city.” Grendler, Universities, 
213. For a discussion of Filelfo’s various accounts of the incident see Robin, Milan, 17-21. While in exile, 
Filelfo composed his treatise On the Disadvantages of Exile. Francesco Filelfo, On Exile, ed. Jeroen de 
Keyser and trans. W. Scott Blanchard (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013).    
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the Florentine elite who supported Cosimo, including Poggio.52 Poggio still bore ill-will 
against Filelfo after relocating to the curia, as is evident in Poggio’s reporting more than 
one story mocking Filelfo in his Facetiae.53 One story tells how a demon visited Filelfo 
in his dreams and offered him a magic ring which, if Filelfo kept it on, would assure his 
spouse’s fidelity.54 Filelfo awoke with his finger in his wife’s vagina. “That ring is indeed 
a first rate preservative for jealous husbands,” joked Poggio, “and secures them against 
their wives being unchaste without their knowledge.” The tale cast Filelfo as a foolish 
cuckold, a common early modern form of slander.55 Elsewhere, Poggio targeted Filelfo’s 
family with a story about how his father “wore silk in the morning.” Not content to let the 
joke go unexplained, Poggio clarified that this meant Filelfo was the bastard son of a 
52 Symonds, in another example of nineteenth-century disgust with invective, refused to report any of the 
particular insults of the Poggio-Filelfo conflict. He described only how the combatants “heaped upon each 
other all the insults it is possible for the most corrupt imagination to conceive,” how Poggio “poured a 
torrent of the filthiest calumnies upon Filelfo’s wife and mother,” and how “All the resources of the Latin 
language were exhausted by the combatants in their endeavours to befoul each other’s character.” 
Symonds, 171-174. 
 
53 The Facetiae are discussed here as a way of establishing Poggio’s reputation as a polemicist. Beyond 
that, Trebizond implicitly mentioned the Facetiae in his letter to his son Andreas from Naples when 
discussing the supposedly-forged letter plots. In that letter, he claimed Poggio was a poor Latinist who had 
written nothing but invective and some “shameful stories.” Collectanea, 123.  
Poggio was not alone composing these kinds of tales. The other major work of this kind in the 
early Quattrocento was The Hermaphrodite of Antonio Beccadelli, commonly known as Panormita, 
discussed below, note 129. He and Poggio defended their compositions as a form of mental relaxation. Holt 
Parker, introduction to The Hermaphrodite, by Antonio Beccadelli, ed. and trans. Holt Parker (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), xxii. Antonio da Rho’s invective against Panormita, edited by 
Rutherford, is highly critical of The Hermaphrodite. See note 13. 
 
54 Unless otherwise noted, I rely on the English of the anonymous translator. Bracciolini, Facetiae, 2:20-21. 
Franciscus Philelphus, zelotypus uxoris, summa cura torquebatur, ne cum altero rem haberet, semper dies 
ac noctes ad ejus custodiam intentus. Huic dormienti, per somnium…visus est Daemon quidam uxoris 
securitatem polliceri, si quae admoneret, vellet facere…“Cape hunc,” ille inquit, “annulum diligenter in 
digito serva. Nam dum in eo gestaveris hunc, nunquam uxor, te inscio, cum alio concumbet.” Prae gaudio 
excitatus a somno, sensit se digitum habere in uxoris cunno. Optimum quidem ejus annuli zelotypis 
remedium, ne uxores, ignorantibus viris, possint esse incontinentes. 
 
55 For similar examples see Ibid., 1:19-21, 1:134-135, and 2:154-155. On cuckoldry and late medieval and 
early modern masculinity see Derek G. Neal, The Masculine Self in Late Medieval England (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2008), 73-74.   
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priest, since morning is when “officiating priests are generally clothed with silk.”56 The 
very next story criticized Filelfo’s sexual misconduct, specifically his “kidnapping” of his 
wife, the daughter of his Greek instructor John Chrysoloras, and his “having taken with 
him to Greece, on account of his handsome form, a certain young man of Padua.”57 These 
were common accusations against Filelfo, whose opponents ably wielded classical tropes 
of sexual misconduct to denigrate him.58  
Poggio was, as his public affair with Filelfo demonstrates, a practiced polemicist 
by 1452 and his quarrel with Valla. To understand the function of his polemics, however, 
and not simply to view them as an expression of the author’s character or his subject’s 
behavior, I turn now to the shared tropes humanists used. First is an examination of an 
oft-repeated claim in fifteenth-century invective, the provocation defense.  
Provocation and Reluctance: A Defense of Invective 
  
Humanist invectives often began with the author’s protest that, although 
reluctant to do so, he had been provoked into writing against an antagonist. The 
provocation-reluctance defense was no stale topos but the foundation of humanist attacks 
56 Bracciolini, Facetiae, 2:104-105. Cum in palatio Apostolico, in coetu Secretariorum, cui et multi viri 
doctissimi (ut solet) aderant, sermo de impura inquinataque vita scelestissimi hominis, Francisci Philelphi, 
ortus esset, multique multa in eum scelera conjecissent, quaesivit quispiam, an Philelphus genere nobilis 
esset. Tum unus contribulis ejus, optimus vir et admodum facetus, vultu ad gravitatem composito: 
“Apprime,” inquit, “maxima is fulget nobilitate, nam pater ejus semper mane vestes sericas induebat,” 
denotas eum sacerdotis filium. Vestimenta enim, quibus presbyteri in sacris utuntur, ut plurimum serica 
existunt. 
 
57 Ibid., 2:105-106. Tum alter non injucundus vir: “Non mirum est,” inquit, “si, nepos Jovis, gesta parentum 
imitatus, et alteram Europam rapuit, et alterum Ganymedem,” denotans eum et virginem Graecam, Joannis 
Chrysolorae filiam, ab eo stupratam in Italiam advexisse, et quemdam adolescentem Patavinum ab eo 
propter formam in Graeciam advectum.  
 
58 Traversari and Poggio both criticized Filelfo’s affair with Chrysoloras’s wife, the mother of his bride-to-
be. In his fourth Invective, Poggio writes that Filelfo “abominably betrayed his own host, John Chrysoloras. 
After all, first he seduced Chrysoloras’s wife, and then in violation of all decency he corrupted 
Chrysoloras’s daughter, a virgin—whom he afterwards married.” The translation is Robin’s. Robin, 
“Reassessment,” 213. 
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and an illustration of how invective had discernible rules.59 Writers could not afford to be 
viewed as unjust. In order to use language that their peers might otherwise judge too 
abusive, they had to demonstrate that their opponents had violated accepted ethical 
norms. Invective was surely a weapon, but the battle was not “carried on without ground 
rules.” Nor was the aim “to overcome the enemy by any means.”60 Humanists who issued 
insults without demonstrating sufficient cause exposed themselves to ridicule, as 
Poggio’s letter to Christopher Cauchus in 1437 illustrates. Poggio chastised Trebizond’s 
behavior as imprudent precisely because he thought Trebizond had written too harshly 
against Guarino and had done so without proof.61  
Humanist declarations of reluctance and provocation had classical antecedents. 
Cicero’s trial speeches often included claims of reluctance, followed by an apologia in 
which he detailed the social obligations—such as the friendship of his clients—that 
compelled him to speak. The technique required establishing an obligation sufficient to 
overcome the advocate’s initial reluctance to speak against another.62 For humanists, that 
obligation derived from an opponent’s provocation and the writer’s concern for his own 
reputation. For both the classical and early modern orator, the goal was to contrast an 
opponent’s arrogance with one’s own modesty. The De oratore addressed arrogance 
59 Davies, 272n. Davies argues that Guarino’s stated reluctance “to attack his one-time benefactor” was an 
“obligatory topos, based on ancient practice, and not in evidence after the opening statement.” While 
certainly a classical topos, this phrasing underplays the significance of the provocation defense, which rests 
at the base of all subsequent attacks.  
 
60 Rao, like Davies, identifies expressed reluctance as a trope. Rao, Curmudgeons, 20-21 and 25. 
 
61 Poggii Epistolae, 2:127-128. Poggio argues that “when something ought to be fought with 
reason…voices bursting with insults and abuses, which to those listening are unpleasant…render our case 
less commendable.” 
 
62 Sarah Culpepper Stroup identifies this as a “rhetorical technique of which Cicero is most fond.” She 
examines his arguments in the Pro Caelio. Stroup, Catullus, Cicero, and a Society of Patrons: The 
Generation of the Text (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 173-177. Cic., Cael. 2.5-6. 
Socrates’s Apology, though not an invective, is an example of the rhetorical claim of reluctance. 
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when discussing the damage to an orator’s case if he attacked without care. The treatise 
noted how the public “dislikes mockery of the wretched, except perhaps if these bear 
themselves arrogantly” and added as well that “there is a rule excluding remarks made in 
bad taste.”63 Humanists justified invective by casting opponents as arrogant provocateurs 
and themselves as reluctant and therefore modest defenders of their reputation and honor.  
 Guarino begins his In auripellem poetam (hereafter, IAP) with a provocation 
defense that establishes the two main personae of his invective, his enemy an arrogant, 
immoral slanderer and himself a long-suffering, reluctant victim.64 His argument 
contrasts themes of reasoned restraint and an emotional lack of control.65  He writes to 
Guasconi that he “often wished to report to you the behavior of this boisterous 
[animosus] man” but had not yet because “I was indeed always eager to honor, observe, 
and venerate him.” Times had changed, however, and he could no longer remain silent 
because his patience [patientia] with Niccoli had only allowed a “more unbridled 
impudence in slander” to emerge. Worse, his silence had led others to believe Niccoli’s 
claims that Guarino had harmed him. Guarino demonstrates concern about his reputation 
because of Niccoli’s slander and laments “absolutely nothing in human affairs will you 
find more deceitful than reputation [fama].” It is because of Niccoli’s abuse that Guarino 
begs [oro] Guasconi, and entreats [obsecro] his humanitas, to listen to his story. 
63 Cic., De or. 2.237-239. 
 
64 The strategies of Guarino and Poggio were not unique, as I argue above, pages 230-232. Claims of 
provocation and reluctance are evident also in Petrarch, Invectives against a Physician, in Francesco 
Petrarca: Invectives, ed.  Marsh, 1.1. “The struggle between us is not fair, I confess. There are places 
where you may strike me, but none where I may strike you back…you force me into a contest that I would 
never have entered willingly, and I must therefore speak. …If I remained silent in my contempt for your 
affairs—as occurs to me at times—you might take pleasure in my silence. So I shall reply to several 
charges, asking the reader’s forgiveness, but not yours, if I say anything that runs counter to my nature.” 
All translations of Petrarch are Marsh’s.  I refer to the section numbers Marsh provides. 
 
65 These themes are explored in Chapter Three and relative to a discussion of masculinity in Chapter Four. 
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Guarino’s invective is a direct appeal to those who would read the letter, whose verdict 
regarding the dispute would determine how the reputations of both men would fare. 
Niccoli, Guarino explains, provokes [provoco] him with shameful letters, which justifies 
the writing of an invective: “Truly, just as I consider it petulant and arrogant to insult and 
revile, so I consider responding and ‘returning insult for insult to be civil and lawful.’”66  
The main components of Guarino’s provocation defense—patience, silence, and a 
concern for his own reputation—are also evident in Poggio’s attacks against Valla. Like 
Guarino, Poggio justifies his invective by painting his adversary as an arrogant slanderer. 
He first remarks on the danger that abuse holds for the reputation of the abused: “It ought 
to be the duty of a prudent man to drive off injury, to repel abuse, in which the glory of 
66 IAP, 1-34. Volui saepenumero animosi mores hominis ad te perscribere…Ceterum veritus ne, quae 
toleratu pergravia erant, auditu quoque fastidiosa fierent, destiti; quippe cum ob conceptas de illo virtutes 
eum adeo colere observare venerarique semper studuerim, ut indignum censuerim eius acerbissimam et 
sibimet intolerandam consuetudinem ferre non posse, ne parum constans et vere puerilis nostra diceretur 
amicitia; sed profecto nihil humanis in rebus fallacius fama reperies. Verum cum hoc in dies malum 
crescat, diutius agere silentium nequeo, praesertim cum ipsum cernam ex patientia mea effrenatiorem 
maledicendi petulantiam comparasse et tacente me suspiciari aliquos intelligam ipsum a me insigni quadam 
lacessitum iniuria, conscientiae obiectantes quod venerationis existebat. Audias igitur oro non omnia, sed 
pauca de multis, quoniam apud peritissimas aures tuas haud prolixioribus agi convenit, qui nostrum 
utrunque pernosti. Qua quidem in re si quid tuas forsan aures offenderit, humanitatem tuam maiorem in 
modum obsecro, ne mihi qui coactus ad respondendum venio, sed ipsi qui tam procacem primus sermonem 
introduxit succenseas; qui postquam indignissimis me modis habuerit, ne hoc quoque iniuriarum genus 
intentatum omitteret, probrosis et vere eo dignis me tacitum quidem ac latitantem provocat epistulis. Ego 
vero ut convitiari et maledicere petulans superbumque arbitror, ita respondere et ‘remaledicere civile fasque 
iudico.’ Cf. Suet. Vesp. 9. 
Leonardo Bruni makes the same justifications in his 1424 Oratio in nebulonem maledicum against 
Niccoli. Like the IAP, Bruni’s invective was originally composed as a letter and addressed to Poggio, a 
friend he shared in common with Niccoli. For a discussion of Bruni’s Oratio, see Davies, 282-283. 
Leonardo Bruni to Poggio Bracciolini, 1424, in Leonardi Bruni Arretini Epistolarum Libri VIII, ed. 
Lorenzo Mehus (Florence, 1741), 5:17-25. Bruni had responded to Niccoli’s abuse, he explains, with 
mildness [lenitudo, patientia] because of their friendship, but Niccoli’s slander [maledictum] had provoked 
him and he warns that Niccoli’s rejection of his patience will be reason enough for him to “draw the sword 
of speech against this provocateur.” Ibid., 5:17-18. Sed quoniam ille est lingua procaci, & odiosa, nec in 
extremo quidem mundi angulo quietum esse te ab iis molestiis passus est, ac maligna quaedam, ut sentio, 
diversaque a vero fugessit…; Ibid., 5:18-19. Respondebo maledictis ejus, qui me tam acerbe, & 
intolerabiliter provocat?; Ibid., 5:24-25. Sed ego certa ratione id feci: vel quia contemno hominem 
praesertim insanum & furentem, vel quia rationem habere malui superioris amicitiae, quam justi doloris 
mei. Id vero difficilius michi fuit, quod ille nichil pensi habet, nullo respectu superioris conjunctionis 
retinetur, sed in maledictis continue perseverat, ut verear jam, ne lenitudo ista mea ad ignaviam & 
socordiam michi imputetur. Tu es primus, ad quem de his rebus scripserim, & hoc excitatus litteris tuis. 
Nam ipse tacere constitueram. Quod si tandem rejecta patientia gladium orationis in hunc provocatorem 
strinxero; faciam ut omnes intelligant, quantum sibi lucrum fuerat in istam dimicationem non descendisse. 
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honor and esteem or the reputations of genius seems to be led into danger by enemies.” 
As for silence and patience, however, he explains that some will say it is more honorable 
to “think nothing of the words of a stupid and plainly insane man, who in the manner of a 
demented person and madman rashly attacks all learned men.”67 “I would admit,” he 
continues, that “it is better to remain silent now and then against those possessed in spirit 
and mind” if not for the opinion of Sallust that “wickedness may become more flagrant 
whenever you disregard it.”68 Poggio thus maintains that “it is very often necessary to 
castigate the insane,” for which reason “I follow the opinion of the people who think it 
just that he who has been provoked by an injury return the favor.”69 Poggio’s language is 
more inflammatory than Guarino’s, particularly regarding his opponent’s irrational 
67 Oratio I, 188. Si quibus in rebus honestum est consensusque omnium permissum, iniuriam propulsare, in 
his maxime prudentis officium hominis esse debet, ut contumeliam depellat, in quibus honoris & 
existimationis laus aut ingenij fama a maliuolis in discrimen adduci videatur. Conscium enim eorum quae 
obijciuntur se facere existimatur, qui taciturnitate utitur pro defensione, quoniam censentur quasi 
conscientia ductus non esse ausus improborum maledicentiae respondere. Quod si dissoluti esse hominis 
Cicero inquit, spernere quid de se quisque sentiat & loquatur, multo dissolutionis uideri potest, ea 
contemnere, quae in suam ignominiam & contumeliam sint descripta. Dicet forte aliquis, honestioris officij 
fuisse futurum, pro nihilo ducere stulti palamque insani hominis uerba, qui dementis ac furiosi more in 
omnes doctos uiros, baculo nescio quo stulticiae proteruaque iactantia temere incursat. 
 
68 Ibid., 188. Faterer satius esse quandoque tacere aduersus animo & mente captos, nisi secundum Salustij 
sententiam: malus fieret improbior ubi negligas. Et satis compertum est saepius ex reticentia animos illis 
adijci ad contumeliam inferendam. Itaque existimans persaepe necessarium esse castigare insanos, quo 
caeteri sint ad iniuriam tardiores, sequar uulgi opinionem, qui iustum putant lacessitum iniuria parem 
gratiam referre; Cf. Sal. Bel. Iug. 31. 
Poggio made this argument in his February 1453 letter to Trebizond, who accused him of 
sending assassins to Naples. He dismissed the accusation and countered “I will regard your words as much 
as those of an irascible man…I will certainly neither betray my standards because of your false accusations, 
nor will I vie with you by means of disgraceful words, but instead by virtue.” He added “since the whole 
thing [the assassination plot accusation] is nothing, it may be honorable that I also offer you no response.” 
Poggii Epistolae, 3:50. The argument became a point of contention. Trebizond replied that Poggio could 
not feign silence since he issued a reply: “You received letters, you now return letters.” Walser, 507. 
 
69 Cf. Guarino’s similar argument about returning insults, note 66. Antonio da Rho uses the same language 
in his Philippic against Panormita. See The Philippic of Antonio da Rho against Antonio Panormita, in 
Early Renaissance Invective, ed. Rutherford, 51-189. Hereafter, I cite the text as Philippic and provide the 
section numbers of Rutherford’s edition. Philippic, 58. Aeque nunc tu, si lubet, quantum ad nos attinet, par 
pari referto, uel si excisionem timet, deponat ipse gladium; ego scutum abiiciam. Rutherford cites the 
reference to Ter., Eun. 445 and a comparison to Cic., Fam. 20.19. 
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nature, but his argument remains the same. Poggio claims Valla’s provocation justifies 
his own attacks and that it is fair to respond to an injury in kind.    
A common way of framing the provocation argument was to accuse an opponent 
of maledicta—that is scurrilous language and false accusations—a strategy both Guarino 
and Poggio used. The intent was to amplify an opponent’s arrogance and to make more 
acceptable one’s criticisms of him.70 Alleged scurrilous language, of course, typically 
concerned another’s reputation. Humanists also distinguished between true, fair 
accusations, and slander, maledictum or convicium.71 Guarino accused Niccoli of the 
latter.72 He claimed that he knew Niccoli had written against him and that Guasconi had 
read the letter.73 Guarino attacked Niccoli’s manhood by accusing him of a childish lack 
of restraint, noting “these are the things he imbibed after the very long labors of his 
70 Cic., De or. 2.237. See for instance the claim that the public “dislike mockery of the wretched, expect 
perhaps if these bear themselves arrogantly.”  
 
71 Rutherford, 21. “In the Roman court, an invective that went too far would be regarded not as legitimate 
invective (accusatio) but malediction (maledictum or convicium), that is, as mere insulting or cursing one’s 
opponent.”  Cf. Trebizond’s invective against Guarino. Trebizond argues that if he does not defend himself 
and his work, Guarino will simply hurl accusations [convicia] unopposed. He describes the attack on his 
Christianity as evidence of Guarino’s maledicendi libido and ends his invective by calling on him to repent 
his maledicta against Greece. Collectanea, 392-393 and 407. 
 
72 IAP, 15-34. …praesertim cum ipsum cernam ex patientia mea effrenatiorem maledicendi petulantiam… 
Ego vero ut convitiari et maledicere petulans superbumque arbitror… See note 66.   
 
73 IAP, 42-59. Et ne longius vager, legisti scio quandam ex sapientissimo illius vertice contra me 
depromptam nuper epistulam, eam perinde ac alteram ex cerebro Iovis oriundam Minervam admiratus. 
Cum ibi lacteum eloquentiae fluxum et singularem hominis modestiam contemplabare, plusne salis an 
leporis inter legendum offenderis, haud facile dixeris. Quas res post longissimos studiorum suorum labores 
ad quinquagesimum aetatis annum hausit. Non usquequaque verum est quod aiunt: ‘secundo puerascere 
senes?’ An legendo potius homini succensebas, propterea quod cum hospes philosophiae credi velit cuius 
tamen acerbissimus hostis est non nisi contra philosophiae praecepta eructantem animadvertebas? Ubi eius 
vitam et ingenium linguae procacitas, ni fallor, indicat; a praesentibus enim praeterita declarantur et 
manifestis occulta produntur. Nec qui tam sordidis verbis utitur, non spurcus esse potest; quoniam, 
quemadmodum ait Isocrates, ‘mentis effigies extat oratio.’ Erumpentem aspiciebas iram invidiam avaritiam 
et aestuantis stomachi spumantem ab ore rabiem… 
On Guarino’s charge that Niccoli wrote against him first, I know of no such letter and suspect this 
may be a false claim. Niccoli rarely responded to his opponents. When Filelfo wrote against him it was 
Poggio who defended him, sparking the Poggio-Filelfo exchange. Robin, “Reassessment,” 204. Davies 
writes “It is characteristic that he [Niccoli] never published any reply to these attacks, nor does he seem 
even to have considered doing so.” Davies, 270. 
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studies into his fiftieth year. Is it not altogether true what they say: ‘old men become boys 
a second time’?” He charged Niccoli with being the first in the quarrel to use shameless 
[procax] language, and to write with a “shamelessness [procacitas] of language,” that, 
“unless I am mistaken, indicates his life and character.”74 “He who uses such sordid 
words,” he explained, can only be foul because “as Isocrates says, ‘speech is the likeness 
of the mind’.” Niccoli’s abuse, he continued, derived from his passions: “You observed 
anger, envy, avarice, and madness bursting forth from the mouth of one in a roiling 
temper.” Guarino later charged Niccoli with a variety of abuses: he obstinately opposes 
those who correct him, he refuses to yield to instructors, he disparages students, 
enviously attacks learned men with maledicta, slanders men in their absence, and insults 
his friends with convitia.75 Convinced that he cannot win glory for his own 
accomplishments, Niccoli has turned instead to winning fame for his maledicta, like “the 
man who, it is said, burned down the Temple of Diana.”76 These allegations, scattered 
throughout the invective, are natural extensions of the provocation argument. They justify 
Guarino’s invective and are key components of his portrait of Niccoli. 
74 For the accusation that Niccoli was the first to use shameful language see note 66. Cf. Panormita’s 
“second childhood.” Philippic, 50. Aut si fortasse, quod liquet, repuerescit rhetorumque coniecturas oblitus 
est, dignus iam fit, qui obolum accipiat, ad emendas nuces et migret. 
 
75 IAP, 177-195.  Immo qui his hominibus morbus est iste noster emendaturis contumacius adversatur, 
cedere monitoribus indignatur, discentis obtrectat, doctos per invidiam maledictis insectatur, eos absentis 
tamen lacerat et cum ipsis capitalis exercet inimicitias….Omitto pietatem in suos, amicitiam et caritatem in 
universos. Ei profecto delicatus est sensus; amicos ut pisces amat, quos e vestigio nisi recentes aspernatur 
et convitiis insultat. 
 
76 Ibid., 205-210. Quanquam quid de huius mirandum est latratibus, cui singula passim mordere propositum 
perstat, ut qui bene agendo gloriam nequit aucupari, saltem maledicendo famosus evadat, sicut olim qui 
Dianae templum Ephesiae concremasse dicitur…? 
 Cf. Valerius Maximus 8.14 ext.5. Cf. Philippic, 42. “You look a lot like the fellow who, since he 
was a nobody and incapable of a good deed that would bring him renown, burned the Temple of 
Diana…When the rulers of Ephesus asked why he’d done it, he responded: ‘Since I was incapable of good, 
I might become famous through evil.’”  
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Poggio, like Guarino, substantiated his provocation argument through a 
discussion of maledicta and convicia, though again he was more aggressive than Guarino. 
For example, he often labeled Valla a conuitiator, but he was also far more likely than 
Guarino to cast Valla as irrational by likening him to a madman or his actions to those of 
a violent beast. Valla was, according to Poggio, not only a very ignorant slanderer 
[imperitissimus conuitiator], but also a mad bawler [latrator furibundus], demented 
slanderer [conuitiator demens], and frenzied slanderer [vesanus conuitiator].77 
Elsewhere, Poggio accused Valla of attacking Aristotle, Varro, Cicero, “and the other 
most distinguished men in teaching and in eloquence,” tearing them apart with his 
snarling teeth.78 Delivering his own apologia, Poggio cited Valla’s violence as the reason 
why he “thought it necessary…to check…the disgrace of this depraved detractor.” Valla 
was no true, rational man but instead demented. Poggio also repeatedly described him as 
an insane beast [insana belua].79 Poggio counted himself among Valla’s victims. He 
recalled how when “the most dishonorable and petulant man” had come upon some of his 
77 Oratio I, 200. Valla imperitissimus conuitiator…; Ibid., 197. Valla latrator furibundus, conuitiator 
demens, rabula foraneus…; Ibid., 203. Iste vesanus conuitiator, superorum omnium autoritate semota, nova 
sensa verbis indidit… I discuss Poggio’s use of latrator below, pages 259-260.  
 
78 Oratio I, 188. Non me esse maioris doctrinae, non autoritatis quam fuerit Aristoteles, Varro, Marcus 
Cicero, Salustius, Lactantius, Boethius, caeterique praestantisissimi doctrina & eloquentia uiri, quos amens 
ille dente suo canino & in rabiem uerso petulanti nimium lacerat ac reprehendit, praeterundos esse aequo 
uultu publice insanos & eorum incursus leuiter perferendos… Hac ego fretus opinione, nequissimi 
detractoris infamiam (qui liuore & inuidia commotus solita dementia in me prosiliuit) saltem uerbis 
necessario mihi censui refrenandam.  
 
79 Ibid., 194. …in quem inuehere insana haec belua non praesumat… See note 93 below; Oratio I, 194. 
Nunc quoniam ignorantis beluae exhalantem foetorem paulum compressimus… See note 167; Oratio I, 
204. Elephanti currum ducent, quo beluae ingentes ingentiorem trahant… See note 174; Oratio I, 205. 
Gloriatur insulsa belua, se Bartholomeaum Fatium, & Antonium Panormitam uiros doctissimos suique 
dissimilimos, qui in eum scripserunt, respondendo compescuisse.  
Poggio uses beast language in other ways. He describes Valla variously as a “stupid young ass, 
born to the pasture and to shame,” as “a beast grazing on the fields of stupidity,” and as a “beast driven by a 
fanatical spirit…[who] out of a lust for censuring slips where even boys are accustomed to stand firm.” 
Oratio I, 191. Quid ageret hic stultissimus asellus ad pastum & ignominiam natus…; Haec belua profecto 
agrum stulticiae depasta…; Sed haec belua fanatico spiritu ducta…pueri consistere solent. See note 117. 
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own work, he dared to criticize and correct it. Poggio returned again to the language of 
irrationality and animal undertones, describing Valla as fanatical and a “senseless 
hallucination” who “poured out his insanity against me” and as one who “despises, 
reproaches, and blames all ancient learned men with a certain wild [fera], immense 
impudence.”80 According to Poggio, this was a constant problem. Despite Valla having 
been admonished many times by others, he continued to use scurrilous language. In 
criticizing Poggio, however, he had assailed—with licentia maledicendi—not one of the 
many deceased men of learning, but one alive, who could return like for like.81 Poggio 
used the language of either mad or beast-like irrationality and characterizations of 
scurrility to denigrate Valla, substantiate his provocation argument, and legitimate his 
own use of abusive language.  
 The invectives of Guarino and Poggio indicate how deeply concerned humanists 
were with demonstrating provocation.82 When demonstrated, provocation allowed an 
80 Oratio I, 188-189. Scripsi olim postquam redij ex Britannis, plures uarijs de rebus epistolas, quas 
postmodum multorum suasione eas legere cupientium, in quoddam uolumen redegi, quod cum in manum 
leuissimi atque petulantissimi hominis Laurentij Vallae (quem ignominiae causa nomino) incidisset, multis 
in locis illas carpens, pro earum uitijs suam ignorantiam expressit, quae qualia sint paulo post discutiemus. 
Non miror hallucinatorem quendam fanaticum ac dementem in me insaniam suam euomuisse, qui propter 
innatam mentis imbecillitatem, propter infixam cordis uesaniam, propter insitam animi peruersitatem, 
omnes priscos illos doctissimos viros, quorum memoria omnibus seculis summa laudis celebratione 
uenerata est, fera quaedam immani proteruitate contemnit, reprehendit, culpat, aspernatur, tanquam 
fortunae rotam in manu tenens sursum deorsum voluit & versat omnia, & ad suum arbitrium trahit.  
 
81 Ibid., 190. A multis admonitus, a multis reprehensus, a quibusdam etiam scriptis castigatus, tamen in sua 
scurrili dicacitate perseuerat. Facillime patiar hunc nostrum fanaticum oratorem in mortuos inuehere, qui 
respondere non possunt, cum non illorum, sed suam inscitiam & ignorantiam testetur, in eum uero qui 
uiuat, qui par pari queat referre, maledicendi licentiam sumere nequaquam aequo animo est ferendum. 
 
82 The same concern is evident in Trebizond’s feuds. Andreas Agaso expressed shock that Trebizond had 
criticized Guarino’s encomium precisely because Trebizond “had not been harmed [lacessitus] by 
Guarino.” See Chapter Two, page 70. Trebizond responded by writing to Leonello d’Este that Guarino 
would never be able to prove that Trebizond had provoked him because his criticisms of Guarino’s style 
been fair and consistent with scholarly practices. See Chapter Four, pages 195-197. During his feud with 
Poggio, Trebizond justified his letter to Nicholas V regarding the alleged assassination plot and his letter to 
his son Andreas detailing the forged-letter plot by framing them as responses to Poggio’s continued 
hostility. For his part, Poggio responded to the assassination charges by arguing he had never done 
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author to denigrate his opponent freely. When paired with claims of reluctance, as 
Guarino did, the effect was amplified and the author could claim the mantle of restraint. 
The concept of provocation also indicates that the authors of humanist invective could 
not simply deride their opponents, much less savage them, without good reason. The 
topoi of reluctance and provocation were necessary framing devices because humanist 
arguments depended on audience, the public arena in which honor was won or lost. The 
provocation defense, even if only uttered explicitly at the beginning of invectives, was 
also the foundation for subsequent accusations of irrational or immoderate behavior. It is 
evident, for example, in all the different kinds of categories of insults humanists wielded. 
Categories of Insults 
  
Humanist invectives tended to derive their accusations from a standard set of 
categories valued for their effectiveness in manipulating an audience’s passions. These 
categories provided a structure for characterizations—or caricatures—of an opponent and 
indicate the rules associated with invective.83 Renaissance scholarship has tended to deal 
with these categories in a cursory fashion.84 David Rutherford, though, offers a useful 
overview, identifying a “standard” set of themes following the De inventione and the 
Rhetorica ad Herennium: external circumstances (res externa), physical attributes 
(corpus), and mental traits (animus). The themes encompass a host of more specific 
anything to provoke Trebizond. For Trebizond’s claims see Chapter Three, pages 118-124 and 139-146. 
For Poggio’s response see Chapter Three, pages 125-129. 
 
83 Rho devoted a section of Rhetorical Imitations to words used in “vilifying,” and cited Cicero’s speeches 
In Verrem, In Catilinem, and In Antonium as exemplars. “For those who have been provoked,” he 
explained, these categories also determined “the vocabulary of invectives” [invectivarum vocabula]. 
Rutherford, 19 and 300-313.  
 
84 Davies and Marsh acknowledge but do not discuss these categories in detail. Davies, 272 and Marsh, xi-
xvi.  
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categories, including slurs about physical appearance (corpus), accusations of avarice, 
impudence, audacity, libido, and madness (animus), and jokes about birth, education—
including “uncouth speech” [oratio inepta]—and friendships (res externa).85 The purpose 
of such attacks was to discredit the opposition, to make use of “everything that detracts 
from the defendant’s honour and repute, lessening his chance for a successful defense.”86 
The categories resulted in some of the most severe and salacious insults and can seem 
absurd or even shocking to modern readers. As aggressive as these insults could be, 
however, there were guidelines governing their use. Successful caricatures required 
choosing the appropriate category for the particular individual. Mere allegation was not 
enough.87 If a scandalous offense was well known or strongly suspected, as was Filelfo’s 
relationships with his instructor’s wife and daughter, the individual in question drew 
specific criticisms regarding libido and animus.88 As their provocation defenses suggest, 
Guarino and Poggio were both primarily concerned with indicating their respective 
opponents’s arrogance. Beyond the opening of their invectives, they do so primarily by 
means of classical loci related to the animus.  
85 Rutherford, 4-7. Ennio Rao identifies the De compositione of Gasparino Barzizza (1423) and Trebizond’s 
Rhetoricorum libri quinque (1433/4) as examples of humanist rhetorical manuals that follow this model. 
Rao, Curmudgeons, 110-111. Robin’s reassessment of Filelfo leads her to a consideration of the categories 
of sexual misconduct and avarice. Robin, “Reassessment,” 204-214. Poggio’s anecdote about Filelfo’s 
father is an example of an attacks against family (res externa). On the classical divisions, see Rhet. Her. 
3.10-15 and Cic., Inv. rhet. 1.34-36, 2.177-78. In the secondary literature, see C.P. Craig’s list of the 
seventeen classical loci of invective favored by Greek and Roman speakers in “Audience Expectations, 
Invective, and Proof” and “Self-Restraint, Invective, and Credibility in Cicero’s ‘First Catilinarian 
Oration.”  
 
86 Cic., Inv. rhet. 2.33.  
 
87 The De inventione counsels that “If you charge that the man whom you accuse acted from avarice and 
cannot prove that he is avaricious, you should show that other vices are not foreign to his nature…” Later, 
the treatise specifies that “praise and censure will be derived form the topics that are employed with respect 
to the attributes of persons.” Cic., Inv. rhet. 2.33 and 2.177.  
 
88 For Filelfo’s supposed sexual misconduct, see note 58. Similarly, Niccoli’s relationship with his 
housekeeper was popular gossip, so his opponents used it against him. See pages 263-265. 
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Boasts, Frauds, and False Glory 
 
Guarino and Poggio attacked what they alleged to be the disparity between their 
opponents’ boastfulness and arrogance and their actual abilities and moral conduct. They 
used a vocabulary of mental traits (arrogance, audacity, temerity) and external 
circumstances (primarily oratorical ineptitude) to cast their adversaries as frauds. The 
resulting portraits reinforced the initial provocation defense. Guarino frequently and 
explicitly accused Niccoli of boasting.89 Niccoli, he explained, “wants to be believed the 
host of philosophy, of which nevertheless he is the most bitter adversary.”90 He is so 
concerned with public accolades that he rants “about any subject, however paltry, to give 
the common people the impression that he is saying something worthwhile.”91 To 
convince others of his architectural expertise, Niccoli “commends ancient buildings, 
examines city walls, and diligently expounds at length about the ruins of fallen cities and 
half-demolished arches.”92 He even knows the number of steps in ruined theaters, how 
many columns have fallen or remain standing, how many feet wide pedestals measure, 
89 See the frequent use of glorior and iacto. IAP, 142-145. …et sicuti frumento Ceres, Chiron medicina 
simul et Phoebus, ita et hoc iste suo gloriatur invento…; Ibid., 164-167. Nam cum erudire pueros per 
quandam inanem iactantiam concupiscit, rudem sese magis puerum patefacit…; Ibid., 243. Gloriari saepius 
solet quod is, famae custos et ianitor…; Ibid., 376-377. O inanem levitatem et iactantiam hominis 
singularem! 
Likewise, Rutherford remarks how “Rho rarely chose between ‘gloats’ or ‘brags,’ preferring 
instead to wrote ‘gloats and brags’ (gloriatur et iactat).” Philippic, 109. Musas etenim Sicelidas, tametsi 
agrestes et impudicas, et Panormitam Apollinem quendam, Hermaphroditum imprimis uel ipsum suum, 
quod sibi honores olim amplissimos immortalemque sui nominis famam policeantur, deos suos esse 
gloriatur et iactat. 
 
90 IAP, 50-55. …hospes philosophiae credi velit cuius tamen acerbissimus hostis est… See note 73. 
 
91 IAP, 97-101. Meministi, ut arbitror, quanta cum adstantium derisione saepe ut aliquid vulgo dicere 
videatur, quavis de re et contempta quidem obiurgare nitatur. 
 
92 Ibid., 222-232. Quis sibi quominus risu dirumpatur abstineat, cum ille ut etiam de architectura rationes 
explicare credatur, lacertos exerens, antiqua probat aedificia, moenia recenset, iacentium ruinas urbium et 
'semirutos' fornices, diligenter edisserit quot disiecta gradibus theatra, quot per areas columnae aut stratae 
iaceant aut stantes exurgant, quot pedibus basis pateat, quot obeliscorum vertex emineat. Quantis 
mortalium pectora tenebris obducuntur! His ipse placere et os populi meruisse se putat, quae ubique de eo 
iocularia festivitatemque pariunt. 
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and how many obelisks retain their tops. The many descriptions of the man’s boasts, and 
particularly the last comment, speak to a consistent theme in Guarino’s invective: 
foolishness, and his presentation of Niccoli as Fool.  
Poggio also emphasized Valla’s “boasting and verbal ostentation” but situated it 
in a narrative of Valla’s madness and beast-like savagery instead of foolishness. He 
argued that the boasts of Valla, this insane beast [insana belua], were so considerable that 
it would lead people to think him “born an Apollo of Minerva and brought up in the care 
of the Sibyls and on the milk of the muses, as though a new wonder of the world.” Later, 
Poggio described Valla as so swollen “that you would believe he is in labor with the 
earth.”93 Like Guarino’s Niccoli, Poggio’s Valla is arrogant, boastful, and savages 
learned authorities, despite the fact that he neither understands his subject matter nor the 
authorities whom he criticizes or cites. Poggio was critical of Valla’s attacks on Boethius 
and Albert before accusing Valla of believing himself to be the only one who truly 
understood words and their meanings. To demonstrate Valla’s ignorance, and to 
juxtapose it with Valla’s alleged arrogance and boasting, Poggio cited Valla’s misuse of 
93 Oratio I, 194. Denique nullus est aut fuit unquam quantumuis doctus & eloquens, in quem inuehere 
insana haec belua non praesumat, ut qui non nouerint hunc satyrum foeculentum, obstupescere cogantur ad 
tantam uerborum iactantiam atque obtentationem, & aliquem Appollineum foetum ex Mineruae partu in 
Sibyllarum gremio ac musarum lacte educatum, ueluti nouum orbis prodigium putent… Ipse certe ita 
tumet, ut terram parturire credas, ita se iactat, ac si maxima febri aestuaret, ita exultat, quasi ex Arabia 
nouum aduexerit foenicem. For the intervening text and Poggio’s additional descriptions of Valla’s 
boastfulness see note 167. 
 Poggio makes many such comments about Valla’s boasts, some of which, like Guarino’s, 
employ glorior and iacto. Cf. Ibid., 189. Eorum autem qui nostra aetate fuere, praeclarissimos viros esse 
dicebat Leonardum Aretinum, Guarinus Veronensem, se tertium Italiae lumen, cum tamen primum locum 
mereret, nisi illis paulum humanitatis gratia cedere uellet. Sed quid mirum si duobus illis se praeferat. Cum 
seipsum maioris esse doctrinae quam M. Varro fuerit palam praedicet, seque nulla in facultate illi cedere, 
quem Cicero & beatus Augustinus omnibus latinis praeferunt sapientia & doctrina; Ibid., 193-194. Nam ut 
a leuioribus ordior: Priscianum, Donatum, Seruium, Pompeium Festum, Nonium Marcellum, Aullum 
Gellium, ipsum Marcum Varronem latinae linguae principem in grammaticis probro insectatur, & infinitis 
fere in rebus sua furibunda praesumptione innixus redarguit. Aristotelis, Boetij, Augustini, Hieronymi, 
Lactantij inscitiam fastidit. Ciceroni se praefert in elegantia. Salustij verba ut non latine posita immutat; 
Ibid., 205. Gloriatur insulsa belua…respondendo compescuisse. See note 79. 
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Cicero. Valla “says praeclarum sometimes signifies bonum” and “brings forth as a 
witness Cicero, whom he does not at all understand.” Poggio then mocked Valla for 
misunderstanding Cicero’s use of irony and proceeded to number it among a host of 
things he argued ought to be condemned by learned men.94 In the case of both Niccoli 
and Valla, their alleged arrogantia, considered a problem of the animus, provided the 
basis for the attacks against them.  
 Guarino and Poggio each claimed their opponent’s sense of self was so inflated 
that they considered themselves to be not just learned but the sole arbiters of learning. 
The accusation helped advance characterizations of foolishness and madness 
respectively. Niccoli appeared throughout as a man who interjected himself into scholarly 
matters to appear learned when in truth he was anything but. “Don’t you see,” Guarino 
asked, “how whatever unbecoming thing has been said or done wrongly by this monster 
of a man, he wants to seem proper and be approved and he longs for them to be received 
with applause like a thought of Plato’s?”95 Worse, Niccoli “is accustomed often to boast 
because he, the custodian and doorkeeper of reputation, makes more or less famous those 
whom he wants.” In disputes of history or literature, “he will be the chosen arbiter, so 
that he may declare victors those whom he prefers.”96 Guarino’s remark smacks of 
94 Oratio I, 201. Primo Boetium (quem Albertus philosophum Latinum appellat) tum ipsum Albertum 
redarguit homo accutissimi ingenij, qui plus somniando didicerit quam reliqui legendo, hic solum se 
uerborum conscium interpretem somniat, cum ipse in multis aberret. Verbum praeclarum, bonum 
quandoque significare dicit. Affert testem Ciceronem, quem minime intelligit. O praeclarum custodem 
ouium, lupum. Non claritas in custode ait, desideratur, sed probitas. Ergo praeclarum pro bono posuit. O 
praeclaram crassamque dementiam. Etiam pueris hoc patet, praeclarum per ironiam dictum, cum contra M. 
Antonium loqueretur, at id ignorantiae magister in laudem dictum putat. Infinita sunt praeterea quae 
damnanda essent a doctis uiris. Cf. Cic., Phil. 3.11.  
 
95 IAP, 71-76. Nonne vides ut, quicquid ab hoc hominis monstro indignum ac perperam dictum factumve 
sit, decere ac probari velit et ut Platonis sententiam plausu excipi cupiat?  
 
96 Ibid., 243-250. Gloriari saepius solet quod is, famae custos et ianitor, quos velit pro personarum 
discrimine plus minusve nobilitat, sicuti copia nunc pleno nunc medio locupletare cornu traditur. Si quid 
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frustration, as Niccoli did have a great deal of influence in Florence, including the 
authority to hire individuals such as Guarino to teach. Guarino intended similarly colorful 
depictions of Niccoli’s boasts to demonstrate the extent of the man’s arrogance, as when 
he relates Niccoli to a “class of people:” 
who although little different from the unlearned multitude, assume the false name 
of knowledge and authority, whereby that herd [ista pecus] is misled by such a 
degree of persuasion that they believe they say nothing except ideas fit for bronze 
and whatever they may have spit out is a rose.”97  
 
Elsewhere, Guarino told his reader that if he wanted Niccoli to love him tell him to his 
face that he possessed “not just Attic, but all Greek and Latin eloquence; and he won’t 
take it amiss if you add Hebrew as well.”98 Guarino also mocked how Niccoli “carefully 
weighs syllables…and carps at the letters—this one is distorted, that one uncultivated, yet 
another is plain, here is something superfluous, there is something omitted—forgetting 
that ‘It is the habit not of eagles but of spiders to catch flies.’”99 Each criticism was an 
example of Niccoli’s foolish pretense but also an example of his arrogant belief that he 
was the arbiter of learning and learned men. 
igitur de rebus cum gestis tum scriptis disceptabitur, is eligendus arbiter erit, ut quos ille maluerit more 
pastoris Alexandri victores declaret ac aureo donet malo.  
 
97 Ibid., 81-95. Quam periculosum igitur hoc hominum genus sit, vides; qui cum indoctae multitudini 
parum intersint, falsum scientiae et auctoritatis nomen induunt; per quam eo suasionis pecus ista deducitur 
ut non nisi dignas aere sententias eloqui se credat et rosa sit quaecunque expuisse contigerit, cum interim 
risus de se iocosque praebeat: laudatur coram lingua, iocatur a tergo… 
 
98 Ibid., 263-268. Vis te diligat, vis te amet? ei coram dicito non atticam modo sed graecam omnem 
latinamque inesse eloquentiam; nec moleste feret si hebraicam insuper addideris.  
 
99 Ibid., 102-108. Iste Ciceronis Amassanius, ‘qui nulla arte adhibita vulgari sermone disputare solebat,’ 
syllabas perpendit, quarum tamen tempora mensurasque simul ignorat, et quasi in provincia sua constitutus 
litteras carpit: haec intorta, crassa illa, gracilis alia, hic supervacua, illic omissa, immemor quod ‘non 
aquilae sed aranearum mos est muscas aucupari.’ Cf. Aristoph. Av. 1110. Guarino alludes to Cicero’s 
Academicus Primus. See Terence J. Hunt, A Textual History of Cicero’s Academici Libri (Boston: Brill, 
1998), 32.  
 Agaso also likens Trebizond’s criticisms of Guarino’s style to a spider catching flies. 
Collectanea, 369. “Nam que illius carpende orationis ratio extitit in Franciscum Carmegnolam… 
quamquam inexpertus homo Trapezuntius minima carpat, araneas imitatus que muscis aucupandis inhiant.” 
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Poggio censured Valla’s claims of superiority by explaining them as a function of 
his opponent’s faulty animus. “Because of an innate perversity of the soul,” he wrote, 
Valla “despises, reproaches, and blames all ancient learned men with a certain wild, 
immense impudence just as if he, holding the wheel of fortune, turns and twists all upside 
down and drags them as he pleases.”100 Likewise, Poggio deemed Valla’s claim that he 
will rescue Latin letters to be “fanatical boasting [fanatica iactantia].” “He [Valla] says 
that he is about to imitate Camillus, so that just as Camillus restored a city captured by 
the Gauls, so Valla himself will restore Latin letters, banished, refugee, and wandering, to 
the city.”101 Poggio’s descriptions of Valla’s mad boasts included a number of 
increasingly vivid remarks. He likened Valla to a Delphic prophet, “devoid of every 
sense,” and questioned the wisdom of responding to him. “Truly I am stupid,” Poggio 
declared, “who judge his loquaciousness, his buffoonery, as anything of weight, [him] 
who is driven by a continual mental spin like a bacchant.”102 In one of his more 
intentionally absurd passages, Poggio likened Valla and his “many and immoderate 
promises” to a “ridiculous man” who, drawing a crowd to himself at a particular date and 
time by promising to fly off a tower, keeps his crowd in suspense into the evening by 
100 Oratio I, 189. Non miror hallucinatorem…ad suum arbitrium trahit. Quoted in note 80. 
 
101 Oratio I, 195. Dicit insuper se imitaturum esse Camillum, ut sicut ille urbem a Gallis captam restituit, ita 
ipse literas latinas exules, profugas, atque aberrantes urbi restituat. O caput insulsum. O cymbalum 
resonans sine sensu. Comprimat os insanum, & istam suam fanaticam iactantiam conterat.  
Marcus Furius Camillus (446-365 B.C.), who defended Rome against the Gauls, received four 
triumphs. Later, Poggio declared a triumph for Valla in honor of his victory over all learned authorities. I 
discuss Valla’s triumph in detail below, pages 275-278. 
 
102 Oratio I, 193. Et certe effrenate nimium ac petulanter effertur Delphicus noster uates, tanquam illa sua 
sensa omni sensu uacua, ex Apollinis Pithij sacrario, non ex armentario uolitantis cerebelli, ac ex fanatici 
dementisque uesano capite promere uideatur. Cuius insaniae respondere ad singula quae sint inconcinniora 
prioribus stultissimum uideretur. Verum stultus ego, qui quicquam pensi faciam garrulitatem, 
scurrilitatemque eius, qui continua mentis uertigine agitur debacchantis ritu.   
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flailing his arms before simply baring his backside to the crowd.103 Poggio extended the 
madness metaphor to the end of the invective. Here he decreed a triumph for Valla, a 
celebratory parade in the classical Roman tradition, “as though for the conqueror of all 
learned men,” just as “the Florentines are accustomed to do for madmen during their 
festivals.” He compared Valla to the kind of demented man who wanders through cities 
declaring himself to be an emperor or a pope. Like this madman, Valla thinks himself 
superior to all, and by virtue of his great wisdom, thinks others ought to favor him over 
the ancients.104  
 Guarino and Poggio added to their caricatures of their opponents’ boasts a 
discussion of oratorical ineptitude, which classical oratory categorized as an example of 
res externa.105 That Guarino expected the combination of arrogance and ineptitude to 
persuade his audience is made clear when he explicitly asks if his reader felt annoyed 
with Niccoli’s posturing. The question implies that everybody should be irked with men 
who, in the pursuit of glory, are boastful and attack others but lack the skill to defend 
103 Ibid., 195. Persimilis est Valla noster homini ridiculo, qui cum aliquando se ex quadam turri uolaturum 
certo die profiteretur, ac populus ad id spectaculum conuenisset homines suspensos uarijs alarum 
ostentationibus usque ad noctem detinuit. Deinde omnibus uolatum cupide expectantibus, populo culum 
ostendit. Ita Laurentius noster, post multas atque ingentes verborum pollicitationes, post tantam 
expectationem promissorum, tandem non quidem culum ut ille, sed uolantis cerebri insaniam, uertiginem & 
pergrandem ignorantiae suppellectilem ostendit. For the preceding text, see note 101. 
 
104 Oratio I, 203. Sed ut homo leuis ex his fatuis qui uulgo per urbes discurrentes se Imperatores esse aut 
Pontifices asseuerant, sibi persuasit omni scientiarum facultate esse caeteris superiorem, tantamque sibi 
inesse sapientiam, ut omnibus priscis non solum sit comparandus, sed etiam anteponendus. Quod perinde in 
animo illius est infixum ac si id esset uerissimum. Et postea quoniam tanta aliorum est negligentia, ut hanc 
plenissimo cornu thesauri copiam absconsam non cognoscant, necesse est ut ipsemet suam insaniam 
ostentet, praedicet, & se grammaticorum, rhetorum, philosophorum, caeteraumque disciplinarum doctorem 
unicum praesentis seculi, & stultorum principem apertissime profiteat. Nil nunc restat, nisi ut quod sibimet 
persuasit, & alijs quoque persuadeat. Sed quoniam nonullorum aemulatione maliuolorum atque inuidia 
factum est ut tanta uirtus sit multis ignota, nos ut ipsam palam omnibus faciamus, decernemus ei 
triumphum & lauream coronam, ne amplius addubitari possit Vallam nostrum stultorum atque insanorum 
principatum possidere. Itaque ut Florentini solent in festis suis aliquando curru triumphali insanos uehere, 
quod est iucundissimum spectaculum. Ita nos isti triumphum decernamus tanquam doctorum omnium 
uictori, ob omnes gentes ingenij acumine superatas. 
 
105 See the division between animus, corpus, and res externa discussed above, pages 219-221 and 248-250.  
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their braggadocio.106 Guarino characterizes Niccoli’s oratorical ineptitude in two ways, 
the first of which, prefaced with a comment about Niccoli’s emotional immaturity, 
concerns his failures in Latin and Greek. He claims that irrational and emotional 
factors—madness, suspicion, gall, envy, and rash desire—instead of reason motivated 
Niccoli’s treatment of him. One of the reasons for his dispute with Niccoli, Guarino 
continues, was Niccoli’s jealousy of a fellow student who after a few short months of 
studying Greek under Guarino was on the verge of surpassing Niccoli, who had studied 
the language for fourteen years. Guarino attributes Niccoli’s lack of progress to “his 
stupidity, his thick skull, and his natural ill-will,” by virtue of which “he could get a taste 
of nothing but the shapes” of the Greek letters. Niccoli, according to Guarino, so resented 
the other pupil that he demanded Guarino expel the young man from his tutelage.107 The 
story is an attack on Niccoli’s manhood as Guarino implies that Niccoli lacks both the 
rational abilities for his studies and the emotional self-control to handle the competition 
with his fellow student in an adult and therefore manly way.108  
Guarino offers a number of other anecdotes to amplify his presentation of 
Niccoli’s failures in Latin and Greek and therefore his oratorical ineptitude. For example, 
he accuses Niccoli of knowing nothing about the books he collects, of being unable to 
comment on them without first checking the inscription— a situation Guarino claims 
106 IAP, 50-55. See note 73.  
 
107 IAP, 274-297. Sui tam rabiosi clamoris in me causas fortasse dudum intentus expectas et rationem 
quaeris? Quid in hoc Horeste ratione opus est? est pro ratione furor, suspicio, bilis, livor, et inconsulta 
voluntas, violenta atque tyrannica. Nam cum in condiscipulatu quendam sui certe amantissimum paucis 
adeo mensibus proficere cerneret, ut non dubium esset quin ipse, qui iam anno quarto decimo huic 
litterarum generi operam dare coepisset, superaretur, immo vero propter ingenii crassitudinem, pingue 
cerebrum et innatam malivolentiam nihil praeter characteres gustare posset, veteri stimulatus invidia ut ille 
continuo reiceretur imperiosus edixit, minas insuper et ingenitam addens magniloquentiam… On Niccoli’s 
demand that Guarino expel the other man see Davies, 272 and Rao, Curmudgeons, 32-33. 
 
108 For a discussion of reason, the emotions, and manhood see Chapter Four, pages 156-164 and 186-187.  
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happens often—and even then being unable to say anything meaningful about them. 
Audience plays an important role in these stories. Guarino maintains that Niccoli’s 
failures are well-known—the stuff of gossip and ridicule—but also that they occur in 
public settings. He explains, for instance, how, “in a meeting of learned men,” when 
Niccoli had read aloud a large page of a Latin codex, he was asked about the meaning of 
the text. Niccoli betrayed his own ignorance by responding that he thought he had read 
Greek.109 It is, of course, difficult to believe that any humanist of repute would make 
such a mistake. The story is intended as a humorous example of a basic fact: Niccoli is 
not as learned as he wants others to think he is. Even Niccoli’s physical appearance gives 
him away, according to Guarino, who mocks the size of his ears as a sign of Niccoli’s 
loquacity and stupidity.110   
 Guarino’s second means of characterizing the oratorical ineptitude of “Niccoli 
the Fool” is by mocking Niccoli’s interest in a variety of studies Guarino casts as largely 
109 IAP, 376-405. O inanem levitatem et iactantiam hominis singularem! ornamentum vendicat quod eius 
inscitiam magis magisque detegat. Nam dum hos in manu codices contrectat, si quis illum interea 
conspicatus id enim saepius obvenit quisnam unus aut alter sit percontetur, iste non nisi inspecto prius 
epigrammate respondebit nec tuto satis; tum si rogetur, ut unum locum et mox alterum exponat, obmutescet 
certo scio aut rubore suffusus ignorare se fatebitur quos tantopere perquisierit. Cuius rei nec longe exempla 
petantur. Nam cum in coetu doctorum aliquando virorum latini codicis grandem sane paginam accurata 
pronuntiatione perlegeret eiusque lectionis sententiam dicere rogaretur, suam in utraque re ignorationem 
incaute detexit. Dum enim excusationes imprudens quaeritat, se graece lectitasse videri respondit: quam 
paucis vera prodere immemor ipse coactus. Nam quid ab eo aliud expressum est, quam latine scire nihil et 
graece tantundem? For the preceding text, see note 127. 
 
110 IAP, 233-242.  Profecto si huis hominis effigiem accuratius intueare, tantam in eo levitatem 
imprudentiamque mirari desines: aspice in eo auricularum magnitudinem, quae, nisi gravissimo testi et 
verissimo auctori Trogo fidem deroges, loquacitatis et stultitiae est nota, sicut Plinius refert. Cf. Plin., HN 
9.276. 
The insult is the only example of Guarino drawing from the corpus category. See pages 248-250. 
Big ears feature repeatedly in Rho’s invective against Panormita. Philippic, 85. For the Bible says that 
Balaam’s ass spoke and that the ass articulated almost in a human voice words that it did not understand. 
So our ass here (My! What ears he has!) quoted words to me that he could not understand…; Philippic, 88. 
Does he tremble and shudder? ‘Did his hair stand up or his voice stick in his throat?’ He certainly absorbs 
the words since his ears have not yet shrunk… 
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inconsequential.111 As the title In auripellem poetam indicates, Guarino distinguishes 
between real scholars and “false poets” like Niccoli.112 “When little goats cannot taste the 
kernel” of true learning, he explains, “they nibble at the shell.”113 Instead of being skilled 
in Latin and Greek, Guarino jokes that Niccoli might better be called a “geometer…since 
the duty of his art consists in points and lines and surfaces.”114 Niccoli sets aside the 
other parts of books as superfluous and “claims as his the skill and acumen in placing 
prickings in books.”115 Guarino remarks “how precisely and copiously and elegantly 
[Niccoli] argues about lines…when he demonstrates how they should be drawn with 
great sharpness, not with a lead instrument but an iron one.” He adds that the fruit of 
Niccoli’s life has been a consideration of “the shapes of letters, the colors of paper, and 
111 Guarino was not alone in doing so. Just as Filelfo’s personal life drew charges of sexual misconduct, so 
did Niccoli’s interests draw criticisms of superficiality. As Anthony Grafton explains, several of those who 
wrote against Niccoli described him as “someone who cared only for the commercial, not the aesthetic or 
intellectual, value of his library….” Grafton, 39-40. 
 
112 On the title, see page 234.  
 
113 IAP, 108-112. Quapropter Caesarem Augustum doctissimum in primis virum non usque adeo 
orthographiam idest formulam rationemque scribendi a grammaticis institutam observasse constat. Capellae 
cum medullas gustare nequeant, cortices obrodunt. For the preceding text, see note 99. 
 
114 IAP, 122-157. Summum ego hunc geometram vocitare nihil expavesco; nam cum eius artis officium 
circa puncta lineas superficies ceteraque id genus versetur, nulli magis quam isti festivissimo vel 
fistulissimo in primis viro eam adiudicari disciplinam posse contenderim, qui omissis reliquis librorum 
partibus ut supervacuis, in constituendis codicis punctis solertiam et acumen suo iuri vendicat. De lineis 
vero quam accurate quam copiose quam eleganter disputet, operae pretium est, quasi Diodorum aut 
Ptolomaeum, audire cum eas acutissime non plumbeo stilo sed ferreo potius deducendas esse demonstrat; et 
sicuti frumento Ceres, Chiron medicina simul et Phoebus, ita et hoc iste suo gloriatur invento. Circa chartas 
idest superficies non parum sua valet sapientitudo in hisque laudandis aut improbandis suam ostentat 
eloquentiam. O consumptam per tot annos inaniter aetatem, cuius is denique decerptus est fructus, ut de 
litterarum formis, chartarum coloribus, atramentorum varietate disputandum sit. Hoc vere Horatianum illud 
est: 'parturient montes, nascetur ridiculus mus.'  
 
115 Given the other references in the passage to the construction of manuscripts, I translate the phrase “…in 
constituendis codicis punctis solertiam…” as “the skill in placing prickings in books.” I take puncta to refer 
to the small holes or prickings made in pages to guide copyists in the ruling of manuscripts. For an 
explanation of pricking and ruling see Barbara A. Shailor, The Medieval Book (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1991), 12-13. Alternatively, puncta may refer to punctuation. Ian Thomson translates the 
line as “the skill...to determine punctuation marks in a manuscript. Thomson, 632. Interpreting puncta as 
punctuation fits well with Niccoli’s interests in orthography, which Guarino criticizes elsewhere. See page 
271. For Niccoli’s role in Quattrocento orthography see Grendler, Schooling, 169 and 324-325. 
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the different kinds of ink.” Clearly, Guarino does not consider these activities marks of 
true scholarship. Nor does he consider Niccoli’s book-hunting and the construction of his 
library as evidence of true learning. He diagnoses Niccoli’s “anxiety of book collecting” 
as a symptom of the man’s “despair that they [the books] will ever be a help to him” 
given his “unteachable mind,” and of his belief that posterity will consider him 
knowledgeable for having built his library.116 These are some of the most belittling 
passages in the invective, but they are hardly gratuitous. Guarino uses criticisms of 
education and aptitude, described in the Rhetorica ad Herennium under the category of 
res externa, to rouse his audience against his opponent.   
 For Poggio, drawing upon the classical locus of oratorical ineptitude was less an 
issue of mockery and more the construction of an exhaustive list of Valla’s alleged errors. 
Poggio composed his oration in the belief that Valla had emended his work, so he spent a 
great deal of time responding to a host of technical issues. In a characteristic passage, 
Poggio defended his use of ex Britannis instead of Valla’s suggested ex Brittania and his 
use of affectio and destinatum and countered Valla’s claim that he ought to have used 
apud instead of coram. Like any good humanist, Poggio appealed to Cicero, Livy, Virgil, 
and others to defend his style.117 Elsewhere, Poggio distinguished between true orators 
116 IAP, 440-450. Scio equidem, scio quorsum haec aggregandorum sollicitudo codicum et libraria, ut ita 
dicam, consilia evadant; nam cum eos per animi indocilitatem adiumento sibi futuros desperaret, 
magnificum quiddam confecisse cogitat si bibliothecam instruxerit, quam intuentes posteri ei opinionem 
scientiae conservent. 
  
117 Oratio I, 191. Arguit insuper cum scripsissem me ex Britannis redijsse, ex Britannia oportuisse dici. At 
tritum est ab Indis, Hispanis, Aphris, Germanis dici nos esse reuersos. Affectionis nomen a me scriptum 
culpat, & ait id uerbum in Tullio minime reperiri. Quid ageret hic stultissimus asellus ad pastum & 
ignominiam natus, si Tullij opera non extarent. Hic aperte stuporem cordis ostendit, & parum se habere 
commertij cum scriptis Ciceronis, cum uerbum ab eo totiens usitatum ignoret. Nam cum in manibus essent 
libri ad Herennium, inter legendum in quarto animaduerti libro posita esse uerba haec: Ad demonstrandum 
quaeuis sit eius affectionis qua impulsus aliquid reus commisisse dicitur. Pauloque post: Ipsa diligenter 
natura eius affectionis quam leuissimae &c. Et deinde: Nam affectionis quidem ratio, & reliqua. Sed multis 
quoque in locis eo uerbo Cicero utitur, quae satietatis causa omisi. Coram pontifice, cum scripsissem 
260 
 
                                                 
 
and “wranglers” or “bawlers,” language suggestive of Quintilian’s distinction between 
the orator as a vir bonus and morally bankrupt, loquacious figures such as the latrator or 
rabula.118 In criticizing Valla’s suggestion that he ought to have used existimo instead of 
aestimo, Poggio described Valla as a “teacher heavy with the loquacity of ignorance” and 
likened him to a “tiresome, stupid, and contentious” grammarian who obstinately clings 
to his interpretations. Valla, “this ridiculous barker [latrator ridiculus],” Poggio 
continued, also criticized his use of pridie instead of postridie. “The impudence of this 
wrangler [rabula] is completely insane,” he added, labeling Valla “a quack [circulator] 
who teaches boys” and, again, an “insolent beast.”119 Poggio spared little in the way of 
abusive epithets focused on his opponent’s oratorical ineptitude, which, of course, 
defended his own competence against Valla’s emendations. Like Guarino, he used these 
soloecismum esse ait, & apud scribi debuisse. Haec belua profecto agrum stulticiae depasta, nihil intelligit 
in latinis quid differant coram & apud. Legat Liuium qui ait, magis apud quos quam coram quibus 
loqueretur. Et si mentis imbecillitas patitur, confideret quid haec distent inter se uerba. Coram quem 
quaeritis adsum Vergilius ait: Sed haec belua fanatico spiritu ducta, cui sola detrahendi facultas est nota, 
impetu quodam uesano fertur in praeceps, & prae libidine detrahendi labitur, ubi etiam pueri consistere 
solent. Qui ad te destinatum legerent, scripsi. Id culpat censor noster Valla, in stulticia ac coecitate Vallae 
uersatus, & non inueniri destinatum ait promissum. Neque uero ego missum intelligi uolui, sed 
quemadmodum Virgilius destinat arae, inquit, a quo & destinatum descendit, ut decretum, addictum, 
adiudicatum uolui significari. 
 
118 Quint., Inst., 12.9.12. In a passage identifying self-restraint as that which “gives weight and credit to his 
[an orator’s] words,” Quintilian warns against the dangers if an individual “debased himself from an honest 
man [vir bonus] into a snarling wrangler [rabula latrator].” All subsequent translations of Quintilian are 
Russell’s. Quintilian, The Orator’s Education, ed. and trans. Donald A. Russell (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2001). The distinction is far more common in Poggio’s invective but is not entirely absent 
in Guarino’s. See IAP, 205-210. Quanquam quid de huius mirandum est latratibus, cui singula passim 
mordere propositum perstat… Quoted in note 76. 
 
119 Oratio I, 192-193. Vbi aestimaui, ille existimaui. Multaque praeterea inepta garrulitate grauis 
ignorantiae praeceptor culpat, & tanquam grammatici molesti, insulsi, & contentiosi solent in uerborum 
interpretationibus haeret. Illud uero absurdum, cum uisitassem pridie abbatem, cuiusdam epistolae 
principium fecissem, ille latrator ridiculus postridie fuisse dicendum scripsit, qua in re magnam inscitiam 
prae se fert omni pudore uacuam. Etenim pridie, cum tempus praeteritum significet, hoc est qui proxime 
praecessit diem, postridie uero futurum, quomodo conuenisse aliquem poteram die qui esset futurus. 
Perinde ac si dicas, cum te cras conuenissem. Insana profecto huius rabulae impudentia est, qui libidine 
detrahendi tanquam uentris crepitus inconsulto nimium uerba effert. Scripsi, urbis omnium celeberrimae. 
At ille circulator disseminare uerba inter pueros solitus, ciuitatis ascripsit, tanquam male a me esset positum 
urbis nomen. Sed quam lata euagatur peruicacis hominis stulticia. Quis crederet hanc insolentem bestiam in 
tanta rerum ignorantia uersari. 
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insults to amplify his caricature of Valla’s arrogance: not only was Valla a vile slanderer 
of learned men, he was an inept fraud as well.  
Cruelty, Avarice, and Sexual Misconduct 
 
In addition to charges of arrogance and ineptitude, Guarino, whose attacks were 
more varied than Poggio’s, amplified his caricature of Niccoli with charges of avarice 
and cruelty, additional flaws of the animus. Such was the case in his claim regarding 
Niccoli’s treatment of his fellow student—who Guarino carefully noted “was certainly 
very fond of Niccoli”—and his demand that Guarino expel the man from his tutelage.120 
The tale indicates Niccoli’s ineptitude but also his jealousy and cruelty, particularly 
toward someone who had given him no reason for either. In an example of praeteritio, 
Guarino elsewhere claimed he would “omit his [Niccoli’s] duty to his family, and his 
friendship and affection to all.”121 “He loves friends as he loves fish,” Guarino clarified, 
“which unless they are fresh he immediately spurns and attacks with insults.” Guarino 
maintained that Niccoli’s cruelty was common knowledge and that there were 
“innumerable letters…in which he inveighs” against his older and closer friends and 
“brands their lives and morals with marks of the deepest shame.”122 The charge is 
interesting since contemporary scholarship regards Niccoli as remaining silent in 
response to the invectives written against him. True or not, it was the charge itself that 
120 IAP, 274-297. For Guarino’s story, see pages 255-256 and note 107.  
 
121 Praeteritio is the rhetorical device of passing over certain information “through a feigned sense of 
modesty or propriety.” Corbeill, Controlling Laughter, 93. See Rhet. Her. 4.37 and Quint. Inst. 9.2.75. 
 
122 IAP, 192-204. Omitto pietatem in suos, amicitiam et caritatem in universos. Ei profecto delicatus est 
sensus; amicos ut pisces amat, quos e vestigio nisi recentes aspernatur et convitiis insultat. Et ut me ipsum 
facilius consoler, innumerabiles visuntur vulgo litterae suo more dictatae, quasi quaedam 'farrago loquendi,' 
quibus eos quos maiori caritate et antiquiore consuetudine complectitur probris insectatur, moribus ac vitae 
turpissimas inurit maculas. For the surrounding text, see notes 75 and 76. 
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mattered. Classical oratory allowed for fabrication to amplify a characterization, as long 
as it could not be disproven easily.123  
Guarino often derived his examples of Niccoli’s cruelty and avarice, of course, 
from Niccoli’s alleged treatment of Guarino himself. In the first draft of the invective, 
Guarino accused Niccoli of avarice [avaritia], charged him with “cheating and robbing 
me,” and claimed that Niccoli never paid him for his services as an instructor.124 This 
was not the only allegation of avarice he made. Guarino later recalled how Niccoli 
“turned greedy [cupidus] eyes on several of my manuscripts” and demanded they be 
turned over to him.125 Worse, Niccoli did not “hesitate to call me his slave in crowded 
gatherings of the noblest citizens.”126 The audience added a layer of humiliation to the 
story, as it made Niccoli’s abuse, wrong in and of itself, a public affair. Guarino then 
linked Niccoli’s avarice and cruelty to his ineptitude. He explained that his opponent did 
not demand his books because “he expected they would be of any use or assistance to 
123 See for instance the discussion of Crassus’s speech against Memmius. Cic., De or. 2.239-241. For a 
warning regarding the use of fabrication in support of narratio, see Rhet. Her. 1.16.  As for whether the 
claim could be disproven, Niccoli had enough enemies among Florentine humanists who, like Guarino, 
wrote about his cruelty. See Bruni’s invective, notes 66 and 129. Niccoli’s reputation for cruelty, fair or 
not, was widely enough alleged that it provided a reliable means to attack his manner and character. 
Davies, 270. 
 
124 IAP, 344-357. Et ut nihil officii et humanitatis relinqueret inexpertum, me contra ius et fas omni pacta 
mercede spoliat. Quantum in eo possit avaritia vel hinc cognosci licet, quod me calcato fidei et aequitatis 
numine fraudat expilat ac populatur; extat conventorum et datae inter nos dexterae chirographum 
gravissimi et doctissimi et certe humanissimi cuiuspiam manu communi consensu et voluntate perscriptum. 
 The passage was omitted from the later draft of the letter. Thomson speculates this was because 
the accusation had lost its point, as Guarino no longer taught under Niccoli’s auspices. Thomson, 644-645. 
 
125 Charges of avarice were not uncommon. Robin notes the many such charges against Francesco Filelfo 
by Traversari and Poggio. Robin, “Reassessment,” 204-212. Trebizond faced similar charges from Poggio 
and Giovanni Aurispa. In February 1453, Poggio wrote that he had considered Trebizond a friend until the 
Cretan stole from the common monies in the curia. See Chapter Three, note 55. Likewise, in June 1454 
Trebizond wrote to his son Andreas that he thought Aurispa’s part in the forged-letter plot was a result of 
the man’s anger with him for having accepted fees in the curia in his place. Collectanea, 120; Monfasani, 
George of Trebizond, 123 and 126. 
 
126 IAP, 303-307. Inde cum nonnullis codicibus meis cupidos adiecisset oculos, eos a me sibi tradi 
depoposcerat, peculiolum meum suo fisco patronatus iure repetens; nec enim dubitavit modestissimus 
homo in frequenti nobilissimorum civium conventu me suum vocitare mancipium.  
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him”—he argued Niccoli lacked the ability to understand them—but because “he wanted 
them to adorn his library.” The recollection led Guarino to lament again—“O the inane 
superficiality [levitas] and singular boasting [iactantia] of the man!”—the disparity 
between his opponent’s boasts and his aptitude.127  
Guarino added to his list of classical loci a consideration of Niccoli’s relationship 
with his “housekeeper,” characterized as a muliercula, a comment on his opponent’s 
libido intended to demonstrate sexual misconduct. The story was a digression—Guarino 
later steered the conversation back to Niccoli’s theft of his manuscripts “from whence it 
had slipped”—following classical models designed to amplify a narrative.128 Stories of 
sexual misconduct were common in humanist invective.129 For Guarino, the story was 
another anecdote that was “common knowledge and gossiped about on every street with 
laughter, ridicule, and scorn.” Here again, the audience was in on the joke with Guarino. 
The premise of the story was that while Niccoli demanded Guarino’s books and treated 
127 Ibid., 363-379. Nec illum a me codices idcirco repetisse credas, quod eos ulli sibi futuros usui aut 
adiumento speraverit, cum ad illos velut 'asinus ad lyram' existat futurusve sit et sicut in proverbio est 
'oleum perdat et impensas,' nisi partae forsitan disciplinae non quinquennale quemadmodum Pythagorei sed 
sempiternum agit silentium. Ceterum eos ad suae ornamentum bibliothecae vel ut melius loquar tabernae 
librariae concupierat. O inanem levitatem et iactantiam hominis singularem! ornamentum vendicat quod 
eius inscitiam magis magisque detegat. See note 109 for the following text. 
 
128 For digression as a means of attack see Cic., Inv. rhet. 1.27 and 1.97. The De oratore counts digression 
as a means of moving the audience. Cic., De or. 2.311. Quint., Inst. 4.3.1-17. For digressions in ancient 
rhetorical theory see Peter S. Perry, The Rhetoric of Digressions (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009), 112-146 
and H.V. Canter, “Digressio in the Orations of Cicero,” The American Journal of Philology 52, no.4 
(1931): 351-361. 
 
129 Lorenzo Benvenuti and Leonardo Bruni both told the story of the housekeeper in their invectives against 
Niccoli, another indication of how certain figures drew particular kinds of insults. See Davies, 283-284. 
Charges of sexual misconduct were frequently made against Francesco Filelfo. See pages 238-239 and 
Robin, “Reassessment,” 212-214. Charges of sexual misconduct abound in Antonio da Rho’s Philippic, 
particularly related to Panormita’s same-sex relationships and because of the content of Panormita’s The 
Hermaphrodite. First circulated in Bologna in 1425/6, The Hermaphrodite features a variety of topics some 
humanists perceived as vulgar, the most controversial of which was sodomy. See especially the useful 
introduction by Holt Parker to Antonio Beccadelli, The Hermaphrodite. See Philippic, 89 and 92 where 
Rho speaks about or alludes to Panormita’s male lover. See Philippic, 133 and 189 where Rho puns on 
Beccadelli with “Lecherelli” and Panormita with “Gomoritta” to cast Panormita as a lecher and accuse him 
of sodomy.  
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him like a slave, Niccoli was the real slave. He was the slave not only of a number of 
base moral practices but also “of the most depraved maidservant and most sordid little 
slut whose command he follows and zealously carries out in such a way that nothing 
influences him more than the lust and judgment of this very stupid woman.”130 The 
anecdote was an attack on the manhood of one who was utterly dominated by his 
mistress. “She shouts,” Guarino elaborated, “and he has to be quiet; she demands…and 
the demand has to be met; she hates any friends or family he has, and they have to be 
thrown out.” Guarino stacked loci one atop another, arguing that Niccoli’s libido and the 
influence of his muliercula led him to treat his friends cruelly.131 The relationship also 
led Niccoli to mishandle his property, another example of res externa, insofar as he had 
let his muliercula take over his affairs. Niccoli “has been reduced to such a state of 
madness,” Guarino continued, that “rumor has it she has been made heiress to a large part 
130 IAP, 308-343. Nec vero mirandum est ut me liberum ignoret qui se mancipium esse nesciat non dico 
libidinum, ventris, iracundiae, inanis gloriae, arrogantiae, invidiae ceterarumque animi turpitudinum, 
quibus infinitis paret servit obsequitur; sed nequissimae ancillae et sordissimae mulierculae, cuius imperia 
ita exequitur navatque, ut nihil apud eum magis valeat, quam huius stultissimae mulieris libido atque 
iudicium. Non ancillam, sed dominam diceres; clamat illa: taceat hic oportet; poscit, immo ultro corripit: 
assentiendum est; amicos et familiares si quos habet odit, eiciundi sunt. Nota renarro, quae in tota sunt 
vicinia cum risu ioco et contemptione fabulamenta. Quid plura? eo redactus est insaniae, ut magna ex parte 
bonorum institutam heredem rumor sit; quae si marem forte pepererit infantem, ei tota speranda possessio. 
Tales ego non servos sed nequissimos servos iudico. Sed revocetur unde dilapsa erat oratio. In his autem 
rebus cum eius imperio minime paruissem, quae turbas, quae convitia, iurgia, probra! Nosti hominem; nihil 
illum ab se degenerasse diceres. For the preceeding text, see note 126.  
 On the sexual connotation to muliercula, see Cic., Catil. 2.10.23. Cicero discusses Catiline’s 
“bodyguard of prostitutes.” Ian Thomson translates Guarino’s phrase as “filthy little slut.” Thomson, 638.  
 
131 Bruni also blames the muliercula as the source of Niccoli’s madness and the reason why, Bruni alleges, 
Niccoli had “savaged [him] with snarling teeth.” Bruni to Poggio, 1423, in Leonardi Bruni Arretini 
Epistolarum Libri VIII, ed. Mehus, 5:19. Si causam quaeris, Poggi, & initium hujusce mali, respondebo 
cum Ennio: Utinam ne in nemore Pelio securibus caesa cecidisset in terram abiegna trabes, & reliqua, 
quae sequuntur. Una siquidem muliercula, Poggi, una inquam muliercula, & ea ipsa turpissima causa est 
illius amentiae, de qua dicam breviter; Ibid., 5:21. Denique ut Circe illa hospites suos diversas in figuras 
convertisse dicitur, & alios leones, alios sues fecisse; sic ista venifica in hospitium, atque adeo in thorum 
Nicolai recepta filtris, & veneficiis hominem exuit, ac belluinam feritatem, amentiamque induit…Ego unus 
supereram: me quoque ferino dente lacerandum putavit. Coepit enim jampridem sic adversari michi, ut 
palam prae se ferret pati non posse, celatim carpere, detrahere, insectari denique, & succensere, 
contentiones avidius captare, lites ultro exposcere, ut manifeste appareret non esse illum, qui prius fuerat, 
sed in truculentam aliquam bestiam esse conversum. 
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of his estate.” The story reads like tabloid gossip but Guarino used it, stacking classical 
loci atop one another, to amplify his portrait of Niccoli as a fool and an abuser of 
friends.132  
Humanist invective was often wide-ranging in its ample use of classical 
categories and denigrating language, but it could also be humorous. Early modern readers 
would certainly have considered some of the passages examined thus far to be humorous. 
Guarino’s depiction of Niccoli as a big-eared, loquacious fool rambling on about 
architecture, diphthongs, and types of paper, and Poggio’s description of Valla as a wild-
eyed, Bacchic beast as demented as the man who believes himself an emperor or a pope 
were intended to draw a laugh. Humor, though, was an important structural component to 
invective, complete with its own guidelines and worthy of its own discussion. 
Wit and Mockery 
  
Humor, aside from its specific use in invective, was an important part of the 
humanist experience in general. Humanists took pride in being considered faceti and 
actively cultivated a reputation as wits. Guarino’s correspondence illustrates how his 
peers praised him for his wit. Whether that praise was sincere or mere flattery, it indicates 
the importance of humor to humanists.133 Gasparino Barzizza wrote to Guarino in 
December 1415 while compiling a book of examples of rhetorical usage modeled on 
Cicero. He acknowledged the persuasiveness of jokes but did not consider himself 
capable of addressing the material in his advice to future orators. He deferred to Guarino, 
132 For the mishandling of property, see Cic., Inv. rhet. 1.35 and Rhet. Her. 3.14. Antonio da Rho used the 
trope as well. Philippic, 132. “Are we really envious that on the heels of becoming an heir he became a 
prodigal, indeed a squanderer and devourer of his own patrimony? that he has frittered away, destroyed, 
and consumed amid sodomites and whores the very substantial dowry of his wife, a most chaste Penelope?” 
 
133 See Thomson’s chapter “Guarino and Humour.” Thomson, 410-428. 
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whom he called a facetissimus homo.134 Francesco Barbaro likewise praised for 
Guarino’s wit when he requested examples, in prose or poetry, of his humorous 
writings.135 Poggio made his interest in humor clear in the title of the Facetiae. In his 
introduction, he defended the levity of the book by noting, like classical authors, the 
importance of refreshing the spirit through humorous tales and fables.136 Both he and 
Guarino congratulated Panormita for his collection of entertaining tales, The 
Hermaphrodite, though each tempered his praise so as not to appear to condone some of 
the more scandalous stories.137 Even tempered, their praise reflects their appreciation for 
the humorous.    
Humanists, valuing humor in general, followed classical models that recognized 
the utility of humor in persuading an audience. Wit had clear appeal to the Roman 
advocate, and so humor received ample attention in a number of classical rhetorical 
134 Gasparino Barzizza to Guarino of Verona, 19 December 1415, in Epistolario, ed. Sabbadini, 100-101. 
Non curavi autem ut pars ea exemplorum ad te mitteretur que ad id genus attinet quo animi iudicum lassi 
audiendo lusu aliquo aut alia ratione recreantur; magis enim in gestu quodam quam in verbis ea ratio est 
posita et ego ita ineptus ad facetias sum ut cum ad cetera tardo sim ingenio, in hac re nullo prorsus existam. 
Prudenter ergo cavi mihi ne hanc unam particulam ad te hominem facetissimum mitterem, ne dum futurum 
oratorem de risu excitando admonere studeo, ipse magis irridendus videar. 
 
135 Guarino of Verona to Francesco Barbaro, 12 June 1408, in Epistolario, ed. Sabbadini, 11. Demum 
instanter oras ut meas, ‘he he he ha ha’ ridiculum! epistulas vel metro vel soluto sermone contextas tibi 
destinem, quibus delectaberis plurimum…Tu quoque, mi Francisce, cave ne dum aliqua mei duceris 
existimatione, quam tu tibi fingis, frustratus redeas. Quid me aridum imploras pro fonte rivulum? Ego si 
qua olim condiderim, ut rudiusculum quandoque exerceam ingeniuim, non repono…Desine igitur et dignas 
latebris nugas ne sub lucem retrahe. 
 
136 Bracciolini, Facetiae, 1:1-6. Poggio argues that though “there will be many, I presume, inclined to find 
fault with these tales of ours, either as being frivolous [leves] or unworthy of a serious man [viro gravi 
indigna]” nonetheless “it is proper, and almost a matter of necessity commended by philosophers, that our 
mind, weighed down by a variety of cares and anxieties, should now and then enjoy relaxation from 
constant labour, and be incited to cheerfulness and mirth by some humorous recreation.”  
Panormita likewise claimed to follow “the example of the learned poets of old, who, it is clear, 
composed trifles,” and exhorted Cosimo da’ Medici to read them when he had a break “from your care and 
concern for the senate of our country.” Antonio Beccedelli, The Hermaphrodite, ed. Parker, 7.  
 
137 Rutherford, 27.  
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works.138 The De oratore described the use of “a certain humour, flashes of wit, the 
culture befitting a gentleman, and readiness and terseness alike in repelling and in 
delivering the attack.” “Jesting too and shafts of wit [facetiae],” the De oratore 
explained, “are agreeable and often highly effective.” Reasons for this were offered:  
It clearly becomes an orator to raise laughter, and this on various grounds; for 
instance, merriment naturally wins goodwill for its author; and everyone admires 
acuteness, which is often concentrated in a single word, uttered generally in 
repelling, though sometimes in delivering an attack; and it shatters or obstructs or 
makes light of an opponent, or alarms or repulses him; and it shows the orator 
himself to be a man of finish, accomplishment and taste…[and] dispels 
suggestions not easily weakened by reasonings.139  
 
Humor could make an orator appear charming and agreeable and win him goodwill while 
weakening goodwill toward an opponent. Cicero listed wit as an important attribute in his 
history of famous orators, the Brutus.140 Later authors echoed these ideas. Quintilian 
praised Cicero’s “remarkable quality of urbanity,” which he used in court to produce 
“more witty remarks than anybody,” and wrote that humor “possesses perhaps the most 
commanding and irresistible force of all…[and] often turns the scale in very important 
matters.”141  
Roman authors advocated the use of humor but also acknowledged its dangers 
and outlined guidelines for its use. The De oratore identified two kinds of humor, wit 
[facetia] and “raillery” [dicacitas], the latter more caustic. The combination of both was 
138 For the classical use of humor in invective see especially Corbeill, Controlling Laugher, 5; Richlin, 96-
104; Krostenko, 202-232. See also Francis W. Kelsey, “Cicero as Wit,” The Classical Journal 3, no.1 
(Nov. 1907): 3-10; Mary A. Grant, The Ancient Rhetorical Theories of the Laughable: The Greek 
Rhetoricians and Cicero (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1924); Barbara C. Bowen, “Ciceronian 
Wit and Renaissance Rhetoric,” Rhetorica 16, no.4 (Autumn 1998): 409-429. 
 
139 Cic., De or. 1.17-18 and 2.236. Humor is the point of a long discussion. Cic., De or. 2.216-291. See also 
Rhet. Her. 1.10. The role of humor in oratory was not a Roman invention. Cf. Arist., Rh. 3.1419b. 
 
140 See Cicero’s discussion of P. Scipio, L. Crassus, Scaevola, and L. Philippus. Cic., Brut. 128, 143, 164, 
173. 
 
141 Quint., Inst. 6.3.4, 9-10.  
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to be reserved for those whom the orator “detests and deems deserving of invective 
[contumelia].” Comparatively severe uses of humor were to be limited to particular 
situations, which left orators in a tricky position.142 Humor would only succeed if it 
appealed to the audience’s emotions. It would fail if the audience considered the speaker 
repugnant. Quintilian addressed these problems, noting the difficulties in assessing the 
causes of laughter. Jokes are judged, he explained, “not on rational principles, but by a 
feeling which cannot be put into words.” “Totally foreign” to the personality of the 
orator, he continued, “is the rough humor [dicacitas scurrilis] of the buffoon or the 
stage.”143 The De oratore likewise recommended restraint in jesting [in iocando 
moderatio] and cautioned that the orator “must not let his jesting become buffoonery or 
mere mimicry.”144 Plutarch acknowledged the hazards of humor in writing that “the 
readiness and sharpness of such wit [Cicero’s] seemed clever and well suited to the 
courts…[but] by giving it too free exercise he hurt the feelings of many and gained the 
reputation of being malicious.”145 Humanists followed their classical models by 
recognizing the perils of language that others might construe as dicacitas scurrilis. 
Scurrilous language was, of course, one of the frequent accusations leveled in the 
provocation and reluctance topos.146 Understanding the classical antecedents of humor in 
denigrating speech can help us move beyond shock at the way humor was used in 
142 Cic., De or. 2.221-223. Nicolino Applauso, “Curses and Laughter: The Ethics of Political Invective in 
the Comic Poetry of High and Late Medieval Italy” (PhD diss., University of Oregon, 2010), 21-22, 
Proquest (ID: 749938952). 
 
143 Quint., Inst., 6.3.7 and 29. 
 
144 Cic., De or. 2.237-239.  
 
145 Plut., Cic. 5. 
 
146 See pages 244-247. 
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sometimes savage ways.147 Classical models left humanists with options. They could, as 
Guarino did, skewer their opponents with charming, clever wit, or they could, like 
Poggio, argue that their opponents warranted a more abusive form of humor.  
 In keeping with his reputation as a wit, Guarino injected facetia into his writing 
both to make himself appear pleasant and clever and to amplify his depiction of Niccoli 
the Fool. His invective was undoubtedly critical but, insofar as it tended to poke fun at 
Niccoli’s expense instead of savaging him, was relatively mild. Guarino’s wit was 
evident from the outset, when he expressed his desire to make his invective enjoyable 
reading.148 He even opened with a joke: “You will recognize a philosopher of our time 
abounding in buffoonery (Whew! What did I say? No, you will recognize a pantomime of 
philosophers)! For as the Greek proverb says: What is funnier than that monkeys behave 
like humans?”149 The gibe blurred the line between rational man and irrational beast, and 
Guarino used the contrast to frame his caricature of Niccoli as a fraud imitating—or 
aping—true scholars.150 The ape imagery casts Niccoli as a buffoon worthy of mockery 
and indicates the playful tone Guarino maintained throughout the invective.  
147 See my discussion of the limitations of existing studies of invective, pages 225-230.  
 
148 Cf. Agaso’s letter to Regius. Agaso writes that he is sending his friend something suitable for a jest. 
Collectanea, 364. Nihil adhuc quod nostra magnopere studia postulent comperi cum aut vulgaria sint aut 
illis abundes. Ne tamen vacuam et inanem sumpsisse legationem videar, aliquid quo iocari aut subirasci 
liceat audias interim faxo. 
 
149 IAP, 34-41. Dabo autem operam ut haec tibi ioco voluptatique sint, dum ridiculosum nostri temporis 
philosophum hui quid dixi? immo philosophorum histrionem recognoscas. Nam ut in Graecorum proverbio 
est: quid iocundius, quam quod hominum est factitare simias? See notes 62 and 73 for the surrounding text. 
 Cf. Philippic, 21. Rutherford explains that pantomimes were often used as euphemisms for 
sodomites. Rho clearly attacked Panormita’s sexuality, see note 129, but there is no evidence that Guarino 
intended that meaning against Niccoli. 
 
150 Early modern individuals, as discussed in the previous chapter, frequently expressed anxiety about their 
humanity and manhood through a consideration of an animal-other. The ape was a problem because of its 
closeness to humans. James Knowles, “‘Can ye not tell a man from a marmoset?’: Apes and Others on the 
Early Modern Stage,” in Renaissance Beasts: Of Animals, Humans, and Other Wonderful Creatures, ed. 
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Guarino’s wit is perhaps most evident in his use of puns and word play.151 His 
intent was to demonstrate a command of language which, as Cicero argued, could help 
raise a laugh and persuade the audience.152 Guarino frequently used puns in his personal 
letters, one of his favorites being the play between Cicero—the orator, as well as a sign of 
excellence—and cicer, the common chickpea.153 He also toyed with the distinction 
Erica Fudge (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2004), 138-163. Guarino also used the ape metaphor 
against an unnamed humanist who may have been Trebizond. See note 154. 
Humanists had a precedent for the ape metaphor in Juvenal’s fifth satire, where the lower-class 
characters are likened to monkeys dressed up like soldiers and forced to perform for rotten apples. Juv., 
5.146-155. “The insignificant friends are served fungi of dubious quality…Your treat is a scabby apple—
like the apple gnawed by the creature [a monkey] dressed up with shield and helmet on the Embankment, 
that in terror of the whip learns to hurl a javelin from the back of a shaggy she-goat.” The translation is 
Braund’s. Juvenal and Persius, ed. and trans. Susanna Morton Braund (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2004). In her notes, Braund explains that the passage refers to a performing monkey, one 
of the various kinds of entertainment on the Embankment between the Esquiline and Colline gates. See also 
Kirk Freudenburg, Satires of Rome: Threatening Poses from Lucilius to Juvenal (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), 274-275; Ralph M. Rosen, Making Mockery: The Poetics of Ancient Satire (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 241-242. 
 
151 For a discussion of word play see Cic., De or. 2.253-257 and Rhet. Her. 1.10. Corbeill cites the oration 
against Verres as an example of Cicero’s use of puns. Cicero likened Verres to a pig, noting the connection 
between his name and verres, an uncastrated boar. Cic., Verr. 2.4.57. Corbeill, Controlling Laughter, 78-80 
and 91-96. Thomson writes at length about Guarino’s use of puns. Thomson, 417-420.  
 
152 Cic., De or. 2.235. 
 
153 A typical example occurs when Guarino hears that another had praised him as a “successor of Cicero.” 
He replies jokingly that while Cicero is honey, he himself is a cicer. Guarino of Verona to Ugo Mazolato, 
Venice, 3 January 1416, in Epistolario, ed. Sabbadini, 93. Quod Parmensis noster, alter aetatis nostrae 
Priscianus, plurimam mihi salutem nuntiat, gaudeo magnopere idque non parvae adscribo gloriae meae 
‘conspicuis placuisse viris’ eisque caritate ac benivolentia devinciri. Mi Ugo mi Ugo, ‘tu das epulis 
accumbere divum,’ quod illius viri iudicio et assertione Ciceronis successor sum; credo equidem ut qui ei 
maximum per intervallum succedam, ita tamen ut non minus quam a sole tenebrae distem. Desine credere 
ut quicquam mihi sit cum Cicerone commune; ego vere cicer, ille mel, ille suavitas, ille dulcedo. 
Sometimes the pun appears without an explicit comparison to Cicero. Guarino of Verona to 
Omnebono Scola, Florence, 9 August 1412, in Epistolario, ed. Sabbadini, 29. Vale suavissime mi 
Omnebonum. Antonius Corbinellus hinc tibi salutem plurimam nuntiat. Habeo de Iuliario nostro Caesare, 
ut ipse iactat, sed potius Oleario Cicere lepidissimam narrationem, qui iudicia sua non legibus modo sed 
etiam ense discutit, clientes non verbis sed gladio castigat.  
The Cicero/cicer pun appears in Agaso’s letter against Trebizond. The use of one of Guarino’s 
favored puns may lend credence to Trebizond’s suspicions that Guarino had composed the letter. 
Collectanea, 364. Videre licet “adpresentiarum” pro “impresentiarum,” “egritudinem” pro “morbo,” 
“exorditus” pro “exorsus est,” “infinitionem” pro “causa infinita,” “a iuventute” pro “iuventa,” 
“humanitatis doctrinas,” id est, doctrine doctrinas, et alia milia que novus hic Cicero, vel cicer, magis sua 
quadam usurpat inscitia?  
The pun had classical antecedents too. Plutarch wrote that Cicero’s friends recommended he 
change his name because of it. Plut., Cic. 1.6; Corbeill, Controlling Laughter, 78-79. 
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between orator, the polished speaker, and arator, the common plowman.154 Guarino’s 
word play against Niccoli was almost gleeful. While mocking Niccoli’s occupation with 
the window-trimmings of true learning, Guarino wondered whether he ought to call him a 
“man of books” [librorum] or “a librarian” [librarius], whether he was a man “imbued 
with letters” [imbutus] or “stupid” [imbrutus]. He quoted Horace to cast Niccoli’s 
pursuits as foolish and worthless: “The mountains are in labor, and an absurd mouse will 
be born.”155 He then mocked Niccoli’s “trifling work [opusculum], which he compiled to 
teach youths.” Although entitled an orthographia, Guarino joked it could more accurately 
be called an orbographia, a compound suggesting the work was bereft [orbus] of 
value.156  
 Guarino’s initial joke likening Niccoli to a pantomime of philosophers also 
illustrates his humorous use of slipped speech.157 This strategy involved first an author’s 
154 Sabbadini and Rutherford note the word play in Cic., Phil. 3.9.22. Guarino used the pun to criticize an 
unnamed humanist in 1423. Thomson speculates that Guarino, who was in Verona at the time, was talking 
about Trebizond, who was in Venice. Guarino joked that the individual was “nearer a plowman than an 
orator.” Note also another reference to the ape. Guarino of Verona to Hieronymus, Verona, 1 November 
1423, in Epistolario, ed. Sabbadini, 384. Risum commovisti illius hominis vel potius simulacri 
commemoratione, qui non tam summus quam simius doctor fieri cupit; est autem aratori quam oratori 
propior. Cf. Philippic, 156. Perabsurdum quidem! Non enim quantula uel ex parte orator sed arator 
(intellegin?) nominandus es quippe qui malus uir, immo sceleratus, atque dicendi imperitus es… 
 
155 IAP, 113-122. Intelligant alii et sensa pernoscant; huic satis est picturas depasci. Quanam hominem 
istum professione dignabimur? quem tandem appellabimus? librorum virum an librarium? litteris imbutum 
an imbrutum? Quanquam quid dissimulo proprium ei referre nomen et artis suae vocabulum? Cf. Hor., Ars. 
P. 139. See notes 113-114 for the surrounding text, including the reference to Horace. 
Cf. Philippic, 132. “Are we really envious that he promises daily to be on the verge of generating 
the highest mountains, Caucasus and Olympus, and then straightaway gives birth to croaking frogs or funny 
little mice?” Rutherford notes the connection to Horace.  
 
156 IAP, 158-171. Proxime venit in manus ab eo editum in lucem opusculum, quod ille ad erudiendos 
compilavit adulescentes; inscribitur autem orthographia, cum verius orbographia possit appellari. Nam cum 
erudire pueros per quandam inanem iactantiam concupiscit, rudem sese magis puerum patefacit, tot in ea 
contra artis praecepta describuntur vocabula, ut correptas a natura syllabas diphthongis annotare non 
pudeat. See note 114 for the preceding text. 
 
157 As an example of the classical use of the device, Thomson cites Cic., Cael. 32. Quod quidem facerem 
vehementius, nisi intercederent mihi inimicitiae cum istius mulieris viro—fratre volui dicere; semper hic 
erro. Thomson, 633. 
272 
 
                                                 
 
claim that he inadvertently used the wrong word, a mistake with amusing consequences, 
and then an immediate correction. Guarino used slipped speech to label Niccoli a 
slanderer: “Let this Solon say, if he can, which learned men of his age he has not harried. 
What a snake [coluber]—I meant to say ‘pillar’[columen]—of learning, and reviver of 
returning letters.”158 The insult relied on similar-sounding words, like his puns, but added 
a component, the feigned accident of pronunciation. Guarino used the device again to 
make light of Niccoli’s book-collecting:  
Certainly, if I saw that by the acquisition of many books erudition is also 
acquired, I would say these libraries ought to be called most learned and I would 
encourage this most excellent poison [virus]—whew! I meant to say “person” 
[vir]—not only to have several at home but to stroll around wrapped up in a cloak 
sewn of commentaries, so that he will be esteemed not only learned in letters 
[litterosus] but even book-laden [librosus].159   
 
The image of Niccoli wandering about clothed in the pages he thought made him wise is 
humorous in its own right and well-suited to Guarino’s caricature of Niccoli the Fool. 
The manipulation of language added another layer of humor for a humanist audience that 
viewed clever word play as a part of being facetus. Guarino was not content to leave this 
image just yet, though, and proceeded to imply that everyone was aware of Niccoli’s 
foolishness [ineptiae]:  
158 IAP, 183-192. Dicat Solon iste, si potest, quos aetatis suae litteratos viros non carpserit et aureo idest 
ventoso illo suo dicendi genere non detractarit. O studiorum colubrum, columen 'volui dicere,' et 
redeuntium instauratorem litterarum. See notes 75 for the surrounding text.  
 
159 I follow Thomson’s rendering of librosus as book-laden to denote the image of Niccoli wearing his 
manuscripts. IAP, 411-425. Verum enimvero si parta librorum multitudine simul et eruditionem suscipi 
cernerem, ipsas in primis bibliothecas eruditissimas appellari dicerem oportere huncque bellissimum virus, 
hui! virum volui dicere, cohortarer ut non modo domi compluris haberet sed et conserto sibi ex 
commentariis amictu circumsaeptus ambularet, quo non modo litterosus, verum etiam librosus putaretur. 
Quamvis quid simulatione opus est? undique se produnt ineptiae. Nam si quis Timothei tibias habuerit, cum 
nihil ex artis instituto modulari sciat, non idcirco hunc tibicinem esse dices; quin si quid canere aut 
ostentare conabitur, 'Romani tollent equites peditesque cachinnum.' Thomson, 640. Cf. Hor., Ars. P. 113. 
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Indeed if someone possesses the flutes of Timotheus, though he knows how to 
play nothing from instruction in the art, you would not for this reason call the man 
a flute player; no, if he tries to play anything or show off, “the Roman nobles and  
mobs will bellow with laughter.”160   
 
Merely owning the tools of an expert—whether books or flutes—does not make one an 
expert. The passage situated Niccoli at the center of another joke that everyone was in 
on.161 Guarino’s word play thus also reiterated the idea that it was only right to laugh at a 
foolish braggart and invited his audience to enjoy a good laugh at the expense of a fool.   
Poggio’s use of humor was far more aggressive than Guarino’s playful caricature 
of Niccoli as a silly—albeit arrogant and abusive—monkey of a man. While Guarino’s 
humor was the wit of facetia, Poggio’s was the mordant dicacitas.162 The distinction is 
notable because Poggio accused Valla of the very same thing: scurrilous speech.163 
Poggio, however, framed his dicacitas as a deliberate response to the alleged abuse of his 
opponent. He claimed he was returning like for like, an implicit argument that he deemed 
Valla worthy of the harshest abuse.164 To justify his own use of mordant humor, then, 
Poggio had to prove his opponent’s use of it. The concept of provocation was especially 
meaningful for Poggio, whose humor runs the gamut of insults to demonstrate how 
egregious were Valla’s breaches of propriety. In a characteristic passage, he accused 
Valla of levitas, temeritas, and impudentia before attacking him for daring to correct 
160 Ostentare could simply mean to display a piece and a have a similar meaning to cano. Given Guarino’s 
numerous accusations about boasting I take ostentare to indicate that Niccoli is showing off. LSII.A.   
 
161 Guarino had already established Niccoli’s public—or so he claims—failings, including his mistaking 
Latin for Greek and his inability to converse about the books in his collection. See pages 255-257. 
 
162 See pages 267-269. Cic., De or. 2.218-219.  
 
163 See Poggio’s provocation defense, pages 246-247.  
 
164 See page 242-244. See too the account of Scaevola Crassus who “when encountering Brutus, whom he 
detested and deemed deserving of invective,” used more aggressive humor. Cic., De or. 2.222-223. 
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Cicero’s eloquence with false and mordant wit [falsa dicacitas].165 Like many of 
Poggio’s characterizations of Valla, the passage focused Valla’s madness and likened 
him to a latrator or rabula instead of true orator. On another occasion, Poggio criticized 
Valla’s attacks on learned authorities as the foolish dicacitas of a “most indecorous 
rabula.”166 Amplifying Valla’s cruelty freed Poggio to denigrate his opponent in creative 
ways. Some of his insults involved Valla himself, who boasts as if he were “boiling with 
the greatest fever” and “rejoices as if he had brought a new Phoenix from Arabia.”167 The 
phoenix, a symbol of exceptionalism, stood as a testament to Valla’s arrogance.168 In the 
same passage, Poggio ridiculed Valla’s Elegantiae as “his bulwark and citadel” filled 
with verbosity and foolish loquacity. Poggio’s humor reads as hyperbole designed to 
165 Oratio I, 197. O uesanam leuitatem. O temeritatem non ferendam. O impudentiam manifestam. Adeo ne 
Ciceronis fama, doctrina, eloquentia in extremum discrimen redijt, ut nescio quis furibundus, demens, 
insanus, indoctus, petulans audeat Ciceronis eloquentiam sua falsa dicacitate corrigere. Quod esse potest 
expressus, quod manifestius stulticiae signum, quam cuipiam Ciceronis eloquentiam non placere, quam 
audere ab eo dicta commutare, tanquam eloquentius dici possint. Atqui nullus hactenus hominum memoria 
repertus est qui id auderet, qui id tentaret. Valla latrator furibundus, conuitiator demens, rabula foraneus 
tandem nescio e quo gurgustio emersus, impetum facit in Ciceronem, quem omnes aureum fuisse flumen 
eloquentiae confitentur. 
 
166 Ibid., 203. Recensui pauca ex infinitis pene locis, in quibus illius iactatoris insania & uerbositas 
temeraria, uelut equus sine freno aut ratione uagatur, non quidem ut mihi desumerem defendendorum 
priscorum uirorum munus (quippe qui etiam taciti se defendunt, illorumque autoritas satis ex seipsa munita 
sit omnia gentium consensu, aduersum stultam rabulae importunissimi dicacitatem) sed ut tanta audacia, 
tanta impudentia stultissimae pecudis non esset ignota.  
 
167 Ibid., 194. Nunc quoniam ignorantis beluae exhalantem foetorem paulum compressimus, sua si libet 
paulum consideremus, discutientes eos potissime libros, in quibus absque ulla aut uerborum, aut 
sententiarum elegantia huius abiectissimae pecudis stulticia est uagata. Opus aedidit Valla noster, uel potius 
castrorum dementiae Vallum, quod de elegantia, uel ignorantia potius latinae linguae appellauit, quod sibi 
tanquam propugnaculum & arcem constituit. In quam omnes suas copias, omnia sua praesidia inclusit, quo 
eius stulticia firmior ac tutior redderet. Multa illud uerbositate & stulta loquacitate tanquam boatu quodam 
ingenti repleuit, ut qui librum non legerint, existiment in eo aliquid tanta expectatione dignum contineri. 
Ipse certe ita tumet, ut terram parturire credas, ita se iactat, ac si maxima febri aestuaret, ita exultat, quasi 
ex Arabia nouum aduexerit foenicem. For the preceding text, see note 93. 
 
168 For similar imagery see pages 250-251. Cf. Philippic, 49. Would you like us to analyze and explain this 
error? Since he is called Antonio, the silly, insipid man gloats that these lines were just now sent to him as 
if (like a Phoenix) he were the only Antonio in the whole world.  
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demonstrate just how unforgivable were Valla’s actions, to raise the stakes of the dispute, 
and to justify his own use of equally harsh language. 
The chief example of Poggio’s dicacitas and the culmination of his portrait of his 
opponent’s arrogance and insanity is his description of Valla’s triumphal parade.169 The 
description of the triumph is filled with evocative imagery typical of Poggio’s brand of 
humor and invective. It is also a sign that Poggio’s humor is in the vein of classical 
satirists who employed the grotesque and ridiculous in denigrating others.170 The premise 
is simple: if Valla thinks he is superior to all learned authorities, then Poggio is ready to 
“decree for him a triumph and laurel crown.”171 Poggio intends the triumph to be both 
humorous and depressing. He places Valla “on a chariot constructed from the bones of 
giants, so that this immanis man will be carried on the strength of immanes bodies.” 
Immanis may refer both to the physical size of the giants and to the monstrosity they 
share with Valla. Elephants will pull the chariot, “so that giant beasts will draw an even 
more giant beast.” The emphasis on size is a tribute to Valla’s overinflated ego and, 
perhaps, his monstrous treatment of others. The chariot must be made of the bones of 
giants, Poggio explains, because Valla deems the alternative, ivory, vulgar.172 Valla 
himself bears all the marks of the madness Poggio describes elsewhere. He will stand 
garbed in stinking pelts of goats, holding a sphinx in one hand and a phoenix in the other, 
169 Poggio returns to the triumph in subsequent invectives. In the third Oratio, Poggio chronicles Valla’s 
march through Hell—where “he is invited by Satan and his demons to proclaim himself the grand 
heresiarch of Christianity, receiving from them lordship over all earthly knowledge and sciences.” In the 
fourth Oratio, Valla “aspires to be counted among the immortals, to share in the glory of the blessed,” but 
is expelled from the Elysian fields. Camporeale, “Poggio,” 36-37. See also Rao, Curmudgeons, 92-93. 
 
170 Camporeale writes that Poggio’s “need to dramatize this triumph of lunacy leads him to parody, to 
depict Valla as a full comical personage, bordering on the grotesque.” Camporeale, “Poggio,” 36.  
 
171 Oratio I, 203. See note 104. 
 
172 On the use of beasts and monsters to elevate satire see Maria Plaza, The Function of Humour in Roman 
Verse Satire: Laughing and Lying (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 305-310. 
276 
 
                                                 
 
“casting his mad eyes here and there.”173 He will wear a laurel crown, a classical and 
humanist sign of excellence, on which is written in gold letters, “I am born of Folly.”174 
The attendants at Valla’s triumph are equally important parts of Poggio’s portrait 
of the triumph as both celebratory and funereal. Owls fly about, a sign of impending 
disaster, singing their funereal song [carmen suum ferale].175 As befits his arrogant 
nature, Valla forces gods and mythological creatures into service, grand figures whom 
Poggio uses to throw into greater relief Valla’s arrogance. Valla is a conquering hero, but 
his victory comes at the expense of all the gods and goddesses, learned men, and learning 
in general.176 Those in attendance clearly do not want to be there. “All the muses stand 
around the chariot like slave girls speaking a hymn,” although “they seem to grieve the 
great insanity of the man rather than to sing.” Apollo is there, “melancholy, because he 
cannot make use of his art in honor of the triumph.” Athena is present, but only to drive 
away flies “lest they are a bother to her prophet [Valla].” She carries a very large book 
“stuffed with the riches of the conqueror” and entitled ‘The Riches of Folly’.”177 Next 
173 Another example of the use of mythical beasts to denote exceptionalism. See notes 167-168. 
 
174 Oratio I, 203-204. Currus itaque erit non ex ebore (nam id quidem uulgare uidet) sed ex Gigantum 
ossibus compactus, ut homo immanis immanium corporum robore uehatur. Non tepetibus, sed pellibus 
sternetur hircinis, triumphantis naturam redolentibus. Ipse adstans alteraque manu sphungem, altera 
foenicem gestans hallucinanti persimilis, oculosque fanaticos hac illac circumferens. Coronam gestabit in 
capite ex folijs lauri, decoctis lucanicis immixtis, ut aliquo suaui odore nauseantis comitum fastidio mens 
fessa reficiatur. Folijs inscriptum literis aureis erit, stulticiae alumno. Elephanti currum ducent, quo beluae 
ingentes ingentiorem trahant…Ipse egregius Imperator grauitate illa elephantina, qui inanem laudem 
respuat, manu omnes admonebit, ut de suis laudibus parcius loquantur, remittant aliquid de cupiditate 
laudandi. I take Poggio’s spelling of sphungem as sphingem, the accusative singular of sphinx.   
 
175 Ibid., 204. Noctuae ac bubones circumaduolabunt, carmen suum ferale canentes.  
 
176 Cf. Plaza’s discussion of elevation and the use of grand personages. Plaza, 90-91 and 101-105 
 
177 Oratio I, 204. Circumstabunt in curru musae omnes uelut ancillae hymnum Apollini educatori gnati sui 
dicentes, sed uoce rauca & submissa, ut potius gemere ob tantam uiri insaniam quam canere uideantur. His 
aderunt proximiores cum cithara absque fidibus, quod eas mures correserint. Phoebusque moestus, quod 
arte sua uti nequeat in honorem triumphi. Pallas cum scuto & ense, quo muscas abigat, ne sint uati suo 
277 
 
                                                 
 
come the most revered men of learning, “all the grammarians, the historians, the poets, 
the theologians, who on account of this demented triumph will cry out in grief.” Mythical 
creatures follow, including centaurs who, in keeping with the themes of madness and 
folly, bear banners identifying the procession as the “Roving Kingship of Fools.” 
Understood in a pejorative sense and fitting with Poggio’s conqueror motif, though, the 
participants of the triumph clearly consider Valla’s regnum a tyranny. The liberal arts are 
there as well, though unhappily “will complain they were pimped.” Perhaps the most 
depressing attendants, particularly for the early modern reader, are the boys spouting a 
variety of Valla’s barbarisms and solecisms.178 These children represent for Poggio the 
consequences of Valla’s arrogance. If left in Valla’s hands, the future for learning is 
bleak indeed. The universal disapproval evident in the attendants adds dramatic tension to 
Poggio’s invective. The triumph is both comedic and tragic, laughable and disheartening. 
The ridiculous triumph is Poggio’s analysis of Valla writ large and epitomizes the 
methods he uses in wielding invective. The description of the triumph is at first shocking 
in its savagery. This likely accounts for the moralizing, condemnatory conclusions of 
Poggio’s character evident even in recent accounts of the Poggio-Valla conflict.179 
molestae. Minerua librum pergrandem super humeris gestabit opibus triumphantis refertum, cuius inscriptio 
erit, stulticiae copia. 
 
178 Ibid., 204. Aristoteles in primis, Albertus magnus, caeterique philosophi ab hoc uno emendati. Tum M. 
Varro, M. Tullius, Salustius, Lactantius, Grammatici omnes, Historici, Poetae, Theologi, qui ob 
triumphantem dementiam lamententur. Post hos curru proximiores satyri faunique sequentur: Sileni sui 
auribus in psalterio & cymbalis plaudentes. Hos inter psallentium modo permixti erunt asini, tibicinum loco 
rugitu magno sonoroque, ac etiam uentris crepitibus triumphantis famam & gloriam tollentes, ut & plausu, 
risuque gestire & laeta esse omnia videantur. Centauri quoque aderunt uexilla deferentes, in quibus 
inscriptum erit: Stultorum regnum peruagatum. Hunc longe post comitabuntur liberales artes, quae se ab 
hoc uesano non ornatas, sed prostitutas querentur. Puerorum quoque turba aderit balbutientium nescio quid 
rusticum magno comitatu barbarismorum ac folcecismorum, quorum inueniendorum hic autor fuerit 
permaximus. 
 
179 See for instance Ennio Rao’s description of the Poggio-Valla feud as the “high-water mark” of humanist 
invective and his assessment of Poggio. Rao, 96-97.  
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Indeed, Poggio’s description of Valla’s triumph is far more scathing than Guarino’s 
caricature of Niccoli or any of Trebizond’s invectives. Beneath the vitriol, however, 
Poggio’s strategies were consistent with classical models of blame. Instead of reading his 
invective as evidence of his bad character, a more accurate reading situates the piece in a 
consideration of the classical guidelines that governed the use of humor. To do otherwise 
is to judge the work by standards foreign to those of its author and audience.   
Conclusion 
 
As fiery and savage as humanist quarrels could be they eventually all found their 
end. In the case of Guarino and Niccoli, there is evidence of their reconciliation as early 
as September 1417. Guarino’s letters indicate the public nature of their dispute as well as 
their public reconciliation made possible by the intervention of mutual friends. To 
Niccoli, Guarino wrote that he had heard from various sources, including a letter Niccoli 
had written to Francesco Barbaro, that he no longer bore Guarino ill-will. While his 1413 
invective had emphasized Niccoli’s cruelty and abuse of friends, Guarino now fondly 
remembered Niccoli’s courtesy [comitas] and humanity [humanitas]. He articulated his 
desire to put the quarrel, which he attributed to ill fate more than to the fault of either 
man, behind them, and to preserve and strengthen their friendship in the future.180 The 
letter was Guarino’s attempt to reengage with Niccoli by means of the language of 
friendship [amicitia], language he used the following month as well in a letter to 
180 Guarino of Verona to Niccolò Niccoli, Venice, September 1417, in Epistolario, ed. Sabbadini, 149-150. 
Superioribus diebus primum <ab ***>, deinde ab Antonio Cor <binello> nostro et nunc denique litteris tuis 
vere ‘melle dulcioribus,’ quas ad Barb<arum> meum dedisti, certior factus sum, et maxima quidem laetitia, 
me tecum in gratiam redisse; quod mihi facillimum persuasu extitit tuam illam summam comitatem ac 
humanitatem pari coniunctam benivolentiae recordanti…Adeo ut quicquid turbulentum interciderit, invido 
magis cuidam fato amori nostro impendenti, quam ulli nostrae culpae imputari obsignarique 
conveniat…Enitar, ‘pro virili parte’ ut ingravescentibus annis et noster una ingravescat amor et simul 
auctius consenescat. Cf. Cic., p. Sest. 138. 
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Ambrogio Traversari. He assured Traversari, a mutual friend, that he would work to 
make his friendship [amicitia] with Niccoli “endure inviolate,” and that “as much as I am 
able, [I] will apply every care, the hardest work, and eagerness to not only conserving this 
friendship, but in fact growing it.”181 Guarino wrote again to Niccoli in November 1417, 
expressing disappointment that his friend had not visited him in northern Europe. He 
grieved that they could have toured the landscape together and that he could have 
benefitted from Niccoli’s expertise in ancient ruins and histories.182 Guarino praised in 
this November letter the very things he had criticized in his 1413 IAP as superficial. In 
December and January, Guarino, who had earlier mocked Niccoli’s self-appointed role as 
arbiter of learning, even appealed to Niccoli to lend his support for a friend, Gian Nicola 
Salerno, to become chief magistrate of Florence. He asked Niccoli to look after Salerno 
“as you are accustomed to do for friends,” commenting that the man is “worthy of your 
friendship [amicitia].”183  
181 Guarino of Verona to Ambrogio Traversari, Venice, 4 October 1417, in Epistolario, ed. Sabbadini, 152. 
De reditu nostro in gratiam, Nicolai inquam et mei, magna te affectum laetitia dicis. Credo equidem idque 
mihi facile persuadeo, haud ignarus quam aegre ferres mutuam illiam disiunctionem vel amoris 
intermissionem. Nihil autem gratius ac iocundius te facere posse credito quam, id quod facturum polliceris, 
ut amicitia nostra inviolata perduret. Ego quantum in me est, de ea non modo conservanda verum etiam 
augenda, quemadmodum ab initio semper feci, omnem curam operam diligentiam studium praestabo. 
 
182 Guarino of Verona to Niccolò Niccoli, Venice, 28 November 1417, in Epistolario, ed. Sabbadini, 160. 
Dolebam quod hoc temporis, quo tibi procul a patria ut sic dicam fugiendum erat, nobiscum non 
consumpsisses, ut ex fuga tam maesta iocundum quandam et amoenam peregrinatiunculam effecisses, ex 
qua tantos una fructus decerpere licebat, ut huius semper temporis meminisse possemus. Nihil ex hisce 
regionibus indiscussum inaccessumque dimittere constitueramus, non montes non agros non flumina non 
lacus non aequora, non ullas iacentium ruinarum reliquias, in quibus revisendis omnem antiquitatem omnes 
annales omnia monumenta revidissemus eruissemus: tu praesertim, cui superiores aetates, civitatum 
historiae, res gestae populorum ante oculos ad unguem propositae sunt.     
 
183 Guarino of Verona to Niccolò Niccoli, Venice, 27 December 1417, in Epistolario, ed. Sabbadini, 171. Id 
autem ut assequi possit te magnum adiumentum afferre posse scio, si modo, uti pro amicis soles, 
advigilaveris: non ignoro quid in omni re possis cum tuam excutis vigilantiam cogitationem consilium; 
Guarino of Verona to Niccolò Niccoli, Venice, 2 January, 1418, in Epistolario, ed. Sabbadini, 174. Nuper 
ad te scripsi pro quodam d. Iohanne Nicola conterraneo meo, equestris ordinis viro clarissimo, qui 
praeturam ambire florentinam statuit. Dii boni! quid hominis est, doctus gravis facilis; quid plura? tua 
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 Poggio and Valla enjoyed no such reconciliation. The direct conflict between the 
two ended when Poggio became chancellor of Florence in 1453, but he continued to 
seethe even though the two were no longer colleagues. To Bartholomeo Ghiselardi, 
Poggio wrote of his hope that the insania of Valla—a petulant ass and detractor of all 
learned men—was public knowledge. He maintained his earlier accusation that Valla 
“boasts so about himself that he places himself ahead of all ancient writers,” and wrote of 
his hope that his orations against the man be seen by all.184 In 1454, he made clear to 
Pietro Tommasi, one of a handful who tried to bring the two together, that reconciliation 
was impossible: “What good man can be a friend to Valla, that fanatic, buffoon, 
slanderer, boaster, heretic, that insulting detractor of the learning of all the most brilliant 
men, present and past?”185 Poggio added that his words were not sufficient to subdue 
Valla—a perverse animal, stubborn, and stupid—and recommended prison and whips 
instead. Poggio even suggested that Valla deserved to be burnt at the stake.186 Both men 
died a few years later, Valla in 1457 and Poggio in 1459.  
 This chapter has demonstrated that invective was one of the preferred vehicles 
for humanist self-presentation and that authors drew from classical models to help 
dignus est amicitia. Commendo rem suam tibi ac tuis in maiorem modum, ut iam nunc de ea sermones 
spargere incipias. 
 
184 The letter is undated but written from Florence. Harth ed., Lettere, 3:220-221. Cupio enim has vulgari ut 
nota fiat insania illius asini petulantis communis doctorum omnium detractoris. Vide quam perversa ac 
facinorosa sit illius natura. Nunquam desistit ab excellentium virorum objurgatione!…se autem ita jactabat 
et efferebat, ut omnibus antiquis scriptoribus anteponeret…Sed alias, si causam dabit, utar graviori medela, 
quam eleboro ad purgandam levissimi cerebelli insaniam. Vellem igitur has orationes omnibus esse notas.    
 
185 Ibid., 3:292. Si mihi amicus esset, reicerem talis monstri omnem non solum amicitiam, sed vite 
consuetudinem abscinderemque a me omnem eam corporis partem, que mihi suam benevolentiam suaderet. 
Nam qui vir bonus posset amicus esse Valle, fanatico, scurre, maledico, iactatori, heretico, omnium 
clarissimorum doctrina virorum tum presentium, tum preteritorum detractori contumelioso? 
In addition to Tommasi, Francesco Barbaro and Francesco Filelfo, who himself had since 
reconciled with Poggio, tried to reconcile the two. Camporeale, “Poggio,” 30.  
 
186 Celenza, Lost, 130. Camporeale, “Poggio,” 31.   
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negotiate fifteenth-century life. As a literary genre, invective allowed humanists to 
construct positive, praiseworthy accounts of themselves and to denigrate their opponents. 
Self-aggrandizement and denigration were primary concerns because of the significance 
that public perception had on humanist careers. Humanist literary attacks were 
fundamentally about audience and invective had very real consequences. Guarino’s feud 
with Niccoli, for instance, led him to leave his teaching position at the Florentine Studio.  
The present chapter also marks a fitting conclusion to the broader study of George 
of Trebizond’s disputes with Guarino and Poggio. Like Poggio, Filelfo, and others, 
Trebizond has long had a reputation as bitter, resentful, angry, and morose. Previous 
chapters have challenged this reputation by demonstrating how Trebizond used the same 
kinds of verbal strategies—related to restraint and manhood, for instance—as his 
opponents. The actions for which he is often negatively characterized were in fact more 
consistent with how scholars comported themselves in the fifteenth century than has been 
acknowledged. The present consideration of the form and function of invective brings 
this argument into sharper focus and the addition of new voices helps contextualize 
Trebizond’s career and modes of expression. 
 I have argued that Marsh’s observation that “the violent language of [Petrarch’s] 
invectives will shock readers” is indicative of a long-term analytical problem in 
Renaissance studies.187 The shock that Marsh describes has colored the reading of 
Renaissance source material and our understanding of the humanist experience for 
centuries. This was certainly the case for nineteenth-century figures such as William 
Shepherd and John Addington Symonds, who viewed the savagery of humanist invective 
as a puzzling practice difficult to square with a movement that articulated goals ranging
187 Marsh, xi.  
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from eloquence to virtue. Even some recent accounts, for example that of Ennio Rao, 
continue to express surprise at and criticize humanist polemicists. Today, as invective 
receives greater attention and the texts themselves become more readily available, it is 
time to move past the shock that has shaped portrayals of humanism and humanists. 
Doing so can help us situate invective in its proper context, the socio-economic realities 
that defined the competitive, professional world of humanist scholars. It can also help us 
revise our understanding of particular authors, Trebizond included. Trebizond was hardly 
unique in the kinds of literary attacks he waged, and others were more than his match in 
terms of vitriol. Though relatively restrained during his conflict with Trebizond, Poggio 
was far less restrained in his feuds with Filelfo and Valla. His lengthy description of 
Valla’s triumph is a hyperbolic portrayal of his opponent that not only adopts themes also 
evident in Trebizond’s quarrels, but takes them to new lengths.   
Ultimately, the problems associated with reading humanist invective and the 
impact these problems have had on the portrayal of specific humanists as historical 
figures suggests that, on some level, humanists were successful in their use of invective. 
They managed to make their opponents appear dishonest, dishonorable, immoderate, and 
imprudent. They were so successful in defaming each other, in fact, that posterity still 
remembers them as a contentious, angry, disenfranchised bunch. To lean too heavily 
upon this impression, however, flattens our understanding of the pressures exerted upon 
scholars, the anxiety they dealt with on a daily basis, and the expectations that guided 
their actions as inheritors of the classical oratorical tradition. Reducing invective to a 
mere matter of objective morality obscures the nuances of the broader humanist 
experience.   
Copyright  Karl R. Alexander 2013 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
EPILOGUE 
 
As the preceding chapters have demonstrated, humanists of early Quattrocento 
Italy were perpetually concerned with honor. Their correspondence was rife with 
discussions about reputation. They consistently strove to present themselves as erudite, 
eloquent, and virtuous. They were also a contentious bunch that frequently engaged in 
literary quarrels over perceived offenses and supposed damage to their reputations. Early 
fifteenth-century humanism was, as Christopher Celenza has noted, naturally agonistic.1 
Competition for patronage increased as the studia humanitatis gained in popularity. 
Competition bred anxiety and conflict, and for good reason. Scholars who succeeded in 
cultivating a reputation reaped the financial rewards. Guarino of Verona enjoyed years of 
success under the Este family and its scion, his pupil Leonello. He earned a salary of 300 
ducats once he became a public lecturer in Ferrara in 1435. In the 1450s, Poggio owned a 
family palazzo, a country estate, nineteen pieces of land, several farms, two houses in 
Florence, and significant banking deposits.2 Monfasani reports that after George of 
Trebizond entered the papal service in 1440 “one result of his new found financial 
security was the purchase of a young female slave…for the relatively high price of 60 
florins.” Trebizond was not wrong in thinking that his new position afforded him 
financial flexibility. Between 1440 and his departure to Naples in 1452 Trebizond 
1 Christopher S. Celenza, The Lost Italian Renaissance: Humanists, Historians, and Latin’s Legacy 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), 130. 
 
2 Stephen Greenblatt, The Swerve: How the World Became Modern (New York: W.W. Norton, 2011), 22; 
Lauro Martines, The Social World of Florentine Humanists, 1390-1460 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1963), 123-127. 
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amassed 4,000 florins. He returned to Rome in 1455 and within three years he had 
purchased a large house in the center of the city.3 Nor were the individuals examined in 
the present study alone in their success. Coluccio Salutati’s wealth was in the “upper 2 
per cent of the city’s [Florence] population” in 1427.  Leonardo Bruni was worthy 2,700 
florins at that time, not including his town and country homes. When Bruni—who had 
served as Florentine chancellor and apostolic secretary during his life—died in March 
1444, his family controlled nine farms and seven houses.4 There were certainly socio-
economic benefits for scholars able to navigate patronage systems and thus concrete 
consequences for humanist contests of honor and reputation. 
 The present study has investigated humanist contests of honor to determine how 
and why humanists engaged in disputes as they did and to establish a richer understanding 
of humanist social practices. What, then, does a study of Trebizond’s feuds—and the 
feuds of his rivals, Guarino and Poggio—tell us about the means at humanists’ disposal 
when competing with their rivals? There was a shared language and set of verbal 
strategies scholars used, as Celenza has noted, in an oppositional manner to praise 
themselves and denigrate others. Humanists employed a language of honor that was 
dependent upon ethical considerations. Allegedly immoral behavior provided fodder for 
attacks against an opponent.  Contrary to many modern accounts—ranging from the 
nineteenth-century to the twenty-first century—humanist quarrels were not all-for-
nothing free-for-alls. Humanists adapted the Roman forensic model to contemporary 
3 John Monfasani, George of Trebizond: A Biography and a Study of his Rhetoric and Logic (Leiden: E.J. 
Brill, 1976), 114-115. 
 
4 Martines, 105-108 and 117-123. 
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needs.5 They replaced the courtroom with the court of public opinion where individual 
honor was won or lost and where their contemporaries played the role of judge and jury. 
Humanists adapted classical models for different purposes. Sometimes they tried to 
establish a reputation by casting themselves as more learned than current respected 
educators, as Trebizond did in his RLV criticisms of Guarino. Sometimes they tried to 
mitigate damage done to their reputation or to regain lost honor, as Trebizond did after 
his chancery fight with Poggio. They often employed the language of honor in response 
to perceived slights, as Andreas Agaso’s defense of Guarino or Poggio’s oration against 
Lorenzo Valla illustrate. The present study makes clear that scholars understood the 
challenges facing them as professionals. They were well aware that reputation played a 
crucial role in their pursuit of financial success and popular approbation, and they 
believed themselves capable of influencing public perception. Humanists viewed 
themselves as active agents in the construction of their public identities.  
 The feuds of Trebizond, Guarino, and Poggio also reveal the wealth of concepts 
and language available to humanists in contesting honor. An analysis of their use of 
language deepens our understanding of humanist social practices. The similarities in the 
modes of expression these three men used are striking. Chapters Two, Three, and Four 
have demonstrated how the Trebizond-Guarino and Trebizond-Poggio feuds each had a 
language of their own unique to the circumstances of each dispute that each author 
wielded as part of a public battle for status and reputation. The Trebizond-Guarino 
dispute was defined by the anti-Greek language of the Agaso letter which led to Agaso—
Guarino?—and Trebizond issuing insults contrasting eloquence and loquaciousness as 
5 Ennio I. Rao, Curmudgeons in High Dudgeon: 101 Years of Invectives (1352-1452) (Messina: EDAS, 
2007), 20. Rao argues that invective became increasingly severe as the fifteenth century progressed and as 
authors became willing to employ any and all means to denigrate their opponents. 
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well as gravitas and levitas. The chancery fight defined the Trebizond-Poggio dispute, 
which was fought via a language of restraint. Categories related to prudence, honesty, and 
forgiveness dominated the conversation. The use of gendered language was notable in 
both feuds. Casting an opponent as childish, womanly, or beast-like in their learning or 
behavior allowed an author to denigrate his opponent as unlearned and irrational while 
demonstrating his own rational manhood. The themes that emerge from each of these 
feuds provides insights into the kinds of issues humanists targeted in their invective—
learning and moral conduct—and the language and paired categories they used to access 
those issues—eloquence and loquaciousness, gravitas and levitas, prudence and 
imprudence, honesty and dishonesty, man and child, woman, or beast. 
 Humanists surely relied on similar concepts but they also structured their 
invectives in similar ways. The structural components of invective explored in Chapter 
Five—provocation, the standard classical categories of insults, wit and humor—are 
evident in the Guarino-Niccoli and Poggio-Valla conflicts as well as in Trebizond’s 
compositions. Guarino and Poggio justified their use of denigrating language by arguing 
they had been provoked by their opponents. Functionally, Trebizond’s claims to Leonello 
d’Este or Guarino himself that Guarino’s composition of the Agaso letter had provoked 
him are no different. Guarino, Poggio, and Trebizond all used insults reflecting the 
classical categories of corpus, animus, and res externa. Insults of an opponent’s animus 
were particularly abundant. Guarino and Poggio attacked Niccoli and Valla for boasting 
and arrogance. Agaso accused Trebizond of believing himself a new Cicero. Trebizond’s 
allegations against Poggio were rooted in his opponent’s alleged perturbationes animi. 
Wit and humor abounded in each of these feuds, whether in the milder humor of Guarino 
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casting Niccoli as a big-eared monkey of a man or the harsher satirical humor of Poggio’s 
triumph for Valla. For his part, Trebizond boasted his eloquence was so great that he, like 
a mailed knight on a charger, would topple Guarino.    
The similarities in the content and structure of the verbal strategies of 
Trebizond, Guarino, and Poggio ultimately suggest the importance of carefully 
considering how we read humanist polemics and talk about their authors. In the end, what 
are we to make of those humanists who composed invectives and quarreled with others? 
Trebizond engaged in a number of feuds during his career and developed a reputation as 
bitter, morose, and angry that remains with him to this day. Might we consider 
Trebizond’s reputation well-earned given his proclamation that he would topple Guarino 
with the force of his eloquence, as though he were mounted on a charger and Guarino 
were seated on a donkey? Might we condemn Trebizond for calling Guarino a “donkey-
driver” or likening Poggio to a beast? Perhaps. The present study has indicated, though, 
that Trebizond’s interactions with Guarino and Poggio were largely consistent with the 
customs of fifteenth-century letter-writing, invective, and self-presentation. Maybe, then, 
Trebizond simply went too far in his attacks. Certain humanists were surely milder than 
others, as a comparison of the Guarino-Niccoli and Poggio-Valla invectives indicates. 
Even on a comparative basis, though, Poggio’s use of beast-like imagery against Valla 
was far more evocative and aggressive than Trebizond’s attacks of Guarino or Poggio. 
Poggio frequently characterized Valla as an insana belua, called him a beast forever 
grazing on the fields of stupidity, and devoted a significant portion of his first Oratio to 
detailing Valla’s mad triumph.
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I have argued that a more fruitful way of reading humanist invective and 
understanding scholarly quarrels is to view them against a backdrop of humanist anxiety 
and professional competition. Accusations of loquaciousness, a lack of learning, or of 
immoral conduct, such as those that Guarino and Poggio leveled against Trebizond, 
carried a great deal of weight among erudite scholars and their patrons. They were all 
serious charges that could do real damage to an individual’s reputation. Such charges 
provoked responses from humanists eager to defend their honor. Moreover, scholars 
articulated their responses in as forceful a language as the charges themselves were 
delivered. To read humanist invective as a function of the nature or character of 
individual humanists limits our insights into the contextual factors that compelled authors 
to compose invective and that guided the tools they used to do so. It distracts from the 
fact that humanists were drawing on a wealth of classical models to appeal to a public 
audience and influence popular perception. It oversimplifies the meaning in invective 
texts and ultimately flattens our understanding of humanism and humanists in the early 
Quattrocento. 
Copyright  Karl R. Alexander 2013 
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